31/18 Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief

Human Rights Council Thirty-first session

Agenda item 3

Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,

political, economic, social and cultural rights,

including the right to development

Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief

Note by the Secretariat

The Secretariat has the honour to transmit to the Human Rights Council the report of

the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, prepared

pursuant to Council resolution 22/20. In the report, the Special Rapporteur analyses the

relationship between the right to freedom of religion or belief and the right to freedom of

opinion and expression. Against the misperception of these two rights purportedly standing

in opposition to each other, he describes far-reaching normative analogies between articles

18 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. He also explores

practical synergies between the rights to freedom of religion or belief and to freedom of

expression. The mutual reinforcement of both rights is particularly relevant when

combating intolerance, stereotyping, discrimination and incitement to violence based on

religion or belief.

United Nations A/HRC/31/18

General Assembly Distr.: General 23 December 2015

Original: English

Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief

Contents Page

I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 3

II. Two closely interrelated rights: freedom of religion or belief and

freedom of opinion and expression .................................................................................................. 3

A. Structural similarities ............................................................................................................... 5

B. Need for communicative freedom in implementing Human Right

Council resolution 16/18 .......................................................................................................... 9

C. Problematic restrictions ........................................................................................................... 16

III. Conclusions and recommendations .................................................................................................. 19

A. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 19

B. Recommendations .................................................................................................................... 20

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted by the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or

belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 22/20.

2. An overview of the activities of the Special Rapporteur between 1 August 2014 and

31 July 2015 is provided in his interim report (see A/70/286, paras 4-11). The Special

Rapporteur also undertook a country visit to Bangladesh from 31 August to 9 September

2015 and presented his annual report, which included a thematic focus on the rights of the

child and his or her parents to freedom of religion or belief, to the General Assembly at its

seventieth session in October 2015.

3. The Special Rapporteur participated in the regional Conference on Freedom of

Religion or Belief in South-East Asia, held in Bangkok on 30 September and 1 October

2015, at which multi-stakeholders participants from member States of the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) made a commitment to defend and promote freedom of

religion or belief for all persons.1 He also hosted a regional conference on the theme

Broadening cross-boundary communications, in Nicosia on 7 and 8 October 2015, at which

religious leaders, lawmakers and human rights defenders from the broader Middle East and

North Africa region discussed ways to strengthen and promote cooperation in cross-

boundary communications in order to prevent religious violence.

4. The present report focuses on the relationship between the right to freedom of

thought, conscience, religion or belief2 and the right to freedom of opinion and expression.

After some systematic observations on the structural similarities between these two rights,

the Special Rapporteur explores the interplay of the two rights in the implementation of

Human Rights Council resolution 16/18 on combating intolerance, negative stereotyping,

stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons

based on religion or belief, bearing in mind, also, important insights formulated in the

Rabat Plan of Action.3 He critically addresses the restrictive measures, including criminal

laws, which adversely affect the two rights and provides practical conclusions and makes

recommendations to different stakeholders.

II. Two closely interrelated rights: freedom of religion or belief and freedom of opinion and expression

5. In political discussions, legal debates and journalistic interviews, the Special

Rapporteur regularly faces questions concerning the relationship between freedom of

religion or belief and freedom of opinion and expression. Often, such questions reveal a

sceptical attitude. The assumption seems to be that these two rights do not easily fit

together. For instance, when people wonder how it might be possible to reconcile freedom

of religion or belief and freedom of expression, such wording displays a perception that the

two rights stand in essential opposition to each other. The underlying idea may be that,

whereas freedom of expression facilitates frank and open discussions, including satirical

provocation and caricatures that may be offensive to some, freedom of religion or belief, by

1 See www.icj.org/faith-based-and-other-groups-commit-to-strengthen-freedom-of-religion-or-belief-

in-southeast-asia/.

2 Hereafter referred to as “freedom of religion or belief”.

3 The Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that

constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence was adopted in Rabat on 5 October 2012

(see A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, appendix).

contrast, would more likely be invoked against excessive provocation relating to religious

issues. In short, while freedom of expression seems to signal a “green light” to all sorts of

provocation, freedom of religion or belief appears to function more like a “stop sign” to

provocation – or such is the perception.

6. In 2006, the previous Special Rapporteur, in a joint report, stressed that “freedom of

religion primarily confers a right to act in accordance with one’s religion but does not

bestow a right for believers to have their religion itself protected from all adverse

comment”.4 This is an important clarification. Freedom of religion or belief is a right to

“freedom”, a quality which accounts for its close relationship to other rights to freedom,

including freedom of opinion and expression. Moreover, among the various facets covered

by freedom of religion or belief, the rights to free personal orientation and free

communicative interaction with others constitute indispensable core aspects, which point to

the positive interrelatedness with freedom of opinion and expression. To a large extent,

both rights move in the same direction — although each has specific features. Articles 18

and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights display far-reaching

analogies in their legal formulations.

7. Both articles have in common the unconditional protection of the forum internum –

a person’s inner realm of thinking and believing, and the criteria for drawing limitations

with regard to their external manifestations, that is, the forum externum, are very similar.

Hence there are good reasons to conclude that the rights to freedom of religion or belief and

to freedom of expression do not stand in opposition to each other, but are actually quite

close in spirit and formulation. Yet, this positive interrelatedness does not preclude concrete

conflicts, as controversial issues may at times emerge at the intersection of both rights.

8. The positive interrelatedness between freedom of religion or belief and freedom of

expression is not only a theoretical postulate. More importantly, the two rights mutually

reinforce each other in practice. This insight should also guide the implementation of

Human Rights Council resolution 16/18 on combating intolerance, negative stereotyping,

stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons

based on religion or belief, which addresses both rights explicitly.

9. With regard to freedom of religion or belief, States should create favourable

conditions for everyone to be able to enjoy this right without fear and without

discrimination. This requires, inter alia, taking measures to eliminate all forms of

intolerance, stigmatization and negative stereotyping of persons based on their religion or

belief, as well as adopting effective policies to prevent acts of violence or incitement

thereto, as requested in resolution 16/18. Although this may at times require restricting

freedom of expression, in accordance with the criteria established for imposing restrictions

in articles 19 (3) and 20 (2) of the Covenant, the right to freedom of expression, above all,

provides positive preconditions for combating intolerance by facilitating the creation of

communicative counter-strategies in the broadest sense, such as public condemnation of

incitement to hatred and public demonstrations in support of targeted individuals or groups.

10. The interrelatedness of freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression was

also explored in some detail in the Rabat Plan of Action, which contains the results of a

series of regional workshops organized by the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 2011 and 2012, with the broad participation

of international experts, civil society organizations, government representatives, as well as

international and regional organizations.

