30/31 Situation of human rights in Yemen - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Human Rights Council Thirtieth session

Agenda items 2 and 10

Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the

High Commissioner and the Secretary-General

Technical assistance and capacity-building

Situation of human rights in Yemen

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights*

Summary

In the present report, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

makes an updated assessment of the overall situation of human rights in Yemen from 1 July

2014 to 30 June 2015, in the context of the deterioration in the security situation since

September 2014. The report describes both alleged violations and abuses of international

human rights law and alleged violations of international humanitarian law by parties to the

conflict. The High Commissioner concludes the report with recommendations, including

some contained in previous reports of the High Commissioner on the situation in Yemen.

* Late submission.

Contents Page

I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 3

II. Background ...................................................................................................................................... 3

A. Political developments and security situation .......................................................................... 3

B. Humanitarian situation ............................................................................................................. 6

C. International legal framework .................................................................................................. 6

III. Situation of human rights ................................................................................................................. 7

A. Conduct of hostilities ............................................................................................................... 7

B. Arbitrary detention, allegations of torture and other ill-treatment and prison conditions ........ 11

C. Right to freedom of expression ................................................................................................ 12

D. Death penalty .......................................................................................................................... 13

E. Children’s rights ...................................................................................................................... 13

F. Refugees, migrants, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons .................................... 14

G. Marginalized groups ................................................................................................................ 15

H. Accountability and transitional justice .................................................................................... 15

I. Cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights .. 16

IV. Conclusions and recommendations .................................................................................................. 17

3

I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted to the Human Rights Council pursuant to its resolution

27/19, In the report, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, covers the

period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015, particularly in the context of the deterioration in

the security situation in Yemen since September 2014.

2. During the period under review, the increasing level of insecurity in Yemen severely

hampered the capacity of the Country Office of the Office of the High Commissioner

(OHCHR) in Yemen to implement effectively its overall mandate, namely, that of

monitoring allegations of violations of international humanitarian law and violations and

abuses of international human rights law, and also of undertaking a wide range of human

rights activities, including capacity-building for national stakeholders. Notwithstanding the

afore-mentioned challenges, the present report is primarily based on human rights

monitoring carried out by OHCHR in Yemen and includes information provided by other

United Nations entities operating in Yemen. Unless specifically stated, all reports of

violations and abuses have been verified or cross-checked with a number of independent

and credible sources.

II. Background

A. Political developments and security situation

3. During the period under review, Yemen was afflicted by increasing tensions that

seriously compromised progress in a range of political and human rights developments. On

8 March 2014, presidential decrees No. 26/2014 and 27/2014 established a constitutional

drafting commission and named its 17 members, including four women. The decrees

provided that the drafting of the Constitution would be followed by public consultations

and a referendum within one year. That process was interrupted when violent outbreaks

increased in September 2014, with an immediate impact on the security situation in Sana’a

and several main cities in the country.

4. Tensions began to grow in June and July 2014, when an armed offensive was

launched in Amran Governorate by members of the Popular Committees, affiliated with the

Houthi movement,1 led by Abdel Malik al-Houthi, in conjunction with deserters from the

Yemeni Armed Forces and tribesmen loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh,2 against

troops from the 310th Armoured Brigade of the Yemeni Army, led by Brigadier General

Hamid Mohammed al-Qushaibi, as well as armed groups affiliated with the Islah party3 that

are also in conflict with the Houthis. Those clashes reportedly resulted in at least 204

casualties and the displacement of tens of thousands of people in June and July 2014 alone.

1 The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, is a movement based on the Zaidi doctrine, and followers of

the late Hussein al-Houthi, who was killed by the Yemeni Armed Forces in September 2004. The

Houthis are known to have a large presence in the northern Governorate of Sa’ada.

2 Ali Abdullah Saleh was the president of Yemen from 1990 until 2012, and previously served as

President of North Yemen from 1978 until unification with South Yemen in 1990. In November

2011, following widespread protests against his Government, Saleh signed an agreement prepared by

the Gulf Cooperation Council whereby he agreed to transfer power to the then Vice-President, Abd

Rabbo Mansour Hadi, in exchange for immunity from criminal prosecution.

3 The Islah is the name commonly used to refer to the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, a Yemeni

political party established in 1990 and believed to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

5. On 9 July 2014, the Popular Committees attacked and took over Amran city (Amran

Governorate), north of Sana’a. The day before, Brigadier General Al-Qushaibi was killed in

clashes between the Popular Committees and the 310th Armoured Brigade. The

circumstances of his death remain unclear. Although allegations were made that Al-

Qushaibi had been detained then executed, OHCHR was unable to verify them. The arsenal

in possession of the 310th Armoured Brigade fell into the control of the Popular

Committees. Their takeover of Amran aggravated the vulnerability of the capital and of the

sitting Government.

6. On 18 August 2014, tens of thousands of pro-Houthi demonstrators took to the

streets in Sana’a and several other cities to protest against the Government, blaming

President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi for failing to carry out the reforms promised. Abdel

Malik al-Houthi called upon President Hadi to dissolve the Government and reinstate fuel

subsidies, which had been abolished on 30 July 2014, resulting in a net increase in the cost

of fuel and other goods. Following the first day of demonstrations, members of the Popular

Committees began arriving in Sana’a, establishing protest camps in different locations

within the city, including nearby several ministries. Counter demonstrations by pro-

Government supporters were held in Sana’a throughout the following month, some of

which degenerated into violent clashes between opponents.

