33/37 Report on the independent investigation on Burundi carried out pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-24/1
Document Type: Final Report
Date: 2016 Oct
Session: 33rd Regular Session (2016 Sep)
Agenda Item: Item2: Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General, Item10: Technical assistance and capacity-building
GE.16-18543(E)
Human Rights Council Thirty-third session
Agenda items 2 and 10
Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General
Technical assistance and capacity-building
Report on the independent investigation on Burundi carried out pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-24/1*
Summary
The present report, which was prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council
resolution S-24/1, covers violations and abuses of human rights committed in Burundi from
15 April 2015 to 30 June 2016. The independent experts who carried out the investigation
have found that gross human rights violations have been committed, primarily by State
agents and those linked to them. They have also found that these gross violations are
systematic and patterned and that impunity is pervasive. While the crisis continues and
even though the level of overt violence has declined, the overall level of oppression and
control over society has increased, as manifested by arbitrary deprivations of life, enforced
disappearances coupled with credible allegations of individuals being held in
unacknowledged places of detention, cases of torture and other forms of ill-treatment and
arbitrary detention on a massive scale. Burundians are almost completely unable to enjoy
their freedoms of expression, association and assembly. Victims and witnesses are the
targets of reprisals. Without a determined intervention by the Government of Burundi and a
renewed robust engagement by the international community, including the United Nations
and the African Union, the country’s downward spiral is unlikely to be reversed,
endangering not only the rights of individuals but also the overall security of the region.
The independent experts cannot exclude that some instances of gross human rights
violations may amount to crimes against humanity and call for the establishment of
independent international judicial processes to bring the alleged perpetrators to justice.
* The present report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect recent developments.
United Nations A/HRC/33/37
Contents
Page
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 3
II. Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 4
III. Legal framework ........................................................................................................................... 4
IV. Background to the current crisis……… ........................................................................................ 5
V. Principal findings .......................................................................................................................... 7
A. Arbitrary deprivations of life ................................................................................................ 7
B. Enforced disappearances....................................................................................................... 9
C. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ............................. 10
D. Sexual and gender-based violence ........................................................................................ 10
E. Excessive use of force........................................................................................................... 11
F. Arbitrary or unlawful arrests and detention, including mass arrests ..................................... 12
G. Ethnically charged language ................................................................................................. 13
H. Freedom of expression and association ................................................................................ 14
I. Economic and social rights ................................................................................................... 15
J. Burundian refugees and internally displaced persons ........................................................... 16
VI. Failure of domestic accountability mechanisms ............................................................................ 16
A. Lack of an independent judiciary .......................................................................................... 17
B. Truth and Reconciliation Commission ................................................................................. 17
C. National Human Rights Commission ................................................................................... 17
D. National commissions of inquiry .......................................................................................... 18
E. Lack of meaningful cooperation with the international human rights system ...................... 18
F. International crimes .............................................................................................................. 19
VII. Conclusions and recommendations ............................................................................................... 20
A. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 20
B. Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 22
I. Introduction
1. In its resolution S-24/1 of 17 December 2015, the Human Rights Council requested
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to urgently organize and
dispatch on the most expeditious basis possible a mission by independent existing experts
to Burundi, to undertake swiftly an investigation into violations and abuses of human rights
with a view to preventing further deterioration of the human rights situation and to make
recommendations on the improvement of the human rights situation and on technical
assistance to support reconciliation and the implementation of the Arusha Peace and
Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi.
2. The focus of the Human Rights Council was on the current and ongoing crisis,
which started in April 2015. In its resolution S-24/1, the Council requested the independent
experts to issue a final report and participate in an enhanced interactive dialogue on the
human rights situation in Burundi at its thirty-third session.
3. In January 2016, the High Commissioner appointed three independent experts to
carry out the independent investigation on Burundi: the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns (elected as Chair); the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and
guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff; and the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa, Maya Sahli-Fadel. Since two of the experts were from the
United Nations and one was from the African Union system, the investigation was a joint
United Nations-African Union undertaking. Active investigations ceased at the end of June
2016.
4. By a letter dated 11 January 2016, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) informed the Government of Burundi of the
appointment of the experts and proposed a framework of four country visits by the experts
and the deployment of observers on the ground.
5. The Government did not respond to the request for the first visit, which
consequently did not take place. Visits took place from 1 to 8 March and from 13 to 17
June 2016. The last visit (scheduled for September 2016), could not take place because of
security considerations.
6. OHCHR established a secretariat to support the independent experts: five Human
Rights Officers were based in Bujumbura from April to September 2016.
7. The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions presented
an oral update on the investigation to the Human Rights Council on 22 April 2016.
Moreover, the independent experts have requested the High Commissioner, whose Office
functions as a repository for the archives related to the investigation, to grant access to
information for the purposes of accountability. In parallel, confidentiality and protection
concerns have been addressed to the relevant accountability mechanisms. In addition, the
independent experts have compiled a list of alleged perpetrators who were repeatedly
named by victims and witnesses as responsible for gross human rights violations, to be
shared with such mechanisms.
8. The independent experts thank the Government for its cooperation in relation to the
country visits and the deployment of Secretariat staff. They note, however, that they also
faced several challenges, including in respect of the fact that two of their four planned visits
could not be carried out. Some victims and witnesses feared reprisals. Moreover, because of
the reported presence of, and surveillance by, agents of the intelligence service and
members of the ruling party’s youth wing, the independent experts refrained from carrying
out investigations at some sites to protect witnesses and victims. While initial access to
government officials was relatively good, it deteriorated over time.
9. Several government officials said they were not in a position to provide information,
but would do so in writing afterwards. By a letter dated 19 July 2016, the independent
experts addressed specific questions to the Government, to which they followed up by a
letter dated 1 September 2016. In that last letter, they also offered to provide technical
capacity to document the alleged mass graves. Regrettably, no response was received until
the day when the report was completed; the response consisted of a blanket denial of all
violations.
10. Despite the constraints, the independent experts were able to collect and verify
enough information to substantiate their conclusions.
II. Methodology
11. The independent experts conducted a total of 227 interviews, in some cases with
multiple parties. Among those interviewed were government officials, politicians and
members of civil society in Bujumbura, Muramvya and Gitega. The independent experts
also conducted field visits to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and
the United Republic of Tanzania to interview, among others, 182 refugees. Following an
online call for submissions website,1 the independent experts received 57 submissions. An
extensive review of other relevant material, including reports by the United Nations and
international and national human rights organizations, was carried out.
III. Legal framework
12. The independent experts discharged their mandate against applicable standards of
international human rights law, international criminal law and international refugee law, as
well as the Constitution of Burundi and other domestic laws.