4 See A/HRC/2/3, para. 37.

11. The present report is intended to contribute to the ongoing discussion on resolution

16/18, which takes place within, inter alia, the Istanbul Process for Combating Intolerance,

Discrimination and Incitement to Hatred and/or Violence on the Basis of Religion or

Belief,5 with the purpose of collecting ideas for the effective implementation of the

resolution. The Istanbul Process itself should also consistently draw on the Rabat Plan of

Action, which in turn refers to resolution 16/18 as “a promising platform for effective,

integrated and inclusive action by the international community”.6

A. Structural similarities

1. Human beings as rights holders

12. As their titles indicate, the right to freedom of religion or belief and the right to

freedom of opinion and expression are both rights to freedom, a quality that they also have

in common with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. All these rights

play an indispensable role in shaping free and democratic societies, in which the diversity

of, inter alia, thoughts, ideas, opinions, interests, convictions, conscientious positions,

religions and beliefs can be manifested and defended freely, including by getting together

with others and by establishing adequate institutions and infrastructures with that purpose.

13. Rights holders are human beings, who may exercise these freedoms as individuals

and in community with others. While this may sound like a truism in the context of human

rights in general, the right to freedom of religion or belief has sometimes been misperceived

as protecting religions or belief systems in themselves. This misperception is the source of

much confusion, as it obfuscates the nature of freedom of religion or belief as an

empowering right. Ignoring that may lead to the wrong assumption of an antagonism

between freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression. Thus, it may warrant

highlighting that freedom of religion or belief protects believers rather than religions or

beliefs.

14. Against a possible misperception, it should be noted that the focus on human beings

as rights holders does not imply a particular “anthropocentric” world view. Instead, this

focus follows from the diversity of existing world views. More precisely, it means taking

religious and philosophical pluralism seriously, including irreconcilable differences in

beliefs and practices. For instance, while some religions are based on scriptures transmitted

through prophets, other religions do not have the notions of prophecy, scriptural revelation

or even God. What is sacred for one community may remain rather opaque to another

community. It is not least for this reason that legal recognition in the framework of human

rights cannot immediately be accorded to the particular contents of religions or beliefs —

such as their truth claims, scriptures or practices —, but only to human beings as the

responsible agents who hold, cherish, develop and try to live in accordance with their

convictions. Only by focusing on human beings as rights holders can freedom of religion or

belief do justice to the broad variety of religious and non-religious convictions, identities

and practices, without singling out one specific religion or belief (or one type of religion)

for privileged treatment.

15. Likewise, freedom of opinion and expression also focuses on human beings, who

have the right to develop, hold and change opinions and ideas on different themes; seek,

receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds; and express their views freely in

5 The Istanbul Process is a series of intergovernmental meetings launched in 2011 with the aim of

supporting the implementation of Human Rights Council resolution 16/18.

6 A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, appendix, para. 41.

communicative interaction with others through any media which they see fit for those

purposes. Here again, legal protection is not directly accorded to certain opinions, ideas or

expressions as such, which may be very diverse and frequently irreconcilable. Instead, the

focus lies on the freedom that individuals and groups of individuals have to hold and

exchange opinions and ideas.

16. It should be furthermore emphasized that the two rights under discussion here are

rights of “everyone” and thus held by all human beings who should be able to exercise

them free from fear and free from discrimination. Freedom of religion or belief and

freedom of expression are not only rights to freedom, but also epitomize the principle of

equality which underpins the human-rights approach as a whole — in “recognition of the

inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human

family” as stressed in the first sentence of the preamble of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights

2. Unconditional respect for the forum internum

17. Articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant show strikingly similar legal formulations, the

most salient common feature being the conceptual distinction drawn in both articles

between the forum internum and the forum externum. This conceptual distinction appears

nowhere else in the text of the Covenant. While the wordings used to define the specific

protection of the forum internum within article 18 and article 19 are slightly different, the

basic content is identical. In both articles the protection accorded to the inner dimension of

a person’s thoughts, opinions or convictions (religious or otherwise) is strictly

unconditional.

18. Article 18 (2) of the Covenant demands that “no one shall be subject to coercion

which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”.

Similarly, article 19 (1) of the Covenant provides for the “right to hold opinions without

interference”. The Human Rights Committee has clarified that the non-coercion and non-

inference provisions both have the status of unconditional normative requirements. In

paragraph 3 of its general comment No. 22 (1993) on the right to freedom of thought,

conscience and religion, the Committee points out that article 18 does not permit any

limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or the freedom to have or

adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice, and that those freedoms are protected

unconditionally. In paragraph 9 of its general comment No. 34 (2011) on freedoms of

opinion and expression, the Committee likewise states that article 19 (1) is a right to which

the Covenant permits no exception or restriction. Such unconditional guarantees are rare in

international human rights law.

19. A main function of both articles is to protect every individual’s inner faculty of

forming, holding or changing, inter alia, opinions, ideas, conscientious positions, religious

and non-religious convictions against coercion and interference. Exposure to coercion in

this inner nucleus, for example, by being forced to conceal one’s true position or conviction

or to feign a belief that is not authentic, can mean betraying oneself. If this happens

repeatedly or over a long period, it can undermine the preconditions for developing a stable

sense of self-respect. That experience warrants an interpretation of articles 18 (2) and 19 (1)

of the Covenant in close analogy to the unconditional prohibition of slavery7 and the

equally unconditional prohibition of torture.8 While legal restrictions against external

manifestations originating from a person’s conviction (i.e., the forum externum) may be

justifiable in certain situations (provided those restrictions fulfil strict criteria), coercive

7 See article 8 (1) of the Covenant.

8 See article 7 of the Covenant.

means can never be legitimately employed to manipulate a person’s inner conviction (i.e.,

the forum internum) itself.

20. The wording of article 18 of the Covenant differs from that of article 19 in that it

explicitly enshrines everyone’s freedom “to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his

choice”, thus using an equivalent of the right to “change”, as contained in article 18 of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This additional clarification is necessary since

religions and beliefs can shape an individual’s personal identity and create a deep sense of

attachment and group loyalty based on shared world views, symbols, ethical norms and

practices. The preamble of the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of

Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief states that “religion or belief,

for anyone who professes either, is one of the fundamental elements of his conception of

life”. What goes without saying with regard to more general opinions and ideas, namely

that they can legitimately change over time, needs explicit confirmation when it comes to

religions and beliefs specifically, which may profoundly shape the identity of the person,

often in conjunction with truth claims and deep-seated expectations of loyalty.9

3. Forum externum dimensions

21. Both articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant also require broad application with regard to

the forum externum. According to article 18 (1) of the Covenant, the external dimensions of

freedom of religion or belief include everyone’s freedom “either individually or in

community with others, and in public or private to manifest his religion or belief in

worship, observance, practice and teaching”. Manifestation of one’s religion or belief

covers a broad range of activities: for instance, bearing witness to one’s faith in private and

in public, educating the younger generation, celebrating religious holidays, fasting,

performing prayers alone or in community with others or establishing community

infrastructures. Article 19 of the Covenant, in turn, deals with “information and ideas of all

kind”; it is applicable “regardless of frontiers”; and it includes the use of any media.

