19/69 Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic

GE.12-10613

Human Rights Council Nineteenth session

Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention

Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic **

Summary

The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic has deteriorated significantly since November 2011, causing further suffering to the Syrian people. Widespread violence and increasingly aggravated socio-economic conditions have left many communities in a perilous state. Meeting basic needs to sustain everyday life has become increasingly difficult.

The present situation risks further radicalizing the population, deepening inter- communal tensions and eroding the fabric of society. Divisions among the international community complicate the prospects for ending the violence.

The Government has manifestly failed in its responsibility to protect its people. Since November 2011, its forces have committed more widespread, systematic and gross human rights violations. Anti-Government groups have also committed abuses, although not comparable in scale and organization to those carried out by the State.

The commission calls for an end to gross violations and related impunity, and recommends that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic continue to monitor gross human rights violations with a view to ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable. In cooperation with the Special Rapporteur, OHCHR should maintain and update the confidential database established by the commission.

 The annexes to the present report are reproduced as received, in the languages of

submission only. ** Late submission.

The commission also recommends the initiation of an inclusive political dialogue, bringing together the Government, the opposition and other anti-Government actors to negotiate an end to the violence, to ensure respect for human rights and to address the legitimate demands of the Syrian people. A contact group composed of States with diverse positions on the situation should be established to initiate a process leading to such a dialogue.

Reconciliation and accountability will be achieved only if there are credible consultations with the population, including women and minorities, as well as with victims. Profound political, justice and security sector reforms must also be undertaken.

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Contents Paragraphs Page

I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1–13 5

A. Cooperation with the Government. ................................................................. 4–6 5

B. Methodology ................................................................................................... 7–13 5

II. Context ................................................................................................................ 14–37 7

A. Domestic political developments .................................................................... 14–16 7

B. Increasing violence and polarization ............................................................. 17–27 7

C. International context ....................................................................................... 28–33 9

D. Socio-economic impact................................................................................... 34–37 10

III. Human rights situation ............................................................................................ 38–82 10

A. Attacks targeting residential areas and civilians ............................................. 39–46 10

B. Attacks on the political opposition, human rights defenders and the media ... 47–57 11

C. Arbitrary arrests, torture, abductions and enforced disappearances ................ 58–70 13

D. Deprivation of economic and social rights ..................................................... 71–77 14

E. Violations of children‟s rights ........................................................................ 78–82 15

IV. Responsibility for crimes against humanity, gross violations and abuses ............... 83–120 16

A. State authorities .............................................................................................. 89–104 17

B. Anti-Government armed groups, including Free Syrian Army groups ........... 105–120 19

V. Conclusions and recommendations ......................................................................... 121–139 21

A. Ending violence .............................................................................................. 131–135 22

B. Reconciliation, accountability and reparation ................................................. 136–139 24

Annexes

I. Note verbale dated 13 December 2011 addressed to the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic .............................................................................................................. 25

II. Note verbale dated 21 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the commission .............................................................. 26

III. Note verbale dated 27 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Human Rights Council .................. 33

IV. Note verbale dated 28 December 2011 addressed to the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic ............................................................................................................ 40

V. Letter dated 18 January 2012 from the commission addressed to the President of the Syrian Arab Republic ............................................................................................................. 43

VI. Letter dated 23 January 2012 from the commission addressed to the Minister for Justice of the Syrian Arab Republic ............................................................................................................. 46

VII. Letter dated 23 January 2012 from the commission addressed to the Minister for the Interior of the Syrian Arab Republic ............................................................................................................ 49

VIII. Letter dated 23 January 2012 from the commission addressed to the Minister for Defence of the Syrian Arab Republic ............................................................................................................. 52

IX. Letter dated 23 January 2012 from the commission addressed to the President of the People‟s Assembly of the Syrian Arab Republic .................................................................. 55

X. Letter dated 23 January 2012 from the commission addressed to the Chairman of the National Independent Legal Commission ............................................................................. 58

XI. Note verbale dated 23 January 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the commission ............................................................. 61

XII. Note verbale dated 2 February 2012 from the commission addressed to the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic ........................................................ 68

XIII. Detention locations for which the commission documented cases of torture and ill-treatment (since March 2011) .......................................................................................................................... 70

XIV. Map of the Syrian Arab Republic ..................................................................................................... 72

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I. Introduction

1. The independent international commission of inquiry, established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-17/1 to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic,1 continued to investigate alleged violations of international human rights law and sought to establish the facts and circumstances that may amount to such violations.

2. In the present report, which builds on and should be read in conjunction with the initial report (A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1), the commission gives an update for the period since November 2011 (sect. III). It provides an account of the ongoing suffering of the Syrian population, the widespread, systematic and gross human rights violations that State forces continue to commit, and the human rights abuses committed by anti-Government armed groups.

3. Consistent with its mandate, the commission also endeavoured, where possible, to identify those responsible for violations and crimes perpetrated since March 2011, with a view to ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable.2 Its findings on responsibility (sect. IV) cover the period from March 2011 until mid-February 2012.

A. Cooperation with the Government

4. The commission regrets that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic did not give the commission access to the country, nor did it respond positively to its requests to interview authorized Government spokespersons.

5. The commission met with the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic on 7 and 15 February 2012.

6. The present report reflects relevant information provided by the Government in response to the commission‟s repeated and detailed requests (annexes I to XII). On 15 February 2012, the day the present report was finalized, the Permanent Representative presented the commission with documents containing detailed information on armed group attacks. The report reflects the overall content of the documents received, which comprised several hundred pages in Arabic. In addition, the commission drew on public statements of senior officials. The commission also followed the reporting of the official Syrian Arab news agency SANA.

B. Methodology

7. The commission endeavoured to reflect violations and abuses on all sides. The lack of access to the country, however, posed particular challenges for the documentation of abuses committed by anti-Government armed groups and opposition actors, given that most victims and witnesses of such abuses have remained in the country and the Government had not facilitated interviews with victims of armed group violence during the period under review. The opportunity to engage with communities and officials on the ground would

1 On 12 September 2011, the President of the Human Rights Council appointed three high-level experts

as members of the commission: Paulo Pinheiro (Chairperson), Yakin Ertürk and Karen Koning AbuZayd.

2 Human Rights Council resolution S-17/1, para. 13.

also have allowed the commission to better appreciate the circumstances of human rights concerns and related human suffering.

8. After its first report, the commission interviewed additional victims and witnesses of violations, defectors and other individuals with relevant inside knowledge. From 9 to 25 January 2012, the commission travelled to several countries to gather first-hand testimony from people who had recently fled the Syrian Arab Republic.3 Additional interviews, including with victims and witnesses still in the country, journalists who recently visited the Syrian Arab Republic and individuals known to support the Government were conducted by telephone. After its initial report, the commission interviewed a further 136 victims and witnesses, bringing the total numbers of interviews conducted by the commission to 369.

9. The commission also examined photographs, video recordings and available Government documents. Satellite imagery of areas where military and security forces were deployed and related reported violations occurred, corroborated a number of witness accounts. The commission took into account the report of the observer mission of the League of Arab States of 22 January 2012 and also interviewed former observers of that mission.

10. With regard to the documentation of violations, the commission applied the standard of proof used in its first report.4 Particular incidents are described in the report if there are reasonable grounds to believe that they occurred, namely if the commission obtained a reliable body of evidence, consistent with other information, indicating their occurrence.

The incidents discussed in the report were the subject of two or more consistent and reliable witness accounts, which were often supported by additional corroborating evidence. In exceptional cases, where credible sources reported relevant incidents but the commission was unable to corroborate them through eyewitness interviews, incidents were included and the source identified. The patterns described in the report are based on multiple documented incidents that are further corroborated by verified circumstances.

