28/44 Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the Occupied Syrian Golan - Report of the Secretary-General

GE.15-04537 (E)



Human Rights Council Twenty-eighth session

Agenda items 2 and 7

Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the

High Commissioner and the Secretary-General

Human rights situation in Palestine and other

occupied Arab territories

Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the Occupied Syrian Golan*

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 25/28

on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and

in the occupied Syrian Golan. The report highlights new developments concerning the role

of Israel in the establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the Occupied

Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. It also analyses the difficulties faced by

Palestinians in gaining access to their agricultural land and the impact of Israeli settlements

on the economic, social and cultural rights of Palestinians. Lastly, it addresses the issues

related to Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan, including exploitation of natural

resources.

* Late submission.

Contents

Paragraphs Page

I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 – 4 3

II. Legal background .................................................................................................... 5 – 6 3

III. Overview ................................................................................................................ 7 – 15 4

IV. Impact of Israeli settlements and settler violence on the human rights of Palestinians 16 – 38 7

V. Failure to maintain public order, settler violence and lack of accountability .......... 39 – 53 12

A. Overview ........................................................................................................ 39 – 41 12

B. Cases of settler violence ................................................................................ 42 – 46 13

C. Failure to protect ............................................................................................ 47 – 49 14

D. Accountability ................................................................................................ 50 – 51 15

E. Attacks on Israelis, and differentiated standards of due process ..................... 52 – 53 15

VI. Settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan ............................................................... 54 – 56 16

VII. Conclusions and recommendations ......................................................................... 57 – 60 17

I. Introduction

1. In the present report, which covers the period from 1 November 2013 to 31 October

2014, the Secretary-General addresses the progress made in the implementation of Human

Rights Council resolution 25/28. In that resolution, the Council demanded that Israel, as the

occupying Power, cease immediately and completely all of its settlement activities in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian

Golan. It also condemned the continuing settlement and related activities, including the

expansion of settlements, the expropriation of land, the demolition of houses, and the

confiscation and destruction of property. The Council called upon Israel to end human

rights violations linked to the presence of settlements and to fulfil its international

obligations to provide effective remedy for victims.

2. The information presented in the present report is based on monitoring and other

information-gathering activities carried out by the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and information provided by other United

Nations entities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The report also contains information

received from Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental organizations and media sources. It

should be read in conjunction with previous reports of the Secretary-General on Israeli

settlements to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly (A/HRC/20/13,

A/HRC/25/38, A/63/519, A/64/516, A/65/365, A/66/364, A/67/375/, A/68/513 and

A/69/348).

3. In past reports, the various types of impact of settlements on the rights of

Palestinians and the key role played by the State of Israel in the creation and expansion of

Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, were

analysed. In his previous report on settlements submitted to the Human Rights Council

(A/HRC/25/38), the Secretary-General focused on the discriminatory nature of Israeli

planning policy, law and practice, which is contrary to international law and has a negative

impact on the human rights of Palestinians.

4. In the present report, the Secretary-General analyses the impact of Israeli settlements

and settler violence on the economic, social and cultural rights of Palestinians, and provides

an update on settler violence against Palestinians and their property, as well as on the

general lack of law enforcement and accountability for settlers in such cases.

II. Legal background

5. International humanitarian law and international human rights law apply, inter alia,

in relation to Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (A/HRC/25/38, para.

4 and A/69/348, para. 4). Israel, as the occupying Power, is bound by the Fourth Geneva

Convention and the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague

Regulations).1 Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention establishes that “the occupying

Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it

occupies”. The construction and expansion of Israeli settlements, as well as other

settlement-related activities such as the construction of the wall violate this provision, and

are illegal under international law. This was confirmed by the Security Council in its

1 In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied

Palestinian Territory (A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1, paras. 89-101), the International Court of Justice

found that, even if Israel is not a party to the Hague Regulations, they are nonetheless applicable to

Israel as customary law.

resolution 465 (1980), the General Assembly in its resolution 68/82, the Human Rights

Council in its resolution 25/28 and the International Court of Justice (A/ES-10/273 and

Corr.1, para. 120).

6. In addition to its obligations under international humanitarian law and under

customary international law, Israel, as the occupying Power, must also comply with the

obligations arising from the international human rights treaties it has ratified, with respect

to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (A/HRC/25/38, para. 5). As

much was confirmed by the International Court of Justice (A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1, paras.

102-113), and by the human rights treaty bodies monitoring the implementation of

international human rights obligations resulting from such treaties (see CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4,

para. 5, and CRC/C/ISR/CO/2-4, para. 3). The accession by the State of Palestine to several

human rights treaties does not affect the obligations of Israel under international human

rights law and international humanitarian law (A/69/348, para. 5).

III. Overview

7. During the period under review, Israel continued to expand existing settlements in

the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and to approve plans for new ones. According to

an Israeli non-governmental organization, between 1 November 2013 and 31 October 2014,

4,554 housing units were tendered in Israeli settlements in the West Bank (2,856),

including East Jerusalem (1,698), and 10,183 housing units were promoted,2 6,042 in the

West Bank and 4,141 in East Jerusalem. As previously reported, on 4 June, the Government

of Israel announced the issuing of tenders for more than 1,400 new settlement housing units

in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (A/69/348, para. 6).In September 2014, the plan to build 2,610 units in the Givat Hamatos settlement in East Jerusalem was approved

by the relevant planning committee, opening the path for the issuance of tenders.3 If

constructed, it would be the first government-led new settlement in East Jerusalem since the

construction of Har Homa in the late 1990s,4 and would sever the territorial continuity

between the Palestinian neighbourhoods of southern East Jerusalem and the southern West

Bank.5

8. The Secretary-General notes the drop in the initiation of new construction in

settlements in 2014 when compared to 2013,6 a year when an exceptional amount of new

construction was recorded.7 The figures of 2014 are similar to the average number of new

building projects initiated in 2011 and 2012 (250-300 housing units per quarter). The

marketing of housing units in the settlements was, however, reportedly on the rise (by

866%) during the first seven months of 2014. 8

2 Peace Now uses the term “promote” to indicate support from the Government of Israel in advancing

new settlement units in the multi-stage planning process.

