34/39 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General - Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories - Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan

GE.17-05982(E)



Human Rights Council Thirty-fourth session

27 February-24 March 2017

Agenda items 2 and 7

Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the

High Commissioner and the Secretary-General

Human rights situation in Palestine and other

occupied Arab territories

Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan*

Summary

The present report has been prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution

31/36 on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East

Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan. The report contains information on trends in

settlement expansion, land designation for Israeli use in the West Bank and policies and

practices pertaining to the Israeli settlement enterprise. It examines the human rights and

international humanitarian law violations arising from the continued settlement expansion

and land designation policy of Israel, including the implications of the coercive

environment affecting Palestinian communities at risk of forcible transfer. The report also

provides an analysis of violations relating to the production of and trade in settlement

goods.

* The present report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect the most recent developments.

I. Introduction

1. The present report is being submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution

31/36 and covers the period between 1 November 2015 and 31 October 2016. It should be

read in conjunction with previous reports of the Secretary-General on Israeli settlements

submitted to the General Assembly and the Council.1

2. The report illustrates the persistence of the Israeli settlement enterprise, which

includes settlement expansion and efforts to exert control over land in the West Bank,

including East Jerusalem, as Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory enters its fiftieth year

and as that of the occupied Syrian Golan enters its forty-fourth year.

3. The report highlights how the policies relating to settlement activities remain at the

core of a range of human rights violations in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. It

examines how such policies create a coercive environment in areas under Israeli control,

placing affected Palestinian communities at risk of forcible transfer. Pursuant to Human

Rights Council resolution 31/36, the report includes an analysis of the human rights and

international law violations involved in the production of settlement goods and the

relationship between trade in those goods and the maintenance and economic growth of

settlements.

II. Legal background2

4. Israel bears responsibility for implementing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

the human rights obligations enshrined in the seven core human rights treaties and

conventions it has ratified. International humanitarian law imposes obligations on Israel as

the occupying power. It is obliged to respect the fundamental rights of the protected

population in all circumstances.3

Transfer of the population of the occupying power to the territory it occupies

5. In its resolution 70/89, the General Assembly reaffirmed the illegality of Israeli

settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the

occupied Syrian Golan.

6. The same determination has been made by both the Security Council, in its relevant

resolutions,4 and the International Court of Justice, as regards settlement activities in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory.5 Settlements amount to the transfer of the population of

Israel into the territory it occupies, which is prohibited under international humanitarian

law. The transfer of an occupying power’s population to a territory it occupies amounts to a

war crime that may engage the individual criminal responsibility of those involved.6

Prohibition against the forcible transfer of protected persons

7. International humanitarian law prohibits “individual or mass forcible transfers” of

protected persons within the occupied territory, as well as deportations outside of the

1 See A/HRC/28/44, A/HRC/31/43 and A/71/355, which covers the first months of the period under

review, and A/69/348 and A/70/351.

2 See A/HRC/28/44, paras. 5-6, A/HRC/31/43, para. 4, A/69/348, paras. 4-5, and A/HRC/25/38, paras.

4-5.

3 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva

Convention), art. 27.

4 Security Council resolutions 465 (1980) and 2334 (2016).

5 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory

Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 134.

6 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8 (2) (b) (viii).

occupied territory, regardless of their motive.7 Such unlawful transfers constitute a grave

breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention (art. 147) and potentially incur the individual

criminal responsibility of officials engaged in such acts. 8 While other international

humanitarian law provisions may be violated within the context of forcible transfer (e.g. the

prohibition of the destruction of private and public property9), such transfers may imply the

violation of several human rights, such as the right to adequate housing, including the

prohibition of forced evictions,10 the right to non-interference with family and home,11 the

right to freedom of movement12 and the right to education.13

Private property and natural resources

8. International humanitarian law provides certain protections for private and public

property in occupied territories.14 Accordingly, Israel, as the occupying power, is prohibited

from destroying public and private property except where it is rendered absolutely

