28/26 Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran - Report of the Secretary-General
Document Type: Final Report
Date: 2015 Feb
Session: 28th Regular Session (2015 Mar)
Agenda Item: Item2: Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General
GE.15-03065 (E)
Human Rights Council Twenty-eighth session
Agenda item 2
Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General
Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran*
Report of the Secretary-General
Summary
The present report is submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution
69/190, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit an interim report
to the Human Rights Council at its twenty-eighth session. The report reflects the patterns
and trends in the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran and provides
information on the progress made in the implementation of resolution 69/190, including
recommendations to improve implementation. In its resolution, the Assembly called upon
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to address the substantive concerns
highlighted in the previous reports of the Secretary-General and to respect fully its human
rights obligations, in law and in practice, in relation to a number of specifically identified
concerns.
* Late submission.
Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 – 4 3
II. Overview of the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran ................. 5 – 49 3
A. Death penalty ................................................................................................. 5 – 17 3
B. Reprisal against activists cooperating with the United Nations ...................... 18 – 21 6
C. Situation of women ........................................................................................ 22 – 32 7
D. Restrictions on freedoms of expression and of peaceful assembly ................ 33 – 39 10
E. Situation of human rights defenders and activists .......................................... 40 – 43 11
F. Treatment of religious and ethnic minorities ................................................. 44 – 49 12
III. Cooperation with international human rights mechanisms and the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ................................ 50 – 57 14
A. Cooperation with the United Nations human rights treaty system ................. 50 – 51 14
B. Cooperation with special procedures .............................................................. 52 – 54 14
C. Cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights ........................................................................................... 55 15
D. Universal periodic review .............................................................................. 56 – 57 15
IV. Recommendations ................................................................................................... 58 – 63 16
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted to the Human Rights Council pursuant to General
Assembly resolution 69/190, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to
submit a report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
Assembly at its seventieth session and an interim report to the Human Rights Council at its
twenty-eighth session. The present interim report provides information on progress made in
the implementation of resolution 69/190, focusing on the concerns identified therein.
2. The report draws upon observations made by the United Nations human rights treaty
monitoring bodies, the special procedures of the Human Rights Council and various United
Nations entities. It also refers to information from official State media and non-
governmental organizations.
3. Since the most recent report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General
Assembly (A/69/306), the application of the death penalty, including in relation to political
prisoners and juvenile offenders, has continued at a very high rate. Reports of the arbitrary
detention and prosecution of journalists, human rights defenders and women rights activists
have continued. Individuals have increasingly been targeted for their alleged contacts with
United Nations human rights mechanisms, and members of minority groups have continued
to face persistent discrimination and persecution. Women’s rights remain a priority
concern, particularly underage marriages and the underrepresentation of women in the
labour force and in decision-making positions.
4. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to engage constructively
with the United Nations treaty bodies, and recently submitted its periodic reports to the
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC/C/IRN/1) and the Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD/C/IRN/1). The Government also engaged substantively
with the universal periodic review for its second cycle review. Despite these developments,
none of the special procedures mandate holders of the Human Rights Council, including the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, has
been admitted to the country.
II. Overview of the situation of human rights in the Islamic
Republic of Iran
A. Death penalty
1. Use of the death penalty
5. The Secretary-General continues to express his alarm at the increasing number of
death sentences handed down and executions carried out in the Islamic Republic of Iran. United Nations human rights mechanisms have repeatedly and consistently expressed their
great concern at this persistent trend, and have urged the Government to end executions. A
total of 41 of the 291 recommendations made to the Islamic Republic of Iran during its
second cycle of universal periodic review concerned the death penalty (A/HRC/28/12).
6. On 28 October 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
publicly expressed serious concern at the large number of executions in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, and called upon the authorities to immediately institute a moratorium on
the death penalty. At least 500 people are believed to have been executed from January to
November of 2014, with some sources suggesting a considerably higher number.1
7. In their comments on the present report, the Iranian authorities stressed that the
death penalty was only considered for the most serious crimes, including drug trafficking,
which is often accompanied by acts of terrorism, and that no political prisoner had been
executed. They also pointed out that defendants were granted all due process guarantees
during their trial, including access to a lawyer and the right to appeal. International human
rights bodies, including the Human Rights Committee (see A/50/40, para. 449), have
determined that drug-related offences do not meet the threshold of the most serious crimes
for which the death penalty may be applied under international law. At least seven
individuals were also reportedly executed in political cases and non-violent economic
crimes following proceedings that reportedly did not comply with international norms
regarding fair trial and due process provided for in article 14 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a State party.
8. In the majority of cases that involve capital punishment, due process guarantees
were often violated in proceedings that fell short of international fair trial standards. This
raises concern about the potential for wrongful conviction, which is unavoidable even for
the most advanced and established judicial system.2 In the light of these concerns, the
Secretary-General reiterates his call upon the Iranian authorities to restrict the use of and/or
abolish the death penalty in law and practice, in particular when the judicial system is
failing to guarantee international fair trial standards (see A/69/ 306, para. 9).
9. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has argued that the “special
circumstances” and the “existing threats from the sharp rise in the production of narcotics
in the regions” near the State’s borders necessitate its resort to the death penalty. According
to the Government, drug-related offences amount to more than 80 per cent of overall
executions (see A/C.3/69/9, annex). On 7 November 2014, however, Mohammad Javad
Larijani, Head of the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
acknowledged the need for amendments to the law on narcotics, stating that this could be
the first step in bringing down the high number of executions.3 In December 2014, the Head
of the Judiciary, Sadeq Amoli Larijani, also acknowledged the need for amendments to
anti-narcotic laws, recognizing that they had not proved effective in the fight against drug-
trafficking.4 The Secretary-General welcomes this acknowledgment within the judiciary
that the death penalty is not effective in the deterrence of drug-related crimes. He notes the
efforts made by the State to combat drug trafficking, and urges the Government to work
with the United Nations to find effective alternative strategies to address this problem.
10. The Secretary-General is also concerned about a number of death penalty cases with
a political dimension. On 20 July 2014, Arzhang Davoodi, an author and poet, was
allegedly sentenced to death on the charge of moharebeh (enmity against God) in
connection with his alleged membership in and support for an Iranian dissident group.5 He
was reportedly arrested in 2003 and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment on charges of
spreading propaganda against the system and establishing and directing an organization
opposed to the Government. In August 2012, the Revolutionary Court reportedly
introduced the charge of moharebeh, for which he was sentenced to death. He was
1 At least 318 people were reportedly executed for drug-related execution in the first 11 month of 2014.
2 OHCHR, Moving Away from the Death Penalty: Arguments, Trends and Perspectives, New York,
2014.
3 Euronews, “Iran’s Larijani slams West’s ‘bias’ on human rights”, 7 November 2014.
4 PressTV, “80% of Iran capital punishments for drug offences to go away”, 8 December 2014. 5 Amnesty International, Iranian writer sentenced to death: Arzhang Davoodi, 24 July 2014.
allegedly subjected to prolonged solitary confinement and torture. Reportedly, neither Mr.
Davoodi nor his attorney was present during the trial at which he was sentenced to death.
The case is currently under consideration, given that the Supreme Court overruled the
judgement and ordered a retrial. Furthermore, Hamed Ahmadi, Kamal Malaee, Jahangir
Dehghani and Jamshed Dehghani, all members of the Kurdish community, were at
imminent risk of execution at the end of the period under review. They were reportedly
convicted in 2010 on charges of moharebeh and mofsed fel-arz (corruption on earth)
following trials that fell short of international fair trial standards.6 The authorities asserted
that these individuals were involved in terrorist activities and were sentenced to death on
the charges of membership in a terrorist group and carrying out armed attacks against the
military establishment.
11. On 25 October 2014, Reyhaneh Jabbari, who had been sentenced to death for the
alleged murder of Morteza Abdolali Sarbandi, a former employee of the Iranian
Intelligence Ministry, was executed despite repeated appeals by various United Nations
human rights mechanisms. Ms. Jabbari reportedly stabbed Mr. Sarbandi after he allegedly
attempted to assault her sexually. Ms. Jabbari maintained that her actions had been in self-
defence. Serious concerns were raised about due process in this case, in particular that her
conviction had been allegedly based on confessions made under duress and that the court
had apparently failed to take all relevant circumstantial evidence into account.
12. In their comments on the present report, the authorities disputed the allegation of
sexual assault and stressed that the judgement had been issued after all legal remedies were
exhausted and that due process guarantees had been respected by the judiciary. In order to
prevent the execution, the authorities stayed the execution twice to allow the two families to
reach a settlement. On 31 October 2014, the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
participating in the second cycle of the universal periodic review argued that Ms. Jabbari
had been hanged pursuant to the qisas (retribution in kind) system under Islamic criminal
law, according to which the closest relatives of the victim determine whether the death
penalty should be carried out (A/HRC/28/12, para. 134). It added that the judiciary had
persistently attempted to persuade the victim’s son to forgive the perpetrator, but he had
refused, largely on account of media propaganda. The Iranian authorities consider qisas to
be a private right of the victim’s relatives that cannot be overruled by the judiciary; the
right under international law to seek pardon or to have the sentence commuted is thereby
denied to defendants.
13. The high incidence of public executions remains a concern. Indeed a spike in
executions was reported in 2014; at least 50 public executions were reportedly carried out
from January to the end of November, with the majority reportedly attended by a large
crowd, including minors. Footage of executions is reportedly broadcast by the media, a
practice that until 2014 was banned (A/HRC/22/48, para. 19). The authorities argue that
public executions are aimed at deterring crimes, and that only a few cases have caused
public outrage. The argument that public executions are an effective crime deterrent,
however, disregards the deleterious effect on people, in particular children, who witness
such scenes.
2. Execution of juvenile offenders
14. While the Islamic Penal Code, which came into force in June 2013, creates a more
favourable environment for the implementation of juvenile justice standards for children in
conflict with the law, it does not preclude juvenile executions fully. At least 160 juvenile
offenders were reportedly on death row as at December 2014. According to the Special
6 OHCHR, “Iran: Execution of juvenile offenders breaches international law – Pillay”, 26 June 2014.
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, eight
individuals below the age of 18 at the time of their offence were reportedly executed in
2014 (A/69/356, para. 7).
15. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and several special
procedures mandate holders have frequently communicated their concerns to the
Government on this issue. They stressed that any judgements imposing the death penalty on
persons under the age of 18 and the implementation of such judgements were incompatible
with the State’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. On 26 June 2014, the High
Commissioner publicly expressed concern at the persistent execution of juvenile offenders,
and stressed that, regardless of the circumstances of the crime, the execution of juvenile
offenders was clearly prohibited by international human rights law.
16. While not denying the execution of juveniles convicted under the age of 18, the
Iranian authorities reported that the judiciary had shown a high degree of leniency and
flexibility in juvenile cases, and had established a working group to help to prevent juvenile
executions, including by encouraging the families of victims and perpetrators to reach a
settlement, and offering financial aid (A/C.3/69/9, annex). On 11 November 2014, the
Deputy Chief of the Judiciary for Cultural Affairs pointed out that, although persons below
the age of 18 could not be executed in the Islamic Republic of Iran, if a person was
convicted of murder, the execution would be carried out after the person turned 18.7 This
stance runs counter to international human rights standards, which impose an absolute ban
on the execution of persons who were under 18 at the time of their offence.
17. During its first universal periodic review, the Islamic Republic of Iran accepted a
recommendation to consider the abolition of juvenile executions.8 The Secretary-General
renews his call to the Government to halt the execution of juvenile offenders and to
undertake a special review of the cases of children on death row with a view to commuting
or quashing their death sentences.
B. Reprisals against activists cooperating with the United Nations
18. Allegations of reprisals against individuals because of their cooperation or for
establishing contacts with the United Nations human rights mechanisms or representatives
remain a cause for great concern. In 2014, special procedures mandate holders constantly
raised cases of reprisals against individuals who had collaborated with the United Nations,
particularly the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Of the 29 communications transmitted to the Iranian authorities from January to
November 2014, four communications related to cases of acts of reprisal, double the
number seen the previous year. In their comments on the present report, the Iranian
authorities stated that no individual had been prosecuted because of their contact with
United Nations human rights mechanisms.
19. On 2 June 2014, Saeed Shirzad, a human rights activist and member of the Society
for Defending Street and Working Children, was reportedly arrested at his workplace by
officials from the Ministry of Intelligence. He was allegedly held at the detention facility of
the Ministry before being transferred to Evin prison in Tehran. He reportedly spent the first
7 Tasnim news, 11 November 2014 (available from www.tasnimnews.com/home/single/554662).
8 With regard to the present report, the authorities stated that the new Islamic Penal Code provided
more favourable treatment for juvenile offenders: in cases not involving qisas, article 89 of the Code
commuted punitive measures for minors between 15 to 18 years to, for example, incarceration in a
correction centre, a short prison term or a pecuniary fine.
two months of detention in solitary confinement, with no contact permitted with his family
or a lawyer. Although no indictment had been issued against Mr. Shirzad, on 18 August, he
was reportedly verbally informed of his charges, which included association and collusion
against national security, propaganda against the system and cooperation with the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Dr.
Mohammad Ali Taheri, the founder of the Erfan-e-Halgheh (inter-universalism) spiritual
group who is currently serving a five-year prison sentence handed down in October 2011
on charges of insulting Islamic sanctities, reportedly faced additional charges and
intensified pressure on his family for sending a letter to the Special Rapporteur. Following
the publication of the letter in June 2014 in which Dr. Taheri described the abuse
committed in prison, the authorities reportedly detained his wife from 2 July 2014, for two
weeks, and laid new charges against Dr. Taheri.
20. Mohammad Reza Pourshajari (also known as Siamak Mehr), was reportedly arrested
on 30 September 2014 and charged with acts against national security, propaganda against
the system, of attempting to leave the country illegally, and contact with the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran and with anti-
revolutionary organizations. He had been released on 23 August after having served a four-
year prison term for propaganda against the State, insulting the Supreme Leader and
defamation of Islam.
21. The Secretary-General encourages the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to protect individuals from all act of reprisal, and to investigate and ensure accountability
for all cases of intimidation and reprisal.
C. Situation of women
22. The Secretary-General welcomes the gains made in higher education and health for
women, as well as the efforts to integrate women in the socioeconomic sphere. Some of the
positive steps taken include the establishment of a foundation for entrepreneurial
development of women and cooperatives to alleviate poverty and female groups that assist
female heads of households and provide self-employment loans and grants to women (see
A/C.3/69/9, annex). In their comments on the present report, the Iranian authorities pointed
out that measures to promote the political and socioeconomic status of women had been
taken. They included the appointment of women affairs advisers to all ministries and
governmental organizations, the establishment of a women and children’s rights protection
centre in the judiciary, the appointment of female advisers to family courts, legislative
reforms that promote the status of women and the creation of special funds in the Ministry
of Justice for female victims of violence.
23. Despite the above-mentioned achievements, women only account for 16 per cent of
the labour force (A/69/356, para. 64). According to the Global Gender Gap Index for 2014
of the World Economic Forum, the Islamic Republic of Iran ranked no. 137 out of 142
countries. Furthermore, men earn 4.8 times more than women (A/69/356, para. 67). With
regard to women in ministerial positions, the Index ranked the Islamic Republic of Iran no.