3 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report,

September 2014.

4 Ir Amim, “Jerusalem 2014: the rising cost of peace”, February 2014.

5 Peace Now, “Why is Givat Amatos so significant?”, 2 October 2014. See also Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report, September 2014.

6 According to the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, between April and June 2014, the building of

235 housing units were initiated in Israeli settlements in “Judea and Samaria” (West Bank), as against

801 housing units started during the same period in 2013.

7 As reported by Peace Now.

8 Marketing of housing units denotes when Israeli authorities sign an agreement with a buyer who won

a bid to construct a house or building. See Peace Now, “When marketing of units increases by 866%,

CBS data shows 70% drop in construction starts”, 9 September 2014.

9. New outposts were also established during the period under review.9 Following the

kidnapping on 12 June of three Israeli youths, who were later found murdered (see paras.

39 - 53 below and A/HRC/28/80/Add.1), four outposts were established in the same area

where the incident took place, in the southern West Bank.10 The media reported that some

Israeli right-wing groups declared that at least one of the outposts had been established in

response to the kidnapping and killing of the three Israelis.11 The creation of the outposts

was reportedly supported by the municipalities of nearby settlements, which supplied trailer

homes and basic electricity and water infrastructure.12 Two of the outposts were dismantled

shortly afterwards by the Israeli authorities for being “illegal” under Israeli law. At the time

of writing, the other two outposts were reportedly still in place (see A/HRC/28/80/Add.1).13

10. New housing units also advanced in East Jerusalem. On 27 October 2014, media

reported that the Israeli Prime Minister’s office had advanced plans for 660 housing units in

the Ramat Shlomo settlement and 400 in the Har Homa settlement.14 According to an Israeli

non-governmental organization, the construction of additional housing units in Ramat

Shlomo would reduce the buffer area between the settlement and the Palestinian

neighbourhood of Beit Hanina. In early November, the Jerusalem District Planning and

Building Committee approved the Ramat Shlomo plan, with the number of housing units

reduced from 660 to 500.15 New housing units in Har Homa would effectively link the areas

of this settlement and Givat Hamatos (see para. 7 above).16

11. During the night of 29 September 2014, Israeli settlers moved into six buildings in

the Palestinian neighbourhood of Silwan in East Jerusalem, below the Old City. This

appears to have expanded the settler presence in Silwan by about 100 new settlers, an

increase of 35 per cent. It was reported that the buildings had been purchased, although

OHCHR is aware that some of the Palestinian owners are taking legal action, claiming that

they did not sell their property to the settlers. It is reported that Israeli security forces

allowed private security guards hired by the settlers to protect their move to the buildings in

the middle of the night. At the time of writing, the Israeli Police were protecting the new

settlers from possible attacks from Palestinians.17 The new influx of settlers and the

additional presence of the Israeli security forces in an area where the settlement presence

has been expanding in recent years contribute to general tensions between Palestinians and

Israeli settlers (A/69/348, paras. 31-32).

12. During the period under review, Israel undertook significant steps to enable further

expansion of settlements. Following an earlier declaration of State land west of Bethlehem

in April 2014 (ibid., para. 19), on 25 August 2014, the Israeli Civil Administration

announced the declaration as State land a further 3,799 dunums (930 acres) around the

settlement of Gva’ot, also in the vicinity of Bethlehem.18 According to the Israeli media, the

9 Outposts are settlements that, although often established with some kind of government

support, are not officially recognized under Israeli law.

10 As reported by the non-governmental organization Kerem Navot.

11 “Settlers set up new outpost in honor of murdered teens”, Times of Israel, 1 July 2014.

12 Peace Now, “Alarming Developments on the Ground”, 7 July 2014.

13 Kerem Navot reported that the outposts dismantled were Ramat Ha-shlosha and Tekoa E. The

remaining outposts are Givat oz Vegaon and Givat Sorek, both in the Southern West Bank.

14 Barak Ravid and Nir Hasson, “Netanyahu orders plans be advanced for 1,060 new East Jerusalem

housing units”, Haaretz, 27 October 2014.

15 Nir Hasson, “Jerusalem planners approve construction of 500 settlement homes”, Haaretz, 3

November 2014.

16 Ir Amim, newsletter October 2014.

17 Peace Now, “Settlers Take Over 6 Houses in Silwan”, 30 September 2014.

18 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report, June –

August 2014.

declaration was made in response to the killing of the three Israeli teenagers in June 2014.19

The affected areas are adjacent to the Green Line within the boundaries of five existing

Palestinian villages. Once the process is complete (see A/69/348, paras. 18-21 and

A/68/513, para. 20), it is expected that the area will be incorporated into the Gush Etzion

Regional Council, possibly as a new illegal settlement.20 This action reportedly constitutes

the largest appropriation of Palestinian land in 30 years.21

13. The settler population continued to grow during the period under review. According

to the official umbrella organization representing settlements (quoting figures obtained

from the Ministry of the Interior), during the first six months of 2014, the settler population

grew by 2 per cent and is expected to grow to 4 per cent by the end of the year, twice the

nationwide population growth rate of Israel.22 A report issued in 2014 indicated that, over

the past two decades, the population in Israeli settlements had grown by 240 per cent,

outstripping growth rates within Israel.23 Estimates of the current settlement population in

the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, range between 500,000 and 650,000

(A/HRC/25/38, para. 8).

