28/51 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human - Rights on the situation of human rights in Libya and on related technical support and capacity-building needs
Document Type: Final Report
Date: 2015 Jan
Session: 28th Regular Session (2015 Mar)
Agenda Item:
GE.15-00375 (E)
Human Rights Council Twenty-eighth session
Agenda items 2 and 10
Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General
Technical assistance and capacity-building
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Libya and on related technical support and capacity-building needs
Summary
The present report on the situation of human rights in Libya and related technical
support and capacity-building needs is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council
resolution 25/37 of 28 March 2014.
Libya is facing the worst political crisis and escalation of violence since the 2011
armed conflict. Two parliaments and governments claim legitimacy, while powerful armed
groups exercise effective control on the ground, committing violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law with impunity. The justice system continues to be
attacked and is no longer functioning in parts of the country. In this context, the provision
of technical assistance has been significantly disrupted. However, some State institutions
and civil society organizations are still functioning to varying degrees and require
assistance.
The report gives an overview of the human rights situation in Libya and of the
technical assistance provided to support key institutions and civil society actors. It contains
recommendations to address the protection of civilians, improve the administration of
justice and support legal reform, transitional justice and national institutions.
Contents Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 3
II. Background ............................................................................................................. 2–10 3
III. Human rights priorities and technical support needs .............................................. 11–81 5
A. Protection of civilians ..................................................................................... 11–20 5
B. Groups in focus ............................................................................................... 21–40 6
C. Administration of justice ................................................................................ 41–53 9
D. Legal reform ................................................................................................... 54–56 11
E. Transitional justice .......................................................................................... 57–74 12
F. National institutions ........................................................................................ 75–81 15
IV. Conclusion and recommendations ........................................................................... 82–85 16
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 25/37
of 28 March 2014. It was prepared in cooperation with the United Nations Support Mission
in Libya (UNSMIL). The figures in the report are best estimates based on information
received from members of the United Nations Country Team in Libya and other sources.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
continues to provide support to the human rights mandate of UNSMIL. The Director of
UNSMIL Human Rights, Transitional Justice and Rule of Law Division represents the
High Commissioner in Libya.
II. Background
2. Since the High Commissioner’s last report to Council (A/HRC/25/42), the human
rights and humanitarian situation in Libya has deteriorated amidst escalating violence and
an increasingly volatile political environment. In March 2014, following controversy over
the expiry date of the term of the parliament — the General National Congress —, an
agreement was reached to amend the Constitutional Declaration to hold national elections
on 25 June to create a new parliament — the House of Representatives. The House was to
convene in Benghazi in accordance with the amended Constitutional Declaration, but in the
light of the security situation, its first meeting was convened in Tobruk on 4 August 2014,
and has remained there since. In February 2014, separate nation-wide elections were held
for a Constitution Drafting Assembly, which was established in the town of Al-Baida and
held its first meeting on 21 April.
3. In mid-May 2014, in Benghazi, General Khalifa Haftar launched Operation Dignity
(karama) against the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, an alliance comprising
Ansar al-Shari’a, Libya Shield units and other armed groups. Fierce fighting has continued
since then. The Shura Council initially gained control of most of the city. Fighting in
Benghazi intensified in mid-October 2014, following a renewed offensive by General
Haftar’s forces — the Libya National Army —, which appeared to have gained control of
sizeable areas of Benghazi by December 2014.
4. Tripoli witnessed six consecutive weeks of heavy fighting from mid-July 2014,
when an alliance of armed groups, primarily from Misrata, but also from other towns,
including Al-Zawiya and Gheryan, and Tripoli-based armed groups launched Operation
Libya Dawn (fajr Libya) against the Zintan-affiliated Al-Qa’qa’ and Al-Sawai’q armed
groups allied with fighters from the Warshafana region, west of Tripoli. The fighting was
particularly intense around Tripoli International Airport, but affected other large areas of
Tripoli. On 24 August 2014, Libya Dawn fighters seized control of the airport and other
areas of Tripoli from Zintan-affiliated armed groups, which withdrew from the city. Libya
Dawn operations were extended to the Warshafana region until Libya Dawn gained control
over the region. Fighting then broke out in the Nafusa Mountains when Zintan-affiliated
armed groups attacked the towns of Kikla and Al-Qala’a. At the time of writing,
intermittent fighting was ongoing in the Nafusa Mountains and air strikes against Mitiga
Airport and other areas in the west of the country had been carried out by the air force
aligned with General Haftar.
5. Sporadic fighting also erupted throughout the year in southern Libya around the
towns of Sabha, Kufra and Awbari, involving Arab, Tabu and Tuareg armed groups, many
allied with either the Dignity or Libya Dawn camps.
6. Following Libya Dawn’s takeover of Tripoli at the end of August 2014, the
Government, led by incumbent Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, left Tripoli and moved
to the town of Al-Baida. The House of Representatives subsequently confirmed Mr. Al-
Thinni as Prime Minister. In Tripoli, the General National Congress reconvened and
established its own government, led by Omar al-Hasi, which gradually took control of
Tripoli-based ministries and other State institutions. On 6 November, the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a provision of the March 2014 constitutional amendment which
had paved the way for elections to create the House of Representatives.
7. Hundreds of armed groups, comprising more than 200,000 fighters, continue to be
paid from central State funds. Some are nominally affiliated with either the Ministry of
Defence or the Ministry of the Interior. Those groups exercise effective control in localized
areas and over detention centres, where thousands of persons associated with the former
regime, among others, continue to be detained outside of the effective oversight of the
authorities.
