30/47 Report of the open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility of elaborating an international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security companies on its fourth session
Document Type: Final Report
Date: 2015 Jul
Session: 30th Regular Session (2015 Sep)
Agenda Item: Item3: Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development
GE.15-11613(E)
*1511613*
Human Rights Council Thirtieth session
Agenda item 3
Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights,
including the right to development
Report of the open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility of elaborating an international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security companies on its fourth session*
Chair-Rapporteur: Abdul S. Minty (South Africa)
Summary
The Human Rights Council, in its resolution 22/33, extended the mandate of the
open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility of elaborating an
international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the
activities of private military and security companies for a period of two years in order for it
to undertake and fulfil the mandate as outlined in paragraph 77 of its report on its second
session (A/HRC/22/41). The Council also requested the working group to present its
recommendations to the Council at its thirtieth session. Those recommendations are
contained in section V of the present report.
* The annexes to the present report are circulated as received.
Contents
Page
I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 3
II. Organization of the fourth session .................................................................................................... 4
A. Election of the Chair-Rapporteur ............................................................................................. 4
B. Attendance ............................................................................................................................... 4
C. Organization of the session ...................................................................................................... 4
D. General discussion ................................................................................................................... 6
III. Discussion on specific topics ........................................................................................................... 9
A. Substantive report of the Chair of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination 9
B. Discussion with representative of private military and security companies ............................ 12
C. Specificities of regulating sea-based private security activities ............................................... 14
D. Use of private security companies by the United Nations ....................................................... 17
IV. Concluding remarks ......................................................................................................................... 20
V. Conclusions and recommendations .................................................................................................. 21
Annexes
I. List of participants ............................................................................................................................ 22
II. Concluding remarks by the European Union ................................................................................... 23
III. Déclaration et observations finales du Groupe africain .................................................................... 25
I. Introduction
1. The Human Rights Council decided, in its resolution 15/26, to establish an open-
ended intergovernmental working group with the mandate to consider the possibility of
elaborating an international regulatory framework, including the option of elaborating a
legally binding instrument on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of
private military and security companies, including their accountability, taking into
consideration the principles, main elements and draft text as proposed by the Working
Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the
exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination.
2. In its resolution 22/33, the Human Rights Council extended the mandate of the
open-ended intergovernmental working group for a further period of two years in order for
it to undertake and fulfil the mandate as outlined in paragraph 77 of its report on its second
session (A/HRC/22/41). The Council also requested the working group to present its
recommendations to the Council at its thirtieth session. Those recommendations, which are
based on deliberations held at the working group’s third and fourth sessions, are contained
in section V below.
3. On 26 March 2015, the Human Rights Council decided, in its resolution 28/7, to
extend the mandate of the open-ended intergovernmental working group for a further
period of two and a half years in order for it to undertake and fulfil its mandate, as
contained in resolution 22/33.
4. The open-ended intergovernmental working group has held four sessions.1 Its fourth
session, held from 27 April to 1 May 2015, was opened by the Chief of the Rule of Law,
Equality and Non-Discrimination Branch, on behalf of the Deputy High Commissioner for
Human Rights. She highlighted several developments that had occurred since the third
session, including the establishment by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 26/9 of
an open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other
business enterprises with respect to human rights. She also said that the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) would shortly publish a
progress report on legal options and practical measures to improve access to remedy for
victims of business-related human rights abuses (as requested in Council resolution 26/22),2
which is intended to contribute to a more effective implementation of the Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (see A/HRC/17/31, annex).3
5. The Deputy High Commissioner stressed that private military and security
companies had a responsibility to respect human rights, as stipulated in the Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights. That might include implementing training
procedures for employees, establishing grievance procedures in cases of alleged abuses and
conducting regular monitoring to ensure adequate oversight, immediate cessation of abuses
and accountability. If cases of human rights abuses occurred, States had the obligation to
ensure that they were referred to the authorities concerned for investigation, prosecution
and reparation. From a human rights perspective, she stressed the importance of ensuring
1 See summaries of first session (23–27 May 2011, A/HRC/WG.10/1/4), second session (13–17 August
2012, A/HRC/22/41) and third session (21–25 July 2014, A/HRC/WG.10/3/2).
2 More information is available from
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/OHCHRstudyondomesticlawremedies.aspx.
3 Endorsed by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 17/4.
that there was no protection gap and no impunity for private military and security
companies, including for those that operated transnationally.
6. The Deputy High Commissioner indicated that the prosecution and recent
sentencing by a United States federal judge of four Blackwater contractors who had killed
14 unarmed Iraqi civilians in 2007 had sent a strong signal that human rights abuses
committed by private military and security companies should never remain unpunished.
However, as flagged by the Working Group on mercenaries in its press release of 14 April
2015: “Justice is served in this case but must be assured globally.”4 She mentioned that
other initiatives were also relevant when considering an international regulatory framework
on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security
companies. Those included the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
Providers and the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies
during Armed Conflict, which sought to promote respect for international humanitarian law
and human rights law whenever such companies were present in armed conflicts.
II. Organization of the fourth session
A. Election of the Chair-Rapporteur
7. At its first meeting, on 27 April 2015, the working group elected the Permanent
Representative of South Africa, Abdul S. Minty, as its Chair-Rapporteur.
B. Attendance
8. The list of attendance is contained in annex I to the present report. Pursuant to
Human Rights Council resolution 28/7, the open-ended intergovernmental working group
invited experts and relevant stakeholders to participate in its work, including the Chair-
Rapporteur of the Working Group on mercenaries, Elżbieta Karska; the Director of the
Security in Complex Environments Group, Paul Gibson; senior researcher in international
law at the University of Pretoria, Stuart Casey-Maslen; and the United Nations Under-
Secretary-General for Safety and Security.
C. Organization of the session
9. In his introductory remarks, the Chair-Rapporteur recalled the mandate of the open-
ended intergovernmental working group. He indicated that at previous sessions a range of
issues and challenges to the effective regulation of the activities of private military and
security companies had been addressed, focusing on existing law and practice, on issues of
accountability for human rights abuses linked to such activities and on the provision of
appropriate assistance and remedies for victims. He also recalled that delegations had
reaffirmed the shared goal of protecting human rights and ensuring accountability for
violations and abuses relating to the activities of private military and security companies;
and that there was widespread agreement about gaps in the current regulatory framework,
not least because only very few States had specific legislation on such companies. The
Chair-Rapporteur mentioned that how to ensure effective remedies and accountability
4 Available from
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15840&LangID=E.
remained one of the central challenges, and he highlighted the clear mandate of the working
group in that regard.
10. At its first meeting, on 27 April 2015, the open-ended intergovernmental working
group adopted its agenda (A/HRC/WG.10/4/1) and programme of work.
11. One delegation commended the Chair-Rapporteur for his ability to get consensus in
the past and referred in particular to paragraph 77 of A/HRC/22/41, but regretted that the
sponsor of the resolutions presented at the twenty-second and twenty-eighth sessions of the
Human Rights Council had disregarded the potential for consensus and had opted instead to
divide the Council, with a view to discussing a draft convention on which there had been no
consensus in 2011. The same delegation pointed to the underlying question as to why some
delegations invested in building consensus during sessions of the open-ended
intergovernmental working group if that consensus was meant to be undermined with a
voted resolution. It also regretted that its request to invite stakeholders to provide updates
on recent developments in the processes on the International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Service Providers and the Montreux Document had not been met. Some
delegations noted that paragraph 77 set forth the scope of the mandate of the working group
and the basis for continued cooperation.