7. On 29 August 2014, the Security Council adopted a statement by the President of

the Council, expressing grave concern about the deterioration of the security situation in

Yemen, and recalling that individuals or entities threatening the country’s peace, security or

stability could be subject to targeted sanctions (S/PRST/2014/18).

8. On 2 September 2014, President Hadi dismissed his cabinet and called upon the

Houthi leadership to participate in a new government. He also agreed to partially reinstate

fuel subsidies. The Houthis rejected the proposal and threatened to escalate their protests. In

the weeks that followed, fighting escalated in Al-Jawf Governorate between Houthis and

armed groups affiliated with the Islah party.

9. Fighting also broke out in Sana’a between supporters of the Houthis and government

forces as the Popular Committees launched an offensive on the city. OHCHR was informed

by witnesses that, between 18 and 21 September 2014, a total of 22 State buildings and the

premises of civil society organizations were seized and occupied by members of the

Popular Committees across Sana’a.

10. On 21 September 2014, President Hadi, together with Houthi delegates and major

political parties, signed the Peace and National Partnership Agreement to stop the fighting.

The Agreement called for a new, technocratic government to be established within one

month and for the reduction of fuel prices by 25 per cent. It also stipulated that President

Hadi should appoint two advisers from the Houthis and Al-Hirak,,4 and a new Prime

Minister within the first three days of the signing. On the following day, Houthi forces

attacked and seized the headquarters of the Sixth Regional Military Command (previously

known as the First Armoured Division) in Sana’a. At around the same time, Al-Hirak

renewed calls for independence and, on 14 October 2014, staged a demonstration with tens

of thousands of people in Aden in support of secession. Over the following weeks, pro-

independence rallies continued in a number of cities, principally in Aden.

11. On 7 November 2014, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014), in

which the Council established a panel of experts to investigate those who engaged in or

4 Al Hirak (“the Southern Movement”) is a political movement operating in the territory of what was

formerly South Yemen before it unified with the Republic of Yemen in 1994. The movement calls for

the independence of the South from the Republic of Yemen.

5

provided support for acts that threatened the peace, security or stability of Yemen, the

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) (2140

Sanctions Committee) designated three individuals as the subject of an assets freeze and

travel bans: Abd al-Khaliq al-Houthi and Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim, Houthi military

commanders; and Ali Abdullah Saleh, President of Yemen’s General People’s Congress

party and former President of Yemen.

12. On 7 January 2015, the Constitutional Drafting Committee submitted the draft

Constitution to President Hadi. On 17 January 2015, Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, Chief of

Staff of President Hadi and Secretary-General of the National Dialogue Conference, was

abducted by the Popular Committees while travelling to a meeting organized by the

national body to approve the draft Constitution. The draft was eventually endorsed by 16 of

the 17 members of the Constitutional Drafting Committee. The Houthis were opposed to

the draft, in particular the division of the country into six administrative regions. On 18

January, President Hadi ordered the security forces to restore government control over

Sana’a, large sections of which had been seized by the Popular Committees, affiliated with

the Houthis, since September 2014. On 19 January 2015, fighting broke out in Sana’a

between Houthi forces and members of the presidential guards. On the following day, the

Houthis seized the presidential palace and the residence of President Hadi, who was then

placed under house arrest, together with other senior officials.

13. On 21 January 2015, President Hadi and the Houthis announced a 10-point

agreement, including provisions to revise the draft Constitution and to allow the Houthis to

appoint new members to the Government. On 22 January, President Hadi, Prime Minister

Khaled Bahah and the entire Cabinet resigned. On 25 January, the Parliament was

scheduled to consider the resignation but its session was postponed; as at July 2015, it had

not reconvened. On 21 February 2015, President Hadi escaped to Aden, announcing that he

intended to continue to exercise his presidential functions. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister

and key ministers remained under house arrest by the Popular Committees affiliated with

the Houthis. On 19 March, the presidential palace in Aden came under aerial attack,

allegedly by pro-Houthi members of the Yemeni Air Forces. President Hadi fled to Saudi

Arabia on 25 March.

14. On 24 March 2015, President Hadi requested the Gulf Cooperation Council and the

League of Arab States to intervene militarily, citing Article 51 of the Charter of the United

Nations (S/2015/217). On 25 March, a number of States members of the Gulf Cooperation

Council and the League of Arab States, led by Saudi Arabia, formed a coalition to initiate

military action alongside other countries against the Houthis, in response to President

Hadi’s request. On 26 March, coalition forces5 launched an aerial military campaign against

Houthi military targets in Yemen. The Government of the United States of America

announced that it would provide logistical and intelligence support for the coalition. In

addition to air strikes, coalition naval forces imposed a blockade on the ports of Aden and

Al-Hudaydah.

15. On 15 April 2015, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen, Jamal

Benomar, announced his resignation. Ismail Oud al-Cheikh Ahmed was appointed as the

new Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen on 25 April.

5 The coalition consists of all the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Countries (with the

exception of Oman), as well as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and the Sudan.