11. To obtain a general background on the situation and the diplomatic efforts to address it, the commission met with the permanent representatives of Member and observer States of the Human Rights Council from all regional groups. It also spoke with representatives of international and regional organizations, including the League of Arab States.

12. The report reflects information received as at 15 February 2012.

13. The commission did not apply international humanitarian law for the purposes of the report and the period covered.5 International humanitarian law is applicable if the situation can be qualified as an armed conflict, which depends on the intensity of the violence and the level of organization of participating parties. While the commission is gravely concerned that the violence in certain areas may have reached the requisite level of intensity, it was unable to verify that the Free Syrian Army (FSA), local groups identifying themselves as such or other anti-Government armed groups had reached the necessary level of organization.6 By the same token, the commission uses the term “FSA group” to refer to any local armed group whose members identify themselves as belonging to the FSA, without this necessarily implying that the group has been recognized by the FSA leadership or obeys the command of the FSA leadership abroad.

3 Places where interviews were conducted have been withheld to protect witnesses and victims. 4 A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, paras. 5-6. 5 Ibid., paras. 97-100. 6 Ibid., paras.106-108.

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II. Context

A. Domestic political developments

14. The Government maintains that the opposition is part of a foreign conspiracy and that Government military and security operations target terrorists. On 10 January 2012, the President affirmed that “restoration of security and fighting terrorism with an iron fist”

remained its foremost priority.7 At the same time, the Government has pressed forward with an agenda of holding elections and adopting new laws, including regarding political participation and the media. On 13 February, the President received the draft of a new Constitution and announced that it would be subjected to a referendum on 26 February. One of the stated objectives of the text would be a political system “based on political pluralism” and sets out a presidential term limit.8 Local elections were held on 12 December 2011; according to the Government, a participation rate of 80 per cent was recorded. Parliamentary elections are announced to follow in May or June 2012. On 15 January, the President decreed the latest of four general amnesties (see also paragraph 66 below).

15. Protests against the Government continued in many parts of the country, although they tended to be more brief and localized to avoid the security forces. Demonstrations in support of the Government were also organized in different governorates.

16. The political opposition in the country has organized itself mainly through local coordination committees under the umbrella of the Syrian Revolutionary General Commission. The committees have taken a leading role in organizing protests and humanitarian relief. The opposition “Syrian National Council”, comprising a diverse set of members ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood to secular formations and representatives of local coordination committees, sought to present itself as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, although other opposition groups exist inside and outside the country. The Syrian National Council has rejected any political dialogue with the Government under present conditions. Serious rifts apparently remain within the Council itself, and between the Council, whose leadership largely resides abroad, and other parts of the opposition.

B. Increasing violence and polarization

17. In recent months, the crisis has become increasingly violent and militarized. The State‟s campaign of violently suppressing dissent, which from the outset employed lethal

force against peaceful protests, was followed by defections and the formation of anti- Government armed groups. The rise of an armed opposition led the Government to intensify its violent repression.

18. Many among the anti-Government armed groups identify themselves as FSA and consist of defectors (mainly from the army) and an increasing number of armed civilians. The FSA leadership resides abroad and its control over the different FSA groups inside the country remains unclear. In mid-January, the FSA leadership and the Syrian National Council agreed to improve their coordination.

19. Most FSA groups initially adopted a defensive posture. More recently, a number of FSA groups carried out offensive operations targeting checkpoints, installations of State

7 http://sana.sy/eng/21/2012/01/10/393338.htm. 8 http://sana.sy/eng/36/2012/02/16/400646.htm.

forces, police stations and Government vehicles. For example, the FSA claimed responsibility for an attack in Dar‟a governorate on 15 December 2011, during which at least 27 soldiers were killed. In its report, the League of Arab States indicated that, in Homs and Dar‟a, armed groups committed acts of violence against Government forces, resulting in death and injury.

20. The activity of FSA groups resulted in the temporary withdrawal of State forces from cities or areas in the Rif Dimashq, Idlib and Homs governorates. Since December 2011, the army has attacked these areas with heavy weapons, leading to massive casualties and the destruction of homes and infrastructure (see paragraphs 38-46 below).

21. The Government stated that other armed non-State actors not affiliated to the FSA are operating in the country, including Al-Qaida and other religious extremists. In its report, the League of Arab States also makes a distinction between the FSA and “other opposition armed groups”. Numerous sources report the presence of extremist groups in the country. The commission was unable to verify information on the membership, background and operations of such groups.

22. On 23 December 2011, 50 people were reportedly killed in two bombings next to the offices of security agencies in Damascus, which the Government attributed to Al-Qaida. No one, including Al-Qaida, claimed responsibility. In its report, the League of Arab States mentioned that its observers in Homs, Hama and Idlib reported the bombing of a civilian bus (with eight casualties), a police bus (two casualties), a train loaded with diesel fuel, an oil pipeline and small bridges. In other cases, League observers found that alleged bombings were falsely reported. On 10 February 2012, 28 people were reportedly killed and 235 injured in two large explosions at Military Intelligence and police buildings in Aleppo. The Government and other sources attributed these explosions to terrorists. On 14 February, a major pipeline near Homs exploded. The Government blamed “terrorist saboteurs”, while opposition activists attributed the act to State forces shelling in the area.

23. According to all accounts, casualties rose steeply as the violence intensified; thousands of lives have been lost.

24. On 27 December 2011, the Government informed the commission that, according to hospital and police reports, at least 2,131 civilians had been killed in the period from 15 March to 19 December 2011. The Government added that a total of 913 soldiers and 215 police officers (1,128 people in total) were killed during the same period.9 According to the Government, from 23 December 2011 to 10 February 2012, a further 651 members of the army and security forces were killed and 2,292 injured.10 In addition, 519 unidentified bodies were found. On 15 February 2012, the Government provided additional figures, according to which 2,493 civilians and 1,345 soldiers and police officers had been killed in the Syrian Arab Republic in the period from 15 March 2011 to 18 January 2012.

25. The Violations Documenting Centre, affiliated to the local coordination committees, counted 6,399 civilians and 1,680 army defectors killed in the period from 15 March 2011 to 15 February 2012.11 The victims included 244 adult women, 115 girls and 425 boys.

9 See annex IV. In another note verbale (annex III), the Government stated that, as at 21 December

2011, a total of 2,000 police officers and soldiers had been killed. There was no indication of the methodology used to determine the secondt set of figures.

10 The Government provided a long list indicating the names, rank and personal details of military and security forces personnel killed, together with the date and place of death or injury.

11 The Centre (www.vdc-sy.org) relies on medical records, direct contacts with victims‟ families and information received from the Imam of the Mosque performing the burial.

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December 2011 (1,046 victims), January (1,196) and the first half of February 2012 (983) have been clearly the most violent period since the unrest erupted in March 2011.

26. The Government, on the one hand, and the opposition Syrian National Council, Syrian Revolutionary General Commission and local coordination committees, on the other, have consistently proclaimed their commitment to non-sectarianism while accusing the other side of instigating hatred. Attempts to mobilize political support have given rise to tensions and crimes with sectarian undertones, especially in Homs. On several occasions in January and February 2012, entire families – children and adults – were brutally murdered in Homs. On both sides, there is a pattern of abducting people not directly involved in the clashes for the purposes of revenge, ransom or as hostages.

27. Minorities‟ fears have been used to garner their support. Most Christians, for example, feel particularly vulnerable in the light of developments in some of the other countries in the region. Sectarian allegiances have also been invoked in calls to oppose the Government. Many Syrian citizens, including intellectuals and religious leaders of different creeds, have stood up for tolerance and denounced such politicking.