12. Some delegations highlighted the need for victims to have the right to an effective
remedy, including reparations, and for an international legally binding instrument in
addition to national initiatives on the activities of private military and security companies.
Those delegations indicated that such companies, given their specificities, should not be
allowed to regulate their own behaviour, which could only be done by an independent
authority. In their opinion, the current normative framework, including the Montreux
Document and the International Code of Conduct, failed to address the complexities of the
problem, nor did they establish proper mechanisms for accountability, effective remedies
for victims, regulation, monitoring and oversight of those entities and their personnel. Some
delegations recommended that the open-ended intergovernmental working group begin
discussions on concrete elements for inclusion in a legally binding instrument during the
fourth session.
13. In that regard, Pakistan indicated that it had submitted draft elements for a possible
instrument, based on human rights instruments, the Montreux Document and the
International Code of Conduct, the draft which had been prepared by the Working Group
on mercenaries.5 The delegation urged the Chair-Rapporteur to present the text of a draft
convention based on those elements and the deliberations at the session, for the
consideration of States, before the next session. South Africa suggested that norms should
be elaborated in international law to (a) define private military and security companies; and
(b) hold such companies accountable under international humanitarian and international
human rights law. The new instrument should complement national and regional
mechanisms, particularly in the area of combating impunity and effective punishment. It
should also include mechanisms for recourse in cases of violations. Such mechanisms
would include a committee on the regulation, oversight and monitoring of private military
and security companies, an enquiry and a complaint procedure and reporting mechanisms
on compliance with new norms and standards in international human rights and
humanitarian law by private military and security companies.
14. Some delegations added that international regulation must be complemented by
effective national laws and policies that would allow States to investigate and prosecute
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. In their view, as a second
5 See www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGMilitary/Session4/Pakistan.pdf.
step, any regulatory gaps in areas such as accountability, remedies, licensing and oversight
should be filled through an international legally binding instrument that would complement
existing initiatives.
D. General discussion
15. Some delegations provided an update on the Montreux Document and the
International Code of Conduct Association processes. The Montreux Document, which has
been signed by 52 States and three international organizations, applies to companies
operating during armed conflicts and recalls the existing obligations of States under
international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict. The Montreux Document
Forum was formally launched on 16 December 2014. Some delegations questioned the
effectiveness of the Montreux Document and referred to concerns expressed in Progress
and Opportunities, Five Years On: Challenges and Recommendations for Montreux
Document Endorsing States.6
16. Some delegations also noted recent developments regarding the International Code
of Conduct Association, which had held its first annual plenary in December 2014. Some
delegations noted that the International Code of Conduct was aligned with the Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, and that the Association was not purely a self-
regulation body, as its board was composed of States, companies and civil society. Some
delegations said that the Association could develop oversight mechanisms on certification,
monitoring and compliance. In the view of some delegations, the complementarity of the
Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct, in addition to domestic
legislation, confirmed that there was no legal vacuum.
17. Some delegations also referred to the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) and its new Management System for Private Security Operations: Requirements with
Guidance (ISO 18788),7 which was expected to be released in June 2015 and which
incorporated relevant elements of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
The new standard was a development from the Management System for Quality of Private
Security Company Operations: Requirements with Guidance (ANSI/ASIS PSC.1-2012).
One delegation referred to the OHCHR-led project to improve access to remedy for victims
of business-related human rights abuses, which had the potential to identify effective ways
to progress on access to remedies.
Developments at the national level
18. The United States of America highlighted that the Department of State required that
companies bidding on its worldwide protective services programme must have membership
in good standing in the International Code of Conduct Association and confirmed
compliance with PSC 1-2012. It also referred to possible criminal charges under the False
Claims Act for those private security companies which falsely stated that they were in
compliance with the required standard. The delegation further referred to the Department of
Defense’s work with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law and the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime on separate initiatives to assist States in the
development of rules on the use of force by private military and security companies in
support of provisions in the Montreux Document. The delegation also noted the recent
convictions of four Blackwater contractors, which demonstrated the commitment and
6 Available from www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Progress-and-Opportunities-Five-Years-On-Challenges-
and-Recommendations-for-Montreux-Document-Endorsing-States.
7 Available from www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=63380.
ability of the United States Government to pursue and obtain justice in cases of violent
crimes committed by contractors.
19. South Africa referred to the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act No. 15 of
1998, which regulated “the rendering of foreign military assistance by South African
juristic persons, citizens, persons permanently resident within the Republic and foreign
citizens rendering such assistance from within the borders” of South Africa. It added that
while law enforcement agencies had consistently sought to look into those activities, they
had not often been successful in the light of the non-cooperation of countries where the
activities had taken place, which were often those countries involved in the Montreux
Document and International Code of Conduct processes.
20. Norway referred to the 2001 Act on private security companies operating on
Norwegian territory, which had been subject to substantive changes in 2011. The purpose
of the Act was to ensure the rights of individuals who were handled by representatives of
private security companies; a high quality of services; sufficient control and oversight over
such businesses; and that they only operate within the parameters of the Act itself. Norway
became a member of International Code of Conduct Association in early 2014 and believed
that it could be significant in ensuring that private security companies in complex
environments respected international law and in improving oversight and accountability.
21. The European Union recalled its view that private military companies and private
security companies should be addressed separately, given their very broad and diverse
range of activities. With regard to accountability and access to remedies, the European
Union recalled the existing solid provisions in the “Brussels I” regulation, as revised. The
European Union noted that States and international organizations, as clients, could enhance
standards in the operations of companies. It stated that the European Union and its member
States were determined to further consider how best to make use of the International Code
of Conduct, including in their procurement processes. It added that much had been done by
the European Union and others to implement the Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, as they were instrumental in preventing and remedying abuses across
sectors, including by private military companies and private security companies.
22. Australia noted that it was a signatory to the Montreux Document, was an active
member of the International Code of Conduct Association and had participated in the
development of new standards. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade required that
private military and security companies be signatories to the Code and comply with
relevant provisions of the Montreux Document in order to provide ad hoc services. Any
international regulatory framework should focus on strengthening compliance with existing
international law and on ensuring accountability. A multifaceted approach encompassing
national legislation and international cooperation was the most effective response.
23. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland referred to its Security
Industry Authority, set up under the Private Security Industry Act 2001, which was
responsible for regulating the private security industry by, inter alia, operating a licensing
regime for individual security operatives and a voluntary approvals scheme for security
businesses. Furthermore, the International Criminal Court Act 2001 provided jurisdiction to
prosecute certain crimes committed by British nationals in or outside the United Kingdom.
The Department of Transport also issued interim guidance to United Kingdom flagged
ships on the use of armed guards to defend against the threat of piracy in exceptional
circumstances. The United Kingdom Accreditation Service accredited auditors for
professional standards, and was a signatory to the International Accreditation Forum
Multilateral Agreement.