According to the last criterion, a person can seek, receive and transmit information or ideas

“orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice”.

Religious or belief-related convictions undoubtedly fall within the broad category of

“information and ideas of all kind”, thus directly benefit from the broad conceptualization

of freedom of expression set out in article 19 of the Covenant. Just as both rights show

large overlaps within the forum internum, they also broadly overlap in the forum externum.

22. Forum internum and forum externum should be generally seen as a continuum. Their

conceptual distinction should not be misperceived as a clear-cut separation of different

spheres of life. Just as freedom in the forum internum would be inconceivable without a

person’s free interaction with his or her social world, freedom within the forum externum

presupposes respect for the faculty of every individual to come up with new thoughts and

ideas and to develop personal convictions, including dissident and provocative positions.

While providing unconditional protection to the inner nucleus of each individual against

coercion and interference, the legally enhanced status of the forum internum at the same

time improves the prospects of free communication and manifestation within the forum

externum. In other words, it strengthens freedom of religion or belief and freedom of

opinion and expression in all their dimensions, both internal and external.

23. Another common feature of the rights to freedom of religion or belief and to

freedom of opinion and expression is that they guarantee open communication, thus

contributing to the flourishing of communities and a culture of free public discourse. At the

same time, the two rights each have their specific applications concerning the forum

9 See A/66/156.

externum. External “manifestations” of religion or belief, while in many cases also

amounting to “expressions” in the understanding of article 19 of the Covenant, often reflect

an existential desire to actually live in accordance with one’s religious or other conviction,

for instance by observing certain dress codes or dietary restrictions, thus exceeding mere

communicative “expressions”. One example illustrating the difference is conscientious

objection to military service, which falls within the subcategories of “observance” or

“practice” listed in article 18. Conscientious objectors would most likely not be satisfied

with having the mere option to publicly “express” their opposition to the use of military

force. What counts for many of them is the possibility to actually shape their lives in

accordance with their conscience-based moral and/or religious position. Generally

speaking, while freedom of religion or belief has a strong communicative component,

which it shares with freedom of opinion and expression, the protected dimensions of

religious manifestations — worship, observance, practice and teaching — cannot be

summed up under the heading of communicative freedom only because they also include

other aspects of leading one’s life in conformity with one’s religion or belief.

24. The importance of living in accordance with one’s religion or belief naturally

includes family life. In article 18 (4) of the Covenant, States parties “undertake to have

respect for the liberty of parents, and when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the

religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions”.

There is no parallel provision in article 19, however, that should not lead to the wrong

conclusions. Of course, the freedom “to impart information and ideas of all kinds”, as

guaranteed in article 19 (2) of the Covenant, also applies to free communication within the

family, particularly between parents and children. Nonetheless, the specific significance

which religious or belief-related convictions have for the self-understanding of individuals

and communities necessitates an explicit recognition of religious and moral socialization

processes within the family. Freedom to “manifest” one’s religion or belief thus includes

the various practical dimensions of organizing one’s entire private and public life,

individually and together with others, in conformity with one’s identity-shaping religious or

belief-related convictions.

4. Criteria for limitations

25. Although the forum externum of freedom of religion or belief and freedom

expression is not protected unconditionally in articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant, its legal

protection remains strong. Limitations or restrictions cannot be legitimate unless they

satisfy all the criteria set out in article 18 (3) or article 19 (3), respectively. Notwithstanding

differences in concrete formulations, the tests required in both articles contain similar

elements. Firstly, limitations or restrictions must be “prescribed by law” or “provided by

law”. The requirement of a clearly formulated legal basis should prevent Governments from

intervening in an arbitrary and unpredictable manner. Moreover, limitations or restrictions

must serve a legitimate purpose from an exhaustive list of possible purposes. In the case of

article 18 (3), this list comprises “public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental

rights and freedoms of others”. Article 19 (3) enumerates “respect of the rights and

reputations of others”, as well as “protection of national security or of public order (ordre

public), or of public health or morals”. Finally, both articles require that limitations or

restrictions be strictly “necessary” to pursue one of the said purposes. In other words,

proposed limitations cannot be legitimate if the respective purpose could also be served by

a less far-reaching intervention.

26. The Human Rights Committee emphasizes the need for limitation clauses to be

applied in a strict manner to ensure that the substance of the respective provisions is

preserved also in situations of a real or alleged collision with other rights or important

public interests. In its general comment No. 22, the Committee insists that “limitations may

be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly

related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. Restrictions

may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner”

(para. 8). In its general comment No. 34, the Committee is even more specific in defining

the criteria for legitimate restrictions to freedom of expression. With regard to the required

legal basis, the Committee states that a law “must be formulated with sufficient precision to

enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made

accessible to the public” (para. 25).

27. With regard to the necessity clause, the Human Rights Committee stresses in general

comment No. 34 that, before resorting to restrictions, States “must demonstrate in specific

and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the necessity and

proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct and

immediate connection between the expression and the threat” (para. 35).

28. Concerning the concept of morals as one of the grounds for limitation, the Human

Rights Committee calls for a cautious approach. In its general comment No. 22, it notes that

“the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious traditions;

consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of

protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single

tradition” (para. 8). In reiterating this clarification in its general comment No. 34, it adds

that “any such limitations must be understood in the light of universality of human rights

and the principle of non-discrimination” (para. 32). This is in line with the Siracusa

Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights, which require States to demonstrate that a limitation on grounds

of public morals is essential to the maintenance of respect for the fundamental values of the

community, “since public morality varies over time and from one culture to another”.10

29. Unfortunately, limitation criteria are often loosely invoked by Governments, for

example by simply citing the truism that “no freedom can be absolute” in order to “justify”

far-reaching restrictions disregarding the criteria on the matter set out in articles 18 and 19

of the Covenant or specified in general comments and the Siracusa Principles. Against this

background, the clarifications made by the Human Rights Committee are all the more

important. It may be useful in this context to reiterate that human rights have the elevated

status of “inalienable rights” since they originate from the due respect for each and every

human being’s inherent dignity. Limitation clauses have an indispensable practical function

in upholding this status of “inalienable rights”, including in complicated situations, in

which public order interests may enter the picture. These clauses must therefore be applied

strictly and with the utmost degree of empirical and normative diligence.