14. In past reports, the Secretary-General noted that Israel played a leading role in the

construction and expansion of settlements, including through the granting of benefits and

incentives to settlers (see A/68/513). During the period under review, public funds

continued to be allocated to settlements. In October 2014, the Israeli cabinet reportedly

approved the allocation of some $34.7 million to the settlement division of the World

Zionist Organization for the purposes of “developing agricultural and rural settlement”.24

Although it was not specified which part of this amount would be invested in settlements in

the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (ibid., para. 9), it might be surmised that the final

amount would be considerable, given the role of the division in assisting the Government in

establishing Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.25 Reportedly, in 2012,

the Government invested more per capita in settlements than within Israel, mainly for

education and welfare services.26

15. With regard to action intended to counter the growth of settlements, the European

Union decided to ban dairy and other products of animal origin produced in Israeli

settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan,

which reportedly was to come into force in January 2015.27 In a statement issued on 6 June

2014, the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and

19 Chaim Levinson and Jack Khoury, “Israel appropriates massive tract of West Bank land”, 31 August

2014.

20 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report,

June – August 2014. The Head of the Gush Etzion Regional Council is reported as having stated that

“the announcement paves the way to establishing the new city of Gva’ot”; see Elior Levy and Itay

Blumental, “Israel recognizes 4,000 dunam in gush Etzion as state land”, ynetnews.com, 31 August

2014. According to Peace Now, Gva’ot was established as a military base in 1984.

21 Peace Now, “Unprecedented land confiscation of 4,000 dunams near Bethlehem”, 31 August 2014.

22 Josef Federman, “Israel’s settler group in the West Bank boast strong population grown”, CTV news,

16 September 2014.

23 Dr. Shlomo Swirski and Etty Konor-Atias, “Inequality in Central Government Transfers to

Municipalities”, Adva Center, 9 September 2014.

24 Nimrod Bousso, “Israel to allocate $35m to World Zionist Organization’s settlement division”,

Haaretz, 23 October 2014.

25 See Talya Sason, Summary of the Opinion concerning Unauthorized Outposts, Israel Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2005.

26 Swirski et al., “Inequality in Central Government Transfers” (see footnote 23).

27 Gianluca Mezzofiore, “EU bans Israeli dairy products made in occupied West Bank settlements from

January”, International Business Times, 10 October 2014.

other international enterprises reiterated that companies engaged in the Occupied

Palestinian Territory should assess the human rights impact of their activities, also in the

light of the heightened risks of negative human rights impact in a conflict-affected area, and

take all necessary measures to ensure that they did not have an adverse impact on human

rights, in conformity with international law and the Guiding Principles on Business and

Human Rights (see also A/HRC/22/63, paras. 96-99 and 117).In 2012, the Secretary-

General emphasized that the business and human rights agenda of the United Nations and

the said Guiding Principles should be an integral part of global efforts to bridge existing

governance gaps and safeguard protection and respect for human rights in the context of

economic activities (A/HRC/21/21, para. 92).

IV. Impact of Israeli settlements and settler violence on the human rights of Palestinians

16. Israeli settlements and acts of violence committed by Israeli settlers against

Palestinians continue to underpin a broad spectrum of human rights violations against

Palestinians (see A/HRC/25/38, A/68/513 and A/69/348).

Denied or restricted access to agricultural land

17. As highlighted in previous reports, the access of Palestinians to agricultural lands is

severely restricted and often completely denied for a number of reasons, including

intimidation and attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians (A/67/375, paras. 19-21);

physical obstacles erected by the settlers themselves (A/67/375, paras. 19-21); the

imposition of military or security areas off limits to Palestinians, for instance, closed

military zones and fenced-off areas around settlements (A/64/516, paras. 30-31; A/65/365,

para. 16,); physical movement restrictions, such as the wall, in particular with respect to the

farm lands located in the seam zone (A/65/365, para. 33); and settlement roads that impede

access to agricultural lands (A/63/519, paras. 16 and 30-36).

18. In response to the difficulties faced by Palestinian farmers in gaining access to

Palestinian-owned land located in fenced-off areas around Israeli settlements and in areas

witnessing frequent incidents of settler violence, the Israeli authorities have, in recent years,

applied the “prior coordination” regime. This mechanism allows registered Palestinian

farmers to have access to their land for a limited number of days each year through

settlement gates, or to work in the fields under the protection of Israeli security forces

(A/67/375, para. 20). According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,

about 90 Palestinian communities in the West Bank that have land inside or in the vicinity

of 55 Israeli settlements and settlement outposts may have access to their land only through

“prior coordination” with the Israeli authorities.28

19. “Prior coordination”, which has mostly been applied during the olive harvest, does

not prevent attacks on trees and crops, which can occur at any time (A/67/375, para. 20).

Access to private Palestinian land at times when no “prior coordination” is available

remains uncertain and dangerous for farmers, particularly in areas with recurrent incidents

of settler violence. Another shortcoming of the mechanism is that it is mainly applied for

the olive harvest, not for other harvests. In a case documented by the Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Israeli security forces officers refused to protect

28 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “The Impact of Israeli Settler Violence on the

Palestinian Olive Harvest: The Case of Al Mughayyir Village”, October 2013.

Palestinian farmers when they were picking almonds, asserting that the “prior coordination”

was only for olives, even though the almond trees were in the same field.29

20. Furthermore, incidents have also been recorded in which Palestinian farmers have

been denied access to their lands even during the time allowed by “prior coordination”; for

example, on 20 October 2014, Palestinian farmers were reportedly denied access to their

olive orchards located in the village of Deir Istiya (Governorate of Salfit) by security

personnel from the settlement of Revava.30

21. Another way of restricting access of Palestinians to agricultural land is the permit

regime established by Israeli authorities for access to farming land in the seam zone, the

closed area located between the wall and the Green Line.31 Israeli authorities often cite

security reasons or claim that the portion of land is too small to qualify for a permit to deny

Palestinians such permits (according to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs, in the past four years, the approval rate in the northern West Bank is 50 per cent).32

For those who manage to obtain a permit, access is nonetheless frequently restricted. In

2013, there were 81 gates designated for access to agricultural lands in the seam zone;

however, only nine of them were kept opened every day, while another nine were kept

opened for only one or few more days per week. The majority (63) was kept opened only

during the olive harvest season, which lasts approximately 45 days.33

22. Palestinian farmers also see access to their private land restricted and often denied

by the civilian security coordinators and guards who operate in the Israeli settlements and

outposts in the West Bank. These coordinators and guards are drawn from residents of

settlements and outposts, and charged with guarding the settlements and outposts on behalf

of the Israeli army.34 They are trained and equipped with weapons by the Israel Defense

Forces, and are subject to the Military Justice Law.35 At the same time, they are appointed

by and act as the representatives of the settlements. As such, the civilian security

coordinators identify with the goals of their communities, the illegal settlements, which

seek to expand their boundaries, even if construction is on Palestinian-owned land.