8. UNSMIL/OHCHR continues to monitor and report on the human rights situation in
Libya, despite the relocation of UNSMIL international staff outside of Libya in mid-July
2014. UNSMIL has repeatedly called on all armed groups to desist from violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law and abuses of human rights. Joint reports
on the situation were issued by OHCHR and UNSMIL on 4 September 20141 and 23
December 2014.2 However, interlocutors are often reluctant to talk about human rights
abuses out of fear of retaliation by armed groups. That climate and the continuing violence
and political crisis have severely impacted the delivery of technical assistance by
UNSMIL/OHCHR and others. In some cases, such assistance had to be reconfigured or
suspended.
9. On 27 August 2014, the Security Council adopted resolution 2174 (2014), in which
it decided that travel ban or asset freeze measures would be applied to individuals or
entities “engaging in or providing support for other acts that threaten the peace, stability or
security of Libya”, including “planning, directing, or committing, acts that violate
applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that
constitute human rights abuses, in Libya” (para. 4).
10. Libya is a party to the core international human rights treaties, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families. It has also ratified the first Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.
Libya is also a party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, but has not yet
ratified, inter alia, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol. In 2013, Libya ratified the Convention
1 See www.ohchr.org/documents/countries/ly/overviewviolationslibya_unsmil_ohchr_sept04_en.pdf.
2 See www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/UNSMIL_OHCHRJointly_report_Libya_23.12.14.pdf.
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but it has not yet deposited the instrument of
ratification.
III. Human rights priorities and technical support needs
A. Protection of civilians
1. Indiscriminate shelling and other violations of international humanitarian law
11. Indiscriminate attacks by all sides in densely populated areas have been frequently
reported, resulting in civilian casualties in Tripoli, Benghazi, Warshafana, the Nafusa
Mountains and other areas. While the precise number of casualties is not known, hundreds
are reported to have been killed. Land mines were reportedly used in the Tripoli
International Airport area and explosive remnants of war are a major hazard for civilians.
12. Armed groups have been using a variety of weapons, including small arms, rockets,
mortars, anti-aircraft guns, tanks and air attacks. Many of the weapons used are unreliable
because they are old and poorly maintained, with inaccurate aiming systems and faulty
ammunition. Fighters have received little training and do not operate with the appropriate
discipline, command and control systems. Those factors have contributed to the
indiscriminate nature of many attacks.
13. There have been frequent power, fuel and food shortages and a breakdown in basic
health and education services.
14. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
estimated that the violence has led to the internal displacement of nearly 400,000 persons
between May and November 2014.3
15. Civilian infrastructure in Benghazi, Tripoli and other parts of Libya has been
damaged extensively by the fighting. Armed groups affiliated with different camps have
also engaged in the deliberate destruction of civilian property belonging to their perceived
opponents in Benghazi, Tripoli and Warshafana, including through the use of bulldozers.
16. Several hospitals were hit, including Tripoli Al-Afya Hospital and Tripoli Central
Hospital, during July and August 2014. In September, a hospital in Al-Zawiya was also hit
and Al-Zahra hospital in the Warshafana area was reportedly looted and burned. In
Benghazi, the Hawari General Hospital suspended operations due to the fighting, and Ansar
al-Shari’a temporarily occupied Al-Jalaa hospital and reportedly shelled a wing of the
Benghazi Medical Centre, setting off a fire in December. Reports were also received of the
obstructed evacuation of injured persons and of impeded humanitarian assistance, as well as
of the misuse of medical vehicles for military purposes.
2. Summary executions, abductions, torture and other ill-treatment
17. Throughout 2014, UNSMIL/OHCHR received reports of summary executions by
targeted assassination, car bombs and beheadings. Human rights defenders, civil society
activists and media professionals, as well as members of the judiciary and law enforcement
officers, were among the victims, amidst the increasing violence. In November, footage of
the beheading of several people, apparently in Benghazi and Derna, were circulated on
social media.
3 See www.unhcr.org/5465fdb89.html.
18. The escalation in violence in 2014 also increased the number of persons deprived of
their liberty by armed groups. In addition to fighters belonging to rival armed groups,
UNSMIL/OHCHR received reports of civilians being abducted solely for their actual or
suspected tribal, family, political or religious affiliation and nationality. A significant
proportion of victims interviewed by UNSMIL/OHCHR reported that they had been
subjected to torture and other ill-treatment during abduction. People abducted have been
either unlawfully detained in official detention facilities or in makeshift facilities which are
not officially recognized. Many people remain missing since the time of their abduction.
19. In western Libya, abductions were carried out by armed groups belonging to or
allied with Libya Dawn, as well as those from Warshafana and Zintan. Libya Dawn fighters
have continued to search for and abduct people, following their takeover of Tripoli. Armed
groups from Zintan and Warshafana abducted travellers and other people from Gheryan,
Misrata, Nalut, Tripoli and Al-Zawiya. Many were held in captivity until they were
exchanged for other abductees.
20. In eastern Libya, armed groups affiliated with Operation Dignity abducted dozens of
men in areas under their control, including on the basis of their political affiliation or
nationality. Some of those abducted were allegedly tortured in several detention centres
before being taken to Gernada prison near Al-Baida. In October 2014, the Benghazi
Revolutionaries Shura Council moved over 130 inmates from Buhdeima military prison to
an unknown destination and stated that they were going to be tried in accordance with
sharia.