C. International context

28. While the permanent members of the Security Council have continued to disagree on how to frame or address the crisis, regional organizations and individual States have continued to apply diplomatic pressure and introduced more sanctions. The European Union and the United States of America have hardened sanctions, in particular by imposing a boycott on the purchase of Syrian oil. Targeted sanctions have been imposed on a growing number of individuals and entities. Turkey banned transactions with the Government and its central bank, froze Government assets and imposed severe import duties on Syrian goods.

29. On 16 November, the League of Arab States called on the Government to cease violence and protect its citizens, release detainees, withdraw its forces from the cities, provide free access to Arab and international media and accept the deployment of an observer mission. The Government‟s initial refusal to sign a protocol agreeing to these terms led the League to adopt sanctions, halting among other things transactions with the Syrian Central Bank and imposing a travel ban on senior officials.

30. On 19 December, the Government signed the protocol, and on 24 December, the observer mission of the League of Arab States was deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic. After the mission filed its report, the League issued a resolution on 23 January 2012 calling for a transfer of authority from the President to his first vice-president and the formation of a national unity Government. The Government rejected this plan. Shortly afterwards, the League suspended the work of the mission, citing security concerns.

31. On 7 February, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation met with President Assad in Damascus to discuss proposals to address the crisis.

32. On 8 February, the Secretary-General of the United Nations evoked the prospect of resuming the observer mission as a joint operation of the League of Arab States and the United Nations. On 12 February, the League adopted a resolution calling on the Security Council to authorize a joint Arab-United Nations force to “supervise the execution of a ceasefire”, and urged its members to “halt all forms of diplomatic cooperation” with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

33. Most in the international community have not favoured direct military intervention to protect the Syrian people. Available information, however, points to existing or planned support for either the Government or the opposition. A number of experts have begun to

report on the presence in the country of individuals and interested parties, some perhaps supported by Governments whose intention is to assist one side or the other. Such information deserves attention in the context of the country‟s pivotal place in the regional and international context and concerns about the consequences of potential changes in its national and international role and relationships.

D. Socio-economic impact

34. The crisis has exacerbated pre-existing high levels of poverty and unemployment. The economy is estimated to have shrunk by 2 to 4 per cent in 2011, with a markedly higher drop expected for 2012. Tourism, which accounted for 6 to 9 per cent of gross domestic product, has collapsed. The Government has attributed economic concerns to the sanctions and armed groups sabotaging fuel supplies and civilian infrastructure, while maintaining that such concerns can be addressed through economic self-reliance initiatives.

35. Syrians, particularly day labourers and others in precarious employment situations, are feeling the impact of the downturn. In December 2011, the Minister for Labour and Social Affairs announced that the unemployment rate was in the range of 22 to 30 per cent.12

36. The boycott on Syrian oil exports, sanctions against the banking sector and reported capital flight have devalued the Syrian currency, spurring inflation. The Ministry of the Economy estimated that, by the end of 2011, prices for basic food items had increased by up to 37 per cent, 13 hurting the poor in particular. The Government sought to offset price increases by raising public sector salaries and extending or increasing subsidies on fuel and other essential goods.

37. People have suffered through an unusually harsh winter, while fuel for cooking and heating has become more expensive and scarce, especially in areas of unrest. Power cuts are frequent in many parts of the country.

III. Human rights situation

38. Since November 2011, the escalation of violence, owing to the intensification of armed operations, has led to an even more dire human rights situation and increased human suffering.

A. Attacks targeting residential areas and civilians

39. Starting in early November 2011, the level of violence between State forces and anti-Government armed groups increased in areas of Homs, Hama, Rif Dimashq and Idlib governorates with a strong presence of such groups. State forces withdrew from and then surrounded many of these areas. Army snipers and Shabbiha14 gunmen posted at strategic points terrorized the population, targeting and killing small children, women and other unarmed civilians. Fragmentation mortar bombs were also fired into densely populated neighbourhoods.

12 Sarah Abu Assali “Labour in vain”, Syria Today. Available from http://syria-

today.com/index.php/focus/17955-labour-invain. 13 “The cost of Syria‟s crackdown”, Al Jazeera, 15 January 2012. Available from

www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidesyria/2012/01/2012115721352136.html. 14 A/HRC/C/S-17/2/Add.1, para. 20.

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40. After the withdrawal of League of Arab States observers in late January, the army intensified its bombardment with heavy weapons. It gave no warning to the population and unarmed civilians were given no chance to evacuate. As a result, large numbers of people, including many children, were killed. Several areas were bombarded and then stormed by State forces, which arrested, tortured and summarily executed suspected defectors and opposition activists.

41. According to the Violations Documenting Centre, at least 787 civilians, including 53 adult women, 26 girls and 49 boys, were killed in the first two weeks of February 2012 alone. The largest number of victims died in Homs.

42. In Idlib governorate, the army shelled the villages of Ihsim, Ibleen, Ibdita, Kasanfra and Kafar Awid in mid-December. When State forces took control of the villages, security agents pillaged houses and loaded their loot into trucks brought along to transport detainees. On 20 December, local residents discovered the bodies of 74 defectors in a deserted area between Kafar Awid and Kasanfra. Their hands had been tied behind their back and they appeared to have been summarily executed. On 21 December, State forces attacked a group of activists from Kafar Awid who had sought refuge in the village mosque. After the forces withdrew, 60 bodies were discovered in the mosque. The victims appeared to have been tortured before their execution.

43. From 24 to 26 December 2011, the army launched a large-scale operation in Bab Amr, Homs, where an FSA group was present. Residential buildings in Bab Amr were shelled by tanks and anti-aircraft guns. League of Arab States observers, who visited on 27 December, confirmed that the area had been shelled. State snipers also shot at and killed unarmed men, women and children. On 19 January, State forces shelled Homs again, including Bab Houd and Bayada, killing civilians.

44. On 12 January 2012, the army started shelling Zabadani, Rif Dimashq, causing civilian casualties. Armed clashes with an FSA group lasted for six days and ended with the military redeploying to the outskirts of the city and imposing a blockade.

45. On 24 January, tanks and snipers surrounded and shelled Bab Qebli neighbourhood in Hama, where an FSA group had been present. FSA members had apparently withdrawn upon the approach of the army, but many opposition activists remained in the neighbourhood. The next day, soldiers raided the neighbourhood, arresting many and looting homes. On 26 and 27 January, State forces conducted a similar operation in the Al Hamidieh neighbourhood in Hama. After the operations in Bab Qebli and Al Hamidieh, the handcuffed bodies of persons who had apparently been executed were dumped in Hama.

46. On 3 February 2012, in an escalation of violence, State forces in Homs began shelling densely populated areas in Khaldieh with heavy weapons. The presence of snipers prevented civilians from fleeing. On 6 February, the same type of operation was extended to Bab Amr, which the Government shelled and attacked with rockets.

B. Attacks on the political opposition, human rights defenders and the

media

47. The crackdown on peaceful protesters and raids on neighbourhoods suspected of supporting the opposition continued. The commission received additional accounts of military, security forces and Shabbiha using live ammunition against unarmed protesters. Defectors indicated that soldiers continued to receive “shoot to kill” orders. The Government also carried out reprisals in response to opposition calls for strikes. Participants in strikes on 11 December 2011 in Rif Dimashq and on 24 January 2012 in Hama were attacked by State forces.

48. During their deployment from 24 December 2011 to 20 January 2012, League of Arab States observers witnessed several peaceful opposition demonstrations, which were held without State interference. The observers considered that their presence may have dissuaded State forces from using violence to disperse demonstrators. The observers also noted that citizens in Homs and Dar‟a pleaded with them not to leave, which the observers attributed to a possible fear of reprisals.

49. In a televised interview broadcast on 7 December 2011, the President stated that the military and security forces had received “no command to kill or be brutal”, while acknowledging that some members of the State forces had gone “too far”.