13. Under international human rights law, States are required to respect human rights
and to ensure that their own representatives do not violate those rights, for example by
using unwarranted force. States are also responsible for the actions of non-State actors that
may be attributed to them, for example informal groups that operate with their endorsement
or acquiescence. 2 States must moreover protect those within their jurisdiction against
human rights abuses by non-State actors. In addition, States must, at a minimum, ensure
accountability for gross human rights violations and abuses. 3 If a State fails to ensure
accountability for the arbitrary deprivation of life, such a failure in itself constitutes a
separate violation of the right to life.4
14. Burundi has ratified a number of human rights treaties, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1990), the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (1990), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
1 See www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/UNIIB/Pages/UNIIB.aspx.
2 See General Assembly resolution 56/83, annex, chap. II.
3 Article 2 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
4 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal
obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 18. See also African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, general comment No. 3 (2015) on the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights: the Right to Life (art. 4), para.15.
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1993) and the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (1989). It is also a party to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (2004). The Constitution of Burundi recognizes the right to life (art. 24) and
the right to be free from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment (art. 25), and guarantees the independence of the courts (art. 209).
15. Burundi is a member of the Human Rights Council and was a member of the
Council when resolution S-24/1 was adopted by consensus.
16. States carry the primary responsibility for respecting, protecting and ensuring the
human rights of all within their jurisdiction. While the sovereignty of States is an important
and respected pillar of the current global order, sovereignty provides neither a justification
for violations of human rights nor an excuse for impunity.
17. The independent experts established their findings on a “reasonable grounds to
believe” standard of proof, in other words on a reliable body of information that was
consistent with other material and on the basis of which a reasonable and ordinarily prudent
person would have reason to believe that an incident or pattern of conduct had occurred.
IV. Background to the current crisis
18. The history of Burundi, before and after independence (1962), has been marked by
repeated cycles of intense violence, including between ethnic communities.
19. The situation in Burundi also has to be understood within the broader regional
context, as violence in one country almost inevitably has spillover effects involving its
neighbours and affects regional security.
20. A decade-long civil war ended with the signature, in 2000, of the Arusha
Agreement, which provided for power-sharing arrangements between the various
sociopolitical and ethnic groups. The Arusha Agreement heralded the longest period of
relative peace since independence.
21. In 2014, a dispute emerged over the question of whether the President, Pierre
Nkurunziza, was entitled by the terms of the Arusha Agreement and the Constitution to run
for a third term of office. A draft law aimed at amending the Constitution in order to make a
third term possible was defeated in the National Assembly on 22 March 2014. Despite
widespread local resistance and appeals by the international community (including by the
African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the East
African Community), the ruling party — the Conseil national pour la défense de la
démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) — designated President
Nkurunziza as its candidate on 25 April 2015.
22. On 5 May 2015, the Constitutional Court of Burundi validated the constitutionality
of President Nkurunziza’s candidacy for an additional term. Some of the controversies
around that decision are mentioned below.
23. A wave of protests accompanied the announced candidacy. Initially, the protests
consisted largely of non-violent street demonstrations, but the authorities soon turned to the
use of force to disperse the protesters and, more generally, to smother political dissent.
24. Following an attempted coup on 13 May 2015, the Government, both in its rhetoric
and in its practice, associated demonstrators, mostly civilians, with the military coup
leaders and expanded the scope of reprisals to include anyone opposed to the President or
the ruling party or anyone suspected of having participated in demonstrations. The
Government used the security apparatus — the National Police, the National Intelligence
Service and the National Defence Force — and the youth wing of the ruling party, the
Imbonerakure, against political opponents to carry out some of the gross violations
mentioned below and, in general, to clamp down on civil society.
25. The security forces frequently conducted violent cordon-and-search operations in the
so-called opposition neighbourhoods of Bujumbura (Musaga, Ngagara, Kanyosha and
Nyakabiga) to track down demonstrators.
26. Following an attack on four military bases in and around the capital on 11 December
2015, the security forces used indiscriminate violence. Anyone suspected of opposing the
Government was at risk, including State officials, agents of the National Intelligence
Service and even senior military officers. Gross human rights violations within the security
forces, carried out tit for tat, became a salient feature of the crisis.
27. Non-State actors have engaged in human rights abuses such as assassinations of
government officials and throwing grenades into public areas, killing civilians.
28. In December 2014, four months before the current crisis erupted, the Security
Council did not renew the mandate of the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB),
which had been engaged in Burundi for over a decade. Once the crisis started, however,
various international initiatives were launched, including a fact-finding mission by a
delegation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the adoption of
various African Union and European Union resolutions, the launch of a dialogue (now
stalled) promoted by the East African Community, visits by various African Heads of State,
the European Union decision on the suspension of direct aid, a visit by the Security
Council, the review of a special report by the Committee against Torture, an early-warning
procedure initiated by the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the
deployment of African Union observers.
29. The report of the delegation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights contains the views of the primary human rights monitoring body of the African
Union.5 Notably, the delegation describes the violations committed by government security
personnel and affiliated groups as “pervasive and systematic” and as “serious and
massive”; 6 it calls for the deployment of “an international police mission” 7 and the
establishment of an independent, internationally supported special tribunal in Burundi.8
30. The African Union Peace and Security Council decided in December 2015 to deploy
5,000 peacekeepers to Burundi. The decision was reversed before it was presented to the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, following the statement by Burundi that the
deployment would be treated as an invasion. In the meantime, following a visit by a high-
level delegation, the African Union decided to deploy 100 human rights observers and 100
military observers. To date, only 45 human rights observers and 24 military observers have
been deployed. The Government has not yet signed a memorandum of understanding with
the African Union about the observers. In addition, the Government insists on “clearing”
the observers’ reports before they are submitted to African Union bodies.
31. On 29 July 2016, the Security Council adopted resolution 2303 (2016), by which it
authorized the deployment of a maximum of 228 United Nations police officers.
Implementation of the resolution has been categorically rejected by the Government.
32. On 3 June 2016, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat
announced its decision not to replace the 280 Burundian police officers in the United
5 Available from www.achpr.org/files/news/2016/05/d218/achpr_report_fact_finding_eng.pdf.
6 Ibid., para. 110.
7 Ibid., para. 169 (h).
8 Ibid., para. 172 (c).
Nations peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic at the end of their tour of
duty. Some Burundian African Union or United Nations peacekeepers have reportedly
refused to return to Burundi for fear of retaliation against soldiers considered close to the
opposition.
33. There are persistent allegations by the Government of Burundi that neighbouring
Rwanda is involved in supporting anti-Government groups in Burundi. Critics of the
Government allege that members of the Interahamwe are used by the Burundian authorities
to supplement its own security structures.
V. Principal findings
34. No one can quantify exactly all the violations that have taken place during the
reporting period and that continue to take place in a situation as closed and repressive as
Burundi.
35. According to some estimates, more than 1,000 people have been killed during the
crisis.9 Thousands more have reportedly been tortured, unknown numbers of women have
been subjected to various forms of sexual crime, hundreds of people have disappeared and
thousands have been illegally detained.10
36. A particularly telling figure, and one that can be more easily verified, is the number
of people who have fled the country since the crisis began. The Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees puts the number of people who have sought
refuge in neighbouring countries since April 2015 at 286,036 (as at 25 August 2016).11 The
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that 109,459 people have been
displaced (as at 31 August 2016).12 Clearly, many people on the ground believe they see
signs of the horrors of the past repeating themselves and flee.