OHCHR found that the lack of adequate supervision by the Israel Defense Forces and of

clearly defined powers leads to daily friction between the security coordinators and the

Palestinians.

23. Civilian security coordinators and guards have been granted police and law

enforcement powers, including the powers to detain, search and arrest persons they deem,

based on “reasonable grounds”, pose a security threat, have committed or are about to

commit an offence.36 As a result, civilian security coordinators and guards have de facto a

considerable margin of discretion in the conduct of their activities. As observed by Yesh

Din, this has enabled them to obstruct arbitrarily the access of Palestinian farmers to their

private land located in the vicinity of settlements and outposts. Reportedly, there have been

29 Ibid.

30 Information provided by Premiere Urgence – Aide Medicale Internationale.

31 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “10 Years since the International Court of

Justice Advisory Opinion”, 9 July 2014.

32 Ibid.

33 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report,

February 2014, p. 11.

34 Military Order No. 432. See also Eyal Hareuveni, The Lawless Zone: the Transfer of Policing and

Security Powers to the Civilian Security Coordinators in the Settlements and Outposts (Yesh Din, Tel

Aviv, June 2014), pp. 4 and 11.

35 OHCHR and the Protection Cluster, “Update on settler violence in the West Bank, including East

Jerusalem”, October 2014, p. 5.

36 Hareuveni, “The lawless zone” (see footnote 34), pp. 12-13.

instances where civilian security coordinators and guards have denied Palestinians access to

farming plots located nearby a settlement or an outpost to prevent alleged attacks. In

addition, cases of Palestinians being injured or having their property confiscated by these

bodies while attempting to gain access to agricultural plots have been reported.37

24. In 2009, a series of military orders defined the “guarding zones” areas, in which

civilian security coordinators and guards operate, in the vicinity of settlements and

outposts, in the West Bank.38 The borders of these areas are wider than the municipal

boundaries of the settlements, which allows civilian security coordinators and civilian

guard squads to act beyond the jurisdiction of the settlements39 and dramatically expands

the impact of the settlements on the freedom of movement of Palestinians, as well as on

their right to work their land and earn a living from it.40

25. The access of Palestinian farmers to their lands is also impeded by attacks and

harassment by Israeli settlers. Documented cases of violence appear to be aimed at

spreading fear among Palestinian farmers and to deter them from farming their lands, in

particular in areas near settlements (A/67/375, para. 19). The phenomenon of settler

violence, and the general failure of Israel to ensure accountability for Israeli settlers who

break the law and to protect Palestinians against attacks to their person and property, have

been thoroughly analysed by the Secretary-General in previous reports (A/69/348, paras.

36-44; A/HRC/25/38, paras. 37-47).

26. About two-thirds of the land in the West Bank, including the majority of Area C, is

unregistered, mainly because of the suspension by Israel of the land registration process in

the West Bank at the beginning of the occupation in 1968. 41

Combined with all of the

above-mentioned factors that impede the access of Palestinians to agricultural land, this

facilitates the dispossession of Palestinians of their land, in particular in Area C of the West

Bank. An added factor in Area C is the application of the Ottoman Land Code, which

establishes that unregistered land belongs to the ruling Power unless a legitimate private

claim to the land arises. Entitlement for such a claim arises over unregistered land that has

been cultivated without interruption for a 10-year period, in the absence of which the land

is assigned to the ruling Power. 42

Given the multiple obstacles faced by Palestinians to

cultivating their land, it is difficult to comply with the requirement of uninterrupted

cultivation for 10 years, which would allow Palestinians to register the land in their name.43

In the absence of land registration, Israel has subsequently claimed much of the

37 Ibid., pp. 40-43.

38 Ibid., pp.15-25.

39 Ibid., p. 19.

40 OHCHR, “Update on settler violence” (see footnote 35), p. 6.

41 See B’Tselem, “Land grab, Israel settlement policy in the West Bank”, May 2002, p. 54. According to

Kerem Navot, another form of land registration regime also exists; the “first registration” or self-

initiated land registration, established in 1964 under Jordanian rule, which in principle allows both

Israeli settlers and Palestinians to register small portions of land in the West Bank. Owing to the

expenses incurred in taxes, lawyers and the elaboration of maps required to use the register, few

Palestinian farmers can afford to register their land, while Israeli settlers, often supported by settler

organizations, are better placed to take advantage of it. See also B’Tselem, “Under the Guise of

legality: Israel’s Declarations of State Land in the West Bank”, February 2012.

42 Kerem Navot, “Israeli Settler Agriculture as a Means of Land Takeover in the West Bank”, August

2013, annex II, p. 107. The Ottoman Land Code also establishes that the State may take possession of

land (held on the basis of a land deed or kushan) that is not cultivated for three consecutive years. See

also Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report,

April 2014, and B’Tselem, “Under the Guise of Legality” (see footnote 41) pp. 25-26.