B. Need for communicative freedom in implementing Human Rights

Council resolution 16/18

1. Reaffirmed significance of freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression

30. As mentioned earlier, the close interrelatedness of freedom of religion or belief and

freedom of opinion and expression is not confined to mere parallelisms in normative

formulations within the Covenant; the interrelatedness is also a practical one, as the two

rights mutually reinforce each other in facilitating free and democratic societies. This

insight should guide the implementation of Human Rights Council resolution 16/18. Many

observers have appreciated resolution 16/18 as a landmark document upon which to base

10 See E/CN.4/1985/4, annex, para. 27.

the ongoing efforts to eliminate the various root causes of religious intolerance and of

related problems.

31. In the preamble of resolution 16/18, the Human Rights Council underlines the

significance of freedom of religion or belief and freedom of opinion and expression. It

reaffirms “that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides, inter alia,

that everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief,

which shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and

freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to

manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching”. It also

reaffirms “the positive role that the exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and

expression and the full respect for the freedom to seek, receive and impart information can

play in strengthening democracy and combating religious intolerance”.

32. The explicit reference to the rights to freedom of religion or belief and to freedom of

opinion and expression is no coincidence, as the Council, in resolution 16/18, attaches great

importance to communicative interaction, which has a key function in building trust

between different religious or belief communities as well as in society at large. This

includes a broad range of measures in the areas of education, awareness-building, outreach

strategy, interreligious communication and public discourse. In that context, the Council

specifically recognizes “that the open public debate of ideas, as well as interfaith and

intercultural dialogue, at the local, national and international levels can be among the best

protection against religious intolerance” (para. 4).

33. At the same time, the Council also calls for a clear rejection of certain speech acts

and condemns “any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to

discrimination, hostility or violence, whether it involves the use of print, audio-visual or

electronic media or any other means” (para. 3). Furthermore, it calls for “measures to

criminalize incitement to imminent violence based on religion or belief” (para. 5 (f)). Other

measures recommended in resolution 16/18 include putting an end to the practice of

religious profiling, which inevitably leads to stigmatization and providing effective

protection for places of worship and religious sites, including in conflict situations.

2. Facilitating free and voluntary communication

34. From the combined perspectives of the two rights at issue, individuals are entitled to

all aspects of communicative interaction. For instance, they have the right to seek, receive

and impart information, express opinions and ideas, voice personal and/or political

concerns, share their religious or philosophical convictions with others, try to persuade

others or let themselves be persuaded, bear witness to their belief in private or publicly,

engage in communication across State boundaries etc. For these and other acts to be

manifestations of freedom, however, individuals also need to have the right not to

participate in certain communicative acts, if they so wish. They are generally free to

withdraw from unwanted communicative actions, remain disinterested in certain

information, keep their political opinions or religious convictions for themselves, decline

invitations to interreligious ceremonies or refrain from participating in public

demonstrations.

35. Rights to freedom typically have their “positive” and “negative”11 sides: they entitle

individuals to perform certain acts or not to do so. Both aspects are equally important.

Indeed, for communicative acts to merit their qualification as “free and voluntary”,

individuals should generally be respected in their freedom to decide for themselves

11 The adjective “negative” does not carry a pejorative meaning in this context.

whether, when and how to communicate, seek or impart information or speak out on certain

issues. The right to withdraw or to remain reserved is the indispensable flipside of the right

to engage in all aspects of free communication. This also applies to persons who belong to

a group, such as members of religious or belief minorities.

36. In that context, it may be useful to recall that freedom of religion or belief includes

the right not to have one’s religious or belief orientation involuntarily exposed, for instance

in passports, identification or other official documents. Likewise, freedom of opinion and

expression entitles individuals to protection of their political or other opinions against

unwanted exposure.12 Such protection functions as a practical safeguard against

discrimination, while at the same time contributing to overcome “religious profiling” and

its stigmatizing effects, as required by Human Rights Council resolution 16/18. Policies of

using communicative interaction with a view to combating intolerance, stereotyping,

stigmatization, discrimination and incitement against individuals based on their religion or

belief should therefore always accommodate the interest in non-exposure, which some

individuals or groups of individuals may have.

37. To facilitate communication while at the same time accommodating the possible

interest in non-exposure presupposes a broad variety of different communicative formats.

For instance, while some communicative settings may operate on the express understanding

that participants represent different faith communities, there should also be formats which

allow people to communicate about religious intolerance and related problems without

“outing” themselves in their personal religious or belief orientation. The different formats

should mutually complement each other, thus facilitating a culture of open and frank

communication with broad voluntary participation.

3. Relevant types of communicative action (examples)

38. As the word limit of the present report does not allow a detailed analysis of the

multiple forms of communicative action needed to combat intolerance, stereotyping,

stigmatization, discrimination, violence and incitement thereto, the Special Rapporteur

would like to make a few non-exhaustive typological observations.

Interreligious communication

39. Human Rights Council resolution 16/18 repeatedly underlines the role of interfaith

and intercultural dialogue for combating intolerance based on religion or belief. Such

dialogue can assume different forms, which all have specific advantages and limitations.

While some interreligious projects chiefly fulfil symbolic functions, others may serve

practical purposes, including interreligious charity work. Whereas in some projects the

main intention may be for persons belonging to different groups to regularly encounter each

other face to face, other projects may aim at the systematic clarification of thematic issues

of common concern. While some activities are carried out explicitly under the auspices of

religious and denominational differences, other types of communication cut across the

entire spectrum of religious diversity without highlighting or even mentioning the

participants’ religious backgrounds.

40. In his country visits, the Special Rapporteur observed different formats of

interreligious dialogue and the variety of purposes pursued thereby. For instance, during his

visit to Lebanon, he participated in a big interreligious ceremony, in which representatives

of different Christian and Muslim communities symbolically reassured each other of their

12 The Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression highlighted that unwanted exposure may serve as a

deterrent to expression, thereby undermining the right and the ability to express opinions or beliefs

(see A/HRC/29/32).

mutual appreciation. Not only were there religious dignitaries, but also ordinary community

members, including young people, who expressed their rejection of violence committed in

the name of religion, in a theatrical performance. One should not underestimate the impact

that such ceremonies — in particular when conducted on a regular basis and with broad

participation — can have on the climate of interreligious conviviality in a country. In

Lebanon and in Jordan, the Special Rapporteur visited private schools run by various

religious communities, which accommodate refugee children across all denominational

boundaries at their own expense. Those admirable examples of practical interreligious

cooperation send much-needed rays of hope in a region currently torn by violent conflicts

with obvious sectarian components.