B. Groups in focus
1. Women
21. There were numerous incidents of violence against women during 2014. In the lead-
up to the February 2014 elections for the Constitution Drafting Assembly,
UNSMIL/OHCHR received reports of threats and attacks against female candidates, which
contributed to their reluctance to run for election, and staff observed posters of female
candidates being torn down. On 25 June, prominent human rights defender Salwa
Bughaigis was shot dead in her Benghazi residence, after casting her vote in elections for
the House of Representatives. On 17 July, former member of the General National
Congress Fariha Barkawi was assassinated in Derna.
22. Several women activists reported that they had been pressured to abandon their
public roles. One human rights defender reported that she had received several telephone
calls from armed groups warning that if she continued writing about women’s rights, she
and her children would be killed. She and her family have since left the country. Another
human rights defender and lawyer who had taken part in a public debate on women’s rights
received anonymous telephone calls and text messages warning her that she would be
abducted and killed.
23. Libyan women also face discrimination in personal status and other matters, such as
polygamy, prohibition to travel without a male guardian and the inability to pass on their
nationality to their children or spouses. Civil society activists have raised these as key
issues to be addressed in the constitution drafting process.
24. UNSMIL is in regular contact with women’s rights defenders and has organized
several workshops to build their capacity. UNSMIL has also provided technical advice to
strengthen women’s participation in areas such as the political process and constitution
drafting.
25. The present report also addresses the efforts of the Libyan authorities to provide
support to women and men victims of sexual violence.
2. Children
26. UNSMIL/OHCHR received reports of children killed or maimed as a result of the
violence, victims of attacks on schools and hospitals, and affected by the denial of
humanitarian access.
27. UNSMIL/OHCHR documented tens of cases of children injured or killed as a result
of shelling in Tripoli and Benghazi. Children in camps housing displaced persons have also
been injured as a result of the shelling. On 30 August 2014, a 15-year-old Tawerghan boy
was reportedly injured during an attack on Al-Fallah camp for internally displaced persons
in an area controlled by Libya Dawn. On 14 September, shelling in Al-Zawiya resulted in
serious injury to two boys, aged 6 and 9, and a girl, aged 10. Other reports include the
killing of at least six children in incidents of shelling or crossfire, in Benghazi.
28. Explosive remnants of war remain a major hazard for children, and civilian objects,
such as schools, have been extensively damaged by shelling, limiting access to education.
Schools in Benghazi, Tripoli and other places have been closed and converted into
makeshift shelters for internally displaced persons. UNSMIL/OHCHR also received reports
that schools in the Warshafana areas and Nafusa Mountains were being used as bases by
armed groups for launching attacks.
29. UNSMIL/OHCHR closely liaised with the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) in monitoring violations of the rights of children; contributing to the annual
report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict; and reporting relevant
violations to the Security Council by way of the Global Horizontal Note coordinated by the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.
3. Internally displaced persons
30. Prior to the recent violence in 2014, roughly 60,000 Libyans remained internally
displaced4, mainly as a result of the 2011 conflict. Those affected included persons from
Mashashiya, Gualish, Jaramla, Si’an, as well as Tabu and Tuareg communities. The
inhabitants of the town of Tawergha are the largest group of internally displaced, totalling
about 30,000.5 They were forcibly displaced from their town in August 2011 by armed
groups from Misrata, following allegations of grave human rights abuses committed in
Misrata by pro-Qadhafi forces from Tawergha. Since then, Tawerghans have been unable
to return to their town and have been subjected to continuous harassment. Some camps for
internally displaced Tawerghans were located in or near areas affected by the fighting in
Tripoli and Benghazi. Members of armed groups have raided camps for displaced
Tawerghans, conducting unlawful killings and abductions. On 30 August, Al-Fallah camp
was raided by forces affiliated with Libya Dawn: one person was reportedly killed and
three were injured. Many Tawerghans have thus fled for fear of further shelling or
abductions. In mid-October, 2,500 Tawerghans fled their camp in Benghazi and are staying
in makeshift shelters in Ajdabiya and elsewhere. UNSMIL/OHCHR has maintained close
contact with the representatives of the Tawergha community in order to monitor their
situation, ensure awareness of abuses against them and address their humanitarian needs.
31. The ongoing escalation in violence led to a new wave of internally displaced
persons. In mid-November 2014, UNHCR estimated that approximately 400,000 people
4 See www.unhcr.org/538484ab9.html.
5 Ibid.
had been internally displaced by the fighting.6 UNSMIL/OHCHR received reports of
displacement as a result of damage to residential properties through indiscriminate shelling,
and of intentional destruction of residential properties, farms, factories and other businesses
by armed groups targeting perceived opponents, particularly in Warshafana and in
Benghazi.
4. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers
32. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers remain extremely vulnerable in Libya. Libya
has not ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and the authorities
have not established a proper protection framework. Detention of such individuals is
widespread and prolonged, particularly affecting those originating from sub-Saharan
Africa. The detainees usually have no means of challenging their detention.
33. In the first half of 2014, UNSMIL/OHCHR visited various detention centres for
migrants, including in Abu Salim, Al-Zawiya, Al-Tewisha, Al-Hamra, Al-Khoms, Al-
Gewia, Burshada, Gatrun, Surman, Zoo Centre and Zliten. UNSMIL/OHCHR found
conditions of grave concern, including chronic overcrowding, poor sanitation and health
care, and insufficient food. There were also consistent reports of physical or verbal
mistreatment, labour exploitation, sexual abuse, extortion and confiscation of identity
documents, and minors were being detained with adults. Women detainees reported that
they were subjected to sexual violence. The escalation in the violence has exacerbated the
situation due to the breakdown in public services and the scarcity of basic items.