37. The independent experts provide below an overview of some of the violations that
have been investigated.
A. Arbitrary deprivations of life
38. No official figures of the number of people killed during the crisis are available and
the system of accountability is virtually non-existent. OHCHR has informed the
independent experts that it verified 564 executions between 26 April 2015 and 30 August
2016. Given the constraints under which OHCHR operates, this is clearly a conservative
estimate.
39. The independent experts found that the large majority of victims were people who
were opposed or were perceived to be opposed to a third mandate for President Nkurunziza
or who were members of opposition parties.
9 See https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/burundi/burundi-a-bloody-first-year-of-challenged-
presidency-for-pierre.
10 See, e.g., the compilation of reports by Human Rights Watch on Burundi available from
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/burundi_compendium_2016_web_versi
on_4.pdf.
11 See http://data.unhcr.org/burundi/regional.php.
12 This may however also include those displaced by natural disasters. See
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/system/files/documents/files/note_dinformation_humanitai
re_31_aout_2016.pdf.
1. Executions committed by the security forces and those who work with them
40. The information received and verified by the independent experts support the
conclusion that executions have been committed on a large sale by the security forces, often
with the support of the Imbonerakure. From among the many testimonies that were heard,
the independent experts highlight the examples below.
41. On the morning of 26 April 2015, 16-year-old Jean Népo was returning from
Sunday Mass at St. Joseph’s church in Bujumbura. Near the University Porte d’Afrique,
Jean met demonstrators chanting slogans against a third term for the President. The police
dispersed the demonstrators who were throwing stones. According to witnesses, a police
commissioner ordered one of his officers to kill Jean, who had remained at the scene while
the crowd had dispersed. Jean reportedly begged the police to let him live, saying: “I could
be your child. I beg you. Save me.” As the officer hesitated, the commissioner pulled out
his gun and shot the young man twice in the head. No investigation has been initiated by
the authorities into the case.
42. The independent experts received first-hand information confirming the involvement
of the Imbonerakure in murders of perceived opposition sympathizers. Thus, a former
member of the Imbonerakure testified that he had participated in the killing of 20
individuals in Bujumbura, including two Imbonerakure members who had warned persons
of plans to execute them. The witness added that Imbonerakure members were expected to
arrest all those who opposed the third mandate, were against the President or did not
collaborate with CNDD-FDD. The bodies of those executed in these cases were reportedly
placed in bags, transported across the Ruzizi River using makeshift boats and buried in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
43. The attacks of 11 December 2015 by armed groups on four military camps, three in
Bujumbura and one in the province of Bujumbura Rural, were followed by operations
during which security forces allegedly committed massive violations of human rights,
notably a high number of extrajudicial executions of youths. The independent experts
received testimonies confirming such extrajudicial executions and indicating that the
official number of 87 killed during the two-day attacks was very conservative.
2. Reports of mass graves
44. Allegations of mass burials of those executed during the above-mentioned incidents
have been widely reported.13 Initial satellite imagery suggests that bodies may have been
buried in mass graves during that period, including in Bujumbura (in Kanyosha and
Mpanda) and Bubanza. The independent experts received testimony corroborating the
existence of mass graves. Reported intimidation by members of the Imbonerakure and
National Intelligence Service officers of persons in possession of related information give
further credibility to the testimony.
45. The proper forensic examination of alleged mass graves calls for specialized
expertise. In the meantime, the sites concerned must be left undisturbed. The independent
experts offered to arrange for the alleged sites to be properly recorded, so that they could be
investigated in full at a later stage, but the Government has not responded to the offer.
13 See https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/01/burundi-satellite-evidence-supports-witness-
accounts-of-mass-graves.
3. Targeted assassinations
46. A former senior officer of the National Defence Force confirmed to the independent
experts the existence of several lists of people, including civilians and military personnel, to
be eliminated by the security forces.
47. Armed elements in opposition to the Government have also been involved in several
murders, notably targeted assassinations. The independent experts documented a case of a
member of the Imbonerakure being burned alive. Grenade attacks have also allegedly been
carried out by the armed elements, causing casualties among the population. From May
2015 to February 2016, the OHCHR office in Burundi documented several cases of
grenades thrown by unknown individuals in public places, mainly in Bujumbura.
48. Apparent examples of tit-for-tat targeted assassinations within the army —
particularly threatening to the integration of the armed forces — include the killings of
several senior army officers belonging either to the pre-Arusha Agreement Burundian
armed forces or to the Armed Political Parties and Movements (a former rebel group), and
the apparent retaliatory killings of alleged supporters of the regime within the forces.
Among the most emblematic examples are the killings of General Adolphe Nshimirimana
on 2 August 2015, of General Athanase Karakuza on 25 April 2016 and of Colonel Darius
Ikurakure on 22 March 2016. The latter was shot dead in the compound of the headquarters
of the army’s joint staff.
49. Human rights activists and their relatives have been primary targets. For instance, on
3 August 2015 Pierre Claver Mbonimpa, a leading human rights activist and representative
of the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and of Detainees, was shot in the
cheek and arm during an apparent assassination attempt. On 6 August 2015, his son, Welly
Fleury Nzitonda, was arrested; he was later killed in the Mutakura neighbourhood of
Bujumbura. On 9 October 2015, Mr. Mbonimpa’s son-in-law, Pascal Nshimirimana, was
killed by firearm and grenades as he was returning home in Ngangara.
B. Enforced disappearances
50. Many persons have disappeared since the beginning of the crisis, often following
their arbitrary arrest by the security forces, notably the National Police and the National
Intelligence Service. The victims include members of the opposition members and civil
society and demonstrators. The independent experts met relatives of people arrested by
elements of the security forces who were never seen again. They were unable to obtain any
information from the authorities regarding the fate or whereabouts of the persons
concerned.
51. Marie-Claudette Kwizera, Treasurer of the civil society organization Ligue Iteka
was allegedly arrested on 10 December 2015 by the National Intelligence Service and has
not been seen since. On 22 July 2016, Jean Birgimana, a journalist for the Iwaku
newspaper, was also allegedly arrested by the National Intelligence Service and has been
missing since then.
52. The independent experts have also received information and names from witnesses
concerning the existence of a group of 12 well-known intelligence, police and military
agents who have allegedly been responsible for many cases of enforced disappearances and
who report directly to the inner circle of the executive branch.
C. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment
53. The use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
against those opposed to a third term for the President and against opposition members or
their relatives, either to extract information or as punishment, has been common during the
crisis. The independent experts conducted 65 interviews with witnesses and victims of
torture or ill-treatment. Elements of the National Intelligence Service, the National Police,
the Imbonerakure and, to a lesser extent, the National Defence Force, are consistently
identified as the perpetrators, and some individuals, including senior figures of the security
apparatus, have been repeatedly cited.