41. In Sierra Leone, the Special Rapporteur was highly impressed by the constructive

role that the Interreligious Council plays in rebuilding the nation after the traumatic civil

war. He also learned that the tangible atmosphere of interreligious “open-heartedness” in

Sierra Leone was not least facilitated by public and private schools, in which students from

different religious backgrounds — Sunnis, Shias, Ahmadis, Catholics, Anglicans,

Methodists, Baptists among others — meet on a daily basis and learn together, thus

building trust from early on. In Kazakhstan, the Government organizes regular

interreligious meetings, with the purpose of strengthening the forces of religious

moderation. While at the regional level, such meetings are open to broad public

participation, the big ceremonial conferences held every second year in the capital mainly

bring together world and traditional religious leaders.

42. During a follow-up visit to the Republic of Moldova, the Special Rapporteur

witnessed clear signs of improvement in the interaction of religious communities. In

Cyprus, the enhanced interreligious communication between Christian and Muslim leaders

has led to recent breakthroughs, including the re-opening of churches and mosques that had

been inaccessible for decades owing to the protracted conflict on the island. Religious

leaders have initiated emergency measures and cleaned up each other’s places of worship,

thus creating an atmosphere of goodwill and trust. Some interreligious encounters in

Cyprus have been open to participation beyond the traditional religious communities,

including Evangelicals, Baha’is, Buddhists and others, thus building awareness on the

further emergence of religious pluralism.

43. Those and numerous other examples testify to the peacebuilding potential of

interreligious communication, which often remains politically underrated. The Special

Rapporteur appreciates the diversity of formats in which interreligious dialogue projects

can take place and the various specific goals that they may pursue. It is certainly useful to

allow for broad ownership in order to solidify regular communication beyond the narrow

circles of “dialogue experts”. Women often remain underrepresented in many of those

projects and that situation should change. Internal diversity of positions and assessments is

important and may help eliminate stereotypical perceptions of religious communities as

monolithic blocks.

44. When convening or facilitating interreligious encounters, government agencies

should ensure that their communicative outreach is inclusive, by also involving members of

small communities, representatives of new religious movements or non-believers.13 Besides

“formal” interreligious dialogue projects, in which people explicitly meet as representatives

of their respective religious communities, “informal” communication should also be

encouraged, as it allows the active participation of persons who are less used to expressing

13 Of course, there may be reasons to reserve certain “bilateral” or other meetings to participants from

specific communities only. What counts is that the general communicative policy is inclusive (see

A/66/156).

themselves under the auspices of religious diversity or might prefer not to “come out” with

their personal religious or non-religious orientations. Here again, the diversity of formats of

interreligious communication can play a productive role and should systematically be taken

into account.

A culture of public discourse

45. Intolerance, stereotyping, stigmatization, discrimination and incitement against

persons based on their religion or belief do not only affect members of religious

communities, but also have an impact on society as a whole. Communicative counter-

strategies cannot therefore be limited to various formats of interreligious dialogue. What is

also needed is the development of frank public discourse, facilitated by free and

independent broadcast, print and online media, a broad range of civil society organizations

and other stakeholders. The best antidote to intolerant propaganda is a culture of critical

public discourse with broad participation. Governments have the responsibility to create a

safe and enabling environment in law and practice for media practitioners and civil society

activists, based on respect for everyone’s freedom of expression and all other human rights.

46. For instance, when it comes to combating negative stereotyping, the counter-strategy

cannot consist in “image campaigns” aimed at replacing negative pictures by positive

pictures. In the long run, such image campaigns will merely reinforce suspicion in sceptical

parts of society. Instead, what is needed is overcoming the root causes of stereotyping in

general, including through nuanced debates and reporting. The purpose should be to

solidify or restore experience-based common sense in society at large, including concerning

issues of religious diversity.

47. Coexistence among people of different religious orientations is not always easy and

can produce tensions, which should be articulated publicly. When sharing experiences —

including negative experiences — in public debates, such experiences and concomitant

feelings at least can be exposed to public counter-narratives, which may help to prevent

them from hardening into fixed prejudices and negative stereotypes. By contrast, lack of

public debate typically provides fertile ground for spreading spiteful rumours against

certain communities and their members. When told merely in hermetic circles or closed

chatrooms and remaining unchecked by any counter-narratives or counter-evidence,

negative rumours may easily lead to collective prejudices. They can even escalate into

paranoid conspiracy projections and concomitant incitement to violence.14

48. An important purpose of public debates is overcoming all forms of essentialism in

the area of religion and belief. Essentialism basically denies or marginalizes internal

diversity, thus assuming that the followers of a certain religion all think and behave alike.

This typically results in a de-individualization of the individual or a de-personalization of

the person, who seems to disappear behind an ascribed homogeneous collective mentality.

It is all the more important to recapture the truth that religions and beliefs, as lived social

phenomena, always consist of human beings with most different biographies, characters,

inclinations, interests, positions and assessments. Beside face-to-face communication,

public discussions play a crucial role in this endeavour and should be based on respect for

freedom of expression. A fair representation of members of different religious communities

in the media, including in particular minorities, is an indispensable part of such a strategy.

49. In this context, the Special Rapporteur would like to recommend the Camden

Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality.15 The Camden Principles advocate

14 See A/HRC/25/58.

15 See Article 19, Global Campaign for Free Expression, “The Camden Principles on Freedom of

Expression and Equality” (April 2009), available at www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/the-

making use of freedom of expression, including media freedom, to promote equality and

non-discrimination in society. According to principle 6, “all mass media should, as a moral

and social responsibility, take steps to: ensure that their workforces are diverse and

representative of society as a whole; address as far as possible issues of common concern to

all groups in society; seek a multiplicity of sources and voices within different

communities, rather than representing communities as a monolithic blocs; adhere to high

standards of information provision that meet recognized professional and ethical

standards”. Principle 5.3, for its part, proposes a public policy framework that, inter alia,

ensures “that disadvantaged and excluded groups have equitable access to media resources,

including training opportunities”. Obviously, the insistence placed by the Camden

Principles on ensuring pluralistic representation within the media, as part of their moral and

social responsibility, includes religious and belief-related pluralism.

Public condemnations of incitement to acts of religious hatred

50. An inclusive culture of public discourse presupposes public rejection of speech-acts

or other symbolic acts by which certain individuals or groups are de facto ex-communicated

from any meaningful communication. Examples include extreme forms of essentialism,

which effectively de-individualize certain individuals, or the equation of human beings with

animals, which even aim at excommunicating them from the human family in general.

Quite often, such rhetorical excommunication of human beings paves the way to real acts of

hatred, such as discrimination, hostility or violence.