34. Migrants became even more vulnerable due to the recent violence, especially those
in areas affected by the fighting, without the ability or means to leave. Many migrants have
sought to flee the violence by crossing the borders into neighbouring countries, some of
which have intermittently imposed strict restrictions on entry. In a visit to Zuwara in north-
western Libya, in mid-August 2014, UNSMIL/OHCHR staff interviewed migrants who had
fled the shelling in the Al-Krimeya neighbourhood of Tripoli and were living without
adequate shelter, proper sanitary facilities, sufficient food or basic physical security, and
who reported threats from Libyan border guards. Others, including women, unaccompanied
children and elderly people, have sought to leave by sea routes. UNHCR estimates that
approximately 130,000 people arrived in Italy from Libya between January and October
2014.7 While many were rescued at sea by the Italian navy and other forces, over 3,000
people reportedly died at sea during that period.8
5. Amazigh, Tabu and Tuareg communities
35. The Amazigh, Tabu and Tuareg communities are officially referred to as
“components” of Libyan society. Many within these communities consider themselves
indigenous persons. The Amazigh community, as well as sizeable proportions of the Tabu
and Tuareg communities, boycotted the elections for the Constitution Drafting Assembly
on the grounds that the proposed decision-making procedures of the Assembly did not offer
sufficient guarantees to protect their rights. In addition, they did not consider the two seats
reserved for each community as adequate. However, Tabu and Tuareg communities did
vote, one month later, to elect representatives.
6 See www.unhcr.org/5465fdb89.html.
7 See www.refworld.org/pdfid/54646a494.pdf.
8 See www.unhcr.org/542d12de9.html.
6. Religious minorities
36. In February 2014, the bodies of seven Egyptian Coptic Christians were found near
Benghazi. Also, in February, over 30 Egyptian Copts were detained in Benghazi, allegedly
tortured and asked to convert to Islam by Ansar al-Shari’a, before being released a few days
later and deported to Egypt.
37. In October 2014, armed men looted and damaged the Othman Pasha Madrasa, which
serves Tripoli’s Sufi community. In the same month, a group of gunmen stormed and
vandalized the Karamanli Mosque. Days later, attackers attempted to vandalize the Darghut
Mosque, but failed when local volunteers protected the building.
7. Civil society
38. Since the outbreak of violence in mid-2014, UNSMIL/OHCHR has received reports
of civil society activists in Benghazi and Tripoli being threatened, abducted, unlawfully
killed or having their homes looted or burned down. Individuals have been shot in the street
while going about their routine, others have been threatened through social media and text
messages. In one case, an activist was abducted shortly after he had been threatened on
Facebook. One prominent human rights defender received text messages warning that his
children would be abducted and killed if he did not stop his advocacy work. Known
activists, Tawfik Bensaud, aged 18, and Sami al-Kawafi, aged 17, were killed in Benghazi
on 19 September. In Derna, Usama al-Mansuri was killed on 6 October, apparently after
publicly criticizing a declaration by armed groups in the town pledging allegiance to the so-
called Islamic State. As a result, numerous human rights defenders have curtailed their
activism, gone into hiding or left the country.
39. UNSMIL/OHCHR is in regular contact with human rights defenders, including
those who have relocated out of the country as a result of attacks and intimidation directed
against them, and has sought to support them through the provision of practical advice, the
facilitation of contact with local non-governmental providers of aid, and ongoing
monitoring and public reporting of their situation.9
8. Media professionals
40. Media professionals have been subjected to increasing attacks and abductions, which
has limited freedom of expression and opinion and the dissemination of information. On 26
May 2014, Muftah Abu Zeid, the editor-in-chief of Berniq newspaper, was killed in
Benghazi. On 8 October, Al-Mu’tasem al-Warfalli, a journalist with the Libya Al-Watan
radio station, was shot dead in Benghazi. Television stations Libya Al-Aseema, Al-Ahrar,
Al-Dawliya and Al-Wataniya have been attacked in Benghazi and Tripoli. A journalist who
used to be based in Tripoli informed UNSMIL/OHCHR that he left the country after
receiving death threats as well as threats against his family on social media.
C. Administration of justice
1. Detention and conditions of detention
41. The situation of persons deprived of their liberty since the 2011 conflict remains a
major concern. In October 2013, UNSMIL/OHCHR published a joint report on widespread
torture, other ill-treatment and deaths of those detained in Libya.10 According to the
9 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15168.
10 See www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/TortureDeathsDetentionLibya.pdf.
Ministry of Justice, as of March 2014, 6,200 people were held under its control across the
country. Only 10 per cent of them had been tried and were serving prison sentences.
42. As a result of the serious security challenges faced by the authorities, progress in the
judicial screening of detainees and the release of those who would not be prosecuted has
been minimal despite successive deadlines set by national legislation. While, scores of
detainees have been released from detention facilities in Al-Zawiya and Misrata, the vast
majority continue to await judicial process.
43. UNSMIL/OHCHR is concerned that, amidst the heightened violence and political
vacuum, persons held in detention are at increased risk of abuse, as it has received several
reports of torture and other ill-treatment. Conditions in some facilities, such as Al-Jawiya
prison in Misrata, officially under the Ministry of Justice, seem to have deteriorated, with
reports of beatings and other abuses. UNSMIL also documented individual cases of torture
carried out by armed groups from Warshafana and Al-Zawiya (in particular in Al-Jazira and
Al-Jandubi prisons) and in Tripoli (in particular in Mitiga and Abu Salim detention
centres). Three inmates were killed in unclear circumstances, allegedly during a prison riot,
in Al-Sikt prison in Misrata, on 29 August. On 22 October, more than 130 detainees were
removed by the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council from Buhdeima military prison to
an unknown location, reportedly to be tried in accordance with sharia.