B. Humanitarian situation

16. The humanitarian situation began to deteriorate following the Houthi takeover of the

capital and other cities, beginning in September 2014. The armed conflict began to escalate

on 26 March 2015, when the coalition forces commenced its aerial strikes and imposed a

naval blockade on the main seaports in Yemen. This dramatically worsened an already dire

humanitarian situation, particularly in the worst affected areas, such as Sa’ada, Hajjah,

Taizz, Al-Dhale’e, Aden and Lahj. As at June 2015, the humanitarian country team

estimated that 20.4 million people required humanitarian assistance in Yemen, in particular

water, protection, food and health care.6

17. Yemen essentially depends on commercial food and fuel imports to meet the basic

needs of the population. More than 90 per cent of food is imported. At the end of the period

under review, approximately 12.3 million people – about half the country’s population –

suffered to some degree from food insecurity. Furthermore, as much as 80 per cent of the

population relies on some form of assistance to maintain access to safe drinking water and

sanitation.7 Severe import restrictions, caused mainly by the naval blockade imposed by the

coalition forces during the conflict, have also aggravated the humanitarian situation,

resulting in fuel scarcity, which adversely affects the distribution of food and water, as well

as the functionality of hospitals.

18. Given that all domestic fuel refineries were forced to stop operating by to the

security situation, the country was heavily dependent on imported fuel.8 In April and May

2015, fuel imports were equivalent to only 1 per cent and 18 per cent respectively of the

total estimated fuel needs.

19. The humanitarian country team estimated that, as at June 2015, some 15.1 million

people required assistance to obtain basic health care. Some 1.5 million women and

children were in need of nutrition supplies, and 2.9 million children required emergency

access to education. About 1.2 million people (1 million internally displaced persons and

200,000 vulnerable host communities) required support for access to emergency shelter and

essential goods. Moreover, the humanitarian country team reported more 7,000 cases of

dengue fever since March 2015.9

C. International legal framework

20. Yemen is a party to seven of the nine core international human rights treaties and to

the two Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Despite approval

by the Cabinet, the Parliament has yet to approve the ratification of a number of human

rights instruments, namely, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons

from Enforced Disappearance, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the

Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish

Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations

Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

6 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan, 19 June

2015.

7 Ibid.

8 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Reliefweb, “Yemen: Reduced Imports Worsen

Crisis”, 23 June 2015.

9 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan, 19 June

2015.

7

21. Yemen is a party to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and to

Additional Protocols I and II thereto, and to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions

on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively

Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

22. Yemen is also bound by customary international law, including customary

international humanitarian law and customary international human rights law.

23. As a State party to the above-mentioned conventions, Yemen is legally bound to

respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of those within its jurisdiction. In addition, all

parties to the conflict in Yemen, including Saudi Arabia and other members of the

coalition, are obliged to respect the applicable rules of international humanitarian law.

These include the obligations to respect the principles of distinction and proportionality,

and to take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population. Civilians and civilian

objectives are protected from attack. Hospitals, schools and religious sites are also subject

to heightened protections, and attacks on them have an impact on peoples’ enjoyment of

their rights, including to health, education and freedom of religion. Parties to the conflict

must also allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of impartial humanitarian relief

for civilians in need. It is important to recall that a situation of armed conflict does not

exempt any State from its human rights obligations.

24. While non-State actors cannot formally become parties to international human rights

treaties, non-State actors that exercise government-like functions and de facto control over

a territory are increasingly considered to be bound by international human rights

obligations when their conduct affects the human rights of the individuals under their

control.

III. Situation of human rights

A. Conduct of hostilities

25. For years, Yemen has been torn by conflicts between different political and

ideological forces. The current conflict between the Government of Yemen and the armed

groups has polarized the country in an unprecedented manner. The subsequent intervention

of the coalition forces intensified hostilities.

26. The information reported below was gathered by OHCHR in Yemen, which has

continued to monitor the situation closely despite the security-related challenges, and while

having to relocate its international staff members to Amman intermittently since May 2014.

The stringent security restrictions and the intensification of the conflict have required

serious limitations to access to the areas where people have been most affected by the

violence. As a result, OHCHR was unable to verify the vast majority of allegations of

human rights violations and abuses or violations of humanitarian law that had been reported

in relation to the ongoing conflict. The information below highlights examples of

allegations of attacks that were documented by OHCHR in Yemen throughout the period

under review.

27. In September 2014, the armed confrontation spread to Sana’a, resulting in further

casualties. According to the Ministry of Public Health, a total of 274 people, including

civilians, were killed as a result of fighting between Yemeni Armed Forces and the Popular

Committees between 17 and 21 September 2014.

28. According to information received by OHCHR, 1,527 civilians were killed and

3,548 injured between 26 March and 30 June 2015 as a result of the conflict, including by

air strikes. Of the casualties, at least 941 civilians were killed and 2,295 injured by coalition

air strikes, while 508 civilians were killed and 954 injured by joint operations led by the

Popular Committees and military forces loyal to former President Saleh in ground battles.

Furthermore, 54 civilians were killed and 234 injured as a result of other armed

confrontations between parties to the conflict, while at least 24 civilians were killed and 65

injured in attacks claimed by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula,10 mainly in Sana’a, Aden

and Taizz.

29. OHCHR received reports that at least 310 civilian infrastructures were partially or

completely destroyed by coalition air strikes and ground fighting throughout the country

from 26 March to 30 June 2015. They included 160 private homes and 150 civilian public

infrastructures that were partially or completely destroyed by the armed conflict. Of the

civilian public infrastructures, 95 civilian public buildings were affected by coalition air

strikes while 48 were damaged by shelling attributed to the Popular Committees. In

addition, four civilian public buildings were partially or completely destroyed by the local

armed groups opposing the Houthis as a result of armed clashes between the two opponent

groups. Lastly, at least three civilian public buildings were partially or completely

destroyed as result of attacks claimed by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.