50. The Government informed the commission that armed groups were killing or forcibly displacing individuals who resisted calls to participate in demonstrations or strikes. The commission documented cases of opposition activists threatening shopkeepers who refused to join strikes. The commission also found cases of anti-Government armed groups executing suspected Shabbiha (see also paragraphs 114 and 115 below).

51. On 28 August 2011, the Government issued a new media law (Decree No. 108/2011), which sets out a number of basic rights relating to freedom of expression and information for journalists and citizens.15 includes broad prohibitions, including a ban on publishing any news related to the armed forces not actually issued by the forces themselves. It leaves untouched the vaguely defined criminal offences described in articles 285 to 287 of the Penal Code that have long been used to punish and silence critical journalists, human rights defenders and political dissidents. In November, the Government established a national media council to implement the media law, and appointed a former deputy Minister for Information to head it. On 8 February 2012, the President issued a decree on organizing Internet communications and combating cybercrime, which sets out broad offences that restrict freedom of expression on the Internet.

52. In practice, freedom of expression and information has continued to be severely restricted. The Government systematically uses censorship and the arbitrary denial of media licenses to control the media. Journalists and bloggers who have expressed dissenting views have been harassed, dismissed from Government jobs, arbitrarily arrested and detained.

53. Activists and human rights defenders have continued to mobilize through the Internet and social media. “Citizen journalists” have filmed human rights violations by the military and security forces and posted them on the Internet. Others have conveyed their dissent through cultural expressions, such as satirical puppet plays broadcast over the Internet. In response, the Government has tried to block or slow down Internet access in restive cities at different times, destroyed computer equipment during raids and hacked into private e-mail and social media accounts.

54. Pro- and anti-Government hackers have fought for control of cyberspace and, in some cases, spread disinformation. According to testimony received, these include the “virtual Syrian army”, an online network that disseminates news supporting the

Government and tries to sabotage opposition sites. A member of this group told the commission that the group neither worked for the Government nor engaged in illegal activities, but sought only to provide a balanced picture of the unrest.

55. Syrian journalists covering the crisis and related violations remained at risk. The Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters without Borders reported on three killings of Syrian journalists, two of which were attributed to State forces. On 19 November 2011,

15 “President al-Assad issues legislative decree on media law”, SANA, 29 August 2011. Available from

www.sana.sy/eng/361/2011/08/29/366490.htm.

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cameraman Ferzat Jarban was arrested by security agents while filming an anti-Government protest in Alqaseer (Homs governorate); he was found dead the next day, his eyes gouged out. On 29 December, citizen journalist Basil Al-Sayed was shot dead by State security forces while he was filming the violent crackdown on a demonstration in Homs. On 30 December, Shukri Ahmed Ratib Abu Burghul, a radio show host and censor for a Government newspaper, was shot dead by unknown gunmen in Damascus.

56. In late December 2011, in accordance with the League of Arab States protocol, the Government recommenced issuing short-term visas to selected foreign journalists. Their movements within the country were often restricted and their contacts monitored by Government officials accompanying them.

57. On 11 January 2012, a shell exploded near a group of journalists covering demonstrations in Homs. French journalist Gilles Jacquier and several Syrians were killed. The Government and the FSA exchanged accusations over responsibility for the incident. The Government stated that it had launched an inquiry.

C. Arbitrary arrests, torture, abductions and enforced disappearances

58. The Government has continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain suspected protesters, opposition activists, human rights defenders and deserters. Arbitrary arrests typically were not formally acknowledged and suspects were often held incommunicado without their families being notified about their arrest or whereabouts.

59. Arbitrary arrests across the country followed similar patterns. During protests, military and security forces would often encircle the protesters. Those arrested, including the wounded among them, would be transported in Government buses and trucks to detention centres operated by security agencies, sometimes after being temporarily held in facilities such as sports stadiums or schools. In addition, soldiers and security agents often carried out arrests at checkpoints on the basis of lists of wanted persons prepared by the local security branch.

60. More large-scale raids were conducted, especially in areas where defectors are presumed to be hiding or in areas perceived as being sympathetic to the protesters. The regular army normally cordoned off the area before security forces or elite army units, sometimes accompanied by Shabbiha, carried out house-to-house searches. In such raids, women were targeted for arbitrary arrest and detention, in many cases also to force male relatives to turn themselves in. Many women also emphasized the traumatic invasion of their privacy when security forces raided their houses, typically at night, and vandalized or looted their personal possessions.

61. The commission received additional testimonies from persons who, long after their family members were arrested, had received no information from the authorities or through informal channels about where their family members were and whether they were still alive. The commission remains concerned about such cases of enforced disappearance.16

62. Torture in places of detention continued. Victims and witnesses provided credible and consistent accounts of places and methods of torture. A list of 38 detention locations in 12 cities, where the commission documented cases of torture since March 2011, is annexed to the present report (annex XIII).

63. Security agencies continued to systematically arrest wounded patients in State hospitals and to interrogate them, often using torture, about their supposed participation in

16 A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, para. 59.

opposition demonstrations or armed activities. The commission documented evidence that sections of Homs Military Hospital and Al Ladhiqiyah State Hospital had been transformed into torture centres. Security agents, in some cases joined by medical staff, chained seriously injured patients to their beds, electrocuted them, beat wounded parts of their body or denied them medical attention and water. Medical personnel who did not collaborate faced reprisals.

64. The above campaign has created a climate of fear. Doctors operated clandestinely on patients facing arrest and hospitals did not keep operated patients for post-surgical care. Some women chose to give birth in unsafe conditions rather than go to a State hospital. In many places of unrest, civilians set up clandestine field hospitals with volunteer practitioners, rudimentary equipment and medical supplies smuggled from abroad, donated by concerned citizens or diverted from State hospitals.

65. The commission received frequent accounts of security officials threatening men with the rape of female relatives.

66. On 19 January 2012, the Government informed the League of Arab States observers that it had released 3,569 detainees under the amnesty declared on 15 January. The observers were able to verify the release of 1,669 detainees under the said amnesty.

67. Given the large number of arbitrary arrests and the fact that most arrests and releases have occurred outside formal procedures, it is difficult to determine with any degree of certainty how many people remain in detention. The commission has requested the Government to provide pertinent figures.

68. According to the Violations Documenting Centre, which gathers the names of detainees and the place and date of their arrest from families and local coordination committees, more than 18,000 detainees, including more than 200 women and girls and more than 400 boys, remained in detention at 15 February 2012.

69. Armed groups, including FSA groups, carried out abductions. In some instances, victims were killed or tortured.

70. The Government informed the commission that, between 15 March and 19 December 2011, 666 civilians, 70 soldiers and 164 police officers were abducted. According to the Government, between 23 December 2011 and 10 February 2012 a further 506 military and security personnel were abducted.

D. Deprivation of economic and social rights

71. While the population at large suffers as a result of the economic impact of the crisis and related sanctions (see paragraphs 34-36 above), communities in restive areas face particularly serious humanitarian concerns. There, formal economic activity and public services are collapsing and such essential supplies as fuel for cooking and heating, medical supplies and, in areas under blockade, increasingly also food, have become scarce. With men in hiding, arrested or killed, many women find themselves having to cope with a range of additional responsibilities in providing and caring for their families.

72. According to estimates, 70,000 people have been arbitrarily displaced within the country. More than 20,000 Syrians found themselves in a precarious situation as refugees in other countries.

73. The military and security forces continued to impose blockades on areas with a significant presence of anti-Government armed groups, including in Homs, Hama, Idlib and Rif Dimashq. Medicine, food and other essential supplies were not allowed to pass. State forces arbitrarily arrested and assaulted individuals who tried to bring in such supplies. The

15

Government also withheld fuel rations and the electricity supply to punish communities and families whose members had participated in anti-Government demonstrations.

74. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent has provided humanitarian relief to part of the affected population in an increasingly difficult environment. According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Secretary-General of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Dr. Abd-al-Razzaq Jbeiro, was shot and killed on 25 January 2012 on the main Aleppo–Damascus highway while traveling in a vehicle clearly marked with the Red Crescent emblem.

75. Local coordination committees and individual Syrians have established community support mechanisms. International humanitarian actors have not been given the direct humanitarian access necessary to assess and address comprehensively the basic humanitarian needs that have arisen since March 2011.

76. The Government provided information on attacks by armed groups on medical facilities. Between 15 March 2011 and 9 February 2012, the Government counted 17 attacks on hospitals and 48 on medical centres. A total of 15 medical staff members were killed, 27 were injured and 119 medical vehicles damaged.

77. The commission documented several cases in which injured patients at State hospitals were forced to falsely state on camera that their injuries had resulted from attacks by armed groups.

E. Violations of children’s rights

78. As the violence intensified, children continued to be the victims. The State authorities made no visible efforts to protect children‟s rights. According to a reliable source, more than 500 children have been killed since March 2011, with the highest number of children killed in December 2011 (80 deaths) and January 2012 (72). The largest group were adolescents aged between 16 and 18 years. Snipers and other State forces killed or wounded children, including those aged 10 years and younger. Many children were killed when the army shelled residential areas in Homs and other cities in January and February

2012.

79. Children continued to be arbitrarily arrested and tortured while in detention. According to former detainees interviewed by the commission, children were treated in the same way as adults, in blatant disregard of their age. They were kept in the same cells and subject to the same methods of torture as adults.

80. Injured children did not benefit from adequate medical treatment, given that hospitals and health clinics were not safely accessible and because adults accompanying them risked arrest. Many children are traumatized and need psychosocial support as a result of witnessing atrocities.

81. Children‟s education was disrupted by the violence, movement restrictions imposed by the Government and opposition strikes and boycotts of schools. The commission also received information on how the Government used teenage children to participate in staged pro-Government demonstrations, leading many parents to keep them out of school when demonstrations were scheduled.

82. On 10 January 2012, the President announced that school enrolment had dropped by half. He added that 30 teachers and university professors had been killed by anti- Government armed groups, and that more than 1,000 schools had been vandalized, burned or destroyed. The commission requested to be provided with details. On 15 February, the Government provided the commission with information on physical damage and looting concerning 866 schools in the governorates of Idlib (240 incidents), Dar‟a (151), Damascus

(131), Homs (127), Rif Dimashq (63), Alhasak (47), Deir el-Zour (45), Tartus (19), Halab (18), Al Ladhiqiyah (12), Hama (10 and Ar Raqqah (30). The Government also highlighted that nine school directors had stones thrown at them and two had been shot and injured.

IV. Responsibility for crimes against humanity, gross violations and abuses

83. The commission documented a widespread and systematic pattern of gross violations committed by State forces – in conditions of impunity – since March 2011. It also found instances of gross abuses committed by anti-Government armed groups. Consistent with its mandate, the commission endeavoured, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view to ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable.

84. On 31 March 2011, the Government established the National Independent Legal Commission, composed of four judges, to carry out comprehensive investigations into crimes committed in the context of the crisis. The commission enquired the Government and the Commission itself about its powers, functions and preliminary results. On 23 January 2012, the Government informed the commission that the National Independent Legal Commission and its branches in the different governorates were investigating more than 4,070 cases and that it would inform the commission about the outcome of these investigations upon their conclusion.

85. In a speech on10 January 2012, President Assad claimed that a limited number of people working for the State had been arrested for murder and other crimes. The Government did not respond to the commission‟s request to provide more details on the number of arrests or the outcome of the criminal investigations pertaining to them. The Government also provided none of the requested information on any cases in which immunity from prosecution that members of the military and security forces enjoy under Decrees Nos. 14/1969 and 69/2008 had been lifted.

86. The commission was unable to identify any case of a successful prosecution of any military or security force commanders or civilian superiors bearing responsibility for any of the crimes against humanity or other gross human rights violations in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.

87. Following a further review of its evidence, including information collected since November 2011, the commission is satisfied that a reliable body of evidence exists that, consistent with other verified circumstances, provides reasonable grounds to believe that particular individuals, including commanding officers and officials at the highest levels of Government, bear responsibility for crimes against humanity and other gross human rights violations. The commission has deposited with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights a sealed envelope containing the names of these people, which might assist future credible investigations by competent authorities. The commission also identified particular army units, security agencies and their branch offices for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they carried out gross human rights violations. FSA groups, for which the commission documented human rights abuses, are also listed.

88. Furthermore, the commission has deposited with the High Commissioner a comprehensive database containing all evidence collected, which may be disclosed to competent authorities carrying out credible investigations, subject to witness protection and confidentiality concerns.

17

A. State authorities

1. State policies and directives

89. The evidence collected since its first report affirms the commission‟s conviction that gross human rights violations were conducted pursuant to a policy of the State, and that orders to commit such violations originated from policies and directives issued at the highest levels of the armed forces and the Government.17 This follows from the nature of the operations involving gross violations and information the commission obtained regarding the planning and implementation process.

90. The commission interviewed individuals with inside knowledge of the planning process. It received reliable accounts that the National Security Bureau18 of the Baath Party National Command was used to translate policy directives from a higher level into joint strategic plans underlying operations. These plans directed State forces and agencies with regard to their expected contributions to operations. On the basis of the Bureau‟s plans and directives, security agency directors passed orders on to their branch offices in the governorates. Orders to the army passed through the military chain of command.

91. At the local level, military and security forces, civilian authorities and Baath Party officials coordinated operations through local security committees, which were usually dominated by the local representatives of security agencies and commanders of army units deployed in the area. On several occasions, senior security officials were deployed from the capital to coordinate operations involving crimes against humanity and other gross violations.

92. Most crimes against humanity and gross human rights violations were carried out in complex operations that involved the entire security apparatus, and therefore would have required superior directives. The four major intelligence and security agencies with direct reporting lines to the Presidency – Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the General Intelligence Directorate and the Political Security Directorate – were at the heart of almost all operations. Most divisions of the Syrian Arab Army, and on some occasions also Syrian Arab Navy units and Air Force defence troops, participated in operations that were conducted in their areas of deployment. However, as the crisis has evolved, the elite army units closest to the leadership – the Special Forces, the Republican Guard and the Fourth Division – have played an increasingly prominent role, the latter two especially in Damascus and its suburbs.

93. State officials, aided by certain businessmen with links to the security apparatus, also paid, armed and informally organized the groups of de facto agents known as Shabbiha. In a number of operations, the commission documented how Shabbiha members were strategically employed to commit crimes against humanity and other gross violations. In other cases, their participation was difficult to verify, as many operations also involved plain-clothed security agents.

94. For many operations, reinforcements were sent from the capital, including on some occasions Special Forces transported by Air Force helicopters. In many cases, State officials carefully organized operations so that units were disassembled into their sub-units, which were then deployed to different places, where they would be regrouped with members of other units and members of the security forces prior to the start of operations. Testimony from defectors indicates that this strategy was employed to break bonds of trust

17 See A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, paras. 102 and 103. 18 Membership of the Bureau includes, but is not limited to, the heads of the four main intelligence and

security agencies, the Deputy National Secretary of the Baath Party and the Minister for the Interior.

within the unit and to prevent collective disobedience or desertion when orders to commit crimes were received.