44. During the course of 2014, UNSMIL/OHCHR staff visited, at least once, some 20
detention centres, mostly in western Libya, where the largest concentration of detainees is
found. Through that monitoring, UNSMIL notified the authorities in control of the facilities
and relevant ministries of pertinent issues and specific cases requiring attention, and made
recommendations to improve the conditions of detention, in an attempt to bring them into
line with international human rights standards, including the Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners.
2. The Judicial Police
45. The Libyan authorities have continued to integrate members of armed groups into
the Judicial Police, whose responsibilities include managing prisons, enforcing court
decisions, maintaining the security of courts and apprehending fugitives. By June 2014,
approximately 10,000 members had been integrated into the Judicial Police. Despite advice
from UNSMIL/OHCHR on international standards relating to vetting procedures, no formal
vetting process was undertaken. The Judicial Police face challenges in ensuring control
over the facilities it is nominally responsible for. Many armed groups continue to retain
command structures and exercise autonomous control over those facilities, even when they
are formally under the authority of the Ministry of Justice.
46. While UNSMIL/OHCHR has observed that basic security has been maintained for a
number of prisons, the recent violence has presented further challenges for the Judicial
Police. Only about 50 per cent of Judicial Police officers are estimated to have been
reporting for duty during the fighting. Prisons have also been affected by the disruption in
basic services, which has led to a lack of medical supplies and scarcity of certain food
items.
47. In February 2014, UNSMIL/OHCHR assisted the Judicial Police in conducting a
census of detainees. For the first time since the 2011 conflict, the exercise provided the
authorities with snapshot data on detainees, including their name, age, gender, charges and
legal status. The census facilitated the follow-up of specific cases. UNSMIL/OHCHR
further advised on the development of information management systems to ensure
sustainable means of maintaining and retrieving timely data on detainees. In May,
UNSMIL/OHCHR cooperated with the World Organisation Against Torture in providing
capacity-building sessions on increasing prison authorities’ awareness of human rights
standards. In November, it took part in a regional exchange on human rights complaint
mechanisms within detention centres.
3. The judiciary and the courts
48. The deteriorating security environment has impacted heavily on the judiciary,
further undermining the effective administration of justice and the process of reform.
Prosecutors and judges have been frequently subjected to intimidation and attacks, in the
form of court bombings, physical assaults, abduction of individuals or family members and
unlawful killings. An explosion on 6 January led to the death of a police officer guarding
the South Benghazi Court. Former Prosecutor General, Judge Abd al-Aziz al-Hasadi, was
assassinated in Derna on 8 February. Two months later, Deputy Director General of the
High Judicial Institute, Judge Kamal al-Bahari, was abducted from his office and released
the following evening. The offices of the Prosecutor General and courts in central Tripoli
were hit by shells on 20 August.
49. The attacks are often intended to prevent the release of members of the former
regime and to thwart the arrest and prosecution of members of armed groups. Law
enforcement officials and the Judicial Police do not have sufficient capacity, training or
resources to ensure the security of the judiciary or to undertake effective investigations.
50. The courts in Derna, Benghazi and Sirte effectively stopped functioning since March
2014, and in Tripoli during the fighting in July and August. There has been no known
prosecution of leaders or members of armed groups, despite serious and continuous human
rights abuses being carried out. Social dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as councils of
elders, have emerged to fill the gap created by the largely non-functioning courts, further
undermining the rule of law.
51. To compound matters, on 31 August 2014, the Government announced that it had
lost control of most ministries and government facilities in Tripoli, including the Ministry
of Justice. UNSMIL/OHCHR subsequently received a number of reports that the archives
of the ministries of Justice, Defence and the Interior, in Tripoli, had been broken into and a
large number of files, including civilian criminal investigation files, were taken by fighters
apparently belonging to Libya Dawn.
52. Prior to the recent violence, UNSMIL/OHCHR had advised the authorities on the
need to conduct a threat assessment and adopt appropriate security plans for the protection
of the courts and the judiciary, with the support of the ministries of the Interior and
Defence, due to the limited capacity of the Judicial Police to confront the scale of the
security challenge.
53. UNSMIL provided technical advice on an ongoing comprehensive judicial reform
process to the High Judicial Institute, which trains judges and prosecutors, and the Supreme
Judicial Council, which governs and administratively manages the courts and the judiciary.
The process includes reform of the organization and functioning of the court system and a
review of career development policies of the judiciary. In February 2014, UNSMIL and the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) organized a study tour to Italy for
members of the Council to interact with counterparts on judicial reform and security issues.
D. Legal reform
1. Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure
54. The Libyan Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure have gaps as well as
provisions that are not in line with international human rights standards. In coordination
with UNDP, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Ministry of Justice, the
High Judicial Institute, academics and civil society, UNSMIL/OHCHR continued to
support the review of the codes, which was initiated in 2013, in order to ensure their
compliance with international human rights standards. On 5 February, the General National
Congress issued Law No. 5, amending Article 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
new provision punishes with imprisonment any person found to be undermining the
17 February Revolution or publicly insulting the legislative, executive or judicial
authorities or disgracing the national flag. The Congress also passed Decree No. 5,
authorizing relevant ministries to discontinue and prevent the broadcasting of satellite
channels that are hostile to the 17 February Revolution or those which “undermine the
security and stability of the country or sow discord and sedition among the Libyans.”