30. According to information received, at least 15 heritage sites, including the United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site

of Old Sana’a and the Seera Castle in Aden were damaged by the armed conflict between

26 March and 30 June 2015. Sites were damaged by included air strikes, rocket attacks,

artillery shelling and ground fighting. Sites were also used for military advantage by

members of the Popular Committees and military units loyal to former President Saleh.

31. In addition, according to information available to OHCHR, 53 health facilities were

damaged or affected, and 96 schools were damaged, while 67 were used by armed groups

in the 18 governorates affected.11

32. According to satellite imagery acquired by the United Nations Institute for Training

and Research Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNITAR-UNOSAT) on 7

January and 17 May 2015, a total of 1,171 structures had been affected by the conflict:

approximately 273 structures had been destroyed, 271 were severely damaged and 627

moderately damaged. In addition, 35 impact craters were found within the city, the majority

of which were located along the runway of Sadah City Airport. Four medical facilities were

identified within 100 metres of damaged and destroyed buildings; it is possible that they

also sustained some damage. This is a preliminary analysis and has not yet been verified in

the field by OHCHR. Data will be cross-referenced and verified with the figures collected

above in due course.

1. Allegations of violations and abuses by the Popular Committees and forces loyal to Ali

Abdullah Saleh

33. OHCHR received reports that the Popular Committees affiliated with the Houthis

launched attacks that damaged public schools, mosques and Koranic schools. For example,

10 Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemeni chapter of Al-Qaida, is the result of the union of the

Saudi and Yemeni branches of Al-Qaida in January 2009. Its stated objectives include the overthrow

of the regime in Sana’a, and to kill Western nationals and their allies, including members of the Saudi

royal family. The group has been in conflict with the Government of Yemen since its establishment.

The Houthi advance has resulted in violent clashes with its fighters and has emboldened Al-Qaida in

the Arabian Peninsula in its quest to expand their control and recruit fighters from Sunni tribes,

claiming that the Houthis are Shia forces supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

11 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015 Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 23

June 2015.

9

according to witness accounts, the Popular Committees reportedly launched an attack in

early July 2014 that resulted in, inter alia, the destruction of a school in Beit al-Fakih and

the Dar al-Quran Mosque in Amran city. On 11 July 2014, the Al-Salam mosque was

reportedly occupied by the Popular Committees during the Friday sermon.

34. OHCHR received reports that, on 21 February 2015, in Lahj Governorate, three

civilians were killed as a result of shelling from the Anad Military Base, which is controlled

by forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. OHCHR interviewed witnesses but

was unable to verify the presence of any military targets that would justify these attacks.

35. On 31 March 2015, at least 20 employees at a cement factory in Lahj were killed

and 36 others injured as a result of shelling from Al-Anad military base. The base was

under the control of the Houthi and Saleh armed groups when the attack took place.

Vehicles and buildings were also destroyed. OHCHR documented structural damage to

three hospitals and 13 educational institutions in Al-Dhali Governorate as a result of intense

indiscriminate shelling, from 25 to 27 March, targeting residential areas by the 33rd

Armoured Brigade loyal to former President Saleh. According to information received by

OHCHR, the hospitals affected included Al-Nasr Hospital (operated by Medecins sans

Frontières) in Qasha’, Al-Salamah Hospital and Al-Dhali Hospital. Educational institutions

damaged by shelling include Al-Jumrok Faculty of Education, the Tadhamon Faculty of

Education and the Al-Dhali Community College.

36. On 10 April 2015, two civilians were killed and five others were injured as a result

of shelling allegedly by members of the Popular Committees. The shelling hit the Al-Salam

Area, Khormaksar District, Aden. All seven victims were inside their homes, which were

destroyed by the shelling launched during violent clashes near the Badr military base.

37. On 22 April 2015, in one incident in Crater District, in Aden, a child was shot in the

head and killed, and a man and a woman from the same family injured as a result of what

was apparently a sniper attack launched from the Al-Yafai building in the Al-Qate’e area. It

is believed that the area was controlled by the Popular Committees.

38. On 6 May 2015, a civilian was shot in the head and killed, allegedly by a sniper on

the roof of the Education College building in Al-Humaira village, Al-Dhali, under the

control of the Popular Committees affiliated with the Houthis.

39. On 16 May 2015, in Al-Mesrakh city (Taizz Governorate), eight civilians, including

four children and three women, were killed and two women and a child were wounded as a

result of artillery shelling reportedly launched from the position of the 22nd Armoured

Brigade, affiliated with the Popular Committees.

40. On 30 May 2015, in Sanah district (Al-Dhali Governorate), two civilians were

killed, including a woman, while 12 others were injured, including three children, as a

result of artillery shelling apparently launched from the area of the Al-Menshar military

location in Khobar. The attack was reportedly launched by members of the Popular

Committees and the 33rd Armoured Brigade loyal to former President Saleh. OHCHR

received reports that members of the Popular Committees and the 33rd Armoured Division

loyal to former President Saleh were shelling the villages of Khobar, Al-Kabeh, Al-Rebat,

Lakmaht Salah and Jouss Al-Jamal. The number of civilian casualties could therefore be

even higher.

41. On 9 June 2015, in the area of Sanah, Al-Dhali, seven civilians were killed,

including four children, and nine others, including a child, were injured as a result of

shelling by the 33rd Armoured Brigade loyal to former President Saleh. In the same

incident, 13 private houses were moderately or severely damaged.