24. Switzerland referred to its new federal law on private security companies, which had
been adopted in September 2013 and was expected to come into force in September 2015.
The law would apply to individuals and companies providing security services abroad, from
Switzerland, or who would provide, in Switzerland, services linked to security services
provided abroad. The law also applied to companies established in Switzerland that
exercised control over security companies active abroad, and prohibited certain activities
relating to direct participation in hostilities or to grave violations of human rights.
25. The Russian Federation recalled that its legislation did not provide for the
extraterritorial activities of private military and security companies, including military
activities. Those functions could only be undertaken by State institutions. In view of global
trends, legal and political experts in the Russian Federation were discussing the advisability
of expanding the activities of private military and security companies and outsourcing some
State functions. Arguments in favour included considerations of professionalism, mobility,
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. The Russian Federation noted that any such move
would need to be carried out within existing international human rights and international
humanitarian law, and highlighted that challenges included the lack of State control over
those activities, the lack of remedies and the current legal norms, which were insufficient or
ineffective.
26. The Chair-Rapporteur indicated several possible points for discussion such as the
implementation of existing standards by States, including grievance procedures for victims,
cases brought against companies and their outcome.
27. The Colombian Commission of Jurists referred to general comment No. 35 of the
Human Rights Committee, in which it was noted, inter alia, that when private individuals or
entities are empowered or authorized by a State party to exercise powers of arrest or
detention, the State party remains responsible for adherence and ensuring adherence to
article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
28. The Executive Director of the International Code of Conduct Association8 provided
an update on the key governance and oversight functions of the Association, indicating that
a draft certification procedure was pending consideration by the Association’s Board of
Directors and its General Assembly. The Association anticipated that its reporting,
monitoring and assessment of performance functions would be significantly developed in
the future, and would involve extensive stakeholder outreach. The Executive Director also
noted that clients of private security companies had approached the Association to discuss
making membership in the Association a requirement in contracts with companies, as well
as an authorization criterion in national legislation (Switzerland). Some had also raised the
intention of the United States Department of State to make membership in the Association a
requirement for potential contractors involved in the Department’s worldwide protective
services programme.
29. The second meeting of the fourth session concluded with an interactive dialogue.
One delegation and the Chair-Rapporteur queried the ability of the International Code of
Conduct Association to ensure accountability, access to remedy and transparency in the
process of examining a complaint. The Executive Director responded that the Association
was limited by its articles of association and by the powers conferred to it by its members
(Governments, companies and civil society). He added that the Association would never be
able to supplant the role of national laws and national law enforcement bodies, but it would
8 Before giving the floor to Mr. Orsmond from the International Code of Conduct Association, the
Chair-Rapporteur recalled Human Rights Council resolutions 22/33 and 28/7, in which the Council
decided that the intergovernmental working group “shall invite experts and all relevant stakeholders
to participate in its work”. He also recalled that during the third session, industry representatives had
been welcome to participate in the session either as an independent stakeholder or member of a
delegation (A/HRC//WG.10/3/2, para. 12).
certainly have the ability to influence the industry from a business standpoint. He
concluded that, although the Association’s grievance mechanism was not as developed as
its certification mechanism, respect of national and international law was viewed as a
fundamental responsibility.
III. Discussion on specific topics
A. Substantive report of the Chair of the Working Group on mercenaries
as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the
right of peoples to self-determination
30. In her statement on 28 April 2015, Ms. Karska said that the Working Group on
mercenaries had undertaken additional research on national laws and regulations regarding
private military and security companies in eight countries in Central America and the
Caribbean, eight countries in South America and four countries in Europe (A/HRC/30/34).9
Three other reports had already been submitted to the Council.10 Its 2016 report to the
Council would address the national legislation of countries in Eastern Europe, North
America and the Pacific. Those studies had assessed existing national laws regarding
private military and security companies and their effectiveness in protecting human rights
and promoting accountability for violations, and had aimed at identifying common points,
good practices and regulatory gaps that might exist. A global analysis would be presented
to the General Assembly in 2016.
31. Ms. Karska said that the Working Group had held two expert meetings and
consulted with stakeholders, including on the use of private military and security companies
by the United Nations. Those efforts had informed the discussions of the Working Group
on a possible legally binding instrument for the regulation of such companies. Those
reflections were contained in the concept note prepared by the Working Group for
consideration at the current session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group.11
32. Ms. Karska added that the concept note reflected the perspectives and experiences of
government officials, experts and civil society representatives, and was the result of
extensive consultations held by previous members of the Working Group. The first draft of
a possible convention was the basis for that reflection (see A/HRC/15/25, annex), while the
concept note was also the outcome of the ongoing research on national legislation referred
to above. Moreover, the concept note represented the commitment of the Working Group to
advancing a coherent, focused and realistic framework for the consideration of the open-
ended intergovernmental working group.
33. In seeking to achieve the above, the Working Group on mercenaries had distilled its
key concerns into the following eight main points:
9 Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama; Argentina,
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay; and France,
Hungary, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
10 Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Morocco,
Senegal and Tunisia (A/HRC/27/50); China, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri
Lanka and the United Arab Emirates (A/HRC/27/50); and Botswana, Ghana, the Gambia, Kenya,
Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda and Zimbabwe
(A/HRC/24/45).
11 Available from
www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGMilitary/Session4/WG_MercenariesCN_14Ap
ril2015.pdf.
(a) The Working Group acknowledged that certain functions were inherent to the
State, for which it retained ultimate responsibility regardless of whether or not it outsourced
that function. Some inherent State functions might not be outsourced, namely direct
participation in hostilities in armed conflict, and detention and interrogation of prisoners of
war, as defined in the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War. The Working Group proposed that recommendations for the recognition
of different classifications of service activity be included in the draft. Those classifications
were predicated on identifying which activities increased the risk of human rights violations
when undertaken by private actors. They also addressed the gap left by the Montreux
Document, which applied solely to armed conflicts;
(b) Intergovernmental organizations, as well as States, could become party to the
convention. While that was not new, it reinforced the notion of accountability of
intergovernmental organizations and supported the growing trend of such organizations
assuming their objective international legal personality in becoming party to international
instruments;
(c) The Working Group proposed one article on implementation, bringing
together the different related articles in the first draft convention. Obligations under that
article would apply to domestic and international companies, as well as to services offered
to States and to intergovernmental, non-State and corporate clients;
(d) The Working Group offered a new definition of a licence, which would serve
as a modality for establishing and enforcing standards;
(e) The Working Group put forward one coherent article on licensing covering
five focus areas, again bringing together related elements in the first draft convention;
(f) Registration should take place as a secondary step following licensing. That
built on the registry of the first draft convention and would serve as a monitoring system of
related actors and activities;
(g) The Working Group introduced a new framework of regulation of
jurisdiction. The new draft sought to strengthen accountability and extraterritorial
provisions, notably to cover the complex environments in which the security industry often
operated. The framework applied the following hierarchy of principles for establishing
jurisdiction: active person; passive person; territoriality; and universal jurisdiction;
(h) The Working Group deemed it essential to establish a mechanism for the
purposes of oversight and ensuring remedy and reparations for victims. The modality, be it
a committee or ombudsperson or other modality, had not yet been determined, but any
mechanism that could regularly, efficiently and comprehensively undertake monitoring and
investigation and guarantee remedy for victims was worthy of review.