UNSMIL/OHCHR has expressed concern that such broad and vague language could be
used to arbitrarily curtail freedom of expression and opinion. For instance, in November
2014, on the basis of the new provision, the Tripoli Appellate Court convicted Amara al-
Khatabi, editor of Al-Umma newspaper, in absentia, to five years’ imprisonment for
allegedly defaming public officials. It also barred him from practising journalism and
ordered him to pay compensation to five claimants. The sentence followed the publication
of a 2012 article, in which he named more than 80 judges and prosecutors accusing them of
being involved in corruption.
2. Law on Counter-terrorism
55. On 14 September 2014, the House of Representatives passed Law No. 3 of 2014 on
Counter-terrorism, defining terrorism as “any use of force, threat or intimidation for the
purpose of inflicting a serious harm to the public order or endangering the integrity of
society, its interests and safety, when the use of force results in harming individuals or
terrorizing them or endangering their life, public rights and liberties or their safety”. The
definition includes environmental and property offences, attacks on infrastructure, as well
as obstructing or hampering public authorities, diplomatic missions and international and
regional organizations and bodies in Libya. Most of the offences specified under the law are
punishable by life imprisonment or other severe prison terms, although the law also refers
to, but does not specify, “more severe” penalties.
56. The adoption of such an overly broad definition appears to be in violation of the
principle of legality and carries the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
E. Transitional justice
1. Law on Transitional Justice
57. On 2 December 2013, the General National Congress promulgated Law 29 of 2013
on Transitional Justice, which repealed a previous law on transitional justice. The new law
provided for the establishment of a new Fact-finding and Reconciliation Commission and a
framework for reparations, and emphasized the importance of criminal accountability. It
further provided for a deadline of 90 days from its promulgation — subsequently extended
by another 30 days —, whereby those still detained in relation to the 2011 conflict would be
either charged or released. At the time of writing there had been little progress in that
process.
58. UNSMIL/OHCHR provided advice to the authorities on the implementation of the
law, as well as extensive comments on the draft law, some of which were incorporated in
the final draft. UNSMIL/OHCHR also organized several meetings with civil society groups
to facilitate their interaction with the Commission and other transitional justice bodies.
2. Truth seeking
59. In March 2014, the General National Congress formed a four-person committee to
establish a roster of candidates for the Board of the Fact-finding and Reconciliation
Commission. On 1 April, the committee issued a public advertisement for candidates. The
committee also participated in a national television programme to explain the selection
process and how transitional justice principles may be applied in the Libyan context. Due to
the political volatility and announcement of elections, the committee did not complete its
work and the Board has yet to be appointed.
60. UNSMIL/OHCHR advised the Congress on international standards and best practice
relating to criteria for and selection of the Board. UNSMIL/OHCHR further informed civil
society organizations about the invitation for applications for membership of the Board, and
facilitated discussions between civil society organizations and the committee.
3. Reparations
61. There was no progress on the establishment of a Victims Compensation Fund, as
provided for in the Law on Transitional Justice. However, other bodies established in 2014
provide for reparations to victims of serious human rights violations. Law No. 1 of 2014 on
the Martyrs and Missing of the 17 February Revolution provides, inter alia, for symbolic
and material reparations, such as commemoration efforts, monthly grants and medical care
to victims (see para. 71 below for further information).
62. In February 2014, the Council of Ministers issued Decree No. 119 of 2014,
Addressing the Conditions of Victims of Sexual Violence, which provides for the
establishment of a specialized committee to identify victims under the former regime and
during the 2011 armed conflict. The committee is to recommend reparations, such as a
monthly stipend, health care, a mechanism to grant legal status to children born of rape and
legal aid for victims to seek accountability. In March, the Minister of Justice passed a
decree to appoint members of the specialized committee and subsequently appointed the
Head of the compensation fund. The fund itself is yet to function.
63. UNSMIL/OHCHR provided advice to the authorities on best practices in the design
and delivery of reparations programmes, and worked with civil society to facilitate their
engagement on reparations with officials. It also provided advice on establishing an
effective complaint mechanism within the police or the Ministry of Health, as well as
drafting legislation which comprehensively addresses the issue.
4. Criminal justice
64. On 24 March 2014, the Court of Assize in Tripoli began hearing the trial of Saif al-
Islam Qadhafi, Abdullah al-Senussi and 35 other members of the former regime, all
charged with crimes related to the 2011 conflict.
65. UNSMIL/OHCHR has been monitoring the trial, attending many sessions and
meeting with the Prosecutor and defence counsel. On one occasion, a staff member seeking
to attend a session was temporarily detained and his personal effects were confiscated. The
authorities subsequently apologized for the incident. UNSMIL/OHCHR also conducted
interviews with all defendants held in detention. The majority are held in Al-Hadhba
Correction and Rehabilitation Institution, in Tripoli, where the Court is based. Mr. Qadhafi
remained held in Zintan at the time of writing, while the eight defendants who had been
held in Misrata were moved to Tripoli in November 2014. Mr. Qadhafi and other
defendants held outside of Tripoli were connected by video-link to some sessions of the
trial, following the adoption of Law No. 7 of 2014, which amended the Code of Criminal
Procedure to permit such a modality to link defendants to a courtroom. The law established
that a hearing shall be considered public if broadcast live on television.