95. The commission observed that large-scale operations conducted in different governorates – such as raids on neighbourhoods or attacks on larger demonstrations (see paragraphs 59 and 60 above) – often involved a similar modus operandi and related patterns of violations, which suggests that they were based on uniform directives from the State. Over the last three months of the period under review in particular, the army conducted a number of similar large-scale operations in at least four governorates, in which it surrounded entire neighbourhoods where anti-Government armed groups were present, then shelled these residential areas with heavy weapons, with complete disregard for potential civilian casualties.

96. The most intense of these operations, conducted in Hama and Homs, were carried out after the Minister for Foreign Affairs publicly stated, on 24 January 2012, that a “security solution was imposed by necessity which has become obvious with the existence

of the armed militias of the so-called „Free Army‟ and other armed groups not affiliated to it that commit crimes.”19 The declaration was followed by a statement by the Minister for the Interior, on 29 January, who stressed that “the Internal Security Forces‟ keenness on continuing efforts to purify the Syrian land from all outlaws to achieve justice and restore stability and security to Syria.”20

2. Individual responsibility for violations

97. In examining specific operations, the commission received credible and consistent evidence identifying high- and mid-ranking members of the armed forces who ordered their subordinates to shoot at unarmed protestors, kill soldiers who refused to obey such orders, arrest persons without cause, mistreat detained persons and attack civilian neighbourhoods with indiscriminate tank and machine-gun fire. In some cases, they gave explicit orders to commit crimes, in others they used more general terms (e.g. “use any force necessary”) that, in the circumstances, left no room for interpretation. The commission verified that, in some locations, individual army officers ordered the indiscriminate shelling of civilian neighbourhoods in urban areas such as Hama, Al Ladhiqiyah, Dar‟a and Homs.

98. Individual officers in the armed forces and Government security forces personally killed, unlawfully imprisoned, tortured, or committed other inhumane acts against innocent civilians. Officers shot unarmed protestors, including children, as well as medical doctors, ambulance drivers and mourners at funerals in cities such as Al Ladhiqiyah, Dar‟a,, Saida (Dar‟a governorate), Zabadani and Jobar (Rif Dimashq governorate) and Almastoumah (Idlib governorate).

99. Army officers and members of the security forces also aided and abetted attacks against civilians; for example, commanders of Government security forces routinely placed their units behind conscripts to ensure that the soldiers would fire at demonstrators. On several occasions, security forces shot conscripts who disobeyed orders to shoot protestors. Furthermore, military officers and commanders of security forces often stationed their units at checkpoints and other strategic locations in urban areas so that other units could attack neighbourhoods to loot homes and arrest residents. In addition, security force commanders

19 “Al-Moallem: the observers‟ report didn't please those plotting against Syria: the solution is Syrian

and based on the people's interests”, SANA, 24 January 2012. Available from www.sana.sy/eng/21/2012/01/24/396268.htm.

20 “Interior Ministry honors families of martyrs”, SANA, 29 January 2012. Available from www.sana.sy/eng/21/2012/01/29/397129.htm.

19

managed detention centres throughout the country where prisoners were subjected to torture, sexual assaults and other inhumane acts.

3. Command and superior responsibility

100. A number of military commanders and civilian superiors may reasonably be suspected of responsibility for crimes against humanity because of their knowing failure to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the commission of relevant crimes by their subordinates or to submit the matter to the competent authorities.

101. During the past year, soldiers and members of security forces who refused to obey manifestly unlawful orders to commit crimes against humanity frequently were subjected to severe punishment, including execution, a vivid illustration of the level of control that commanders hold over their subordinates. The broad and repetitive nature of these crimes and the availability of public reports on such crimes by international media broadcasting in Arabic, United Nations human rights mechanisms and the observer mission of the League of Arab States all indicate that military commanders and civilian superiors at the highest levels must have had knowledge of such events. On 7 December 2011, in a televised interview, the President himself referred to the findings made by the present commission in its first report.

102. Notwithstanding this knowledge about crimes, no serious effort was made to prevent and repress them. As discussed above, the commission is not aware of any successful prosecutions; indeed, the commission documented how some officers who directly participated in crimes against humanity were promoted or commended. The commission‟s evidence also demonstrates a consistent and continuing effort by the Government, the military and the security forces to conceal the facts about crimes. State officials often forced families of those killed by State forces to sign declarations attributing responsibility to armed groups before they would allow the body of the person killed to be released. Where such false declarations were signed, branch offices of the National Independent Legal Commission refused to carry out investigations. The commission of inquiry also found that pro-Government media were used to cover up violations or falsely attribute them to anti-Government armed groups.

103. Structural obstacles, including the immunity from prosecution enjoyed by members of the State forces, and the dependence of the judiciary on the presidency and the Baath Party have fostered impunity.21

104. Under the present legal framework and circumstances, it appears that the judiciary lacks the capacity to effectively address crimes against humanity committed on the basis of State policy.

B. Anti-Government armed groups, including Free Syrian Army groups

105. By all accounts, anti-Government armed groups, especially FSA groups, have become much more active since November 2011. The commission assumes to have described only part of the spectrum of anti-Government armed groups that have emerged and their activities.

21 A/HRC/S.17/2/Add.1, paras. 21 and 22.

1. Free Syrian Army policies and lack of central control

106. The commission carefully reviewed the information gathered on the operations and activities to date of FSA groups. In this regard, the commission notes that, at a minimum, human rights obligations constituting peremptory international law (ius cogens) bind States, individuals and non-State collective entities, including armed groups. Acts violating ius cogens – for instance, torture or enforced disappearances – can never be justified.

107. FSA leaders abroad also assured the commission that the FSA was committed to conducting its operations in accordance with human rights and international law. They requested guidance in shaping rules of engagement consistent with this undertaking. The FSA leadership indicated to the commission that commanders in the field currently made their own rules of engagement in accordance with the training received in the Syrian Armed Forces.

108. The commission was unable to ascertain the extent to which the FSA leadership abroad commanded and controlled the various FSA groups operating in the Syrian Arab Republic. It received conflicting accounts from inside the country. Some local groups seem to recognize the leadership, yet may not communicate with it regularly or receive specific orders from it. Others merely adopt the name “FSA” to underscore their revolutionary aspirations, their army background or the fact that they are not Shabbiha. The commission also received information about Syrian civilians reinforcing anti-Government armed groups, which increases problems of effective control even at the level of local FSA groups. The FSA leadership abroad indicated to the commission that groups on the ground did not receive orders from it. The leadership saw its role as facilitating coordination between different FSA groups and ensuring its media outreach.

109. As the commission was unable to verify the existence of a functioning chain of command or a superior/subordinate relationship between the highest leadership of the FSA and local units, it was unable to determine individual responsibility of FSA leaders abroad. Rather, the commission‟s findings pertain to violations perpetrated by FSA groups in different locations within the country.

2. Abuses by Free Syrian Army groups and other armed groups

110. The Government, in public statements and communications to the commission, repeatedly stated that anti-Government armed groups, in particular FSA groups, had committed gross abuses of human rights. In its note verbale addressed to the commission dated 23 January 2012 (annex XI), the Government referred to “acts of kidnapping, killing, mutilation, forced and involuntary disappearance and violations of the right to life committed by armed groups against Syrian citizens, including women, children and personnel of the army and security forces”. It also mentioned “the killing and forced displacement of anyone who did not comply with the orders of armed groups to participate in protests, strikes, civil disobedience or did not subscribe to their terrorist agenda.” SANA has alleged such incidents in its daily reporting.

111. The commission repeatedly invited the Government to provide information on specific cases. On 15 February 2012, the Government provided a list of specific incidents, providing the date, place and details on “armed actions by terrorist armed gangs” for the period from 23 December 2011 to 10 February 2012. The lists details attacks in all 14 governorates on military and security forces and civilian targets such as schools, universities, factories and warehouses. In the category of attacks on public and State property, 212 incidents are detailed; another 162 incidents concerned bombings or attempted bombings, and 85 incidents involved attacks on installations of the State forces and the police.