34. Ms. Karska concluded by hoping that that new formulation of key principles would
be a source of fruitful and constructive discussion among the open-ended intergovernmental
working group, and would build a stronger foundation for mutual consideration and shared
positions as deliberations progressed.
35. During the subsequent discussion, some delegations welcomed the concept note
prepared by the Working Group. According to one delegation, the concept note
comprehensively covered the elements that might be included in the kind of legally binding
instrument for which the open-ended intergovernmental working group had been created. It
also suggested that the Chair-Rapporteur consolidate all proposals, including the concept
note, for future deliberations and as a basis for future work. Furthermore, it expressed its
appreciation for the work of the International Code of Conduct Association and the
Government of Switzerland in relation to the Montreux Document, and said that it was time
for the intergovernmental working group to pull together all those efforts in a
comprehensive manner. Another delegation suggested that the draft be discussed among
Governments, and not only within an expert body.
36. One delegation pointed out that the work of the Working Group on mercenaries to
map existing legislation on private security and military companies might be undermined if
it was meant to support a pre-established position that a legally binding instrument was the
“best way to ensure adequate protection of human rights” without developing arguments
that could highlight the advantages of other options. The same delegation expressed
concern about the Working Group’s plan to further elaborate a draft convention, which
seemed to go beyond its mandate and risk complicating discussion in the intergovernmental
process. Some delegations said that they did not support the draft convention elaborated by
the Working Group, which had not met with consensus at the open-ended
intergovernmental working group’s first session. They recalled that the mandate of the
open-ended intergovernmental working group had been broadened (see A/HRC/22/41,
para. 77). Some delegations reiterated that a convention was not necessary, but that there
was a need to strengthen domestic laws and their implementation, as well as to see how the
International Code of Conduct and other initiatives translated into practice. One delegation
noted that the concept note was highly problematic as it took discussions back to those held
during the first session of the intergovernmental working group in 2011. The delegation
suggested that other options could be explored, including guidelines, possible plans of
action, model laws, good practices and mutual legal assistance programmes.
37. The Colombian Commission of Jurists welcomed the concept note as a good starting
point, while noting that it was linked to a new set of articles that was not yet available and
that could not, therefore, be properly commented upon.
38. In response to questions from delegations, Ms. Karska said that the Working Group
was convinced that an international convention would be the best mechanism to regulate
the issue of private military and security companies. That did not exclude other options,
including guidelines, model laws and legal assistance programmes, which in the opinion of
the Working Group were complementary. Gaps in national law still existed and the analysis
of the Working Group had not shown much progress in that regard. As such, an
international convention would be an effective mechanism for a better implementation of a
system of control. Ms. Karska highlighted that the Working Group welcomed all comments
and suggestions from States on its concept note, as it sought to finalize its proposed new
draft convention by the end of 2015. In that regard, the Chair-Rapporteur of the open-ended
intergovernmental working group suggested that any comments should be forwarded to the
secretariat by the end of May 2015, for transmission to the Working Group on mercenaries.
39. Delegations discussed the way forward with regard to the elaboration of possible
recommendations on the future programme of work for the open-ended intergovernmental
working group. Some noted that there was no consensus on any further discussion on the
draft convention elaborated by the Working Group on mercenaries and discussed by the
intergovernmental working group in 2011. One delegation noted its preference for the
recommendations from the session not to refer to the concept note or the possibility of a
revised draft convention, while recognizing that the report of the intergovernmental
working group would duly reflect what was said by all delegations and speakers.
Delegations discussed the mandate of the intergovernmental working group, which one
delegation said was to look into elaborating a new instrument, while another said that it did
not call specifically for the drafting of a legally binding treaty but rather to considering the
possibility of elaborating an international regulatory framework. One delegation mentioned
that the intergovernmental working group had not explored the range of options; instead,
there seemed to be an attempt to discuss a draft on which there was no consensus.
B. Discussion with representative of private military and security
companies
40. On 28 April 2015, the Director of the Security in Complex Environments Group,
Mr. Gibson, indicated how responsible companies within the private security sector were
embracing standards and regulations to ensure that their operations were transparent,
accountable and compliant with international and national legislation, including human
rights law.
41. Mr. Gibson first addressed the notion of the “complex environments” in which
security companies worked. He admitted that the hitherto unregulated private security
sector had fallen short of internationally recognized standards and that not all of those
shortcomings had been addressed. However, he contended that the private security
companies with which he had engaged were demonstrably embracing standards and
regulations to ensure that they operated in an appropriate and transparent manner, and
within the rule of law.
42. As for the companies that he represented, Mr. Gibson clarified that they did not
employ mercenaries, a term he labelled emotive and implying action for financial gain.
Those companies did not conduct offensive military operations but provided a range of risk
management and protective services for their clients that were essentially defensive in
nature. He said that weapons were rarely fired and then only for self-defence.
43. Mr. Gibson proceeded with an overview of self-regulation initiatives with regard to
private security companies, including the Montreux Document and the International Code
of Conduct. He highlighted the PSC-1 standard, which had been endorsed by the
Government of the United Kingdom in 2013, and stated that British companies were being
independently audited and certified against that standard. He recalled that the standard was
expected to become fully international in 2015 and would be known as ISO 18788. He
mentioned that full members of the Security in Complex Environments Group were
required to demonstrate that they were working to achieve certification under PSC-1.
Mr. Gibson also recalled the core functions of the International Code of Conduct
Association, and explained his organization’s engagement with it, including to encourage
others to develop coherent, transparent and affordable standards and oversight mechanisms.
With regard to regulations in the maritime sector, Mr. Gibson briefly outlined the most
recent developments, calling the publication of ISO 28007 in March 2015 a game changer
that offered maritime security companies a robust auditable standard.
44. Mr. Gibson acknowledged that the key to the success of those standards had been
the identification of independent third-party accreditors, who ensured that companies
claiming to comply with the standard did so fully and in an auditable fashion. The United
Kingdom Accreditation Service had accredited four certification bodies and they conducted
rigorous third-party audits of companies to certify them against PSC-1 and ISO 28007.
Those bodies, for example, had to assess how well the company’s human rights impact
assessments had been incorporated in their management processes. In support of those
international standards, the Security in Complex Environments Group had established an
enhanced vetting process, using a credible and respected national body: the Disclosure and
Barring Service. Mr. Gibson also mentioned that City and Guilds had developed a Maritime
Security Operative Qualification that encapsulated all the core competencies required by
ISO 28007, and that the United Kingdom had put in place a licence regime for the export,
control and disposal of weapons used by private security companies.
45. Mr. Gibson also highlighted some of the industry’s frustration with the
understandably cautious approach of the Government of the United Kingdom in handling
operational issues affecting the sector, including with regard to floating armouries, a feature
of maritime security operations in the Indian Ocean. Mr. Gibson pointed out that following
sustained engagement the British Department for Business Innovation and Skills had
announced that it would issue British trade licences authorizing the use of floating
armouries for the storage of controlled equipment, including firearms. While he described
that as a significant step, he asserted that more needed to be done to facilitate a floating
armoury operating under a United Kingdom flag. He further stated that the restrictive
nature of the firearms legislation currently prevented appropriate firearms training in the
United Kingdom.