43 Under the “first registration” or self-initiated land registration (see footnote 41).

unregistered land as government property and declared it State land.44 Once declared State

land, it is often allocated to settlements (A/69/348, para. 20).45

27. The above circumstances create a situation of insecurity of tenure for Palestinian

landowners, which in turn create the conditions for Israeli settlers to take over land by

cultivating it and eventually registering it under their name. 46

28. According to the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of

Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security of the Food and

Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), States should remove and prohibit

all forms of discrimination related to tenure rights, including registration of land.47

Furthermore, States are to recognize informal land tenure in a manner that respects existing

rights and in ways that recognize the reality of the situation and promote social, economic

and environmental well-being. The Palestinians, who have long been present on and have

cultivated land in the West Bank, should have their legitimate tenure rights recognized and

be protected against dispossession of their land. This is in line with the obligation of Israel,

as the occupying Power, to protect the population in the occupied territory and their

property.48

29. Attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians and their property, and the denial or

restriction of access to agricultural land, undermine Palestinians’ right to an adequate

standard of living (A/HRC/25/38, paras. 26-29), as set out in article 11 of the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which Israel is party. The right to an

adequate standard of living encompasses the right of everyone to continuous improvement

in living conditions; however, it is evident that, rather than improving, the living conditions

of Palestinians are deteriorating as a consequence of Israeli settlement activities and settler

violence, while the settlements continue to prosper (see A/HRC/25/38, A/68/513,

A/69/348).

30. Before the occupation, agriculture was the main source of labour and resources for

Palestinians. Palestinian agriculture has, however, been adversely affected by measures

taken by Israel as the occupying Power, in particular land seizures and restrictions on

access to land and water resources (A/68/513, para. 40). From 1965 to 1994, cultivated

areas shrank by 30 per cent from 1965 to 1994, and Palestinian agricultural production was

reduced, from 50 per cent in 1968 to 4.9 per cent of GDP in 2013. 49

31. Agriculture constitutes the largest sector of the economy of Israeli settlements

(A/68/513, para. 41). Settlers do not face the same restrictions as Palestinians in their access

to agricultural land, and receive the protection and support of Israel. This generally allows

them to invest in new technologies and more efficient farming methods, which is reflected

in their productivity (A/HRC/22/63, paras. 22, 89-92; A/68/513, para. 28; A/69/348, paras.

28-32). Every year, Israeli settlers export some $285 million worth of agricultural products,

against only $19 million by Palestinians.50

44 B’Tselem, “Under the Guise of Legality” (see footnote 41), p. 33.

45 State land is automatically placed within the settlement’s regional and local councils and then

allocated for settlement development or military training. Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report, April 2014.

46 Using the self-initiated registration regime. Kerem Navot, “Israeli Settler Agriculture” (see footnote

42), p. 108. See also A/69/348, paras. 29-31.

47 See also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2.2.

48 Hague Regulations, art. 43; Fourth Geneva Convention, arts. 4, 27 and 55.

49 Emergency Water and Sanitation/Hygiene (EWASH), Fact Sheet 14, 2013; and Palestinian

Central Bureau of Statistics, “Palestine in Figures 2012”, March 2013.

50 Who Profits, “Made in Israel: Agricultural Exports from Occupied Territories”, April 2014.

Case study: the olive harvest

32. Almost half of the agricultural land in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (48 per

cent) is planted with 8 million olive trees, with the majority located in the West Bank. The

olive oil industry accounts for 25 per cent of all agricultural income of the Occupied

Palestinian Territory; it is estimated that about 100,000 families depend to some extent on

the annual olive harvest for their livelihood (A/HRC/25/38, para. 26).51 Between 90 and 95

per cent of the olive harvest is used to produce olive oil. Production of olive oil depends on

the yield cycle, and accordingly fluctuates between 6,000 and 34,000 tons a year.52

33. The restriction or denial of access for Palestinian farmers to olive orchards has a

negative impact on the production of olives, in particular in areas in the vicinity of

settlements, in the seam zone (where some 40,000 dunums (9,884 acres) of olive groves are

located), and in those areas where incidents of settler violence are recurrent. Olive orchards

require maintenance all year round. Restrictions on and delay or prevention of performance

of agricultural maintenance activities have an adverse impact on productivity and value of

the harvest. According to FAO, each olive grove requires a total of 133 days of work a year

to adequately maintain it, including tasks such as land clearing, fertilizing, ploughing, pest

control and harvesting. Owing to the restrictions imposed, most Palestinian farmers have

access to their olive orchards for just a few days a year, mainly confined, through the “prior

coordination” mechanism, to the harvest period, which is far less than the 133 days required

to adequately maintain the orchards.

34. Restrictions on access to olive orchards located in the seam zone have a negative

impact on the production and the value of the harvest. Data collected in the northern West

Bank since 2010 showed that olive trees in the seam zone had a reduction in yield of

between 40 and 60 per cent when compared to equivalent trees in areas where maintenance

activities could be carried out freely on a regular basis.53

35. Settler violence also has a negative impact on Palestinian agricultural productivity.

Attacks and intimidation against Palestinian farmers and the destruction of their property

take place on a regular basis, affecting their rural livelihoods. According to information

from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, during the period under

review, 8,482 Palestinian-owned trees were damaged in the West Bank, including East

Jerusalem. Although there has been a reduction in the number of trees affected in

comparison with 2013, the number of trees uprooted and damaged remains high.54

36. Settler violence usually increases during the olive harvest (A/67/375, para. 19).55

During the first month of the olive harvest, in October 2014, 15 incidents of settler

violence, resulting in damage to 277 trees, were recorded.56 For example, on 14 October, 21

Palestinian-owned olive trees were reportedly cut and damaged by settlers from the Bait

51 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report,

September 2014, p. 2.

52 Ibid., p. 4.

53 Ibid., February 2014, pp. 11-12.

54 Between January and September 2014, 7,342 trees were damaged. During the same period in 2013,

the number of trees affected was 8,615.

55 See the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “Olive

harvest: continued settler attacks against refugee livelihoods”, October 2013.

56 In 2013, 33 incidents were reported during the whole period of the olive harvest (October – December

2013), which resulted in damage to 1,522 trees.