necessary by military operations. In addition, it is limited in how it may use public

property; and the property of municipalities must be treated in the same way as private

property.15 Moreover, the water and other natural resources of the occupied territory must

be administered in accordance with the applicable rules of international humanitarian law

and may not be damaged or depleted.16

Extraterritorial application of domestic laws

9. Israel applies a substantial part of its domestic laws to Israeli settlers living in the

occupied territories, while Palestinians living in the West Bank are subject to Israeli

military rule.17 The extraterritorial application of Israeli domestic law to settlers creates two

different legal systems in the same territory, on the sole basis of nationality or origin. Such

differentiated application is discriminatory and violates the principle of equality before the

law, which is central to the right to a fair trial. 18 In addition, the occupying power is

required to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory, unless it is absolutely

prevented from doing so.19

III. Settlement enterprise: expansion, land takeover and denial of Palestinian development

10. With the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory now in its fiftieth year, illegal

settlement activity continues to advance apace. Through continued expansion of illegal

settlements and parallel efforts to consolidate Israeli control over the West Bank, successive

Israeli governments since 1967 have overseen the steady growth of the settler population

7 Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 49. International Committee of the Red Cross, “Customary law”,

International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 87, No. 857 (March 2005), rule 129.

8 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 7 (1) (d), 8 (2) (a) (vii) and 8 (2) (b) (viii).

9 Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 53, and Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on

Land, art. 46.

10 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11. See also Committee on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights general comment No. 7 (1997) on forced evictions.

11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17.

12 Ibid., art. 12.

13 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 13.

14 Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, arts. 46-47 and 52-56, and Fourth

Geneva Convention, arts. 33, 46 and 53.

15 Fourth Geneva Convention, arts. 43, 53, 55 and 64.

16 Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 55.

17 This is not relevant to East Jerusalem, which, since its illegal annexation by Israel, has been subject to

the Israeli legal system. It is recalled that the Security Council, in its resolution 252 (1968),

reaffirmed that acquisition of territory by military conquest was inadmissible, a position reiterated in

subsequent resolutions.

18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 2 and 14.

19 Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43.

and the unilateral takeover of large swaths of West Bank land reserves, in violation of

international law.

11. The settler population in Area C and East Jerusalem has doubled since the Oslo

Accords, reaching over 594,000 people (including an estimated 208,000 in East Jerusalem)

by the end of 201520 living in some 130 settlements and 100 outposts. That number is

expected to rise further given the advancement of new construction in settlements. The

existence of Israeli settlements and the designation of land for exclusive Israeli use have

resulted in the gradual fragmentation of the West Bank, demographic changes and the

illegal exploitation of natural resources, while restricting Palestinians’ access and denying

possibilities for Palestinian development.

12. In July 2016, the Middle East Quartet questioned the long-term intentions of Israel

given its continued efforts to exert control over the West Bank.21 The Quartet cited the

Israeli policy of settlement construction and expansion, designating land for exclusive

Israeli use and denying Palestinian development as key elements in the steady erosion of

the viability of the two-State solution, which undermines hopes for peace.

13. The policies and practices of Israel detailed in the sections below raise serious

concerns. The impact of the Government’s settlement policy on the human rights situation

of Palestinians in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, has been devastating, as

highlighted by the significant developments that occurred during the period under review.

A. Designation of land for exclusive Israeli use

14. Since Israel began its occupation of the Palestinian territory in 1967, a central

feature of its settlement policy in the West Bank has been the gradual takeover and

designation of land for exclusive Israeli use. This has been done through various measures,

including the designation of certain areas as “State land”, closed military zones, national

parks and archaeological sites, State support for the informal takeover of land and the

encouragement of economic activities in the settlements. As a consequence of such

policies, approximately 70 per cent of Area C land is off-limits for Palestinian construction

and development and the situation in East Jerusalem has been profoundly altered.22