21

112. In its report, the League of Arab States referred to bombing of buildings, trains carrying fuel, vehicles carrying diesel oil and explosions targeting the police, members of the media and fuel pipelines. Without further disaggregating responsibility, the League concluded that some of the attacks had been carried out by the FSA, and others by other anti-Government armed groups.

113. The commission documented instances of gross human rights abuses committed by members of various FSA groups.

114. In Homs, FSA members were found to have tortured and executed suspected Shabbiha members in retaliation for abuses committed by Shabbiha or plain-clothed security officials posing as them. In late January 2012, in Karm Al-Zeitun, FSA members and others lynched a man suspected of working with the State security forces, and paraded his body on a pick-up truck through the streets.

115. In late December 2011, FSA members in Bab Amr captured two suspected Shabbiha members following an exchange of fire. The two men were beaten by the local population. In this instance, FSA members pulled the men away from the angry mob and took them for interrogation to an undisclosed location.

116. In November 2011, in Bab Amr, armed group members abducted a foreign media worker and mistreated him for several hours before releasing him.

117. There were also reports of FSA members in Homs taking security agents, their family members or foreign nationals of certain countries hostage to obtain the release of people detained by State forces. The FSA leadership acknowledged in a written exchange with the commission that FSA groups had indeed abducted foreign nationals, but described those captured as foreign fighters.

118. Some armed civilians in Homs, including armed civilians belonging to the FSA, sought to exact blood revenge for abuses by killing family members of security personnel or Shabbiha. The FSA leadership in Homs and also the local coordination committee denounced such collective reprisals and tried to contain them.

119. Credible reports indicated that members of FSA groups in other locations had tortured or summarily executed captured members of the armed forces or security forces. In mid-November 2011, members of the FSA near Talbiseh tortured a member of Military Intelligence during an interrogation. The captured man was beaten, whipped with a cable and threatened with a knife. In late November 2011, a FSA group from Rif Dimashq captured, tortured and killed a member of the security forces.

120. The commission highlights the fact that FSA members, including local commanders that have command responsibility, may incur criminal responsibility under international law.

V. Conclusions and recommendations

121. The grave and ongoing human rights crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic is the consequence of a combination of factors, including a State that has failed to respond

to the legitimate political, economic and social demands of its people and its position

in the highly complex geopolitics of the region.

122. The response of the security apparatus to what started as peaceful dissent soon led to armed clashes. One year later, the Syrian Arab Republic is on the brink of an

internal armed conflict. Diverging agendas within a deeply divided international

community complicate the prospects for ending the violence.

123. The socio-economic situation in the country has deteriorated, leaving the vast majority of the population in a state of disarray. Meeting basic needs to sustain

everyday life has become increasingly difficult for the population at large. In this

respect, the commission of inquiry does not support the imposition of economic

sanctions that would have negative impact on the human rights of the population, in

particular of vulnerable groups.

124. The continuation of the crisis carries the risk of radicalizing the population, deepening inter-communal tensions and eroding the fabric of society.

125. The commission remains convinced that the only possible solution to end the violence is an inclusive dialogue leading to a negotiated settlement that effectively

ensures the human rights of all people in the country.

126. The Government has manifestly failed in its responsibility to protect the population; its forces have committed widespread, systematic and gross human rights

violations, amounting to crimes against humanity, with the apparent knowledge and

consent of the highest levels of the State. Anti-Government armed groups have also

committed abuses, although not comparable in scale and organization with those

carried out by the State.

127. In accordance with international law, the responsibility to investigate, prosecute and punish international crimes and other gross violations rests first and

foremost with the State. The crimes against humanity and other gross violations

documented in the commission’s reports have been committed, however, within a

system of impunity. Profound structural reforms in the political, justice and security

sectors are necessary to break the culture of impunity and to deliver justice to the

victims.

128. Reconciliation and accountability should be based on broad, inclusive and credible consultations involving all Syrian people and situated within the framework

of international law. International justice mechanisms could be used to support and

complement national efforts.

129. In the meantime, thorough monitoring of the situation of human rights needs to be continued and evidence of international crimes and other gross violations

systematically collected to facilitate the process of holding those responsible for such

acts accountable.

130. The commission makes the recommendations below to immediately end the violence and to initiate a longer process to achieve reform, reconciliation and

accountability.

A. Ending violence

131. The commission calls for an urgent, inclusive political dialogue, bringing together the Government, opposition and anti-Government actors to negotiate an end

to the violence, to ensure respect for human rights and to address the legitimate

demands of the Syrian people. A contact group composed of States with diverse

positions on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic should be established to initiate

a process leading to such a political dialogue. An international peace conference

should be convened as soon as possible to facilitate this process.

23

132. The commission recommends that the Government implement the recommendations issued in its first report,22 and that it also:

(a) Ensure that all people in detention are informed promptly of the reasons

for their detention and any charges against them, and allowed prompt and regular

access to a lawyer of their choice and visits by their families, who should also be

notified about their status and location;

(b) Conduct fair trials for deserters and armed group members, and ensure

that no evidence obtained by torture is relied on;

(c) Take all feasible measures to locate and identify persons who died

during the unrest and determine the fate of disappeared persons;

(d) Deploy civilian police, instead of the army or security forces, to control

and protect protests by unarmed civilians, and provide them with training and non-

lethal equipment to control crowds in compliance with international standards;

(e) Publish a list of all places currently being used as detention facilities,

together with information on the agency or unit responsible for their supervision;

(f) Publish the rules of engagement guiding army and security force

operations against anti-Government armed groups.

133. The commission renews its recommendation that all armed groups ensure respect for and act in accordance with international human rights law. Armed groups,

in particular the FSA and its local groups, should:

(a) Adopt and publicly announce rules of conduct that are in accordance

with international human rights law and other applicable international standards,

including those reflected in the Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards;23

(b) Publicly pledge not to torture or execute captured soldiers, Shabbiha

members or civilians, not to target people who take no part in the clashes, and not to

take hostages, whether civilian or military;

(c) Instruct FSA members to abide by these commitments and hold

perpetrators of abuses within their ranks accountable;

(d) Take care to minimize the risk of civilians coming under Government

fire or facing reprisals as a result of the deployment of FSA members in specific

places;

(e) Provide relevant humanitarian and human rights institutions with all

available information on the fate of persons it has captured, and give such actors full

and unimpeded access to detainees.

134. The commission recommends that the United Nations include a strong human rights component in any international mission deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic,

with the mandate and capacity to monitor effectively any human rights violations,

including those involving violence against women, children and minorities.

135. The commission recommends that OHCHR and the future Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic continue to identify,

where possible, those responsible for international crimes with a view to ensure that

perpetrators are held accountable. OHCHR, in cooperation with the Special

22 A/HRC/17-2/Add.1, para. 112. 23 E/CN.4/1995/116.

Rapporteur, should maintain and update the confidential database established by the

commission.

B. Reconciliation, accountability and reparation

136. The commission recommends that the Syrian Arab Republic carry out profound political, justice and security sector reforms. These should include the

removal of legal and institutional obstacles to the independence of the judiciary; the

abolition of immunities from prosecution enjoyed by members of the military and

security forces; a credible vetting process to remove officers involved in gross human

rights violations from the military and security forces; a comprehensive reform of the

Penal Code; the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

and the adoption of domestic legislation consistent with it.

137. The Syrian people, on the basis of broad, inclusive and credible consultations, should determine, within the framework provided by international law, the process

and mechanisms to achieve reconciliation, truth and accountability for gross

violations occurring since March 2011, as well as reparations and effective remedies

for the victims. Women, minorities and victims groups should be adequately

represented.