Ayin settlement, in the Bethlehem Governorate.57 On 22 October, a field of olives was set

alight, allegedly by Israeli settlers from the Yitzhar settlement in the Nablus Governorate.58

37. Statistics indicate that most attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinian individuals and

on Palestinian-owned trees reportedly go unpunished. , Of the 246 investigations opened

between 2005 and 2014 monitored by Yesh Din, only four ended with an indictment and

223 were closed owing to possible investigative failures, such as a failure to identify

suspects or to collect evidence.59 The establishment of an anti-nationalistic crimes unit

within the “Judea and Samaria” (West Bank) police seems to be ineffective. Out of the 35

cases of damage by settlers to Palestinian trees documented by Yesh Din in 2013, 23 cases

were closed, apparently because of investigation failures, with no indictments issued.60

38. Physical attacks against Palestinian farmers were also recorded during the 2014

olive harvest. On 11 October, in the village of Kafr al-Labad, Tulkarem Governorate, Israeli settlers reportedly injured a 45-year-old Palestinian man and his 9-year-old son who

were picking olives with their family on land that does not require prior coordination for

access to it. Three Israeli settlers holding knives reportedly attacked them. The settlers

allegedly stole the harvest equipment and personal belongings, and seized five sacks of

olives, amounting to approximately 250 kg.61 In another incident on the same day, a 27-

year-old Palestinian woman was injured by Israeli settlers when picking olives on a grove

located near the settlement of Kfar Tappuah, Salfit Governorate.62

V. Failure to maintain public order, settler violence and lack of accountability

A. Overview

39. The persistent and troubling phenomenon of settler violence is directly related to the

continued existence, proliferation and expansion of illegal settlements inserted in and

between Palestinian communities throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, as

described above and in previous reports of the Secretary-General (see A/69/348, paras. 36-

44).

40. Settler violence is one of the clearest and most direct negative consequences of the

settlements. It affects the enjoyment by Palestinians of their basic rights, including their

rights to freedom of movement, an adequate standard of living, work, and education, as

they face difficulty in having access to schools or their land for fear of attack by settlers

(A/68/513, paras. 12-14).63 Repeated calls by the international community for the Israeli

authorities to address the problem have generally not succeeded in prompting positive

action to improve the situation (CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para.16 and A/69/348, paras. 36-44). 64

57 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Protection of Civilians (Weekly), 14 –20

October 2014, p. 2.

58 Information provided by Premiere Urgence – Aide Medicale Internationale.

59 See Yesh Din, “96.6 Percent of Investigations into Attacks on Palestinian Trees are Closed due to

Police Failings. Indictments in Only Four Cases”, 13 October 2014, and “Law Enforcement on Israeli

Civilians in the West Bank”, Yesh Din Monitoring 2005-2013, 24 July 2013.

60 Yesh Din, “96.6 Percent of Investigations into Attacks” (see footnote 59).

61 Information provided by Premiere Urgence – Aide Medicale Internationale.

62 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Protection of Civilians, 30 September – 13

October, and “Settlers beat woman picking olives with her children near Salfit”, Ma’an News

Agency, 12 October 2014.

63 OHCHR and the Protection Cluster, “Update on settler violence” (see footnote 35), pp. 3-4.

64 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Between 1 November 2013 and 27 October 2014, 207 Palestinians were recorded as injured

in settler-related incidents, including 88 by settlers themselves and 119 by Israeli security

forces. According to information received from OHCHR, five Palestinian fatalities were

recorded in settler-related incidents, including three killed by Israeli security forces and two

by Israeli settlers. During the same period, six Israelis were reportedly killed and 62 injured

by Palestinians in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (see also paras. 52-53 below).

41. In this context, Israel has repeatedly failed to prevent or halt attacks on Palestinians

as it is obliged to do under international law.65 This failure is underpinned by a long-

standing lack of accountability in cases involving settlers, whether in relation to physical

assaults or attacks on Palestinian property (see table below). As stated in previous reports,

Israel has an obligation to bring perpetrators to justice under international human rights law

(A/HRC/25/38, para. 38 and A/68/513, paras. 42-52), as a key component of ensuring

protection, justice for victims and non-repetition of similar incidents.

Impact of settler violence: 2009-2014 (January to September)

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Incidents resulting in

casualties

37 55 105 71 79 88

Injuries caused by settlers 106 76 144 115 121 142

Injured caused by Israeli

security forces

49 204 95 42 172 79

Incidents resulting in property

damage

69 145 232 183 240 166

Trees/saplings destroyed or

damaged

2 075 3 910 8 033 6 565 8 615 7 342

Source: Protection Cluster in the occupied Palestinian Territory (October 2014)

B. Cases of settler violence

42. Incidents of settler violence against Palestinians and their property continued

throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The kidnapping and murder of three

Israeli teenagers, Naftali Fraenkel, Gilad Shaer and Eyal Yifrah, near Hebron in June 2014

sparked a wave of racist attacks by Israelis, including settlers, on Palestinians, particularly

in East and West Jerusalem but also across the West Bank. This culminated in the

abduction and murder by Israelis, including one settler, of Palestinian teenager Mohammad

Abu Khdeir from East Jerusalem, which in turn sparked violence by Palestinians against

Israelis (see A/HRC/28/80/Add.1).

43. Such cases recorded in Jerusalem included physical attacks, “price tag” hits (see

A/HRC/25/38, para. 47) and damage to property. The attacks were perpetrated by both

settlers and other Israelis, but were all part of an increase in attacks in Jerusalem during the

period under review. In one case monitored by OHCHR, on 10 February 2014, several cars

65 Israel has a positive obligation to protect Palestinians from settler violence and, as the occupying

Power, also the obligation to maintain public order and safety in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

including by providing Palestinians with all the guarantees accorded to protected persons under

international humanitarian law. Fourth Geneva Convention, in particular, arts. 4 and 27;

CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para.8, and Hague Regulations, art. 43.

were allegedly painted with “anti-Arab” graffiti and their tyres flattened in the Palestinian

neighbourhood of Silwan in East Jerusalem.