Designation of “State land” and allocation of land for settlements

15. Over one third of Area C has been formally designated as public land (referred to as

“State land” by Israel), following a process of land registration initiated under Jordanian

rule and, since 1967, by the Israeli authorities. The vast majority of “State land”

designations took place before the start of the Oslo peace process in the early 1990s. “State

land” has been allocated exclusively for use by Israel and its citizens, rather than for the

benefit of the local population, as required under international law.23

16. Land allocations to 24 Israeli regional and local settlement councils, comprising 126

settlements on approximately 63 per cent of Area C, typically encompass (in addition to

built-up settlement areas) farmland, industrial zones, parks, access roads and security

perimeters or buffer zones.24 Such allocations result in a footprint that vastly exceeds built-

up settlement areas, which amount to only around 2 per cent of Area C.25

17. During the reporting period, the Israeli authorities declared over 200 hectares south

of Jericho as “State land”. The Blue Line team in the Israeli Civil Administration tasked

20 Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics.

21 Report of the Middle East Quartet of July 2016, pp. 5-6. Available from www.un.org/News/

dh/infocus/middle_east/Report-of-the-Middle-East-Quartet.pdf.

22 Area C comprises approximately 60 per cent of the West Bank and includes most of the land reserves

for a future Palestinian State.

23 B’Tselem, By Hook and By Crook: Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank (July 2010), pp. 21-35.

Available from www.btselem.org/download/201007_by_hook_and_by_crook_eng.pdf.

24 Yesh Din, “Land takeover practices employed by Israel in the West Bank” (September 2016), p. 2.

25 Ibid.

with inspecting and amending or validating the boundaries of land previously designated as

“State land” continued its activities. In a number of cases, this process has enabled the

retroactive authorization of prior settlement construction carried out without the permits

required under Israeli law.26

Impunity and support for the informal takeover of land

18. Incidents of violence against Palestinians, trespassing and the forceful takeover of

land have often been conducted as part of a calculated effort by settlers to expand Israeli

control beyond settlement jurisdiction areas.27 Such actions have become effective ways of

taking over land,28 notably owing to the passivity of the Israeli authorities in addressing

them.29 Indeed, Israeli settlers in the West Bank have historically enjoyed impunity for

trespassing and committing violent attacks against Palestinians, and orders against

agricultural invasions, whereby settlers take over and cultivate private Palestinian land,

remain almost entirely unenforced.30

19. The period under review witnessed the continuation of a significant decline in

incidents of settler violence resulting in Palestinian casualties or damage to property, from

397 incidents in 2013 to 81 incidents between January and 31 October 2016.31 During the

reporting period, the severity of settler violence also declined compared with 2015.

20. This positive trend has been linked to preventive measures implemented by the

Israeli security forces, including enhanced presence in friction areas and known hotspots for

settler violence and increased issuance and enforcement of administrative measures against

known violent settlers — primarily restraining orders barring them from the West Bank

and, in some instances, administrative detention orders. Resort to such measures reportedly

intensified following the murder of three members of the Dawabsheh family in Duma, in

July 2015, for which two Israeli citizens were indicted.32

Designation of land for use as national parks, archaeology sites and tourism

destinations as a means to entrench Israeli presence in the West Bank

21. The designation of national parks and archaeological sites and their promotion for

Israeli and international tourism continues to contribute to consolidating Israeli civilian

presence and control over land in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Approximately 14 per

cent of Area C land has been designated for use as national parks, and the tourism heritage

site development rooted in the illegal annexation of East Jerusalem has profoundly altered

the shape and character of the areas surrounding the Old City, creating footholds for

residential settlement expansion in Palestinian neighbourhoods.33 The management of such

26 See A/HRC/31/43, paras. 21-23, and A/71/355, para. 13.

27 See A/70/351, paras. 52-60.

28 Talya Sason, in “Summary of the opinion concerning unauthorized outposts” (10 March 2005),

writes:

The expansion of the unauthorized outposts phenomenon began in the mid-nineties, after the building

in Judea, Samaria and Gaza was frozen by the Rabin Administration in 1993. Building in settlements

was still approved, but the approval rate went decreasing as the negotiations with the Palestinian

representatives accelerated. The unauthorized outposts phenomenon began expanding, in light of the

government’s position opposing the authorizing of the building of settlements in the territories.