54. From various testimonies, the independent experts were able to establish a non-
exhaustive list of forms of torture and other ill-treatment to which the victims were
subjected at the hands of the security forces:
(a) Attaching weights to testicles;
(b) Crushing fingers and toes with pliers;
(c) Detaining a person in a closed container;
(d) Forcing families to stay next to the dead body of a relative;
(e) Forcing the victim to sit in acid or on broken glass or nails;
(f) Gang raping a woman in the presence of her children;
(g) Injecting a yellow liquid in the testicles and other parts of the body, leading
to paralysis;
(h) Inflicting knife and machete stabs;
(i) Inflicting lashes using preheated electric cables or iron bars;
(j) Progressively burning with a blowtorch or gas cylinder;
(k) Progressively electrocuting;
(l) Pulling a cord attached to the testicles;
(m) Sprinkling the victim with a mixture of water and sand and rubbing the
mixture with a broom so that it fills the pores of the skin (known as “ubutoteza” in
Kirundi);
(n) Tightly tying a person’s arms behind the back for several days;
(o) Using insults and humiliating speech, including with an ethnic dimension;
(p) Poking fingers in the eyes of the victim;
(q) Tying the victim up by the feet upside down (known as “amagurizege” in
Kirundi).
55. No national preventive mechanism has been set up by the Government as required
under Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.
D. Sexual and gender-based violence
56. The crisis has exacerbated the already prevalent issue of sexual and gender-based
violence, which is one of the patterns of violations that has emerged from the independent
experts’ investigations. Incidents recorded by the independent experts from Burundian
refugee women and girls reveal various forms of sexual and gender-based violence
experienced both in Burundi and beyond, during flight from the country.
57. Witnesses and victims told the independent experts that many of the women who
had fled the country were subjected to sexual violence, while in flight, by Imbonerakure
members, unidentified armed men and border guards, including as a punishment for leaving
the country “while there was no war”.
58. The independent experts obtained credible information indicating that many
Burundian women and girls related to males who opposed a third term for the President, or
who were perceived as political dissidents, became the targets of physical and sexual
violence by elements of the security forces.
59. In a number of cases documented by the independent experts, the victims were
sexually mutilated. For instance, in August 2015 a woman in Cibitoke was sexually
mutilated by Imbonerakure members who were searching for her husband. She stated that
when they did not find him, they tied her hands behind her back and hit her. She added:
“They put their hands inside my vagina until the uterus came out. I was left alone bleeding,
screaming. The neighbours came out and they tried to put my uterus back in place.”
60. In Cibitoke, a witness stated that in April 2015 armed men dressed in military
uniforms entered her neighbour’s house. The following day, the witness found her
neighbour dead, with wood inserted in her vagina.
61. The independent experts also recorded first- and second-hand allegations of sexual
violence against men, in particular in detention. In May 2015, a man detained by the
National Intelligence Service for 18 days was reportedly forced to spread his legs and was
severely beaten on his genitals, causing permanent erectile dysfunction. A male student
who refused to join the Imbonerakure was reportedly picked up by classmates and taken to
a house where he was reportedly handcuffed and raped by three men while others watched.
E. Excessive use of force
62. Several reports by international, regional and national organizations have
condemned the conduct of the Burundian security forces during the demonstrations.14 The
authorities now insist that the demonstrations were never peaceful. The information
collected by the independent experts indicates that the police used excessive force against
demonstrators who had been chanting slogans against the President, with some of them
throwing stones and blocking intersections. None of these actions merited law enforcement
officers using firearms, including against fleeing demonstrators. Moreover, even after
having gained control over the demonstrators, the police generally arrested and beat up
demonstrators, notably young men, in flagrant violation of the international standards on
the use of force.15
63. The independent experts visited the quarters of the anti-riot brigade in Bujumbura.
Among the commanders there seemed to be very little awareness of alternative techniques
of managing demonstrations or the use of non-lethal weapons. When asked whether the
members of the unit had received special training, the commanders said that they had not
and the answer to the question about how the members had been selected was “physical
strength”.
14 See, e.g., A/HRC/32/30.
15 See, e.g., the Basic Principles on the use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990).
64. Protest in the form of public demonstrations (except if organized by the authorities)
hardly occurs any more, by all accounts not because there is less reason to protest, but
because of fear of the consequences.
F. Arbitrary or unlawful arrests and detention, including mass arrests
65. Arbitrary arrests and detention have been a cornerstone of the repression in Burundi
and have opened the way for a wide range of other human rights violations. Arbitrary
arrests and detention surged after 26 April 2015, targeting individuals demonstrating
against a third term for the President. After the attempted coup of May 2015, the authorities
intensified the repression. The National Intelligence Service, the National Police, the
Imbonerakure and the National Defence Force reportedly tracked down opponents, notably
through cordon-and-search operations and raids in the so-called opposition neighbourhoods
of Bujumbura.
66. According to testimony received by the independent experts, the security forces
would typically bring arrested persons to temporary detention sites before sorting them
according to their presumed collaboration with armed opposition groups or involvement in
the movement against a third term.
67. Persons arrested by the security forces would often be subjected not only to physical
abuse but to extortion, asked to pay “ransoms” of 4-5 million Burundian francs to middle
men in an attempt to secure their release.
68. Mass arrests have become common during the crisis, both in certain neighbourhoods
of the capital and at the borders. The security forces engage in almost daily raids in the so-
called opposition neighbourhoods of Bujumbura. Early in the morning, police officers
arrive heavily armed, encircle the targeted area by ordering all occupants of the houses to
empty their homes for the purpose of searches. Some are arrested. Young people aged 18-
35 are particularly targeted. This practice creates a climate of fear and panic in the
neighbourhoods concerned.
69. Prison overcrowding is alarming, as there is a 300 per cent occupancy rate in some
prisons. Mpimba prison in Bujumbura, which the independent experts visited, was built for
800 prisoners but was housing 3,800 instead.
70. The investigations confirmed an abuse of pretrial detention and a practice of
prolonged detention without charges. During their visit to Mpimba prison, the experts
encountered several very young detainees who had reportedly been arrested during the
demonstrations in the first half of 2015 but who had not yet been put on trial for any
offence.
Unacknowledged places of detention
71. Although the Prosecutor General of the Republic has formally denied the existence
of unacknowledged places of detention, the independent experts conclude that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the security forces and the Imbonerakure have
established several such sites.