44. In another case monitored by OHCHR, on 12 April 2014, at around midnight, three

Palestinians from the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Beit Hanina went to withdraw

money from an automatic teller in the adjacent Pisgat Zeev settlement. As they were

leaving, they were blocked by some 25 settlers who reportedly declared that it was “a

Jewish neighbourhood” and that “Arabs are not allowed in”, and then severely beat them.

When the settlers left, the Palestinians informed an Israeli police patrol of the incident. The

police searched the area and arrested three suspects. On 13 April, the victims identified one

of the alleged perpetrators among those arrested. A few days later, however, the victims,

inquiring about the case, were informed that it was closed.

45. Incidents were also recorded in other areas of the West Bank. In a case monitored by

OHCHR, on 23 May 2014, two Palestinians were allegedly attacked by a group of four

settlers on road #457 when they stopped their car near the Ma’ale Mikhmas settlement. One

was beaten with metal pipes for about 15 minutes. He suffered three fractures to his skull

and spent three days in intensive care. The other Palestinian, the driver, was stabbed in the

arm by one of the settlers, and wounded his hand when attempting to grab the knife. He

managed to drive off to look for help. When he returned to the site accompanied by three

Palestinian cars, the settlers fled the scene.

46. During the period under review, cases of Palestinians throwing stones – and in some

cases Molotov cocktails – at Israeli vehicles in the West Bank, resulting in material damage

and a number of injuries, were recorded. Assaults by Palestinians against Israelis, including

against settlers, were also reported (see section below).

C. Failure to protect

47. The failure of Israeli forces to protect and enforce the law against settlers has been

well documented (see A/HRC/25/38, paras. 42-47). While past initiatives have led to

increased protection for Palestinians and their property, for the most part the violence

continues unabated. Concerns persist in two primary respects: incidents in which the Israeli

security forces are present at the scene of an incident involving violence by a settler, but fail

to intervene to prevent or stop the attack, including by failing to make arrests; and a more

general failure to provide adequate protection at known trouble spots and during periods of

heightened risk.

48. Past reports included information on several cases in which Israeli soldiers appeared

to stand by while settlers committed offences (A/66/364, paras. 23-25; A/67/375, paras. 30-

32; A/68/348, para. 40), despite having the authority and obligation to respond in cases

where the Israel Defense Forces are on the scene before the Israeli police.66 The State

Comptroller, responsible for, inter alia, auditing acts of Israeli institutions, in a report of

2013 raised similar concerns regarding the failure of the Israel Defense Forces to detain

suspects and to ensure the integrity of a potential crime scene.67

49. Recurrent incidents of settler violence in specific geographic areas have been

broadly documented.68 Accordingly, the authorities are aware of the locations and times of

year when greater protection is necessary. In 2012, the Office for the Coordination of

66 See Yesh Din, Shadow report to the fourth periodic report of Israel, Human Rights Committee, 8

September 2014 (available from www.yesh-din.org/infoitem.asp?infocatid=628), pp. 19-20.

67 Ibid., p. 20.

68 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, map of Palestinian communities at risk of

Israeli settler violence, September 2012. See also A/69/348, paras. 38-44 and A/68/513, paras. 46-47.

Humanitarian Affairs estimated that 315,000 people in 110 communities were at high or

moderate risk of settler violence.69 They included Palestinian villages close to Yitzhar and

Bracha settlements in the Nablus area where, for example, 1,974 olive trees were reportedly

damaged between January 2013 and the end of September 2014.70

D. Accountability

50. Where there is a willingness on the part of the Israeli authorities to enforce the law,

they are able to do so effectively. For example, as previously reported, following an attack

by Israeli settlers on an Israel Defense Forces post on 8 April 2014 sparked by the

demolition of some structures in Yitzhar settlement, the Government of Israel adopted a

position of “zero tolerance” and five arrests were reportedly made (A/69/348, para. 41).

The stationing of a border police company in Yitzhar appears to have led to a decrease in

settler violence incidents in the surrounding Palestinian villages since May 2014.71

Furthermore, there have been some cases of arrest of Israelis for committing “price tag”

attacks,72 an anti-nationalistic crimes unit has been created within the “Judea and Samaria”

(West Bank) police, and perpetrators are now reportedly classified as belonging to “illegal

associations”.73 The number of cases that actually lead to any kind of accountability is,

however, negligible.74

51. Overall, settlers committing violent acts against Palestinians are rarely prosecuted,

providing little deterrence against similar attacks. An examination of complaints of settler

violence since 2005 has revealed a lack of accountability in the vast majority of cases.

Indictments were served in only 72 of the 970 processed cases monitored between 2005 and

2014. A total of 887 files (or 91.4 per cent) of complaints were closed without an

indictment being served, of which 593 because the “offender was unknown”, 195 because

of “insufficient evidence” and 76 due to the “absence of criminal culpability”.75 This

reinforces a sense and culture of impunity for perpetrators, and exacerbates Palestinians’

sense of insecurity and lack of confidence in the Israeli judicial system.

E. Attacks on Israelis, and differentiated standards of due process

52. According to information provided by OHCHR, between 1 November 2013 and 27

October 2014, six Israelis (including two children) were killed, and 62 were wounded in

attacks committed by Palestinians - a worrying increase when compared with previous

years (see A/HRC/25/38, para. 39). The means deployed to investigate such incidents

appear to be greater than those for attacks against Palestinians. When the victims are Israeli,

large-scale arrest and detention campaigns are typically carried out by the Israel Defense

Forces throughout the West Bank, and by the Israeli police and border police in East

Jerusalem, in order to apprehend the suspects (A/66/364, para. 31). By contrast,

69 31 per cent in the North, 34 per cent in the Centre and 35 per cent in the South of the West Bank; see

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Monthly Humanitarian Monitor, August 2012.