29 As documented by Talya Sason in “Summary of the opinion concerning unauthorized outposts”,

privately led settlement expansion efforts have also received direct support from the Israeli

authorities, despite an official position opposing settlement construction. See also Yesh Din, The

Road to Dispossession: a Case Study — the Outpost of Adei Ad (February 2013).

30 Yesh Din, “Land takeover practices employed by Israel in the West Bank”. See also the following

reports commissioned by the Government of Israel addressing historic law enforcement failures in the

West Bank: Talya Sason, “Summary of the opinion concerning unauthorized outposts”; Meir

Shamgar, “Commission of inquiry into the massacre at the tomb of the patriarchs in Hebron (26 June

1994); and Yehudit Karp, “The Karp report: investigation of suspicions against Israelis in Judea and

Samaria, Jerusalem” (1982).

31 Figures provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat.

32 See A/71/355, para. 19.

33 See A/70/351, paras. 29-36 and 63-66.

sites restricts Palestinians’ freedom of movement and prevents equal enjoyment of cultural

life and heritage.34

22. The management of archaeological and tourism sites by private settler groups came

under scrutiny following the intervention by senior officials of the Ministry of Justice on

behalf of the settler group Elad. Elad successfully reinstated the original plans for Kedem

Compound, a large tourist facility proposed in Silwan, East Jerusalem, after Jerusalem

planning bodies had significantly reduced the scope of the plans.35 A report of the Israeli

State Comptroller highlighted the lack of poor oversight by government authorities in

relation to Elad’s management of tourism and ancient sites and the lack of transparency in

relation to links between the organization’s management and government entities.

Designation of occupied land for economic activities

23. In the report on Israeli settlements submitted to the General Assembly at its seventy-

first session (see A/71/355, para. 4), it was noted that the encouragement of economic

activities, including industrial and agricultural activities, within and around settlements

represented an additional way for Israel to support settlement expansion besides the

allocation of land for settlement homes and infrastructure.36

24. Through financial incentives, the Government of Israel has continued to actively

encourage commercial development by Israeli and international businesses in and around

the settlements. Almost all settlement industrial zones are designated as national priority

areas, which carries benefits such as reductions in the price of land, grants for the

development of infrastructure and tax breaks for individuals and business enterprises.37 In

its recent report on settlement businesses, Human Rights Watch noted that the physical

footprint of Israeli business activity in the West Bank was larger than that of residential

settlements. According to Human Rights Watch, industrial zones (1,365 hectares) and

agricultural land (9,300 hectares) exploited by Israel in the West Bank occupy a surface

area 1.7 times greater than the built-up area of residential settlements (6,000 hectares).38

B. Settlement construction and expansion

25. The Israeli policy of construction and expansion of settlements and related

infrastructure, and support to privately led settlement expansion initiatives throughout the

West Bank continued, and an overall acceleration in settlement expansion was observed

during the reporting period. Following a period of significant slowdown in planning and

tendering since mid-2014, an overall acceleration in settlement expansion was reported

during 2016, as measured against the main indicators of government-led settlement activity:

the number of new constructions rose compared with previous years, with the highest

number of new constructions in three years recorded during the second quarter of 2016.

Moreover, there was an uptick in plans advanced in both East Jerusalem and Area C.39

Similarly, settler-led initiatives continued to enjoy State support, as evidenced by the

34 See A/70/351.

35 See www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.745359.

36 In its resolution 31/36, the Human Rights Council requested the Secretary-General to report on the

human rights and international law violations involved in the production of settlement goods and the

relationship between trade in these goods and the maintenance and economic growth of settlements.