46. Finally, Mr. Gibson commented on the decline of Western defence spending without
a commensurate decline in political ambition, creating a strategic deficit that would have to
be filled by the private sector. Governments would have to increasingly outsource contracts
to the private sector in areas that until recently had been considered to be the exclusive
prerogative of the military. He also recalled that private security companies were in the
business of making a profit, and that it was important that the costs of increasing regulation
should not make companies uncompetitive — so as not to penalize those who wished to
comply. He emphasized that it was everyone’s responsibility to ensure that clients
understood the importance of regulation, and that the additional costs arising from it were
worth accepting.
47. Some delegations raised questions regarding the potential of the International Code
of Conduct Association to become an effective mechanism and the consequences of non-
compliance with applicable law. In his response, Mr. Gibson stated that the Association
was still in an early phase of its operationalization, and that the complex issues of
certification and oversight were still being discussed. He was confident, however, that there
was a real consensus within the Association to make it an organization with teeth. The
representative of the Association similarly recalled that it was a three-pillar organization
that also included States and civil society. There was agreement that the Association must
have effective oversight mechanisms, the ability to exclude those who did not comply and
effective grievance mechanisms also offering access to remedies. Some delegates clarified
that voluntary regulatory frameworks and recourse avenues neither replaced national
legislation and regulation, which took precedence, nor replaced criminal proceedings where
appropriate. Mr. Gibson confirmed that the majority of members were from Europe or the
United States and that the success of the initiative would depend on the ability of the
Association to reach out to other regions. The Executive Director of the Association added
that the most recent applications had come from non-Western States, indicating an
increased interest and awareness in other regions.
48. Delegations sought Mr. Gibson’s views on issues regarding the use of private
military and security companies in complex environments, for example: (a) cases where
foreign nationals had engaged in military activities and committed violations, but had
benefited from diplomatic immunity; (b) cases where private military and security
companies had been in charge of administrating detention centres and prisons; (c) cases
where private military and security companies had been hired to protect extractive
industries and had committed human rights abuses; (d) reports that floating armouries were
placed on the high seas to circumvent national regulations and control; (e) the employment
of South African citizens by private military and security companies in violation of South
African law, which made it illegal for any South African to render foreign military
assistance; and (f) the industry’s lack of denials of, or credible responses to, numerous
allegations of human rights abuses committed by private military and security companies.
49. In his responses, Mr. Gibson stated that the companies he represented had no
diplomatic immunity and that they, their employees and subcontractors were fully
accountable under domestic and international legislation. He confirmed that some
companies had indeed been involved in the administration of detention facilities and that
they should be subject to regulation and be held accountable for any abuses committed. He
also conceded that some environments were particularly problematic owing to the absence
of the rule of law. He emphasized that, in order to avoid abuses, it was critical to vet and
train employees of private security companies, but also to make clients understand that they
bore responsibility for contracting reliable companies only.
50. Mr. Gibson explained that floating armouries were placed in the Indian Ocean near
the routes of ships that required protection, and not as a way to circumvent control. He said
that those armouries fell under the jurisdiction of the flag State, but also expressed
sympathy for the view that in some of those States the regulatory frameworks were not
sufficiently robust. He refuted the suggestion that staff of maritime security companies
might find it easier to shoot first and ask questions later. He explained that companies
adhered to strict rules on the use of force that mandated proportionate and escalatory
measures, that experience had shown that the firing of warning shots was enough to deter
and avert pirate attacks, and that maritime security companies did not detain pirates. He
also stated that privately contracted armed security personnel on ships wore helmets fitted
with cameras to provide full visibility and accountability for their actions.
51. With regard to the employment of South African citizens by private military and
security companies, Mr. Gibson agreed that South Africa should receive a considered
response on why there had so far been no commitment in the context of the Montreux
Document or the International Code of Conduct not to recruit South Africans in violation of
South African law. The representative of the International Code of Conduct Association
concurred with that view. With regard to the suggestion that private security companies
were not responding to allegations of human rights abuses, Mr. Gibson said the companies
he dealt with had grievance mechanisms embedded in their business models that enabled
thorough investigations to take place following an allegation of a human rights abuse. The
industry welcomed civil society and others bringing such allegations to the fore to enhance
the transparency and accountability of those investigations. In due course, oversight
mechanisms would also be in place under the auspices of the Association.
52. One delegation described the International Code of Conduct as a gentlemen’s
agreement and the Association as a gentlemen’s association, and considered them
insufficient to protect victims of human rights abuses. Pointing out that the self-regulatory
system in the banking industry had proved insufficient, it was questioned whether self-
regulation processes could be trusted and whether there was any experience with such
processes functioning satisfactorily. Mr. Gibson explained that, in his view, considerable
success had been achieved with voluntary regulation in the private security sector. In a
short time frame and with the industry as catalyst, two international standards recognized
by ISO had been developed and the Association had been created. However, Mr. Gibson
added that the industry would not be opposed to an international legally binding instrument,
with the critical proviso that it must create a genuinely level playing field at the global
level. If that were achieved, the industry would be fully supportive. Some delegations
commended Mr. Gibson for that statement, recalling their view that a global and binding
convention laying out the minimum standards was necessary.
C. Specificities of regulating sea-based private security activities
53. On 29 April 2015, senior researcher in international law at the University of Pretoria
Mr. Casey-Maslen presented some of the issues regarding the use of force by private
maritime security service providers, in particular with respect to counter-piracy operations
and how they might affect the possible international regulatory framework governing
private security companies. While the Security Council, in its resolution 1851 (2008),
referred to “applicable international humanitarian law”, counter-piracy operations and
measures were undertaken not within the realm of the law of armed conflict, but under
international law of law enforcement, which combined international human rights law and
general principles of domestic criminal law with international criminal justice standards.
54. The use of armed private security providers to protect commercial shipping had
increased in recent years, and had been an important factor in reducing the number of
successful acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. Bringing weapons on board a vessel had
its own risks, in terms of physical security to crew members and respect for a State’s
obligations under international law on the transfer of conventional weapons and in terms of
the risk of reckless and excessive use of force, including lethal force, by personnel in an
environment where effective monitoring and oversight were exceptionally hard to ensure.
55. Mr. Casey-Maslen noted that, in carrying out their duties, State law enforcement
officials were required to use force only when necessary and to employ only such force as
was necessary in the circumstances and proportionate to the threat.12 Lawful use of force by
private maritime security service providers was limited to acts carried out in defence of any
person from unlawful violence. That might encompass lawful acts involving use of force
when under imminent threat of attack, either in self-defence or in defence of others. The
determination of whether any particular use of force in the maritime environment met the
legal criteria might be contentious given the lack of detailed guidance at the domestic level
on what was and was not lawful; materially differing domestic criminal law thresholds for
justified use of force in self-defence; and a lack of consensus as to which national law
should determine legality.
56. Mr. Casey-Maslen undertook a review of selected national jurisdictions and
standards, including the 2012 interim guidance of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO).13 He also referred to the case before an Indian court in which two Italian marines
had allegedly opened fire on a vessel, killing two Indian fishermen on board; the trial of the
two marines had recently been postponed to July 2015.