66. A trial session scheduled for August 2014 was postponed due to the fighting in
Tripoli, and the trial resumed in October, although Saif al-Islam Qadhafi was not connected
by video-link and has not participated in trial sessions since.
67. While all the defendants were eventually represented by defence counsel during the
trial sessions (either retained by their families or appointed by the court), the defence
counsel for Messrs. al-Senussi and Qadhafi have changed several times and Mr. Qadhafi is
no longer represented by a lawyer. Defence counsels reported difficulties in having full and
timely access to case material and in meeting their clients in private.
68. UNSMIL/OHCHR is concerned that the trial risks falling short of basic international
standards as reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
prosecution presented its case in June 2014, in less than one hour, without calling any
witnesses. At the time of writing, the court was asking defence counsel to present their case
and was reportedly trying to curtail the number of witnesses per defendant to two or three.
UNSMIL/OHCHR has repeatedly stressed that the trial should take place in compliance
with international human rights standards, including in relation to the importance of proper
legal representation for all defendants and for unfettered access by defence counsel to case
files and their clients in confidence. If the trial continues to proceed in this way, it will not
meet international standards. It will also constitute a missed historical opportunity to
publicly disclose and scrutinize crimes committed under the former regime.
5. Proceedings before the International Criminal Court
69. Following the Security Council’s referral of the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court in 2011, the Court issued arrest warrants and requested
the transfer of Abdullah al-Senussi and Saif al-Islam Qadhafi to The Hague. The Libyan
authorities challenged the admissibility of the cases. On 21 May 2014, the Appeals
Chamber confirmed that the case of Mr. Qadhafi was admissible before the Court, in part
because it found that he was not in State custody. In contrast, in July 2014, the Appeals
Chamber decided that Abdullah al-Senussi’s case was inadmissible before the Court as it
was subject to ongoing domestic proceedings and that Libya was willing and able to carry
out such investigation; also he was considered to be in State custody. On 10 December, the
Pre-Trial Chamber found that Libya had failed to surrender Mr. Qadhafi to the Court, and
referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council.
70. To date, both Saif al-Islam Qadhafi and Abdullah al-Senussi have been unable to
access legal counsel representing them before the International Criminal Court. In her
briefing to the Security Council on 12 November 2014, the Prosecutor noted that the
“ongoing violence and alleged threats to judges, prosecutors and lawyers do not augur well
for a fair trial”. She further noted that she would assess options, “including whether to
apply for a review of the judge’s decision upholding Libya’s request that the case against
Mr. Al-Senussi be tried in Libya”.
71. On 25 July 2014, the Prosecutor issued a statement that she “[would] not hesitate to
investigate and prosecute those who commit crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction in Libya,
irrespective of their official status or affiliation.”
6. Law on Political and Administrative Isolation
72. The authorities have undertaken limited or no vetting of new members of the armed
forces, law enforcement, judiciary or Judicial Police. In contrast, extensive measures
targeting those affiliated with the Qadhafi regime have been applied. Law No. 13 of 2013
on Political and Administrative Isolation lists a wide range of political, administrative and
other positions under the Qadhafi regime, as well as types of affiliation and conduct, as a
basis for excluding individuals from public life for 10 years. It contains criteria which are
vague, far-reaching and disproportionate and thus likely to violate the right to public
service of those affected. UNSMIL/OHCHR had advised the General National Congress on
international standards for vetting State institutions and the risks of exclusionary measures,
but that advice was largely not taken into account.
73. The Supreme Court considered seven challenges to the constitutionality of the law,
presented on both substantive and procedural grounds. The last session was on 26 June
2014, whilst members of armed groups protested outside the court. No further sessions have
been held since and no decision has been rendered.
7. Missing persons
74. More than 2,000 people from all sides of the conflict are reported to have gone
missing during the 2011 revolution. At the time of writing, there had been no progress in
the implementation of Law No. 1 of 2014 on the Care for Martyrs and Missing Persons of
the 17 February Revolution. The law provides for the establishment of a General
Commission for Tracing and Identifying Missing Persons and benefits to the families of
those killed or missing in the context of the revolution. However, it explicitly excludes
from such benefits the families of those who opposed the revolution. The Commission is
yet to be set up.
F. National institutions
1. The General National Congress and the House of Representatives
75. In contrast to the 2012 legislative elections for the General National Congress, the
2014 electoral law in relation to elections for the 200-member House of Representatives
excluded the participation of political parties, with 1,714 candidates standing in their
personal capacity. A special provision ensured that a minimum of 32 seats would be taken
up by women. Approximately 40 per cent of the 1.5 million registered Libyans voted on
25 June 2014. UNSMIL/OHCHR provided technical advice to the Congress specifically on
the implementation of the Law on Transitional Justice, but the growing political crisis and
the escalation in violence precluded the provision of further assistance to the Congress and
the beginning of a programme of assistance to the House.
2. Constitution Drafting Assembly
76. The elections for the Constitution Drafting Assembly took place on 20 February
2014. A special provision held that six of the 60 available seats would be taken up by
women; however, due to security complications in a multi-district area in the east of the
country, one of the six seats ended up being seated by a man. As a result of the boycott by
the Amazigh community and the security situation in Derna, which halted polling there,
four seats comprising of two from Derna and two reserved for the Amazigh community
remain unfilled. On 21 April, the Assembly held its first session in Al-Baida.
77. Amendment 3 of the Constitutional Declaration mandated the Assembly to draft the
constitution within 120 days. The Assembly publicly committed to completing a draft
Constitution by the end of December 2014. However, at the time of writing, it was expected
to take longer. The Constitution is to be adopted by a referendum.