138. The process should provide for reparation and effective remedies for victims and their families. The international community should contribute to make adequate

reparation possible.

139. The commission recommends that the Syrian Arab Republic seek technical assistance with regard to reform and consultation processes and related training for

policymakers, judges, prosecutors and security sector officials from the United

Nations, in particular OHCHR. To facilitate the process to achieve reconciliation and

accountability, the international community should consider implementing the

jurisdiction of suitable international justice mechanisms.

25

Annexes

Annex I

Note verbale dated 13 December 2011 addressed to the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic

Annex II

Note verbale dated 21 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the commission

27

29

31

33

Annex III

Note verbale dated 27 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Human Rights Council

35

37

(Unofficial translation)

Statistics of Acts of Killing, Kidnapping, Looting and Car Theft from

15/3/2011 - 19/12/2011

Source: letter from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic dated 27/12/2011

1. Killing incidents of civilians, military personnel and policemen according to hospital

reports and policing units

P ro

vi n

ce

T o

ta l

H a

ss a ka

h

D ei

r A

l Z

o u r

A l

R a q

a h

A le

p p o

Id li

b

A l

L a

d h

iq iy

a h

T a

rt u

s

H a

m a h

H o

m s

A l

Q u

n a

yt ir

a h

A l

S u w

a yd

a

D ra

a

R if

D im

a sh

q

D a

m a

sc u

s

Killings of civiliansa 2,131 2 42 – 10 234 124 22 280 829 – – 341 153 85

Killing of policemen 215 1 6 – – 29 1 – 55 83 – – 22 15 3

Killing of soldiers (based on information provided by the Office of National Security as of 18.12.2011) 913

Total 3,259

a The list is not exhaustive because the State could not physically reach all bodies, or because they were buried by family members or armed groups

2. Looting

P ro

vi n

ce

T o

ta l

H a

ss a ka

h

D ei

r A

l Z

o u r

A l

R a q

a h

A le

p p o

Id li

b

A l

L a

d h

iq iy

a h

T a

rt u

s

H a

m a h

H o

m s

A l

Q u

n a

yt ir

a h

A l

S u w

a yd

a

D ra

a

R if

D im

a sh

q

D a

m a

sc u

s

Civilians 468 10 23 4 30 111 8 2 78 99 – 18 19 61 5

Vehicles 1,195 – 1 3 44 661 – 6 308 107 – – – 55 10

Total 1,663

Kidnapping incidents: Civilians, military personnel and policemen and the result

Kidnapped

civilians Total

Killing after

kidnapping

Released

after

ransom

Released

without

ransom

Released

after looting Liberation

unknown

destiny

Damascus 8 _ _ 4 1 _ 3

Rif Dimashq 25 3 2 16 _ _ 4

Draa 3 1 _ 2 _ _ _

Al Suwayda _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Al Qunaytirah _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Homs 388 73 2 219 8 6 80

Hamah 129 10 10 59 _ 1 49

Tartus _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Al Ladhiqiyah 4 _ _ 4 _ _ _

Idlib 99 9 5 71 _ _ 14

Aleppo 7 _ 3 3 _ _ 1

Al Raqa _ _ _ _ _ _

Deir Al Zour _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Hassakah 3 2 _ _ 1

Total 666 96 22 380 9 7 152

Kidnapped military

personnel Total

Killing

after

kidnapping

Released

after

ransom

Released

without

ransom

Released

after

looting Liberation Escaped

unknown

destiny

Rif Dimashq _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Dar‟a

2 _

1 (1,400

bullets) 1

(weapon) _ _ _

Al Suwayda _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Al Qunaytirah _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Homs 17 3 _ 1 _ 3 _ 10

Hamah 24 1 _ 2 _ _ _ 21

Tartus _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Al Ladhiqiyah _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Idlib 22 1 1 3 _ _ _ 17

Aleppo 1 _ 1 _ _ _ _ _

Al Raqa _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Deir el-Zour 4 _ _ 3 _ _ _ 1

Hassakah _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Total 70 5 3 9 1 3 _ 49

39

Kidnapped

policemen Total

Killing

after

kidnapping

Released

after

ransom

Released

without

ransom

Released

after

looting Liberation Escaped

unknown

destiny

Rif Dimashq 2 _ 1 _ _ _ _ 1

Dar‟a 8 2 _ 2 2 (guns) 1 1 _

Al Suwayda _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Al Qunaytirah _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Homs 15 4 _ 7 _ _ _ 4

Hamah 72 4 _ 31 _ _ _ 37

Damascus 1 _ _ 1 _ _ _ _

Tartus _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Al Ladhiqiyah 1 _ _ 1 _ _ _ _

Idlib 31 6 _ 13 _ _ _ 12

Aleppo 30 _ _ 29 _ _ _ 1

Al Raqa _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Deir el-Zour 4 _ _ 1 _ _ 3 _

Hassakah _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Total 164 16 1 85 2 1 4 55

Total kidnappings

Total kidnapping incidents 900

Car theft

Police car 9

Government car 296

Civil car 583

Total 888

Annex IV

Note verbale dated 28 December 2011 addressed to the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic

41

43

Annex V

Letter dated 18 January 2012 from the commission addressed to the President of the Syrian Arab Republic

45

Annex VI

Letter dated 23 January 2012 from the commission addressed to the Minister for Justice of the Syrian Arab Republic

47

49

Annex VII

Letter dated 23 January 2012 from the commission addressed to the Minister for the Interior of the Syrian Arab Republic

51

Annex VIII

Letter dated 23 January 2012 from the commission to the Minister for Defence of the Syrian Arab Republic

53

55

Annex IX

Letter dated 23 January 2012 from the commission addressed to the President of the People’s Assembly of the Syrian Arab Republic

57

Annex X

Letter dated 23 January 2012 from the commission addressed to the Chairman of the National Independent Legal Commission

59

61

Annex XI

Note verbale dated 23 January 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the commission

63

65

67

Annex XII

Note verbale dated 2 February 2012 from the commission addressed to the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic

69

Annex XIII

Detention locations for which the commission documented cases of torture and ill-treatment (since March 2011)

City Type Detention center

Aleppo Security Forces Political Security Branch

Banias Security Forces Military Security Branch

Security Forces Political Security Branch

Damascus Military Prison Sednaya Military Prison

Police Criminal Security Branch

Prison Adra Central Prison

Security Forces Air Force Intelligence Branch in Bab Tuma

Security Forces Air Force Intelligence Branch in Harastah

Security Forces Palestine Branch

Security Forces State Security Branch in Kafar Sussa

Security Forces State Security Branch in Duma

Dar‟a Police Criminal Security Branch

Prison Gharez Central Prison

Security Forces Air Force Intelligence Branch

Security Forces Military Security Branch

Security Forces Political Security Branch

Security Forces State Security Branch

Hama Security Forces State Security Branch

Homs Prison Central Prison

Security Forces Air Force Intelligence Branch

Security Forces State Hospital

Idlib Prison Central Prison

Security Forces Detention facility

Security Forces Military Security Branch

Jisr Al Shughour Security Forces Military Security Branch

Security Forces Political Security Branch

Al Ladhiqiyah Security Forces Military Security Branch

71

City Type Detention center

Security Forces Political Security Branch

Security Forces State Hospital

Rif Dimashq Security Forces Air Force Intelligence Branch

Security Forces Military Security Branch

Security Forces Military Security Branch

Security Forces State Security Branch

Tadmur Military Prison Tadmur Military Prison

Tartus Security Forces Intelligence detention centre

Security Forces Military Security Branch

Security Forces Political Security Branch

Security Forces State security branch

Annex XIV

Map of the Syrian Arab Republic