57. Mr. Casey-Maslen noted that a detailed code on use of force in the maritime
environment was lacking and that that lacuna could not be filled in the proposed
international regulatory framework. He also referred to the guidelines elaborated by the
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in 2012.14
58. He noted that the core law enforcement function of arrest, and a concomitant power
to use force in order to effect a lawful arrest involving use of force, were functions inherent
to the State. He added that, to some extent, those powers were delegated in the maritime
environment. Whether or not private security service providers had been granted those
powers, they might need to use them, leading to concerns about treatment of suspected
pirates in detention and respect for the fundamental right to habeas corpus.
59. Finally, as recognized by the Security Council in its resolution 2184 (2014), the
solution to the problem of piracy lay on land rather than at sea. Mr. Casey-Maslen
concluded that, in the meantime, use of armed private security service providers looked
likely to continue, with all the risks that that entailed.
60. One delegation noted that it was essential to acknowledge the work undertaken by
IMO and that the Human Rights Council should not duplicate the work done by IMO.
Another delegation underlined the primary role of IMO in the context of sea-based
12 See principle 9 of the 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials, available from
www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx.
13 See www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/SecDocs/Documents/Piracy/MSC.1-Circ.1443.pdf.
14 Available from www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/projets/Counterpiracy.pdf.
activities of private military and security companies and stressed the relevance of the 2012
IMO interim guidance in that regard. Some delegations requested further information about
the IMO interim guidance and its implementation. A delegation and the Chair-Rapporteur
expressed regret at the absence of IMO at that session. The Chair-Rapporteur confirmed
that he would continue to invite IMO to cooperate with the open-ended intergovernmental
working group and provide any information relevant to its work. He also encouraged
stakeholders to provide relevant information on that issue for the consideration of the
working group. He noted that the working group was particularly concerned with
accountability and ensuring remedies for victims of human rights abuses and sought
clarification on any cases involving such issues, including evidentiary issues of incidents at
sea.
61. One delegation asked about the phenomenon of “floating arsenals” located outside
territorial waters, which by their name pointed possibly to a type of unofficial warship. It
also described the situation by which armed merchant ships would sail into territorial
waters and be granted temporary firearms permits; once that system was implemented, the
ships stopped entering the waters and instead were floating arsenals outside those waters.
The same delegation asked how the challenges with regard to the flag State (in situations
where flags of convenience were used) could be addressed. Some delegations requested
information about trends in piracy and which parts of the world were affected. One
delegation queried how national legislation could address the extraterritorial nature of
companies in that sector in the absence of a legally binding instrument. Another delegation
acknowledged other processes such as the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia.
62. In response to a suggestion to use the terms “floating armoury” or “floating safe”
instead of the term “floating arsenal”, Mr. Casey-Maslen agreed that such terms might be
more appropriate and he acknowledged the risks associated with using them. He clarified
that they had been created as an attempt to address the problem of weapons being thrown
overboard, when vessels sought to enter ports in States that did not allow weapons to be
brought into their territorial waters. He also acknowledged the challenges associated with
flags of convenience and with vessels that did not fly a flag, and pointed out that the
general principle of the duty of the flag State15 might need to be considered in terms of the
reality of counter-piracy operations. Mr. Casey-Maslen further questioned the credentials of
some of the companies that undertook armed security services. He noted that the IMO
interim guidance was widely referred to, while he considered that it did not go into enough
detail with regard to when the use of force would be lawful. He referred to the ongoing case
in India and the questions regarding the limits of self-defence.
63. Mr. Casey-Maslen noted that the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
had encouraged the adoption of laws to allow for prosecutions in the light of the practice of
“capture and release”. He clarified that the guidelines of the Geneva Academy of
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights had been developed as a contribution to
the debate, and noted that existing guidance by States was not sufficiently detailed with
regard to self-defence. Demand for armed security services had been driven by a perception
of a very real risk, especially in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea and the South China
Sea, and he pointed to IMO reports on piracy for further details.16 The crime of piracy was a
domestic crime, while domestic legislation could encourage States to exercise jurisdiction
on the high seas. The United Kingdom clarified that it had moved to address the crime of
piracy and that the United Kingdom interim guidance was intended for use of British
15 See the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
16 Available from www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Reports/Pages/Default.aspx.
flagships, and not for jurisdiction over other ships. Finally, Mr. Casey-Maslen noted that
evidentiary issues and ensuring the respect for the fundamental right to habeas corpus on
vessels were a challenge.
64. Norway provided further details of its national legislation and regulations. The use
of private security companies on board ships registered in Norway was not regulated by the
act on private security companies, but by Regulation 972/2004 on Ship Security. Particular
rules governing shipowners’ use of private security companies were included in the
regulation in 2011. The regulation did not provide requirements directed towards the
security companies themselves. Rather, it addressed the responsibilities of shipowners of
informing Norwegian authorities when and why use of private security services were
required; providing an assessment of the company in question including its internal
recruitment and training procedures; and its regulations on use of arms. Shipowners were
required to emphasize IMO guidelines in the selection and use of private security guards on
board. Norwegian authorities had the competency to decide that certain private security
companies might not be used by Norwegian shipowners. The regulation also stipulated
when armed guards might be used; how weapons were to be stored on board; and
procedures for the use of armed weapons. In 2011, Regulation 904/2009 Relative to Arms
was supplemented with a provision regulating the circumstances under which ships
registered in Norway might store arms on board on behalf of private security companies.
Such storage was only allowed for the objective of protecting the ship against acts of terror
or piracy, and required permission granted by Norwegian police. Only ships certified under
the International Ship and Port Facility Security-regulations of IMO might be granted such
permission, and the permission was only valid when sailing in, to or from certain
geographic areas. That regulation was also followed by reporting requirements, in line with
IMO guidelines, including to the Norwegian National Criminal Investigation Service if
there was reason to believe that the use of force had resulted in personal injury or death.
Whenever arms had been used, that had to be reported to the Maritime Directorate.
D. Use of private security companies by the United Nations
65. On 29 April 2015, the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security outlined the
main features of the current global security context. He referred to a recent report on the
safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel
(A/69/406), according to which personnel served in increasingly dangerous environments
and encountered a variety of threats not previously encountered. He added that the existing
threat had been aggravated by the blurring of the lines between criminal and extremist
groups, the expansion of the latter and the emergence of new extremist groups. Against that
background, the United Nations had engaged armed private security companies in selected
duty stations as a last resort, in an effort to strengthen the safety and security of its
personnel and to enable the Organization to deliver its programmes and mandates in high-
risk environments. That was particularly true in high-risk areas where peacekeeping forces
had yet to be deployed and where critical political or humanitarian needs existed. To date,
the United Nations had contracted armed private security services in three countries where
peacekeeping and political missions had been established (Afghanistan, Haiti and Somalia)
out of the more than 170 countries in which the United Nations maintained a presence.