78. A committee of the Assembly was established to address human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the Constitution. UNSMIL/OHCHR has identified international
experts on standby to advise the Assembly on human rights matters, but at the time of
writing, the Assembly had not specified the modalities of the assistance it wished to
receive.
3. National human rights institution
79. The National Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights was established in
December 2011 and began functioning in January 2013. UNSMIL/OHCHR deployed a
dedicated adviser, in December 2013, to provide sustained technical assistance to the
Council for four months. The adviser delivered training activities on relevant international
norms and standards, and provided advice on organizational structure and working methods
to improve the effectiveness of day-to-day operations.
80. In March 2014, UNDP, in partnership with UNSMIL/OHCHR, organized a
workshop for civil society organizations working on issues related to human rights, and the
Council, UNDP and UNSMIL/OHCHR organized a seminar with civil society
organizations and members of the Human Rights Committee of the General National
Congress to discuss a national plan of action on human rights. The work stalled following
the June 2014 elections for the House of Representatives.
81. UNSMIL/OHCHR received reports of threats and intimidation targeting staff
members of the Council. In October 2014, a staff member left Tripoli after receiving a
threatening phone call from someone claiming to be affiliated with Libya Dawn. That same
month, armed men sought to question senior Council representatives who were not in the
office at the time. A group of armed men claiming to be associated with Libya Dawn also
visited the premises of the Council requesting the handover of keys and official stamps.
Council staff refused to comply. Witnesses reported that armed men in military uniform
arrived at the Council headquarters on 9 November 2014, locked the doors and publicly
proclaimed that the Council was being closed by Libya Dawn, and that anybody attempting
to re-open the premises would be arrested. At the time of writing, the Council was not
functioning.
IV. Conclusion and recommendations
82. The actions taken by all parties involved in the current violence have led to numerous grave abuses of human rights and violations of international human rights
and humanitarian law.
83. The High Commissioner reiterates his appeal to all parties to the conflict to end hostilities and, through an inclusive political dialogue, to put in place a framework to
build a State based on respect for human rights and rule of law. He accordingly
recommends that:
(a) All armed groups comply fully with international humanitarian law,
specifically with the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution in attack.
In particular, they must immediately cease all attacks on civilians and must take steps
to protect civilians and fighters hors de combat. All armed groups must also desist
from violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law and abuses
of human rights, and remove from active duty those suspected of such actions;
(b) The Libyan authorities hold accountable, in accordance with
international standards, all parties responsible for violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law and abuses of human rights.
84. Whilst the ongoing violence has significantly impacted the rule of law and effective running of key institutions, some institutions still operate. There is a need for
further technical assistance to enhance their effectiveness and compliance with
international human rights standards. Accordingly, whilst cognizant of the major
security challenges, the High Commissioner recommends that the Libyan authorities,
through capacity-building and technical assistance support:
(a) Urgently address the situation of persons deprived of their liberty. Those
detained in connection with the recent conflict, as well as those held since the 2011
conflict, must be released or handed over to the justice system. All detention facilities
must be handed over from armed groups to the effective control of the State.
Authorities must investigate all allegations of torture and other ill-treatment, and
those found responsible must be removed from active duty and brought to justice.
Safeguards against torture and other ill-treatment should also be put in place;
(b) Develop a comprehensive strategy to address the issue of displaced
persons. Those displaced — including since 2011 — must be allowed to return to their homes in safety and dignity. In the interim, they must be given protection and
humanitarian assistance, in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement;
(c) Resume building State institutions, in particular the armed forces, law
enforcement and the judiciary, as soon as feasible. Enhance security for prosecutors,
judges and the courts as a priority to strengthen the rule of law. Establish a fair and
transparent vetting and recruitment process for the Judicial Police, and ensure that
prison officials are provided with adequate resources and training to effectively
manage their facilities, in line with international human rights standards;
(d) Ensure full support to the Constitution Drafting Assembly and ensure an
inclusive and consultative drafting process, leading to a constitution that is fully
compliant with international human rights standards, safeguarding dignity, non-
discrimination, equality and human rights for all. National legislation should also be
fully reviewed to ensure its compliance with international human rights standards,
and revised accordingly, with priority to the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal
Procedure;
(e) Review and strengthen legal and policy protections which guarantee the
rights of women, minorities, children, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and
establish measures to facilitate greater access to justice for those groups;
(f) Bring the transitional justice process back on track, with priority to the
appointment of qualified and independent members of the Board of the Fact-finding
and Reconciliation Commission, taking into account fair gender representation. The
Law on Political and Administrative Isolation should be revised to ensure that vetting
criteria are precise, proportionate and fair. The law on missing persons should be
revised to ensure that benefits extend to all victims, regardless of affiliation, and an
independent and impartial commission on missing persons established;
(g) Ensure that all those responsible for human rights violations and abuses
are brought to justice, with all the guarantees of a fair trial and due process, including
the ability to speak freely with counsel in confidence, and adequate facilities and
resources to conduct their defence. All necessary measures should be taken to ensure a
safe environment, free of intimidation, for any trial;
(h) Cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court by assisting its
investigations and complying with its rulings;
(i) Take all necessary steps to ratify the Optional Protocol to the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and withdraw reservations to the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
85. The High Commissioner further urges Member States of the Human Rights Council to remain seized of the situation in Libya, and proposes to present an oral
report on the human rights situation in Libya during the twenty-ninth session of the
Council and a written report during the thirty-first session, in order to keep Member
States actively apprised of the rapidly developing situation.