51. Incitement to acts of hatred can never be condoned and requires quick and clear

communicative interventions.16 While a broad range of different stakeholders — civil

society organizations, the media, religious communities and others — should participate in

communicative counter-activities, the public condemnation of incitement also falls within

the responsibility of the Government. Lack of government commitment in this regard or

delayed and lukewarm reactions can easily be perceived as tacit complicity by government

agencies with acts of incitement, or even as encouragement to commit violent crimes. By

contrast, when the Government publicly sends quick and clear messages that any attacks

against certain individual or groups will be perceived as attacks on society as a whole, this

may function as a deterrent to potential perpetrators.

52. It is well known that entrepreneurs of hatred like to stage themselves as the political

avant-garde, typically pretending to act in the name of a “silent majority”. As long as the

majority of people within a society actually remain silent, this cynical game can continue

unabated. It is all the more important that public rejections of violence and incitement to

violence find a broad echo in society and that many people actively join in such rejections.

The Special Rapporteur was repeatedly impressed to see public demonstrations in which

numerous people — ordinary citizens, representatives of civil society organizations,

religious leaders and others — took the streets to visibly express their abhorrence of any

advocacy of hatred in the name of religion(s). Such activities can have an enormous impact

on the climate in a society by sending a clear message to potential perpetrators, while at the

same time mobilizing broad support for targeted minorities.

53. In cases where violent acts have actually occurred, credible public expressions of

solidarity for the targeted groups are crucial alongside other measures. Members of targeted

groups should be able to experience sympathy and feel that they are not alone in their

mourning. Whereas lack of public solidarity may make members of minority groups feel

helpless and encourage the radical forces within them to resort to violence in response to

camden-principles-on-freedom-of-expression-and-equality.pdf.

16 See A/HRC/28/66.

attacks, the experience of practical sympathy can help restore trust in society among

members of the targeted minority after violence has been perpetrated. Acts of solidarity

should include participation in funerals and visits to bereaved families. Again, government

representatives have a particular responsibility to be visibly and credibly present in such

critical situations.

4. Restrictive measures connected to high thresholds

54. As previously stated, the rights to freedom of religion or belief and to freedom of

expression are not beyond limitations in the forum externum. However, bearing in mind the

special rank of these “inalienable” rights as well as their practical significance for creating a

culture of trustful communication and public discourse, limitations should always be drawn

with caution and must be fully in line with international human rights standards. Among the

criteria required for restrictions to be justifiable, these measures must actually prove

“necessary” for achieving one of the enumerated legitimate aims. The principle of necessity

implies that certain restrictive measures cannot be legitimate if less far-reaching

interventions could accomplish the same results.

55. Unfortunately, realities in many countries differ from those standards. The Special

Rapporteur was repeatedly surprised that some Governments all too quickly resort to

restrictive measures in their fight against religious intolerance, often without even trying to

explore the potential of communicative counter-strategies. Rather than using

communicative counter-strategies and forming broad alliances with different societal

stakeholders in creating a culture of open-mindedness against religious intolerance, some

Governments seem to see their leadership role chiefly as passing and enforcing criminal

legislation. However, this means turning the sequence of measures upside down. From the

perspective of freedom of religion or belief, seen in conjunction with freedom of

expression, the primacy of non-restrictive policies should always be upheld. Moreover,

restrictive measures if deemed necessary must meet all the criteria laid down in

articles 18 (3) and 19 (3) of the Covenant, as developed above.

56. Another important norm, which has recently attracted more attention, is

article 20 (2) of the Covenant, which states that “any advocacy of national, racial or

religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be

prohibited by law”. The title and the text of Council resolution 16/18 reflect the renewed

awareness of this norm. In its general comment No. 34, the Human Rights Committee

emphasizes that prohibitions enacted in the name of article 20 (2) must comply “with the

strict requirements of article 19, paragraph 3, as well as such articles as 2, 5, 17, 18 and 26”

(para. 48). This means that, besides preserving all the guarantees enshrined in article 19 (3)

of the Covenant, which can never be circumvented by invoking article 20 (2), prohibitions

must be precisely defined and must be enacted without any discriminatory intention or

effect.

57. Article 20 (2) of the Covenant is also reflected in the title of the Rabat Plan of

Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes

incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. In appreciation of the special rank of the

right to freedom of expression, the Rabat Plan of Action clarifies that “article 20 of the

Covenant requires a high threshold because, as a matter of fundamental principle, limitation

of speech must remain an exception”.17 In order to further spell out the required threshold,

the Rabat Plan of Action proposes a six-element test which should support the judiciary in

assessing whether concrete acts of hate speech actually amount to “incitement to

discrimination, hostility or violence” and are serious enough to be considered as criminal

17 See A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, appendix, para. 18.

offences. The six elements are: the social and political context; the speaker (e.g. his or her

status and influence); the intent of a speech act (as opposed to mere negligence); its content

or form (e.g. style, degree of provocation); the extent of the speech act (e.g. its public

nature and the size of its audience); and the likelihood and imminence of actually causing

harm.18

58. The Rabat Plan of Action thus strictly upholds the criteria laid down in article 20 (2)

of the Covenant. It calls upon States to bring their relevant legislation fully in line with

articles 18, 19 and 20 of the Covenant when taking action against incitement. As the

flipside of this approach, the Rabat Plan of Action reaffirms the role that non-restrictive

measures of counter-incitement should play, thus corroborating the legitimacy of

limitations as measures of last resort only. In this context, the Rabat Plan of Action

explicitly underlines the close interrelatedness of freedom of religion or belief and freedom

of expression in any attempt to combat incitement to acts of hatred:

It is often purported that freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief are

in a tense relationship or even contradictory. In reality, they are mutually dependent

and reinforcing. The freedom to exercise or not exercise one’s religion or belief

cannot exist if the freedom of expression is not respected, as free public discourse

depends on respect for the diversity of convictions which people may have.