105 out of 142 countries, and there are few women in managerial or decision-making roles
(A/69/356, para. 69) – despite the emphasis that article 3 of the Charter of Women’s Rights
and Responsibilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran places on the right of women to equal
wages, privileges and work conditions. The draft comprehensive population and family
excellence plan, reportedly currently being considered by parliament, would further restrict
the participation of women in the labour force. Preference for employment opportunities
would be given, in order, to men with children, men without children, then lastly to women
with children. Furthermore, teaching positions in higher education and research institutions
would be reserved for qualified married applicants (A/69/356, para. 70).
24. According to article 1117 of the Civil Code, a husband may prevent his wife from
occupations or technical work deemed incompatible with family interests or his own
dignity or that of his wife.9 The law may even prevent women from pursuing artistic
activities. For instance, on 30 September 2014, the Head of the Family of Martyrs and
Veterans Association filed a suit against the Minister for Cultural Affairs for allowing
women to sing solo in concerts.10
25. The Secretary-General welcomes the efforts made by the Islamic Republic of Iran to
combat violence against women, which is critical to their ability to participate in civil,
political, economic, development, educational, social and cultural life. The Government is
reportedly supports research projects that analyse the causes and motives for gender-based
violence and is working to develop preventative strategies (see A/C.3/69/9, annex). The
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran found
that 66 per cent of women had reportedly experienced domestic violence (A/69/356, para.
18).
26. Section 2 of the Charter of Women’s Rights and Responsibilities in the Islamic
Republic of Iran stresses the right to be aware of the appropriate criteria for choosing a
spouse, and also the right to become acquainted with that person before marriage. Despite
this assertion, child marriage remains prevalent in the country. The legal age of marriage
for girls is only 13, and some as young as 9 years of age may be married with the
permission of the court. In 2011, about 48,580 girls between the age of 10 and 14 were
married; and in 2012, there were at least 1,537 girls under the age of 10 who were
reportedly married (A/69/356, para. 40).
27. Child marriage is a violation of human rights that put women and girls at risk of
physical, psychological, economic and sexual violence and can lead to a range of poor
health and social outcomes and other negative consequences, including early pregnancy and
high rates of maternal and infant morbidity and mortality. The lack of legal protection and
safe houses for women to seek refuge forces them to live in situations of abuse, which may
lead them to commit acts of violence. In 2010, for example, Razieh Ebrahimi was
reportedly convicted of killing her husband when she was 17 years old. She was reportedly
married at the age of 14, gave birth to a child at 15, and was reportedly subjected to
physical and psychological abuse from her husband. She reportedly admitted to have killed
her husband while he was asleep. Her request to the Supreme Court for a retrial was
reportedly declined; her execution could now be carried out at any time. Furthermore, laws
continue to allow for marital or spousal rape and discriminate between men and women
with regard to the spouse’s ability to initiate and complete divorce. A woman is required to
prove that a significant threat has been made to her life in order to be able to file for divorce
(A/60/356, para. 19). Such laws make it difficult for women to escape domestic violence
and to protect themselves from any real and immediate risk to life or integrity.
28. Nationality laws in the Islamic Republic of Iran do not grant women equal rights
when transferring their nationality to their children. According to the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as at January 2015, there were more
than 950,000 refugees from Afghanistan and 32,000 from Iraq living in the country.11
9 See submission by
http://www.uprstinfo.org/sites/default/files/document/iran_islamic_republic_of/session_20_ -_october_2014/freemuse_upr20_irn_e_main.pdfFreemuse for the universal periodic review of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014.
10 International Organisation to Preserve Human Rights in Iran, “Group sues minister for letting women
sing solo”, 1 October 2014.
11 UNHCR, 2015 UNHCR country operations profile: Islamic Republic of Iran.
Iranian women who marry men from Iraq or Afghanistan are unable to pass on their Iranian
nationality to their children, who thereby risk becoming stateless. Gender-discriminatory
nationality laws often lead to the statelessness of women and children, or to situations
where a woman, her children or husband are deprived of the nationality of the country
where they reside.12
29. On 20 June 2014, Ghocheh Ghavami, a British-Iranian woman, was reportedly
arrested and subsequently convicted to a year of imprisonment and a two-year travel ban
for protesting peacefully against a State ban on Iranian women attending male volleyball
and football games in a stadium.13 She was reportedly held for 41 days in solitary
confinement and charged with propaganda against the establishment and attending
gatherings and demonstrations against the system.14 On 22 September, the Public
Prosecutor dismissed claims that Ms. Ghavami had been detained for attending a sport
event, explaining that she had been arrested because of her activities against the
establishment and for her links with satellite channels, including BBC Persian.15 She was
later released on bail for an amount equivalent to $37,000.
30. Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran are required to observe Islamic dress code in
public places. The parliament reportedly recently approved a plan “on the protection of
promoters of virtue and preventers of vice”, which would increase checks on improper
veiling. In their comments on the present report, the Iranian authorities reported that the
plan had been sent back to the parliament by the Guardian Council after it found 14
paragraphs in conflict with the Constitution. The morality police strictly monitor all public
places, including vehicles, and take action against those who do not adhere to the morality
codes. Women who appear without an Islamic hijab risk arrest and imprisonment of
between 10 days and two months, or a fine of up to 500,000 rials. Approximately 30,000
women were reportedly arrested between 2003 and 2013, with many others subjected to
expulsion from university or banned from entering public spaces, such as parks, cinemas,
sport facilities, airports and beaches.16
31. The acid attacks in October 2014 against six women for allegedly wearing improper
hijab in Isfahan, Kermanshah and Tehran highlights the risks to health and safety run by
women.17 The incidents drew considerable attention both domestically and internationally,
with concerns being were expressed that the attacks might be linked to the approval of the
plan on the protection of promoters of virtue and preventers of vice. On 22 October,
security forces reportedly attacked with batons protestors who had gathered in front of the
parliament to denounce the acid attacks.18 Journalists and activists were detained, including
12 In their comments on the present report, the Iranian authorities pointed out that a law adopted in 2006
provides that children born in the Islamic Republic of Iran from a marriage of an Iranian woman with
a foreign man could be granted Iranian nationality if they had no criminal or national security-related
record.
13 PressTV, “Iran Judiciary rejects media propaganda on Qavami case”, 18 November 2014.
14 Human Rights Watch, Iran: “Free Woman in Sports Protest Case”, 8 November 2014: PressTV,
“Iranian-British national, Ghoncheh Qavami, released on bail”, 23 November 2014.
15 PressTV, “Iran Judiciary rejects media propaganda on Qavami case”, 18 November 2014.
16 Justice for Iran, “Disciplining Bodies, Diagnosing Identities, Mandatory Veiling, Mandatory
Sterilization, Sexual Torture and the Right to Bodily Integrity in the Islamic Republic of Iran”
submission for the universal periodic review of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014.
17 International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, “Sotoudeh: Acid Attacks on Women Show ‘Plan to
Promote Virtue’ Must Stop”, 22 October 2014.
18 International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, “Protesters Deploring Acid Attacks against
Women are Beaten and Arrested”, 24 October 2014.
19 Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Iranian journalists detained after reporting on acid attacks”, Guardian, 28
October 2014.
members of the Iran Student News Agency, who were reportedly interviewing victims and
photographing the protest.19
32. The Secretary-General urges the Islamic Republic of Iran to review critically the
plan on the protection of promoters of virtue and preventers of vice, which may allow
individuals to target women who are dressed in a manner deemed unconventional.
D. Restrictions on freedoms of expression and of peaceful assembly
1. Freedom of expression
33. The continued crackdown on media professionals, the pervasive restrictions on
freedom of opinion and expression, including the closure of newspapers and magazines,
and the ongoing monitoring, filtering and blocking of websites that carry political news and
analysis raise great concern. Individuals who have expressed their views on social media or
appeared in videos have been targeted and prosecuted. Some 5 million websites are
currently blocked, and the Government is reportedly planning to implement “smart
filtering”, which would further restrict content on the Internet (A/69/356, para. 22). The
creation of a “national Internet”, announced in 2006, would further restrict users’ access to
the global Internet.20 On 21 September, the Prosecutor General urged the Minister for
Communication and Information Technology to immediately block messaging services
such as Viber, Tango and WhatsApp, which, he claimed, were being used to disseminate
derogatory remarks about the Supreme Leader.21 According to a report on the website of the
news agency Khabaronline (www.khabaronline.ir), on 12 September the Head of the State
cyber-police force warned that private messages on Viber and WhatsApp could be
monitored and that persons circulating “insulting comments” about the Supreme Leader and
other officials would be “dealt with” accordingly.
34. On 18 September, six individuals were reportedly arrested in May 2014 for making
a YouTube video that showed them dancing to the popular song “Happy” were sentenced to
prison terms ranging from six months to a year, and to 91 lashes. They were reportedly
convicted of participating in the production of a “vulgar video clip” and of “illicit relations”
between group members. Although the sentences were suspended for three years, they now
risk arrest again should they commit an offence.
35. In November 2014, the Supreme Court reportedly upheld the death penalty sentence
for Soheil Arabi, for “insulting the Holy Prophet” in several Facebook posts.22 The
authorities pointed out that Mr. Arabi’s case was currently being reviewed and the sentence
was yet to be finalized. Eight individuals, including a British national, were sentenced to a
combined 123 years in prison on charges that included blasphemy, propaganda against the
Government and insulting the Supreme Leader on Facebook (A/69/356, para. 27).
36. Freedom of information and expression is of paramount importance for every
society; the prosecution of individuals for expressing their views on social networks not
only silences legitimate peaceful expression but pushes society towards self-censorship.
The Secretary-General urges the authorities to promote and protect the right of individuals
to express themselves freely, and to refrain from any sanction that contravenes international
human rights law.
20 International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, “Internet in Chains: The Front Line of State
Repression in Iran”, November 2014.