42. On 11 June 2015, a child was reportedly killed after sustaining a gunshot wound to

the arm. Family members who witnessed the incident and interviewed by OHCHR reported

that the child was standing next to his mother queuing to purchase ice in Souq Al-Taweel

Market Area, Crater District, Aden. The shooting reportedly came from the direction of a

position held by combatants of the Popular Committees. On 12 June, nine civilians were

killed in Al-Mansourah, in Aden following artillery shelling reportedly carried out by

members of the Popular Committees.

43. Since the escalation of the conflict in Yemen on 26 March, OHCHR has

documented the killing of at least 18 civilians as a result of apparent sniper attacks in Aden,

Al-Dhali and Taizz.

2. Allegations of violations committed by coalition and joint government forces

44. Information gathered by OHCHR indicated that, on 30 March 2015, the coalition

forces launched a number of air strikes that hit the al-Mazraq camp for internally displaced

persons in Harad.12 At least 19 civilians were reportedly killed and 35 others injured,

including 11 children. The camp, which shelters some 4,000 people, was established by the

United Nations in 2009 and, at the time of the attack, hosted at least 300 families recently

displaced from Sa’ada. Information provided to OHCHR did not identify the presence of

any military objectives in the area.

45. At least 20 civilians were killed and 59 others injured when a dairy factory was

directly hit in four air strikes in Hudaydah city (Al Hudaydah Governorate), on 31 March

2015. The people killed inside the factory were personnel. On 12 May, at least 43 civilians,

including eight women and 12 children, were killed, while an additional 135 were injured

as a result of four air strikes that directly hit the Al-Wajeeh building located in a busy

commercial hub in Zabeed (Al-Hudaydah Governorate). The majority of the casualties

belonged to Al-Muhamasheen community. The information received by OHCHR did not

clarify whether the building was deliberately targeted.

46. On 20 April 2015, at least 87 civilians were killed, including six children and two

women, and at least 647 others injured as a result of airstrikes that appeared to be directed

at the Faj Attan military base in Sana’a. Hundreds of homes and private businesses in the

vicinity of the base (as far as Al-Tahrir Square) were damaged.

47. On 21 April 2015, 40 civilians were killed, including seven children, and 70

civilians were injured as a result of air strikes that hit the Al-Dhaleel bridge (Ibb

Governorate). Reports indicated that the connection bridge between Ibb and the main route

to Sana’a Governorate was hit twice by air strikes, causing a large number of civilian

casualties. People were arriving to assist those injured by the first explosion when missiles

were launched in a second round of air strikes.

48. OHCHR received reports alleging that, in late April 2015 in Sa’ada Governorate,

cluster munitions were used by the coalition forces in several air strikes, which resulted in

at least six civilian casualties, including children. Owing to the continuing airstrikes,

OHCHR was unable to collect any further information.

49. On 5 May 2015, fighters from the Popular Committees from the Bakil al-Meer tribe

(in Hajjah) attacked areas of Najran city, including what appeared to be civilian objects,

and also reportedly attacked Saudi border guard posts. In retaliation, on 8 May, coalition

forces announced a military operation against Sa’ada, warning civilians to stay away from

what they said were Houthi locations and crowds. In particular, the coalition forces

declared the cities of Marran and Sa’ada military zones. According to Saudi State television

12 OHCHR, “Yemen: The world must be prepared for rapid collapse into mass displacement crisis – UN

expert”, 8 April 2015.

11

channel Al-Ekhbariya, flyers announcing the operation were released over Old Sa’ada.

According to information received by OHCHR, the limited availability of fuel, the

particularly challenging terrain, and barely operational telecommunications services

prevented tens of thousands of civilians from complying with the ultimatum launched by

the coalition.

50. Despite the obstacles, thousands of inhabitants fled from Sa’ada to the neighbouring

governorates of Amran and Hajjah, while at least 15,984 were internally displaced within

Sa’ada. Although OHCHR was unable to obtain detailed information on affected cities and

resulting casualties, it was informed that coalition air strikes hit at least six residential

homes and five markets in Sa’ada, reportedly with no evidence of Houthi military

deployment.

51. On 6 May 2015, 15 civilians were killed, including four children and three women

from the same family, when two homes collapsed while the families were inside. The

homes were hit by two air strikes in Al-Dhaid, Sa’ada.

52. OHCHR gathered information indicating that, on 7 June 2015, coalition forces

conducted air strikes against an area hosting a high concentration of internally displaced

persons in Duaij village (Hajjah Governorate), allegedly killing four civilians, including

three women, and injuring 41 civilians, including 12 women and 16 children. Four

makeshift homes for displaced persons were allegedly destroyed in that incident. On 14

June, a family of 10, including four women and two children, were allegedly killed in Al-

Hamza as a result of an air strike by coalition forces that struck their vehicle travelling from

Al-Jawf to Sana’a.

53. OHCHR documented allegations that, on 17 June 2015, two buses transporting

displaced families were hit by air strikes conducted by coalition forces in Al-Alam (Abyan

Governorate). It found that 17 civilians had been killed in the incident, including five

women and five children, while 10 others, including two women and three children, had

been injured. The victims were reportedly fleeing the violence from Al-Mansoura district

(Aden Governorate), and were on their way to Hadramout.

3. Armed drones

54. OHCHR was informed of reports of drone strikes in parts of the country with

allegations of civilian casualties. The attacks are believed to have been conducted by joint

forces of the United States of America and Yemen as part of a campaign against Al-Qaida

in the Arabian Peninsula. OHCHR received reliable information indicating that as many as

40 civilians, including a child, may have been killed during the period under review as a

result of drone attacks in Al-Baida, Al-Jawf, Marib and Shabwah. According to a Yemeni

non-governmental organization, a one-year-old boy and two adults were killed on 26

January 2015 after a Yemeni Air Force drone struck a vehicle at Huraib (in Marib

Governorate). The victims were in a car reportedly suspected of transporting members of

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. No official investigation had been conducted at the end

of the period under review.