72. A number of victims interviewed by the independent experts identified the exact
places of their detention, which include:
(a) In Bujumbura:
(i) A green painted house near the office of the apostolic nuncio;
(ii) An uninhabited house in the area of Mutakura, located between 8th and 9th
streets;
(iii) Secret cells on the premises of the National Intelligence Service;
(iv) The bar called “Iwabo Nabantu”, in Kamenge, which belonged to the late
General Nshimirimana;
(v) The basement of the headquarters of CNDD-FDD at Ngagara;
(vi) The basement of the residences of the Minister of Public Security, Alain
Bunyoni, in Kinanira and Gasekebuye;
(vii) The containers serving as military positions next to the building of the water
supply distribution company, REGIDESO, in Kigobe, close to the National
Assembly;
(viii) The police-manned site known as “Chez Ndadaye”, next to the cemetery of
Ndadaye;
(ix) The REGIDESO building in Ngangara, near King Khaled Hospital;
(x) The containers serving as military positions next to the REGIDESO building,
in Kigobe;
(b) In Ngozi:
(i) The bar called “Chez Nyamugaruka”, at Vyegwa;
(ii) The houses of President Nkurunziza in Mwumba commune;
(iii) The basement of the National Intelligence Service.
G. Ethnically charged language
73. Various cases of ethnically divisive language have been documented.
74. On 24 August 2016, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide issued a
press statement expressing his concern at the inflammatory statements made by public
officials that could constitute incitement to violence.16 The Special Adviser referred to a
large number of comments made by public officials and specifically to the statement
published on 16 August on the CNDD-FDD website by the then President of that political
party and President of the National Assembly, Pascal Nyabenda, which the Special Adviser
warned had “the potential to inflame ethnic tensions, both within Burundi and outside its
borders”.17 In his statement, Mr. Nyabenda also suggested that the genocide in Rwanda was
a fabrication of the international community.18
75. The independent experts are gravely concerned about the general trend of ethnically
divisive rhetoric by the Government,19 which may lead to the situation spiralling out of
control, including beyond the borders of Burundi. The potential for this to happen is all the
more serious given that the integration of ethnicities was one of the main achievements of
the Arusha Agreement.
76. The independent experts urge the Government and its officials to refrain from such
acts and call upon all relevant stakeholders, in particular the African Union and the United
16 See www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54757#.V8UilU1f3cs.
17 Ibid.
18 See also www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20215&LangID=E.
19 See CAT/C/BDI/CO/2/Add.1, para. 18.
Nations, to scrupulously monitor the situation20 and to take the steps necessary to prevent
further mass violations.
77. The independent experts obtained evidence of several cases of the use of ethnically
divisive language. For example, in July 2015 a Tutsi woman from Nyakabika was picked
up by four men in police uniform in Bujumbura and taken to the woods. She was reportedly
severely beaten, stabbed in the breast and raped by all four men. One of them reportedly
told her: “I do this because I want you to carry my Hutu children.”
H. Freedom of expression and association
78. As has been widely reported, Burundian civil society actors, notably human rights
defenders and journalists, have been primary targets of systematic repression by the
authorities. Below are just some of the cases that members of civil society organizations
and media outlets have described to the independent experts.
79. On 23 November 2015, the activities of the 10 leading civil society organizations
were “temporarily” suspended by ministerial decree, and the bank accounts of some of
them, as well as of those of their executives, were frozen.
80. International arrest warrants have been issued against leaders of civil society
organizations, namely Justine Nkurunziza of the Civil Society Coalition for the Monitoring
of Elections, Pacifique Nininahazwe of Forum pour la conscience et le développement,
Vital Nshimirimana of the Forum for Strengthening Civil Society, Gatogato John Vianney
of the Association of Catholic Jurists in Burundi and Armel Niyongere of Action by
Christians for the Abolition of Torture in Burundi.
81. Independent journalists have been subjected to harassment, death threats, arrests and
torture and have had their offices closed or their equipment destroyed.
82. On 13 May 2015, following the attempted coup, men in uniform and Imbonerakure
members reportedly used heavy weapons to attack the following independent radio stations:
Radio publique africaine, Bonesha FM, Isanganiro and Renaissance Broadcasting. Shortly
before, Rema FM, a radio station known to be very close to the Government, was destroyed
by people protesting against a third term for the President, just after the announcement of
the coup.
83. On 2 August 2015, the Burundi correspondent of Radio France Internationale and
Agence France-Presse was arrested by the police as he was taking pictures at the scene of
the assassination of General Nshimirimana, former Head of the National Intelligence
Service and a man close to the President. He was taken to the National Intelligence Service
headquarters, where a commander ordered that he be given the “daily ration”, in other
words that he be beaten 100 times with a stick. He was eventually released and treated for a
perforated eardrum, a broken finger, broken bones in the legs and toes, and internal
bleeding. No investigations into the incident have been initiated to date.
84. On 13 October 2015, a reporter from a local television station was killed at the
entrance of his house, allegedly by police officers of the Unit for the Protection of
Institutions. His wife and two children were reportedly forced to kneel for over two hours
beside the body, pending a decision on their fate. They were eventually executed, along
with another relative, by the same people.
85. The Government argues that the situation is close to being normal, that stations have
had their licences restored and that those that still have not had their licences restored have
20 See www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54757#.V8UilU1f3cs.
not filed the necessary applications. Some radio stations have indeed been issued licences,
but there are legitimate questions as to whether the outlets whose licences have been
restored are indeed the same: their staffing, content and editorial views appear
fundamentally changed.
86. As with the other violations recorded in the present report, the victims are not only
those outside the Government. Even within government circles or the ruling party, there is
no room for dissenting positions.
87. The atmosphere of repression has manifested itself in the Government’s harsh
reaction to students scribbling on photographs of President Nkurunziza; hundreds of
students were reportedly suspended in May 2016 and close to 60 were detained by the
National Intelligence Service, while 16 schools in Bujumbura were occupied by the police
(10 of which remained under police control for a prolonged period).21 Discussions with the
Minister of Education did not reassure the independent experts that the importance of the
school system as an incubator of democratic values was understood.
88. There are worrying signs of a personality cult being built around the President.
I. Economic and social rights
89. The civil war in Burundi has had a devastating effect on the economy and living
standards. After the Arusha Agreement was signed, however, and especially after 2005, a
return to peace and stability allowed for an economic growth of between 4 and 5 per cent,
with corresponding improvements in the health and education sectors.22
90. Reforms in the education sector have led to increases in primary school enrolment23
and reforms in the health sector have led to improvements in access and in some basic
health and life expectancy indicators.24
91. The political crisis, however, is reversing such progress. The climate of violence and
repression has disrupted economic activity, leading to a 20 per cent decline in official
revenues during the fiscal year 2015, to declining purchasing power and to disruptions
given the suspension of aid to the official sector. Overall, the World Bank estimates that the
economy contracted by 2.5 per cent in 2015.25
92. There is no sector of the economy that has not been affected by the crisis. The public
sector provides jobs to 80 per cent of salaried employees in Burundi (a small percentage of
the economically active population). 26 The economic crisis has not only led to limited
recruitment in the public sector, but to the apparent politicization of hiring; the small
number of posts available are allegedly reserved for members of the ruling party.
93. It is estimated that half of all young people in Burundi are unemployed. The
majority of the demonstrators against a third presidential mandate were youths, and the
high unemployment rate may provide a large source of recruitment for nascent rebel
movements and the Imbonerakure.