Likewise, freedom of expression is essential to creating an environment in which

constructive discussion about religious matters could be held.19

C. Problematic restrictions

1. Blasphemy laws

59. In its general comment No. 34, the Human Rights Committee stresses that

“prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or other belief system, including

blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the Covenant, except in the specific circumstances

envisaged in article 20, paragraph 2, of the Covenant” (para. 48). To exemplify this

clarification, the Committee underlines that prohibitions cannot be permitted in order “to

prevent or punish criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrines and

tenets of faith”. The Rabat Plan of Actions likewise criticizes blasphemy laws and finds it

counterproductive at the national level as they may result in de facto censure of all

interreligious and intrareligious dialogue, debate and criticism, most of which could be

constructive, healthy and needed.20

60. As stated earlier, rights holders in the framework of human rights can only be human

beings, as individuals and in community with others. This logic fully applies also to the

right to freedom of religion or belief. While human beings — and indeed all of them —

should receive recognition and legal protection in their freedom to believe and practise in

the ways they see appropriate, blasphemy laws typically single out certain religions for

special protection, thus not only encroaching on freedom of expression but also on freedom

of religion or belief, in particular of members of religious minorities, converts, critics,

atheists, agnostics, internal dissidents and others. Abundant experience in a number of

countries demonstrates that blasphemy laws do not contribute to a climate of religious

openness, tolerance, non-discrimination and respect. To the contrary, they often fuel

stereotyping, stigmatization, discrimination and incitement to violence. As noted in the

18 Ibid., para. 29.

19 Ibid., para. 10.

20 Ibid., para. 19.

Rabat Plan of Action, “many blasphemy laws afford different levels of protection to

different religions and have often proved to be applied in a discriminatory manner. There

are numerous examples of persecution of religious minorities or dissenters, but also of

atheists and non-theists, as a result of legislation on what constitutes religious offences or

overzealous application of laws containing neutral language” (para. 19). Based on that

assessment, it recommends that “States that have blasphemy laws should repeal them, as

such laws have a stifling impact on the enjoyment of freedom of religion or belief, and

healthy dialogue and debate about religion” (para. 25). Moreover, blasphemy provisions

may encourage non-State actors to threaten and commit acts of violence against people

expressing critical views.

61. Obviously, satirical comments on religious issues or depictions of religious figures

may sometimes offend the feelings of believers. Those who feel offended are free to voice

their anger publicly and call for a change in attitudes. This can also become an issue for

interreligious communication and public debates. Subjective feelings of offensiveness,

however, should never guide legislative action, court decisions or other State activities. The

threshold for imposing legal restrictions on freedom of expression must remain very high,

in compliance with the criteria provided in international human rights law. At the same

time, there is still space for other. non-restrictive, activities. For instance, the media may

establish voluntary mechanisms of religious sensitization. In general, sensitivity concerning

the religious sentiments of different religious and belief communities should become an

important feature of a culture of communication, especially in multi-religious societies.

However, the employment of criminal sanctions against expressions which do not advocate

for violence or discrimination but which are deemed “blasphemous” cannot play a

productive role in such endeavours, and such criminal sanctions, wherever they exist, are

incompatible with the provisions of freedom of religion or belief and freedom of

expression.

2. Unclear anti-hatred laws

62. While legal sanctions must not be employed to protect the religions or belief-

systems per se against adverse comments, such sanctions may be necessary to protect

human beings against incitement to acts of hatred, as reaffirmed in Human Rights Council

resolution 16/18 and the Rabat Plan of Action. Indeed, article 20 (2) of the Covenant

explicitly calls upon States to prohibit any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes

incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, which implies, inter alia, adopting

adequate legislation.

63. However, State practices in this regard vastly differ and often reveal a lack of

consistency. Sometimes failure to act on “real” incitement cases, on the one hand, and

overzealous reactions to innocuous cases, on the other, exist simultaneously, thus creating a

climate of impunity for some and a climate of intimidation for others. The Rabat Plan of

Action notes:

It is of concern that perpetrators of incidents, which indeed reach the threshold of

article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are not

prosecuted and punished. At the same time members of minorities are de facto

persecuted, with a chilling effect on others, through the abuse of vague domestic

legislation, jurisprudence and policies (para. 11).

In practice, this often leads to the non-prosecution of perpetrators belonging to the State

religion and to the persecution of members of religious minorities under the guise of anti-

incitement laws.

64. Domestic laws which prohibit incitement to hatred are often vaguely defined, thus

failing to meet the requirements contained in articles 18 (3), 19 (3) and 20 (2) of the

Covenant and further specified in general comments No. 22 and No. 34. Of the Human

Rights Committee. Sometimes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence is

amalgamated with broad legislative provisions against creating “discord” in society,

undermining the unity of the State, or endangering interreligious “harmony”. Such broad

concepts typically remain undefined, opening the way to arbitrary application of such laws,

often to the disadvantage of those who would actually need protection from incitement to

acts of hatred, including members of religious minorities, dissenters, critics, converts,

atheists and others. In fact, they may even suffer additional intimidation owing to unclear

legislation and its inconsistent, arbitrary application. Indeed, the Special Rapporteur has

had to deal with a number of cases, including by means of allegation letters to

Governments, in which individuals have been imprisoned under the pretext of vaguely

defined anti-hatred laws for simply expressing religious criticism, internally dissenting

views or creating their own reform branches of religious communities.21

65. Overcoming impunity is the main responsibility of Governments when combating

incitement to imminent violence. In order to fulfil the envisaged goal, however, anti-

incitement laws must be clearly defined and meet all the criteria set out in articles 18 (3), 19

(3) and 20 (2) of the Covenant and all other relevant provisions of international human

rights law.

3. Criminalizing ill-defined superiority claims

66. Anti-hatred laws sometimes combine criminalization of incitement with prohibiting

the spread of superiority claims based on “race”, ethnicity, religion or belief. This is yet

another source of legal insecurity. The Special Rapporteur therefore attaches great

importance to drawing a clear conceptual distinction between claims of superiority of

certain religions or beliefs, on the one hand, and superiority claims based on “race” or

ethnicity, on the other.

67. Surely, there are many overlaps at the phenomenological level. For instance, a

common religion or belief may become one of the elements shaping the identity of an

ethnic group. In spite of possible phenomenological overlaps, however, religion preserves a

specific anthropological and epistemological status. Unlike various ethnic or “racial” group

characteristics, religion typically includes ideas — for example, ideas of a metaphysical

and/or a normative nature — which may invite personal reflection and meditation,

exchange with others, public discourses, critical comments, academic research, missionary

attempts and other forms of communicative positioning. That likewise applies to non-

religious belief-systems too, including atheism or agnosticism. The possibility of becoming

an object of communication — affirmative or critical — constitutes an indispensable part of

freedom of religion or belief. It is even one of the defining characteristics of this human

right, which again accounts for its closeness to freedom of expression.

68. According to article 4 (a) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Racial Discrimination, States parties “shall declare as an offence punishable by

law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority”. Whereas article 20 (2) of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights calls for prohibiting incitement to acts

of discrimination, hostility of violence, article 4 (a) of the International Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination requires criminalizing the dissemination

of certain such ideas. It is important to adhere to a narrow interpretation of this provision,

including a narrow definition of the nature of those ideas, i.e. their characterization on the

21 See, under expert papers, the joint submissions by Special Rapporteurs to the four 2011 Expert

workshops on the prohibition of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred. Available from

www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Articles19-20/Pages/ExpertsPapers.aspx.

basis of “racial superiority”. Reading into the required prohibition of “ideas based on racial

superiority” an implicit prohibition also of ideas based on “religious” superiority would

lead to problematic results. Punishing such ideas would amount to nothing less than the end

of any free communication concerning religious and belief-related issues. It would de-

legitimize theological analysis, academic studies of religion, missionary and da’wah

activities as well as other kinds of communication in this field and thus erode basic

guarantees of freedom of religion or belief in conjunction with freedom of expression.