21 PressTV, “Iran Judiciary orders blocking of Viber, Tango, WhatsApp”, 21 September 2014.
22 Human Rights Watch, “Death Sentence for Facebook Posts”. 2 December 2014.
37. While a number of journalists were freed in the latter months of 2014, a large
number of journalists remain jailed. National security, espionage, propaganda against the
system and insulting the Supreme Leader are some of the chargesfrequently invoked for the
arrest and prosecution of journalists. 38. For instance, Serajeddin Mirdamadi, who
returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran following the election of President Rouhani, was
reportedly sentenced to six years of imprisonment on charges of propaganda against the
system and crimes against national security. His sentence was reduced to three years on
appeal.23 Jason Rezaian, a journalist with the Washington Post, in detention since July
2014, reportedly had his detention extended for 60 days in November.24 The authorities
reported that Mr. Rezaian was facing espionage charges and that his case was currently
being investigated by the Prosecutor’s office. Mr. Rezaian was arrested together with his
wife, Yeganeh Salehi, also a journalist. Ms. Yeganeh was, however, released on bail after
60 days in detention.25 In an interview, Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani stated that Mr.
Rezaian had been arrested for his involvement in activities that breached the security of the
State.26 The arrest, detention and prosecution of journalists constitute a severe violation of
the right to freedom of expression and breach the international obligations of the Islamic
Republic of Iran under article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
2. Freedom of assembly
38. On 31 October 2014, in his statement to the Human Rights Council, Dr. Mohammad
Javad Larijani reported on the proactive role played by more than 17,000 civil society
groups in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the promotion and protection of human rights. He
also stated that more than 230 political parties, 400 trade unions and specialized
associations, as well as 60 religiously affiliated societies, were active in the country.
39. Human rights defenders, lawyers, students and women rights activists, journalists
and trade unionists, however, continue to face restrictions, arrest, conviction and
imprisonment for exercising their rights to freedom of association and freedom of
expression and opinion. The authorities have not yet lifted the ban on the activities of the
Workers’ Union of the Tehran and Suburbs Bus Company, the Sugar Cane Workers’ Union
of the Haft Tapeh Sugar Cane Company and the Teachers’ Association. Union activists are
often subjected to politically motivated prosecution and unfair trials. More than a dozen
activists are currently held in prison for merely exercising their right to peaceful assembly
and association. The leaders of the Green Movement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and Mehdi
Karoubi, have been under house arrest since 2011, with no formal charges ever brought
against them, for staging a rally in solidarity with protesters in Egypt. Another worrying
development is a new bill, made public early in 2014, on the activities of political parties
which, if passed, would prohibit parties from activities until they obtain a permit from a
five-member commission comprising representatives of the judiciary, parliament and the
Ministry of the Interior (see A/69/356, paras. 38-39). It also requires political parties to
notify the Ministry at least 72 hours in advance of any gathering or demonstration.
23 Radiozamaneh news, “Appeal court cuts journalist’s sentence in half”, 30 November 2014.
24 Aljazeera, “Iran extends detention of US journalist”, 4 December 2014.
25 Sherif Mansour, “Jason Rezaian’s family appeals for Iran to release him”, Committee to Protect
Journalists, 10 November 2014.
26 Euronews, “Hopes raised that US-Iranian reporter could be out soon”, 6 November 2014.
E. Situation of human rights defenders and activists
40. The Secretary-General remains concerned at the shrinking space for human rights
defenders, who continue to risk harassment, intimidation, arrest and prosecution for
defending rights and speaking up against violations and abuse. In certain cases, the
authorities have invoked national security-related charges against individuals for merely
expressing their opinion and for participating in peaceful assemblies. Lawyers and human
rights defenders associated with the Centre for Human Rights Defenders (founded by Nobel
Laureate Shirin Ebadi), the Committee for the Defence of Political Prisoners in Iran, the
Committee of Human Rights Reporters and individual lawyers representing clients in
sensitive cases have in particular been attacked. This not only endangers their physical
integrity but also undermines their work as human rights defenders and instils fear in
society.
41. On 8 August 2014, a group of special procedures mandate holders publicly
expressed their dismay at the escalating trend of arrest and sentencing of individuals
exercising their rights to freedoms of expression and opinion, peaceful assembly and
association.27 They noted the arrest and sentencing of at least 36 individuals, many of whom
human rights activists, between 22 May and 8 August, in connection with their activities or
for expressing their opinion on social media websites. Some had also been charged for
“gathering and colluding against national security” following their participation in peaceful
assemblies, then sentenced to prison terms ranging from six months to more than 20 years.
One individual was sentenced to 50 lashes, and another to death. Many of the trials had
been marred by procedural irregularities, including deprivation of legal representation and
exclusion from attending one’s own sentencing.
42. On 18 October 2014, the Iranian Bar Association, allegedly under pressure from the
Deputy Prosecutor of Tehran, the Head of the Evin prison court and the Ministry of
Intelligence, reportedly imposed a three-year professional ban on Nasrin Sotoudeh, an
internationally recognized human rights activist and recipient of the European Parliament’s
2012 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, after revoking her lawyer license. Ms.
Sotoudeh, who had been released on 18 September 2013 after having served half of a six-
year sentence imposed on charges of acting against national security, not wearing a hijab
during a videotaped message, propaganda against the system and membership of the Centre
for Human Rights Defenders, was not allowed to present a defence during the hearing at
which the sanctions were decided, in contravention of the Basic Principles on the Role of
Lawyers, in particular principles 27 to 29 thereof The decision came despite the fact that, in
September 2014, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal had reportedly revoked a 10-year
professional ban previously imposed on her. On 25 October, Ms. Sotoudeh was reportedly
briefly arrested by security forces after returning from a protest against the acid attacks on
women. On 8 November, Nargis Mohammadi, also a prominent human rights activist, was
reportedly summoned to Evin prison court for interrogation, which lasted for six hours. She
is currently at liberty but risks arrest.