B. Arbitrary detention, allegations of torture and other ill-treatment and

prison conditions

55. Despite Cabinet decision No. 180 (2012) to release all those detained in relation to

their participation in the uprising 2011 against the former Government of Yemen, 16

individuals continued to be held in pretrial detention in connection with the events. No

charges were brought against them nor were they tried during the period under review.13

56. OHCHR received reports indicating that at least 124 people, many believed to be

civilians, were detained by the Popular Committees between 3 and 21 November 2014 in

unrecognized places of detention, including the Amran Sport Stadium and in private homes

throughout Amran Governorate. The circumstances of detention are not known, given that

OHCHR was denied access to the detainees.

57. On 7 December 2014, OHCHR was informed by representatives of the Governorate

of Amran that about 250 men had been detained by members of the Popular Committees at

the Amran sports stadium. According to OHCHR sources, the majority of the detainees

were eventually released, with the exception of 18 individuals, who were still in detention

at the end of the period under review. The circumstances of detention remain unknown.

58. From 19 January to 19 February 2015, OHCHR documented 145 cases of persons

detained by the Popular Committees. Most cases involved detention of anti-Houthi

protestors. Witnesses informed OHCHR that they had been held between one and seven

days in former government prisons that had been taken over by the Popular Committees in

Sana’a, Houdaida, Ibb and Hajjah. Some alleged having been subjected to different forms

of ill-treatment, which may amount to torture, at the hands of the Popular Committees in

Sana’a.

59. OHCHR also learned that, on 4 February 2015, six students were detained by

members of the Popular Committees for organizing peaceful sit-ins organized to call for the

withdrawal of the Popular Committees from the student halls of residence in Arhab district

(Sana’a Governorate). The students were then reportedly transferred to an unknown

location aboard a military vehicle carrying a Houthi slogan. OHCHR has no information on

their whereabouts.

C. Right to freedom of expression

60. Freedom of expression was considerably undermined and the safety of journalists

dramatically deteriorated during the period under review. OHCHR documented dozens of

cases of violations of the right to freedom of expression, including incidents where

journalists had been subjected to threats and physical attacks. Some of the most salient

incidents documented by OHCHR are described below.

61. On 18 September 2014, members of the Popular Committees stormed the State

television station in Sana’a and clashed with security guards. The Minister for Information

later announced that members of the Popular Committees had seized control of State-run

television and of the national news agency Saba. On 22 January 2015, the Popular

Committees took control of the Aden State television station and suspended broadcasts. The

Popular Committees have exercised complete control over the State television broadcasts

since.

62. OHCHR received credible allegations that, from 21 January to 19 February 2015, at

least 17 journalists were illegally detained by members of the Popular Committees, eight of

whom had been detained repeatedly in previous months. Nine of them informed OHCHR

that they had been physically abused, while all but one had been reportedly threatened with

a weapon.

13 According to OHCHR sources, one of the demonstrators arrested in 2011 was released in July 2013.

13

63. On 3 February 2015, two journalists employed by a satellite channel were detained

by members of the Popular Committees while covering events at Sana’a University. Both

were reportedly transferred to the 14th police station in Sana’a and held for three days

before being released without charges against them.

D. Death penalty

64. Yemen has not ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights on the abolition of the death penalty. National legislation

imposes the death penalty for a wide range of offences,14 including financial crimes,

blasphemy, offences committed under Hodoud (religiously ordained crimes) and Qisas

(death in retribution) and drug-related offences. The Penal Law also maintains death by

stoning for extramarital heterosexual and consensual adult homosexual intercourse.15

65. While the Penal Law prohibits the death penalty for minors, courts still hand down

death sentences to minors or adults found guilty of committing crimes when they were

under the age of 18 years. The practice is attributed to, among other factors, the difficulty in

determining the age of offenders in the absence of birth certificates.

66. Yemen has not established a moratorium on the use of the death penalty. Despite

repeated requests by OHCHR, the Attorney General did not provide figures on the number

of individuals on death row or who have been executed during the period under review. The

imposition of the death penalty for any but the most serious crimes, or for persons under the

age of 18 years at the time of commission of the crime, is a contravention of international

law. In addition, death by stoning amounts to cruel and inhuman punishment.

E. Children’s rights

67. The overall situation of children in Yemen has significantly deteriorated since the

intensification of the conflict, particularly since March 2015. The United Nations country

task force on monitoring and reporting documented that 74 children were killed and 242

injured between 26 March and 11 June 2015.

68. Furthermore, as noted above, attacks affecting schools in the context of hostilities

have endangered children’s safety and restricted their right to education. OHCHR also

found that there had been a significant increase in child abductions, with at least 81

documented cases of children abducted by different groups between January and March

2015, as against only two documented incidents in the last three months of 2014.

69. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) informed OHCHR that the

recruitment and use of children in conflict rose sharply during the period under review.

Trained monitors and United Nations staff members documented numerous cases of

children manning checkpoints or being used by armed groups in the context of hostilities.

In 2014, 157 cases of children allegedly being used for military purposes were documented.