States should therefore repeal any laws which impose criminal sanctions against claims of

religious or belief-related superiority. Moreover, article 4 (a) of the International

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination should be

consistently interpreted with due regard to the right to freedom of expression, as protected

under article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination, article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and

other relevant provisions of international human rights law.

III. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

69. The human rights to freedom of religion or belief and to freedom of opinion

and expression, as enshrined in articles 18 and 19 of the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights and other international human rights instruments, are

closely interrelated in law and in practice.

70. The widespread perception that these two rights are in opposition to each other

is usually based on the misunderstanding that freedom of religion or belief protects

religions or belief systems per se. However, like freedom of expression, freedom of

religion or belief is a right to freedom and the right holders are human beings. It

facilitates the flourishing of free and democratic societies in conjunction with other

rights to freedom.

71. Both rights share similar features of unconditional protection of the forum

internum, i.e. the person’s internal dimension of religious or belief-related conviction

or thinking that does not allow for any limitations or restrictions on any grounds

whatsoever. External manifestations of freedom of religion or belief and freedom of

expression do not enjoy unconditional protection, but the thresholds of limitations are

high. Limitations can only be justifiable when the criteria set out in articles 18 (3) and

19 (3) of the Covenant, respectively, are met.

72. In spite of these similarities, freedom of religion or belief and freedom of

expression each have their specific features. Freedom of religion or belief protects a

broad range of “manifestations” in worship, observance, practice and teaching, many

of which may go beyond the “expression” of one’s belief. What is specific to freedom

of religion or belief, above all, is the recognition of the practical implications that a

religion or belief may have on the way its followers shape their lives as individuals and

in community with others.

73. The close interrelatedness of freedom of religion or belief and freedom of

opinion and expression facilitates manifold practical synergies. Any attempt to

combat intolerance, stereotyping, stigmatization, discrimination and incitement to

violence based on religion or belief should therefore make use of both rights in

conjunction. It is no coincidence that the Human Rights Council, in the preamble of

resolution 16/18, mentions these two rights as the main references on which to base

the measures to be taken against religious intolerance and concomitant problems.

74. Synergies between freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression

come to the fore in different formats of interreligious communication, in a culture of

frank public discourse and in policies for Government and other actors to speak out

quickly, clearly and publicly against incitement to acts of hatred. The Rabat Plan of

Action is a helpful tool in interpreting and implementing article 20 (2) of the

Covenant, which prohibits any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that

constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.

B. Recommendations

75. Against the background of these observations, the Special Rapporteur would

like to make the recommendations set out below.

1. Recommendations mainly addressed to States

76. Legislators, judges and policymakers should implement laws and policies based

on the understanding that the rights to freedom of religion or belief and to freedom of

opinion and expression are complementary.

77. States should always respect and uphold the unconditional protection status of

the forum internum dimensions of freedom of religion or belief and freedom of

opinion. They should provide space for different dissenting religious or political views,

refrain from any coercion or interference and provide protection against coercion

exercised by third parties.

78. States must abide by the criteria enshrined in articles 18 (3), 19 (3) and 20 (2) of

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights before imposing restrictions

that they deem necessary on certain external manifestations of religion or belief or

expressions.

79. States should not require anyone to register or reveal their religious affiliation

in official documents, such as passports or identity cards.

80. States, in collaboration with relevant stakeholders, should develop

comprehensive policies to combat intolerance, negative stereotyping and

stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against

persons based on religion or belief further to Human Rights Council resolution 16/18.

Such policies should reflect the primacy of non-restrictive communicative

interventions wherever and whenever possible.

81. States should proactively share their experiences and best practices when

implementing Council resolution 16/18 and the Rabat Plan of Action, for example

within the Istanbul Process.

82. States are responsible for creating the public space that facilitates intergroup

communication, frank and open discourse, free and independent media and civil

society activities.

83. State representatives should always speak out quickly, clearly and publicly

against any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,

hostility or violence.

84. In line with Human Rights Committee general comment No. 34 and the Rabat

Plan of Action, States that still have blasphemy laws should repeal them, as such laws

may fuel intolerance, stigmatization, discrimination and incitement to violence and

discourage intergroup communication.

85. States should prevent or overcome a climate of impunity, in which intolerant

groups may feel encouraged to commit acts of discrimination, hostility or violence

against persons based on their religion or belief.

86. Legislation aimed at prohibiting incitement to acts of hatred needs to be

precisely defined, in line with the criteria set out in articles 18 (3), 19 (3) and 20 (2) of

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and further developed in

Human Rights Committee general comment No. 34 and the Rabat Plan of Action.

Such legislation should not contain provisions aimed at sanctioning those claiming

superiority of certain religions or beliefs.

2. Recommendations addressed to different stakeholders

87. Interreligious communication should accommodate the diversity of

interreligious and intrareligious positions as different formats of “formal” or

“informal” communication may complement each other in this regard. Broad

engagement with people from different age, gender, ethnic and indigenous groups will

enhance the dialogues and overcoming the underrepresentation of women must be a

priority.

88. All relevant stakeholders should cooperate in developing a culture of public

discourse in accordance with the Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and

Equality by addressing and discussing problems openly, hence exposing negative

experiences of interreligious coexistence to counter-evidence and counter-narratives.

This can help prevent the spread of rumours and their escalation to fully fledged

conspiracy projections.

89. Civil society organizations are encouraged to show public solidarity with

targeted individuals or communities, including by mobilizing public demonstrations

against entrepreneurs of hatred.

90. National human rights institutions are encouraged to use the Rabat Plan of

Action when designing national policies of combating incitement to acts of hatred.

3. Recommendations addressed to the international community

91. The international community should continue to cooperate within the Istanbul

Process which aims at the systematic implementation of Human Rights Council

resolution 16/18. The Rabat Plan of Action should serve as an interpretative tool in

this regard. National human rights institutions and civil society organizations should

participate in exchanges on how to implement resolution 16/18 and the Rabat Plan of

Action.

92. Commitment of States towards Human Rights Council resolution 16/18 should

become a systematic element of the interactive dialogues within the universal periodic

review. The international community should continue to monitor the situations of

prisoners of conscience and advocate for their release.