43. The ongoing harassment of and professional ban on human rights activists and
lawyers, who are instrumental in representing their clients and safeguarding the rule of law,
is a setback for the country as a whole.
27 OHCHR, “Iran: UN rights experts condemn the recent wave of arrest and sentencing of civil society
actors”, 8 August 2014.
F. Treatment of religious and ethnic minorities
44. The Secretary-General remains concerned at reports about the situation of religious
and ethnic minorities, which continue to endure abuses and discrimination. The President
and other high-profile officials have publicly pledged to ensure equality, to uphold freedom
of belief and religion, to extend protection to all religious groups and to amend legislation
that discriminates against minority groups. In their comments on the present report, the
Iranian authorities pointed out that the Constitution provides equal rights to all and that no
person is prosecuted on the basis of their affiliation to a particular religious or ethnic
minority group.
45. The above-mentioned commitments have not, however, been translated into results,
and discrimination against ethnic and religious groups persists in law and practice
(A/69/306, para. 40). Members of ethnic and religious minority groups continue to face
persecution, including arrest and imprisonment, the denial of economic opportunities,
expulsion from educational institutions, deprivation of the right to work, and closure of
businesses and the destruction of religious sites, such as cemeteries and prayer centres.
Individuals seeking greater recognition for their cultural and linguistic rights risk facing
harsh penalties, including capital punishment.
46. Reports of incitement targeting the Baha’i faith and its adherents, and the destruction
of sites of religious and cultural value, such as cemeteries, are of serious concern. In a press
statement issued on 4 September 2014, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or
belief urged the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to take urgent action to stop
the destruction of a Baha’i cemetery in Shiraz by Revolutionary Guards. He stressed that
attacks on Baha’i cemeteries were in violation of the freedom of religion or belief, because
they were an essential part of how people exercise and manifest their right to freedom of
religion or belief and their significance goes beyond their physical presence.28 In their
comments on the present report, the Iranian authorities pointed out that burial in the
cemetery had been banned since 1981 and that a substitute cemetery had been designated
for Baha’is in Shiraz. They added that the destruction of the cemetery was based on public
health reasons, not to denigrate the Baha’i faith.
47. In his most recent report to the General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran reported on the arrest, detention
and prosecution of Christians, Sufi or Dervish Muslims and Sunni Muslims for organizing
religious meetings or activities. He noted that, of 150 Sunni Muslims currently detained, the
majority had been charged with serious security offences, and at least 49 Protestant
Christians were being detained for their involvement in informal house churches (A/69/356,
paras. 47-53).
48. At the end of the period under review, 33 members of the Kurdish community were
reportedly on death row after having been sentenced to death on national security-related
28 In August 2014, Revolutionary Guards in Shiraz reportedly vandalized and desecrated an old Baha’i
cemetery, where approximately 950 Baha’is were buried. They allegedly erected a sign at the
cemetery detailing plans to build a cultural and sports centre, a mosque, a library, a restaurant, a
theatre and a child-care facility on the site. Remains that had been disinterred during initial
excavations in April are said to have been thrown into a nearby trench. The commander of the
Revolutionary Guards in Shiraz allegedly stated that the Baha’is had “no rightful place” in Iranian
society and that the Islamic regime would not take note of a “foul, unclean and rootless sect”. See
joint press statement by the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, the Special
Rapporteur on minority issues and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 September 2014.
offences,29 including spreading propaganda against the system, gathering and colluding
against national security, “corruption on earth” and “enmity against God”. Serious concerns
remained with regard to their guarantees of due process, given that, during pretrial
detention, they were allegedly torture and ill-treated, held for several months in solitary
confinement and denied access to counsel or family members. One of the men is reported to
have been a minor at the time of his alleged crime, and eight were at risk of imminent
execution after their sentences were forwarded their implementation. It is feared that these
individuals might have been jailed for their promotion of the Sunni religion by taking part
in seminars and distributing religious reading material.
49. The Secretary-General renews his call upon the Government to respect the right to
freedom of religion and belief, to address discrimination in all spheres of life, to uphold and
implement legislation that protects minority groups and individuals, and to ensure the
release of all individuals imprisoned on the basis of their religion or belief.
III. Cooperation with international human rights mechanisms
and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights
A. Cooperation with the United Nations human rights treaty system
50. The Secretary-General welcomes the cooperation of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s
with the treaty bodies,30 which has improved in recent years. In addition to periodic reports
examined by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (August 2010)
(CERD/C/IRN/18-19), the Human Rights Committee (October 2011) (CCPR/C/IRN/3) and
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (May 2013) (E/C.12/IRN/2), the
State also submitted its third periodic report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child
(March 2013) (CRC/C/IRN/3-4) and its first report to the Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (December 2013) (CRPD/C/IRN/1). The Committee on the Rights
of the Child will review the report of the Islamic Republic of Iran in June 2015.
51. The Secretary-General encourages the Government to comply fully with the follow-
up mechanisms of the treaty bodies and to provide the information sought by the
committees on the implementation of recommendations made in their concluding
observations. The Secretary-General renews his call upon the Government to seize this
opportunity to examine progress made in the application of the human rights treaties by
means of accurate, regular and timely reporting.