In the month and a half following the start of the aerial bombardments on 26 March 2015,

318 instances of children seen carrying weapons at checkpoints and elsewhere were

14 A total of 315 offences are punishable by the death penalty under four main laws: the Penal Law

(1994), the law on combating kidnapping (1998), the military Penal Code (1998) and the law on

combating trafficking and the illicit use of drugs and psychotropic substances (1993). A draft law on

combating human trafficking would introduce another offence punishable by death.

15 According to international human rights jurisprudence, these crimes do not meet the threshold of

“most serious crimes” and should not be punishable by death (see A/HRC/27/23, paras. 28–39).

documented. Even though appointed monitors could not always identify the group

responsible for the recruitment of children, reports indicate that both government and non-

State armed groups – including the Popular Committees and the tribal militias affiliated

with the Islah party – are recruiting and using children as soldiers.

70. Under international law, the use and recruitment of children in armed conflict is

strictly prohibited. The use of children below 15 years of age in active hostilities is a war

crime.

71. OHCHR observed that, while the pattern of child marriage has been declining, it

remains a common practice, affecting around 10 per cent of girls under the age of 15.16

Early marriage, a practice that contravenes international human rights law, is perpetuated

by the lack of a legislative framework that identifies the minimum age of marriage and

persisting traditions. Following advocacy efforts by UNICEF and OHCHR, language was

included in the draft Constitution stipulating the minimum age for marriage as 18 years.

F. Refugees, migrants, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons

72. During the period under review, large numbers of refugees, asylum seekers and

migrants continued to arrive in Yemen. While a signatory to the Convention relating to the

Status of Refugees, Yemen has not incorporated the Convention into national law nor has it

established a procedure for determining refugee status. In the absence of such legislation,

the legal status of asylum seekers and refugees has been governed by a combination of

decrees and provisions. While the authorities may grant refugee status on a prima facie

basis to Somali refugees, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR) determines refugee status for all other asylum seekers.

73. The scale and intensity of the conflict has left thousands of undocumented migrants

trapped and deprived of basic resources and attention. According to UNHCR and the

International Organization for Migration, more than 4,000 migrants arrived from the Horn

of Africa in April 2015 alone.

74. On 20 April 2015, the Protection Cluster formed a task force on population

movements to better coordinate partners’ efforts in collecting and disseminating consistent

and reliable data on internally displaced persons in Yemen. Since the beginning of the

aerial bombardment by coalition forces on 26 March 2015, the total number of displaced

persons has increased to approximately 1 million.17 Furthermore, during the period under

review, documented incidents of administrative detention of newly arrived immigrants

appear to have increased. OHCHR understands that a large proportion of those detained are

being held in overcrowded facilities.

75. During the period under review, hundreds of men, women and children continued to

be victims of human trafficking into and from Yemen. OHCHR discovered numerous cases

of displaced persons, including children, reportedly kidnapped in camps and subsequently

trafficked abroad. Refugee women and children are at particular risk, and are often

kidnapped for ransom. Cases of physical and sexual violence against men and boys were

also reportede along the coast of the Red Sea. Smuggling and trafficking gangs have been

reportedly operating with impunity in Yemen.

76. Progress was recorded in the Government’s efforts to set up institutional

mechanisms to counter human trafficking. Established in 2013, the National Technical

16 UNICEF, Situation Analysis of Children in Yemen 2014.

17 2015 Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 June 2015.

15

Committee to Counter Human Trafficking, chaired by the Minister for Human Rights, met

several times during the period under review. Legislation criminalizing human trafficking

was drafted by the Ministry of Justice, reviewed by the Committee, commented on by

United Nations entities and submitted to the Parliament for review and enactment. At

August 2015, the draft bill was still pending parliamentary endorsement.

G. Marginalized groups

77. Yemen does not recognize in its legislation the marginalized status of some minority

groups, who continue to suffer from discrimination, in particular the Muhamasheen (also

known as Al-Akhdam), a social group whose exact number remains unknown (according to

unofficial sources, there are between 500,000 and 3.5 million Muhamasheen in Yemen).

The group has no political representation at the national level and suffers from extreme

levels of social stigma and discrimination, which exacerbates their socioeconomic

exclusion and poverty. For centuries, they have been excluded from mainstream society,

and they continue to be subjected to severe forms of descent-based discrimination. The

Muhamasheen mainly reside in underdeveloped neighbourhoods in the outskirts of Sana’a,

Aden, Taizz, Lahij, Al-Abyan, Al-Hudaydah and Al-Mukalla. According to a national

statistical and population monitoring survey conducted in 2012, the illiteracy rate among

the Muhamasheen community is around 90 per cent. Women and children are forced to beg

in rural areas, and to work as entertainers at weddings or community ceremonies. The

Government has also failed to adopt legislation criminalizing abuses against them, which

serves to reinforce discriminatory practices. The Muhamasheen community successfully

advocated for its rights during the National Dialogue Conference, particularly with regard

to participation in the public sphere.18 The Working Group on Rights and Freedoms of the

Conference recommended a 10 per cent participation of persons from the Muhamasheen

community in employment in public services, as well as equal access in leadership and

decision-making positions. Despite the community’s advocacy efforts, supported by

OHCHR and other actors, this minimum participation quota was not included in the first

draft Constitution.

H. Accountability and transitional justice

78. Progress in setting up accountability and transitional justice mechanisms was

severely hampered by instability and violence. Throughout the period under review,

governance and security continued to be affected, a situation compounded by the ongoing

denial of social equity and justice, and a lack of basic services.