21 See www.news24.com/Africa/News/burundi-school-kids-deface-portraits-to-defy-president-
20160620-4.
22 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=BI.
23 See http://allinschool.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/OOSC-2014-QW-Burundi-Primary-final.pdf.
24 See www.who.int/bulletin/africanhealth2014/improving_access_to_health_care/en.
25 See www.worldbank.org/en/country/burundi.
26 See www.heritage.org/index/country/burundi.
94. The agricultural sector, which employs 90 per cent of the economically active
population, has been affected both by the displacement of persons and by the land conflicts
that such displacement generates.27
95. Education has also been affected by the displacement of both students and teachers
and by cuts in subsidies to the school canteens on which many students depend.
96. State expenditure for the health sector has also been reduced. Conditions in hospitals
have deteriorated,28 in particular outside the capital, where beds are sometimes shared by as
many as four patients. The health service has also been affected by a deficit in personnel as
some practitioners have left the country as a result of the political crisis.
J. Burundian refugees and internally displaced persons
97. The number of refugees and internally displaced people resulting from the crisis is
provided in paragraph 36 above. The outflow of refugees rose substantially during specific
periods: following the attempted coup d’état in May 2015, during the July 2015 presidential
elections and following the attack on military camps in December 2015. The outflow has
since continued at a slower pace, partly owing to increased restrictions on leaving the
country, including in the form of numerous checkpoints in border provinces.
98. The independent experts’ investigations have confirmed the link between the
political crisis and the massive outflow of Burundians. Refugees interviewed in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania
listed the following reasons for leaving: reprisals or fear of reprisals by National
Intelligence Service and the Imbonerakure for having participated in demonstrations or
having provided material or financial support to demonstrators, for refusing to join the
Imbonerakure, for defecting to the opposition or having opinions that are different from
those of CNDD-FDD, for being family members of people who have been arrested or for
supporting opposition parties. The general climate of insecurity and land-related conflicts,
most of which were allegedly political in nature, were also cited as reasons.
99. The majority of refugees live in precarious conditions in camps. In addition, credible
allegations that some camps or refugee locations have been infiltrated by the National
Intelligence Service and the Imbonerakure contribute to a climate of fear and insecurity
among refugees.
100. While there are no precise statistics on persons displaced specifically because of the
crisis throughout Burundi, the raids on the so-called opposition neighbourhoods of
Bujumbura and the general repression against a real or perceived opposition has resulted in
large-scale displacement.
VI. Failure of domestic accountability mechanisms
101. The State is responsible for ensuring accountability for human rights violations. The
Government of Burundi is blatantly failing to meet its obligations to promptly, thoroughly
and impartially investigate and prosecute violations; to bring the alleged perpetrators to
justice and sentence those who are found guilty to a punishment commensurate with the
seriousness of their actions, including those occupying positions of authority; to provide
27 See www.worldbank.org/en/country/burundi/overview.
28 See www.unicef.org/appeals/files/UNICEF_Burundi_Humanitarian_SitRep_30Oct2015.pdf.
victims with effective remedies and adequate reparation; and to take steps to prevent
recurrence.
A. Lack of an independent judiciary
102. The current crisis has further entrenched the existing systemic and institutional
dominance of the executive branch over the judiciary.
103. The institutional dominance of the executive branch over the judiciary is now
compounded by an executive branch whose members have used violent methods against its
(perceived) opponents. This new situation has resulted in victims not filing complaints for
violations of human rights and not using the justice system to settle differences.
104. In a well-known illustrative case of the pressures faced by the judiciary, the Vice-
President of the Constitutional Court, Sylvère Nimpagaritse, went into exile and made
public the threats received by the Court’s judges to change their ruling on the legality of the
third-term bid of President Nkurunziza. The independent experts received credible reports
about the intense pressure placed on members of the Court to rule in favour of the
President. Some of the former justices of the Court who supported a third term were
reportedly offered lucrative positions as a reward.
105. Another emblematic case is the trial in relation to the failed coup of 13 May 2015,
which was a benchmark to assess the credibility and independence of the judicial system. It
resulted in a series of systematic denials of judicial guarantees.
B. Truth and Reconciliation Commission
106. Given the ongoing political crisis, the independent experts are concerned by the
difficulties faced by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to implement its important
mandate: to uncover the truth about the events that took place in Burundi between 1962 and
2008, and to start a process of transitional justice and collective forgiveness.
107. The independent experts reiterate the concerns already raised with respect to the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth,
justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition, namely: (a) the de-prioritization of the
truth-seeking function in favour of the pardon process; (b) the fact that insufficient
resources have been made available to the Commission to carry out its mandate; and (c)
concerns over the protection of victims and witnesses.
108. The concerns identified by the Special Rapporteur are exacerbated by the challenges
posed by the current crisis. At a moment when public liberties are suspended and
expressing disagreement with the Government has become a ground for persecution, when
many key witnesses are currently exiled and when gross human rights violations are taking
place once again, it is difficult to see how the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be
able to discharge its mandate in a meaningful manner.
C. National Human Rights Commission
109. The Burundian Independent National Commission on Human Rights has issued one
report since the crisis erupted.29 In it, the Commission downplays the extent of the gross
human rights violations that have been committed by indicating minimal numbers. As an
29 See www.cnidh.bi/sites/default/files/CNIDH_Rapport%20annuel%202015%20.pdf.
illustration, for the whole of 2015 only 27 cases of torture and ill-treatment are mentioned
in the report, in contrast to the 250 cases of torture and ill-treatment documented by
OHCHR between April 2015 and April 2016.
110. The Commission did issue a press release concerning the arrest of schoolchildren for
scribbling on pictures of the President.30
111. The Commission, which is currently still accredited with A status, will be reviewed
in November 2016 by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions
subcommittee on accreditation in view of the allegations of partiality levelled by
international and Burundian human rights organizations against the institution.
D. National commissions of inquiry
112. Since the beginning of the crisis, the Office of the Prosecutor General has set up
three commissions of inquiry into human rights abuses.
113. The commission charged with shedding light on the insurrectionary movement
triggered on 26 April 2015 established, in a report, only the responsibilities of individuals
and organizations involved in organizing the demonstrations, ignoring the human rights
violations committed by the security forces.
114. Another commission, set up to shed light on the deaths of 11 and 12 December 2015
and on the allegations of the existence of mass graves, concluded that allegations of the
existence of mass graves and the occurrence of extrajudicial executions were unfounded.
These findings contradict the results of the investigations carried out by the independent
experts.
115. The independent experts regret that the practice of setting up commissions of inquiry
appears to be a means for the Burundian authorities to circumvent accountability by State
perpetrators of grave violations of human rights.
E. Lack of meaningful cooperation with the international human rights
system
116. In assessing the human rights situation in Burundi, the independent experts have
looked for indications of cooperation between State authorities and the international human
rights system. They are seriously concerned by the apparent increasing reluctance of those
authorities to engage with the international human rights system. A salient example is the
refusal of the Government to participate in the second session of dialogue with the
Committee against Torture (29 July 2016), the first time a State delegation has chosen such
a course of action.31
117. The independent experts note with concern the approach of the Government of
automatically offering a blanket denial of almost all alleged human rights violations.