66. The Under-Secretary-General stressed that the “last resort principle” guided the
United Nations as to when it might be appropriate to seek out armed private security
services. He added that armed private security services were engaged exceptionally, when
other options, namely security services by the host Government and other Member States
were not provided for or, alternatively, when security professionals and officers from
within the United Nations system were unavailable. The principle was articulated in the
United Nations Policy on Armed Private Security Companies,17 which clarified the roles
and responsibilities for recommending and approving the use of specific companies; and
outlined specific selection criteria, along with screening and training requirements for
contracted personnel. It also covered roles and responsibilities with respect to management
and oversight.
67. The above-mentioned United Nations policy was accompanied by Guidelines on the
Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies,18 which further
specified roles and responsibilities for determining when it might be appropriate to obtain
armed private security services. They set forth specific criteria for recommending the use of
specific armed private security companies, based on the latest security risk assessment,
while identifying the types of services that might or might not be contracted out to such
companies. The Guidelines also provided further details, including on screening and
training requirements of contracted personnel.
68. The Under-Secretary-General recalled that respect for international human rights
law and international humanitarian law was among the core values of the United Nations,
including the Department of Safety and Security. It took all measures in that regard,
including collaborating with other United Nations departments, offices as well as agencies,
funds and programmes on various policies, procedures, standards and other arrangements,
in accordance with the Human Rights Up Front initiative. That initiative aimed to
mainstream human rights considerations in all United Nations activities and programmes
and foster engagement with Member States on human rights issues. The United Nations
Security Management System Policy Manual and related guidelines sought to contract only
with those armed private security companies with the highest standards of integrity,
competence and performance in line with internationally accepted human rights standards
and principles, while barring contracts with those convicted or implicated in human rights
abuses or criminal offences. At the same time, the most efficient way of ensuring that
international human rights and humanitarian principles were adhered to was to properly
implement such a policy and its guidelines.
69. The Under-Secretary-General congratulated the Working Group on mercenaries on
the comprehensive nature of its report to the General Assembly (A/69/338) and expressed
sincere appreciation for the opportunity to express views on its content. He referred to the
measures undertaken pursuant to one of the report’s recommendations, namely to extend
the United Nations Security Management System Policy Manual to unarmed private
security companies. In line with that recommendation, the Inter-Agency Security
Management Network recognized the importance of further clarifying the United Nations
position on the use of unarmed private security companies, and thus endorsed the
establishment of a working group on the subject. In March 2015, the unarmed private
security services working group had been formally established, had agreed upon its terms
of reference and taken initial steps in determining the need for a separate policy and related
guidelines relating to the use of unarmed private security services.
70. The Under-Secretary-General pointed out that there was arguably more to be done in
terms of how the existing United Nations Security Management System Policy Manual and
related Guidelines were implemented at the operational and tactical levels. In that regard,
17 Available from www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGMilitary/Session4/
UNSecurityPolicyManual.pdf.
18 Available from www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGMilitary/Session4/
GuidelinesUseArmedSecurityServices.pdf.
one of the greatest challenges was to ensure that the contracted private security companies
had adequate internal oversight and accountability mechanisms, including complaint and
performance reporting mechanisms, as recommended by the Working Group on
mercenaries. Given current resource constraints, the United Nations had yet to allocate
additional resources for establishing external monitoring mechanisms in order to ensure the
proper execution of a given contract, and accountability of contracted companies and
personnel with respect to improper or unlawful conduct. He also noted that, at the policy
level, the main gap lay in the lack of an international normative framework on the use of
private security companies, whether armed or unarmed. He stated that that issue could not
be addressed by a single or even multiple international organizations. Key actors —
including States in which private security companies were based or operated and the private
armed security companies themselves — must also be involved in a formal process
whereby a common and internationally agreed upon normative framework could be
established.
71. In the discussion that followed, delegations raised questions about: (a) the number of
countries in which the United Nations had engaged unarmed private security companies;
(b) the involvement of private security companies in peacekeeping operations and whether
any further increase in their involvement could be anticipated in the light of their greater
use by States; and (c) whether there was a risk that companies contracted by the United
Nations would participate directly as combatants or might be involved in interrogation or
detention of prisoners of war.
72. The Under-Secretary-General replied that currently the United Nations employed
unarmed security companies in 10 missions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
in 11 special political missions and in its support bases in Kenya and Spain, among others.
He expressed the hope that there would be no need to increase their use, while noting the
security and safety situation in which the United Nations operated. Such a decision was not
taken lightly and would be a matter of last resort on the basis of security risk assessment
and on the advice of the security team in the mission concerned. Finally, the Under-
Secretary-General confirmed that private security companies employed by the United
Nations neither participated directly as combatants nor were they involved in interrogation
or detention of prisoners of war. The principal role of private security companies was the
protection of United Nations personnel, premises and assets.
73. One delegation noted that while States might have different views on contracting
private security companies, all States were part of the United Nations and probably
recognized that their use by the Organization had become a practice, if not a necessity, for
it to operate in certain situations. With reference to oversight and accountability, the
delegation asked for further information on instances in which the United Nations had been
called upon to take steps to prevent abuses and facilitate access to remedy.
74. In his response, the Under-Secretary-General reiterated that all measures were taken
to ensure that international humanitarian law and human rights law were observed. Since
his appointment and in the prior handover period, no abuses had been brought to light.
There was a monthly review and Department of Safety and Security personnel had day-to-
day responsibility for oversight. Furthermore, the process of recruitment was stringent and
designed to minimize all abuses. Should any abuses occur, they were brought to the
attention of the Under-Secretary-General.
75. The Chair-Rapporteur enquired about the possibility of sharing United Nations
experience in using unarmed security companies, and its detailed standards and guidelines,
as a basis for discussion and possible use by States. He also queried the extent to which,
and under what conditions, national contingents of peacekeeping missions were allowed to
use private military and security companies. One delegation asked about the security
situation facing other humanitarian actors, and what collaboration the United Nations had
with actors in challenging security environments. In response, the Under-Secretary-General
mentioned close collaboration with States and referred to a colloquium in June 2015 to
share experiences, including on delivery of security. He also clarified that the United
Nations employed private security companies and not private military companies. Finally,
he pointed out that the United Nations collaborated with international non-governmental
organizations in complex and challenging security environments, including in the Syrian
Arab Republic and Yemen.
IV. Concluding remarks
76. On 1 May 2015, the Chair-Rapporteur thanked the delegations and expressed
gratitude to the experts for their excellent contributions. He mentioned the increased
use of private military and security companies in various sectors and contexts, both on
land and at sea. Specific challenges discussed included: jurisdiction issues linked to
“flags of convenience”; weapons storage in the context of “floating armouries” in
international waters, including possible circumvention of national laws limiting the
import and export of weapons; ensuring that private military and security companies
respected applicable national legislation; and challenges relating to international
cooperation in legal matters, in particular mutual legal assistance.
77. The Chair-Rapporteur suggested that the open-ended intergovernmental
working group consider including the following text as part of its conclusions and
recommendations:
[Paragraph 1] The intergovernmental working group noted the multifaceted
and diverse issues raised throughout its third and fourth sessions. These
included: the distinction between the activities of private military companies
and private security companies; measures for registering, licensing and
contracting private military and security companies; ensuring accountability
and provision of assistance and remedies for victims; possibility of an
international regulatory framework; specificities of regulating sea-based
private security activities; and the use of private security companies by the
United Nations. The intergovernmental working group noted the initiatives
undertaken by various stakeholders relating to those issues, while highlighting
the challenges that remain.