70 OHCHR and the Protection Cluster, “Update on settler violence” (see footnote 35), p. 6.

71 Ibid., p. 5.

72 See “Seven Jewish teens arrested for ‘price tag’ attacks near Jerusalem”, ynetnews.com, 5 May 2015,

and Ben Hartman, “Husband and wife from Yitzhar arrested for Umm al-Fahm Price Tag attack”,

Jerusalem Post, 1 May 2014.

73 See Tovah Lazaroff, “US: Price tag attacks against Palestinians ‘largely un-prosecuted’”, Jerusalem

Post, 30 April 2014.

74 See Daniel Estrin and Josef Federman, “In West Bank, teen offenders face different fates”, AP, 20

April 2014.

75 Yesh Din, “Law Enforcement on Israeli Civilians in the West Bank”, November 2014.

investigations of attacks against Palestinians tend to raise serious questions about their

effectiveness in bringing perpetrators to account.

53. The difference witnessed in the justice systems applied is also matter of concern.

Most Palestinians accused of attacks against Israelis are tried by the Israeli military justice

system, while Israeli civilians, including settlers, accused of crimes are tried by civilian

courts.76 The Israeli military court system imposed on Palestinians in the West Bank,

including East Jerusalem, does not afford suspects some of the fundamental guarantees of

the right to a fair trial, in particular the independence and impartiality of the tribunal

(A/67/372, para. 27).

VI. Settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan

54. An estimated 21,000 Israeli settlers currently live in the occupied Syrian Golan in 33

settlements heavily subsidised by Israel. These settlements enjoy a number of financial

incentives as well as a disproportionate allocation of water resources, which contributes to a

higher agricultural yield for settlers. By contrast, approximately 20,000 Syrians, the

majority from the Druze community, live in six villages dependent primarily on agricultural

income, but disadvantaged by restricted water supplies at higher prices and fewer economic

opportunities. 77

The exploitation of natural resources in the occupied Syrian Golan, in

violation of international law, has continually been supported by the Government of Israel,

and includes permits and licences granted to extractive multinational corporations involved

in oil and gas mining (A/HRC/25/38, para. 48, and A/68/513, paras. 53-54). The

Government’s latest five-year development plan, announced in January 2014, aims to

provide better water infrastructure systems and accelerate de-mining efforts to support

settler farming communities in the occupied Syrian Golan (A/69/348).

55. The beneficiaries of such developments may include the Israeli wine industry. A

total of 14 Israeli wineries, mostly founded in the late 1990s or early 2000s, are based in

Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan, and produce their wine from grapes grown

in the occupied territory. The oldest of the wineries based in several settlements in the

occupied Golan, Golan Heights Wineries, founded in 1983, produces an estimated 5.4

million bottles of wine annually. Many of the wineries, which market their produce

globally, reportedly do not label the origin of the grapes accurately on their bottles. 78

56. The Government is also reportedly focusing on investing in education for the benefit

of settlers in the occupied Syrian Golan. In August 2014, it was reported that an Israeli

academic institution, Ohalo College, based in Katzrin settlement in the occupied Syrian

Golan, was offering a wide range of financial incentives to prospective students in order to

increase enrolments. 79

The Secretary-General reiterates that the Security Council, in its

resolution 497 (1981), reaffirmed that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible,

in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law,

and relevant Security Council resolutions, and decided that the decision of Israel to impose

76 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recommended that Israel ensure equal

access to justice for Palestinians and Israelis, including settlers; see CERD/C/ISR/CO/14, para. 27.

77 Patrick O. Strickland, “Residents in occupied Golan Heights fear creeping Israeli presence”, 12

February 2015.

78 Forbidden Fruit: the Israeli Wine Industry and the Occupation (Tel Aviv, Who Profits, April 2011).

On the labelling of products from settlements in the West Bank, see A/HRC/22/63, para. 99.

79 “As world watched Gaza, Israel announced 1472 new settlements in West Bank”, Mondoweiss, 30

August 2014.

its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights was null and

void and without international legal effect.

VII. Conclusions and recommendations

57. During the period under review, Israel continued to play a leading role in the

establishment and the expansion of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian

Territory, in violation of international law, in particular article 49 of the Fourth

Geneva Convention. The settlements continue to be a central source of multiple

human rights violations of Palestinians. In this context, Israel still largely fails to

comply with its international obligation to protect the Palestinian population from

violent acts committed by Israeli settlers, and to effectively prevent, and ensure

accountability for, settler violence. Israeli policies and practices regarding access to

Palestinian land have a negative impact on the rights of Palestinians, in particular

their rights to an adequate standard of living and to work.

58. Israel must stop obstructing and restricting the access of Palestinians to

agricultural land in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Disproportionate

restrictions, mostly related to settlements, are putting Palestinian livelihoods at a great

risk. Effective measures should be taken to ensure that Palestinians are able to have

access to and cultivate their land on a continuous basis, beyond ad hoc mechanisms

such as “prior coordination”. In addition, security of land tenure must be ensured,

including by means of measures allowing Palestinians to register without

discrimination the land they have been using for long periods of time.

59. Israel, as the occupying Power, is obliged to take all reasonable measures to

prevent violent attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians. Israel must ensure that

all acts of violence committed by Israeli settlers against Palestinians and their

property are investigated independently, impartially, thoroughly, promptly,

effectively and in a non-discriminatory manner. Investigations should be open to

public scrutiny and allow for the participation of victims. Alleged perpetrators should

be prosecuted and victims should be granted an effective remedy.

60. Israel must cease all settlement activity in the West Bank and East Jerusalem,

as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan, and implement relevant United Nations

resolutions, including Security Council resolution 497 (1981), and withdraw from the

territories occupied in 1967. Israel must also immediately cease the exploitation of

natural resources from these territories.