30 Ibid.
31 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20325&LangID=E.
F. International crimes
118. The above assessment relates largely to the question of State responsibility for
human rights violations. However, the mandate of the international experts also covers
individual responsibility.32
119. On 25 April 2016, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
started a preliminary examination of alleged crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction
committed in Burundi since April 2015. The preliminary examination focused on
allegations of killing, imprisonment, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and
cases of enforced disappearance.
120. Article 7 of the Rome Statute provides that some crimes, including murder, unjust
imprisonment, torture, persecution against an identifiable group and enforced
disappearance, amount to crimes against humanity when committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.
The term “crimes against humanity” refers to “a campaign or operation carried out against
the civilian population”.33 Hence, the crimes cannot be random or isolated, but need to form
part of an overall State policy.34 The State policy, however, does not need to be explicitly
articulated but may be inferred.35
121. The “widespread” or “systematic” elements of the attack against civilians are to be
read disjunctively. The term “widespread” refers to attacks committed on a large scale and
directed against a multiplicity of victims.36 The term “systematic” refers to the “organized
nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence”.37
122. According to article 6 of the Rome Statute, genocide entails, among other things, the
killing or causing serious bodily harm “with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic [or] racial group”.
123. In view of the facts summarized in the present report, the independent experts
cannot exclude that some of the incidents analysed herein amount to crimes against
humanity.
124. Given the country’s history, the danger of the crime of genocide also looms large.
The independent experts recommend that independent international processes determine
accountability for possible international crimes.
32 See Human Rights Council resolution S-24/1, para. 17 (c).
33 International Criminal Court, decision pursuant to article 15 of the Rome Statute on the authorization
of an investigation into the situation in Kenya, 31 March 2010, para. 80.
34 Ibid., para. 94. See also Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic, case No. IT-94-1-T, opinion and judgment of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 7 May
1997, para. 648.
35 See also Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic opinion and judgment, para. 653.
36 International Law Commission, 1996 draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind,
para. 4 of the commentary to draft article 18. See also: International Criminal Court, decision
pursuant to article 15 of the Rome Statute on the authorization of an investigation into the situation in
Kenya, para. 95.
37 International Criminal Court, decision pursuant to article 15 of the Rome Statute on the authorization
of an investigation into the situation in Kenya, para. 96, and Prosecutor v. Blaškić, case No. IT-95-14-
A, judgment of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since
1991, 29 July 2004, para. 101.
VII. Conclusions and recommendations
A. Conclusions
125. The independent experts found abundant evidence of gross human rights
violations and of human rights abuses by the Government and people whose actions
can be attributed to the Government. Human rights abuses by third parties have also
taken place. Responsibility for the vast majority of these violations should, however,
be laid at the doorstep of the Government.
126. The high levels of open violence witnessed by Burundi at the end of 2015 no
longer prevail but that does not mean that the situation is moving in the right
direction. As one interlocutor told the independent experts, “what you see here is the
peace of a loaded gun”. Repression has become less open and therefore more difficult
to trace, but it is more systematic and is increasing. The accountability mechanisms
are exceedingly weak and impunity is endemic, which allows cycles of violence to
continue unabated.
127. Moreover, during the course of the investigation it became clear that more and
more people who would otherwise have confronted repression have fled the country or
are too scared to speak out or take action. Any reduction in the violence has occurred,
to a significant extent, as a result of increased oppression. Any semblance of
opposition to the Government is dealt with ruthlessly and seemingly without fear of
accountability.
128. As one interlocutor said: “Civilian space, if closed up long enough, dies.” What
is needed is not merely for the situation to be stabilized: it must be reversed. Civil
society and the social fabric have been weakened to such an extent that a concerted
effort will be required to establish the conditions for a democratic State based on
human rights and the rule of law.
129. It is the distinct impression of the independent experts that Burundian society
is becoming more and more repressive, less tolerant of dissent and more closed to the
outside world. Unless specific steps are taken by the Government, the population and
the international community, very little of what human beings around the world value
and need to lead dignified lives will be available to Burundians in the years and indeed
the months to come.
130. Virtually nothing is being done by way of providing effective remedy to victims,
including bringing perpetrators to justice, or to prevent a recurrence of the violations.
Decreases in some indices of overt violence can be interpreted as improvements in the
human rights situation in the country only if certain conditions are satisfied. Relevant
questions include:
(a) Are there changes in the movement and flow of people (in particular, are
more people returning to Burundi)?
(b) Are there increases in the space for free expression and for the activities
of civil society?
(c) Is the sense of intimidation waning?
(d) Is the number of inflammatory statements, in particular on the part of
senior authorities, decreasing?
(e) Is the confidence in State institutions, including the security sector,
improving?
(f) Are institutions responding promptly and effectively to claims by citizens
regarding possible violations or abuses?
(g) Are institutions responding to those claims effectively and are they
establishing initiatives to prevent new violations?
131. There are serious concerns on all those fronts.
132. The independent experts are gravely concerned about the fact that the
violations and the lack of accountability are “patterned”. The independent experts’
investigations suggest that the number, modes of operation, alleged perpetrators,
apparent identity of the victims, apparent motivations and the lack of either remedial
or preventive action on the part of the State authorities show that the violations are
not simply the result of chance, “bad apples”, provocation or necessity. The robust
correlation between the violations and particular political incidents also strongly
suggests that they are the result of deliberate choices. The investigations also suggest
that widespread and systemic patterns of violations are taking place, of the sort that
call for, among other things, judgments of State, individual responsibility for
perpetrators and effective remedies for victims through an international process.
133. The independent experts are deeply concerned about the tendency of the
Government to view itself as being under an onslaught from the international
community, and indeed as being in conflict with the United Nations and other human
rights bodies, as opposed to being engaged in a common pursuit to address the
challenges faced by the country.
134. The role of observers on the ground, in the capital and wherever else violence
takes place, is crucial. Rumours are rife in the country and uncertainty fuels
insecurity. Accountability is impossible without reliable facts.
135. The attention of the international community may have helped to put a damper
on the more overt manifestations of violence, but it is clear that the crisis continues.
Most stakeholders agree that an inclusive political settlement aimed at establishing a
system based on strong institutions that protect the rule of law and human rights is
required, but the political process has largely stalled.
136. While there is no simple way to characterize the ethnic dimension of the crisis
in Burundi, the independent experts are alarmed that, in a context in which so much
was achieved through the Arusha Agreement to remove the ethnic component from
the area of political contestation, State officials, including at the highest levels, use
language that can only provoke previously bridged divisions and fuel mistrust among
ethnic groups both in Burundi and beyond its borders. Those divisions are starting to
manifest themselves within the security forces, the ethnic integration of which was
both a signal success of the Arusha Agreement and a bulwark against a tragic relapse
into ethnic strife, inside and outside Burundi.