[Paragraph 2] Different views were offered as to how to achieve the shared goal
of protecting human rights and ensuring accountability for violations and
abuses relating to the activities of private military and security companies.
Some delegations proposed that the intergovernmental working group begin
elaborating a legally binding instrument for the regulation, monitoring and
oversight of private military and security companies, and submitted elements of
a draft convention for the consideration of the intergovernmental working
group. Other delegations proposed the consideration of the range of options to
be explored to further develop an international regulatory framework,
including international standards setting and development of guidelines,
possibly actions plans or model laws, contract templates based on the Montreux
Document, good practices and mutual legal assistance programmes.
[Paragraph 3] Taking account of Human Rights Council resolution 28/7 of 26
March 2015, the intergovernmental working group will continue its work on
the above-mentioned issues and also recommends further consideration of
human rights issues relating to, inter alia, (a) the operation of private military
and security companies in the maritime context; (b) the use of private military
and security companies by humanitarian actors; and (c) access to justice and
remedies for victims of violations and abuses linked to the activities of private
military and security companies.
78. The Chair-Rapporteur regretted that, despite the approval expressed by some
delegations, the second and third paragraphs had not found consensus.
79. The concluding remarks of the European Union and the African Group are
reproduced, in annex II and III respectively, in the language of submission only.
V. Conclusions and recommendations
80. The open-ended intergovernmental working group noted the multifaceted and
diverse issues raised throughout its third and fourth sessions. These included: the
distinction between the activities of private military companies and private security
companies; measures for registering, licensing and contracting private military and
security companies; ensuring accountability and provision of assistance and remedies
for victims; possibility of an international regulatory framework; specificities of
regulating sea-based private security activities; and the use of private security
companies by the United Nations. The intergovernmental working group noted the
initiatives undertaken by various stakeholders relating to those issues, while
highlighting the challenges that remain.
81. The open-ended intergovernmental working group will continue its work on the
above-mentioned issues and also recommends further consideration of related human
rights issues.
Annex I
[English only]
List of participants
States Members of the United Nations
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, China, Cuba, Egypt,
France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Syrian Arab
Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
States of America, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam
Non-member States represented by an observer
State of Palestine
United Nations funds, programmes, specialized agencies
and related organizations
World Trade Organization
Intergovernmental organizations
African Union, European Union
Other entities
International Committee of the Red Cross
Special procedures of the Human Rights Council
Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination
Non-governmental organizations in consultative status
with the Economic and Social Council
American Association of Jurists, Colombian Commission of Jurists, Centre for Socio-
Economic Development
Annex II
[English only]
Concluding remarks by the European Union
The European Union would like to thank the Chair and the Secretariat for the work in
preparation of this session and during the session.
The European Union believes that private security companies need to respect international
humanitarian law and international human rights law.
The European Union has actively and constructively engaged in the discussion of this
intergovernmental working group over the past four years. Several presentations during this
session were particularly informative and confirm that this industry is complex, and
evolving. The presentations also confirm that many steps have already been taken to
prevent abuses, and provide remedy when abuses occur. A range of obligations for States
already exists, as well as several processes to set new standards, to elaborate concrete
guidance for specific sectors, and to ensure oversight and accountability.
The discussion confirmed the specificities of regulating sea-based private security activities
and the need to look into progress made in other fora. It is particular important not to
duplicate the work carried by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). IMO has a
leading role on this issue.
The European Union is prepared to consider other options, and has come forward with a set
of possible action oriented recommendations to ensure that this intergovernmental working
group can progress in its deliberations. The European Union would like to share with the
plenary its proposed recommendations, as circulated on the third day of this session and
presented during the informal consultations on the fourth day :
In view of the substantive discussions held during the past sessions of the open-
ended inter-governmental working group, and in light of the complexities of the
issues, it recommends to the Human Rights Council the following:
(a) Continuation of the substantive discussions in the intergovernmental
working group with the participation of experts and all relevant stakeholders to take
stock of progress at the national and international levels — including in widening
the support to the Montreux Document and its Forum, and the development of the
International Code of Conduct Association — regarding the regulation, monitoring
and oversight of the activities of Private Military Companies and Private Security
Companies;
(b) Review the implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, with particular emphasis on the third pillar regarding access to
remedies, in the case of the activities carried out by private military companies and
private security companies;
(c) Consideration of the range of options to be explored to further develop
an international regulatory framework, including international standards setting,
development of guidelines, possibly actions plans or model laws, contract templates
based on the Montreux Document, good practices and mutual legal assistance
programmes;
(d) Consideration of the tasking of a high-level group of legal experts/the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to prepare a
document for consideration at the fifth session to outline the modalities for each
possible option, drawing when possible on past experience.
The European Union showed willingness to work on a compromise which would have
allowed this intergovernmental working group to agree on a set of solid and action oriented
recommendations. The European Union would like to thank delegations from across
regions who offered compromise language, and regrets that other delegations insisted on
language which clearly would never allow for consensus. The European Union further
regrets that some delegations called inter alia for the deletion of the paragraph referring to
the implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and in
particular to the third pillar on access to remedies. The European Union is committed to the
implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and hopes that all
States are also committed to their implementation.
Finally, the European Union would like to refer to the important role of civil society
organizations and human rights defenders who are actively engaged in this area of work.
I thank you Mr. Chair.
Annex III
[French only]
Déclaration et observations finales du Groupe africain
Le Groupe africain regrette que le Groupe de travail ne soit pas parvenu au consensus eu
égard à l’importance de cette question et le Groupe africain regrette qu’il n’y ait pas eu de
consensus au cours de cette session.
Le Groupe africain souhaiterait encore une fois réitérer l’importance qu’il attache au
mandat de ce groupe de travail qui selon le Groupe doit se focaliser sur l’élaboration d’un
instrument international à caractère contraignant. La nécessité et l’opportunité et les
éléments qui peuvent constituer ledit instrument ont fait à notre avis l’objet de présentations
détaillées au cours de la semaine écoulée ainsi qu’au cours des sessions précédentes. A ce
titre, le Groupe de travail sur l’utilisation de mercenaires comme moyen de violer les droits
de l’homme et d’empêcher l’exercice du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes a été
explicite à ce sujet et ce, en soulignant que la manière la plus efficiente d’adresser cette
question devrait se faire par le biais d’un instrument international à caractère contraignant.
Cela permettrait sans nul doute de prendre en charge les violations des droits de l’homme et
la question de reddition de comptes.
Le représentant [des sociétés de sécurité privées] a mis en avant clairement l’opportunité
d’élaborer un instrument international à caractère contraignant. Le représentant des Nations
Unies également n’a pas fait d’intervention qui était contraire à l’opportunité de travailler
sur un instrument. Je pense que cela a été dit au cours de nos différentes discussions qui se
sont tenues dans le cadre de ce groupe de travail aussi bien de la part du Groupe africain
que de la part d’un certain nombre de délégations.
Pour le Groupe africain, nous appelons ce groupe de travail à poursuivre ses travaux dans le
cadre du mandat qui a été mis en place et qui consiste en l’élaboration d’un instrument
international à caractère contraignant.