79. In 2014, the draft law on transitional justice and national reconciliation was further

amended to bring it into line with the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference. The

final draft did not, however, include any provisions on accountability and therefore did not

comply with international norms and standards. It sought rather to further strengthen

immunities for high officials and to establish a mandate for a transitional justice

commission. As the end of the period under review, the draft law had not been adopted.

80. Furthermore, a commission of inquiry mandated at the National Dialogue

Conference to investigate allegations of human rights violations committed during the

events of 2011 has still not become operational, given that its members have never been

appointed by the President. In addition, the work of the Land and Dismissals Commissions

18 See A/HRC/24/34, paras. 4-5.

in the Southern Governorates, established in January 2013 to investigate land-related

violations and to provide victims with compensation, has stalled owing to a lack of funds.

81. Yemen has an obligation to investigate alleged violations of international

humanitarian law and international human rights law, to bring those responsible to justice

and to provide victims with an adequate and effective remedy, including reparations and the

right to the truth.

I. Cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights

82. Following the escalation of violence and the evacuation of international personnel

from Sana’a, OHCHR was forced to interrupt a number of technical assistance activities,

and to shift its focus to monitoring and documenting violations of international human

rights law and international humanitarian law.

83. OHCHR established a monitoring, documentation and investigation mechanism

through the deployment of monitors in conflict-affected areas. In addition, a series of

training workshops on monitoring and reporting human rights violations were conducted

for the benefit of members of the Protection Cluster and national non-governmental

organizations. During the period under review, OHCHR human rights monitoring and

documentation formed the basis of its advocacy and by other United Nations entities

regarding alleged violations of international humanitarian law and international human

rights law in Yemen.

84. Furthermore, OHCHR and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

facilitated workshops aimed at empowering civil society organizations that had been

engaged in data collection relevant for the work of the Land and Dismissals Commissions.

85. OHCHR and UNDP also worked jointly to provide capacity-building to Government

officials and civil society across the country in the implementation of the recommendations

received by Yemen during the universal periodic review. Government sectors consequently

included pertinent review recommendations in their respective operational plans. Moreover,

OHCHR and UNDP supported the Government in establishing a national human rights

institution. Before the hostilities spread to Sana’a in September 2014, OHCHR was

working with the Government on various technical assistance projects, some of which were

subsequently postponed owing to security challenges.

86. Through a joint project, OHCHR and UNDP provided support to different

stakeholders in the area of the transitional justice, including by facilitating consultation

workshops on the draft transitional justice law, convening representatives of the

Government, the Parliament, political parties, national dialogue members, lawyers, victims’

associations and tribal communities, as well as representatives of minorities and religious

communities.

87. OHCHR also supported civil society organizations advocating for the endorsement

of a draft law on missing persons and enforced disappearances. OHCHR delivered human

rights training workshops designed to increase the knowledge and capacity of law

enforcement officials, judges and prosecutors on the rights of women, marginalized groups,

persons with disabilities and migrants.

88. Lastly, OHCHR and UNDP provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Human

Rights with a view to developing a national human rights strategy. A document outlining

the basis for the strategy was developed in consultation with civil society and relevant

government bodies. The strategy describes action to be undertaken by the Government,

17

building upon the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference and universal periodic

review and treaty body recommendations.

IV. Conclusions and recommendations

89. The High Commissioner is concerned about the continued escalation of violence

in Yemen and the related allegations of violations of international humanitarian law,

some of which may amount to war crimes, and violations and abuses of international

human rights law. This situation is partly the result of failure to address past

grievances and to bring perpetrators to justice.

90. Recalling the recommendations already made by OHCHR in previous reports

on the situation of human rights in Yemen, the High Commissioner recommends that

all parties to the conflict:

(a) To comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law

and international human rights law, as applicable, including by taking all feasible

precautions to avoid and minimize civilian casualties;

(b) To abide by the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions

in attacks in the conduct of hostilities;

(c) To end the recruitment and use of children for military purposes, and to

ensure that measures are taken to prevent such acts;

(d) To ensure immediate, safe and unimpeded access of humanitarian

organizations to all areas under their control;

(e) To recall that the arms embargo pursuant to the Security Council

resolution 2216 (2015) should not result in restrictions of the right to freedom of

movement and trade in commercial goods, including fuel;

(f) To return to negotiations and to find solutions to end the conflict.

91. The High Commissioner recommends that the coalition forces and the

Government of Yemen ensure prompt, thorough, effective, independent and impartial

investigations into alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law and

alleged violations of international humanitarian law. The investigations should be

conducted by independent bodies, their results should be made public, and those

responsible should be brought to justice in a manner consistent with international

human rights law and without resort to the death penalty.

92. The High Commissioner recommends that the Government of Yemen, pending

the abolition of the death penalty, establish a moratorium on its application. In the

meantime, Yemen should comply with its international human rights obligations,

including by not imposing the death penalty, except for the most serious offences;

suspending the application of the death penalty for crimes committed by persons

under the age of 18; and ensuring scrupulous respect for the rights to due process and

to a fair trial in death penalty cases.

93. The High Commissioner calls upon the international community:

(a) To encourage the establishment of an international independent and

impartial mechanism to investigate alleged violations and abuses of international

human rights law and alleged violations of international humanitarian law that have

resulted in loss of life and/or serious injury;

(b) To ensure the scaling-up of humanitarian assistance in Yemen by

providing the urgently needed support to the Yemen humanitarian response plan;

(c) To cooperate with the panel of experts charged with investigating

individuals or entities engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the

peace, security or stability of Yemen, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140

(2014).