137. The independent experts also express alarm about the potential threat to peace
and security in the Great Lakes region posed by the events they were mandated to
investigate. In a region with a history of complicated ethnic relations with significant
cross-border consequences, stalemated political initiatives, continuing and systematic
gross human rights violations that may amount to crimes against humanity, a
humanitarian crisis involving massive flows of internally displaced persons and
refugees, the disruption to trade and the rampant impunity, to cite only the most
obvious factors, cannot be ignored by the international community.
B. Recommendations
To the Government of Burundi
138. The Government must immediately halt the gross and other human rights
violations committed by its agents and other entities whose actions can be attributed
to it, such as the Imbonerakure, and put into place effective accountability
mechanisms and processes.
139. There is no way out of the crisis without a comprehensive political settlement.
The Government should demonstrate, in word and in deed, its commitment to a
political settlement, including through its active participation in the Arusha peace
talks alongside all those involved in the crisis. It should refrain from any effort to
manipulate the inter-Burundian dialogue for its own ends.
140. All youth militias urgently need to be disarmed. The disarmament should be
scrupulously monitored by international entities. At the same time, the ruling party,
in particular, should disavow the use of violence or threats of violence by its youth
wing and ensure that it does not assume any sort of policing function.
141. All government officials must refrain from using hate or divisive speech. Those
using such language should be prosecuted and hateful and divisive sentiments should
always be publically disavowed, especially by high-ranking authorities.
142. The Government must take all the steps necessary to strengthen the
independence of the judiciary. It should, with immediate effect, in law, rhetoric and
practice, reaffirm its commitment to the principle of judicial independence and
refrain from taking any action, including the levelling of direct or indirect threats to
the judiciary, that undermines it. In the medium and long terms, it is crucial to
resume the stalled discussions about constitutional reforms leading to limiting the
power of the executive branch over the judiciary in terms of the appointment,
promotion and disciplining of judges.
143. The Government must as a priority establish an effective torture prevention
mechanism, in accordance with its obligations under the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The international
community should assist in that venture.
144. The Government must immediately cease using the intelligence services and the
police force, in particular, as armed instruments in defence of a partisan political
project. In the medium and long terms, ambitious and thorough security sector
reforms, regarding both personnel and structural readjustments and review, will be
necessary in order to establish an intelligence service and a national police force that
all Burundians can trust. Effective civilian oversight mechanisms must be established
over the security sector. Such mechanisms should be multi-layered and dispersed, so
that oversight does not become a tool for the executive branch to exert political
control over the security sector.
145. The integration of the armed forces stemming from the Arusha Agreement was
a cornerstone of the peace that Burundi enjoyed for the first time in its history. The
quota system should not be undermined, either overtly or covertly, either through the
creation of special units that fail to conform to the agreed-upon distribution of
positions or through the manipulation of budgets for different units of the forces to
the same end.
146. The Government must cooperate with the international human rights system,
including treaty bodies such as the Committee against Torture. It should also
cooperate with efforts to monitor the human rights situation on the ground.
147. The Government must immediately cease its reprisals and threats against
individuals who have cooperated with the independent experts and other human
rights mechanisms and organizations.
148. The deployment of African Union human rights and military observers should
be completed and expanded in terms of their numbers and the areas they cover, to
include regions beyond the capital. Their status should be recognized through a
memorandum of understanding and their reports should not be subject to clearance
by the Government.
149. The Government must urgently comply with Security Council resolution 2303
(2016).
150. The Government must stop its reprisals and threats against Burundian
refugees abroad. Any repatriation of refugees must be undertaken in compliance with
international human rights standards and be aimed at facilitating the return of
displaced persons to their areas of origin.
151. The Government must ensure that the rights to freedom of expression and
association are fully enjoyed by all citizens and groups. It must therefore cease all
interference with the media and non-governmental and other civil society
organizations in the country.
152. The Government should immediately ratify, without reservations, the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance.
To non-State actors
153. All non-State actors must prioritize the protection of civilians and refrain from
committing human rights abuses.
To the United Nations system and the African Union
154. Given the ineffectiveness of the accountability institutions set up by the
Government, independent international judicial processes must consider whether
international crimes were committed. All relevant stakeholders, in particular the
African Union and the United Nations, must remain seized of the matter, monitor the
situation scrupulously38 and take the steps necessary to prevent the occurrence of
further mass violations with ethnic connotations.
155. Should the Government continue to fail to comply with Security Council
resolution 2303 (2016) and should the violations continue, the independent experts call
upon the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, to discharge effectively its
mandate to ensure peace and security, and to protect, without prejudice to the
primary responsibility of the Burundian authorities and the basic principles of
peacekeeping set out in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 25
November 2015 (S/PRST/2015/22), the civilian population from threat of physical
violence, under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
156. A commission of inquiry should be established immediately to continue the
work accomplished by the independent experts, giving due consideration to the
continuation of the collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union
in that regard. The commission should be mandated to ensure individual
accountability and share the findings with the Security Council with a view to
38 See www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54757#.V8UilU1f3cs.
applying targeted sanctions, through judicial processes. The mandate must include the
task of investigating the allegations of cross-border armed groups operating in
Burundi, including the possible involvement of other States. In conducting its
investigations, the commission must have sufficient resources and warranties, as well
as access to specialized ballistic and forensic expertise.
157. The monitoring role of OHCHR on the ground must be expanded and
strengthened, both in terms of the numbers and the expertise of its Human Rights
Officers, ensuring comprehensive territorial coverage.
158. The United Nations system should scrutinize its own actions in Burundi, in
particular the decision to end the mandate of the United Nations Office in Burundi. It
should also examine whether the Human Rights Up Front initiative has been effective
on the ground and take appropriate remedial measures.
159. The United Nations and the African Union should phase out the use of
Burundian troops in peacekeeping operations while the crisis continues.
160. The African Union is the guarantor of the Arusha Agreement and must make
sure to play a key role in ensuring the long-term success of the Agreement. The
various African Union bodies concerned should take steps to ensure greater
consistency in their approach to ensuring that that happens.
161. The East African Community has the lead role in the current negotiations.
Understanding that without the cooperation of the Government there can be no
success, the Community needs to do its utmost to get the process out of its current
stalled state.
162. The citizens of Burundi are not helped by the country’s friends and neighbours
who shield the Government from abiding by its national and international human
rights obligations. All countries, in particular those with close relations with Burundi
and those that have historically played an important role, including in the process
leading to the Arusha Agreement, should exercise their good offices unambiguously in
defence of the human rights of the citizens of Burundi.
163. The international community should make it clear that it intends to increase
the pressure if the human rights situation does not improve or deteriorates. It should
take measures that are targeted and proportional so as to minimize the impact on the
population.
164. The Human Rights Council should consider whether Burundi can remain a
member of the Council given the terms of paragraph 8 of General Assembly
resolution 60/251.