29 Hamed Ahmadi, Shahram Ahmadi, Alam Barmashti, Jahangir Dehghani, Jamshid Dehghani, Seyed
Shaho Ebrahimi, Varia Ghaderifard, Mohammad Gharibi, Seyed Abdol Hadi Hosseini, Farzad
Honarjo, Mohammad Keyvan Karimi, Taleb Maleki, Kamal Molaee, Pouria Mohammadi, Keyvan
Momenifard, Sedigh Mohammadi, Seyed Jamal Mousavi, Teymour Naderizadeh, Farshid Naseri,
Ahmad Nasiri, Borzan Nasrollahzadeh, Idris Nemati, Omid Peyvand, Bahman Rahimi, Mokhtar
Rahimi, Mohammadyavar Rahimi, Abdorahman Sangani, Amjad Salehi, Behrouz Shahnazari, Arash
Sharifi, Kaveh Sharifi, Farzad Shahnazari and Kaveh Veysi.
30 The Islamic Republic of Iran is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the Optional Protocol thereto on the sale of children, child prostitution and child
pornography, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It is also a signatory to the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed
conflict.
B. Cooperation with special procedures
52. The Secretary-General welcomes the pledge made by the Islamic Republic of Iran to
invite two thematic mandate holders for a country visit in 2015. These would be the first
country visits by mandate holders since 2005 and be a step forward in the implementation
of the standing invitation issued by the Government in 2002 to all thematic special
procedures. Although the Government has not specified which mandate holders will be
invited, it should be recalled that it had previously agreed in principle to visits by the
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of
religion or belief.
53. The Secretary-General encourages the Government to advance its cooperation with
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran by
allowing him to visit the country. The mandate holder has repeatedly sought access to the
country since his appointment in 2011. He has been able to meet with the Permanent
Missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Geneva and in New York, as well as with
representatives of the judiciary, members of parliament, officials from the Iranian High
Council for Human Rights and members of other visiting delegations. While encouraging
further such dialogue, the Secretary-General urges the Government to strengthen its
cooperation with the Special Rapporteur, particularly by inviting him to visit the country.
54. Only a few replies have been received to the large number of communications sent
by the special procedures to the Islamic Republic of. Of the 29 communications sent from
January to November 2014, the Iranian authorities responded to only five. The majority of
the communications addressed concerns with regard to cases of torture, executions,
arbitrary arrest and the detention of journalists and human rights activists, the persecution
of religious minorities, unfair trials and the ill-treatment of prisoners, the denial of medical
treatment, and reprisals against individuals for their contact with United Nations human
rights mechanisms.
C. Cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights
55. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights continued to raise
human rights concerns with Iranian officials, including in meetings with the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, the Head of the High Council for Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations
and visiting delegations. The High Commissioner also intervened with authorities on
individual human rights cases. The Iranian authorities invited the new High Commissioner
to visit the Islamic Republic Iran at a mutually convenient time.
D. Universal periodic review
56. The Secretary-General welcomes the active engagement of the Islamic Republic of
Iran with the universal periodic review by submitting its national report on the
implementation of the recommendations resulting from the first review in 2010
(A/HRC/WG.6/7/IRN/1) and by sending a high-level delegation for the interactive dialogue
held on 31 October 2014. During the second review, 104 delegations made statements and
291 recommendations. The Islamic Republic of Iran will provide its replies to the
recommendations made at the twenty-eighth session of the Human Rights Council.
57. The Secretary-General encourages the Government to examine the
recommendations made thoroughly with a view of considering their acceptance and
implementation. He also encourages the Government to seek technical assistance from the
United Nations and civil society organizations in order to ensure the successful
implementation of the recommendations.
IV. Recommendations
58. The Secretary-General remains deeply troubled by the continuing large
number of executions, including of political prisoners and juveniles, and reiterates his
call upon the Government to introduce a moratorium on the use of the death penalty
and to prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders in all circumstances.
59. The Secretary-General urges the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to create space for human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists, and to release
political prisoners, including human rights defenders and lawyers detained solely for
legitimately exercising their right to the freedoms of expression, association and
peaceful assembly.
60. The Secretary-General welcomes the Government’s invitation to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to a country visit, and encourages the
Government to cooperate fully with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Islamic Republic of Iran by giving him access to the country.
61. The Secretary-General welcomes the achievements that the State has made in
the field of women’s education and health, and notes the emphasis placed on gender
equality by the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani. The
Secretary-General encourages the Government to take practical steps by eliminating
discrimination against women in all spheres of life, including political, social, cultural
and civil areas. He urges the Government to ensure equality and protection for
religious and ethnic minorities in the country.
62. The Secretary-General welcomes the engagement of the Islamic Republic of
Iran with United Nations human rights treaty bodies, and urges the State to follow up
on the concluding observations of all treaty bodies and to ratify the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.
63. The Secretary-General welcomes the active engagement of the Islamic Republic
of Iran with the universal periodic review mechanism, and encourages the
Government to accept the recommendations made to the State during its second
review and to seek technical assistance from the United Nations and civil society in
their implementation.