37 See https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/01/19/occupation-inc/how-settlement-businesses-contribute-

israels-violations-palestinian.

38 Ibid.

39 According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, construction started on 1,723 housing units

during the first three quarters of 2016, an increase of 25 per cent compared with the same period in

2015. In Area C, 24 settlement plans involving the construction of 2,264 housing units were put

forward without reaching the final approval stage. Fourteen additional plans reached a final approval

stage (710 units). The figures represent an increase over 2015 but a decrease compared with 2014.

Similarly, in East Jerusalem, plans for 1,572 units were put forward during 2016 compared with 1,285

units in 2015, which represented a significant decrease compared with the 3,300 units proposed in

2014.

growth in privately led East Jerusalem settlement enclaves (see para. 31 below) and

continued efforts to retroactively legalize unauthorized Area C outposts.

Housing and infrastructure

26. There were significant developments in planning and construction during the period

under review, particularly in East Jerusalem, including the issuance by the Israeli

authorities, in November 2015, of a tender for 438 housing units in the settlement of Ramat

Shlomo, in the northern periphery of the city.40

27. In July 2016, the Israeli media reported on a rare, court-mandated approval of a plan

for 600 housing units in the Palestinian village of Beit Safafa.41 It also reported on advances

made in the construction of 560 settlement units in Maale Adumim and of 240 such units in

East Jerusalem, which were soon followed by the issuance of tenders for an additional 323

units in those settlements.42

28. Other key developments in East Jerusalem included advances in the planning and

construction of residential buildings and infrastructure in the southern perimeter of the city

by municipal planning authorities. Non-governmental organizations monitoring settlement

expansion have highlighted those developments as part of broader efforts by the Israeli

authorities to further the establishment of a contiguous Israeli-controlled corridor

connecting the Gush Etzion settlement bloc, located in Bethlehem Governorate, to

Jerusalem. In that regard, construction began on a new road facilitating access between

Gush Etzion and Jerusalem;43 proposals for housing plans and tenders continued to advance

in Gilo settlement, 44 which was expected to enable the expansion of the settlement

southward, towards Beit Jala; the construction of the wall resumed south of Beit Jala and

west of Al Walajeh; and the construction of a visitors’ centre started in an adjacent area

located in Beit Jala’s agricultural hinterland, which had been designated as a national park

in 2013. Furthermore, the construction of a road leading to an undeveloped parcel in nearby

Givat HaMatos C raised concerns as an indication of possible future construction plans in

the area.45

29. An acceleration in the implementation of settlement-related policies and measures in

the southern periphery of Jerusalem and in Bethlehem Governorate resulted in the

fragmentation of the area, the shrinking of space available for Palestinian development and

the separation of rural hinterlands from urban areas. Key concerns emanating from these

developments include the impact on the rights of Palestinian residents of the area to

freedom of movement, an adequate livelihood and the enjoyment of natural resources.46

Support to privately led settlement initiatives in East Jerusalem

30. Israeli civil society organizations reported on the growth of privately led settlement

efforts in East Jerusalem, particularly in the city’s “historic basin”, which saw a 25 per cent

increase in the total number of settlers between 2009 and October 2016, to approximately

2,500 settlers.47 The initiatives are supported by government funding, including through a

40 See www.peacenow.org.il.

41 See www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.728768.

42 See https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2016-07-04/un-secretary-general-israeli-

decisions-regarding-new-construction.

43 Ir Amim newsletter available from www.altro.co.il/newsletters/show/8617?key=08df354b3

dd7853bae6cc333e526b2dd&value=9a3cdcd0e38da468aea5b504ce87c7a2d1ce4fef: 1260978.

44 As part of the announcement for the tender of 323 units (see para. 27 above).

45 While not yet approved at the time of writing, the parcel in question has been designated for 800

housing units. See Ir Amim newsletter available from www.altro.co.il/newsletters/show/9056?key=

ebb7138f916d1c7391aeee8ed6e1c804&value=c2e4bb0d506603c6a015881780b407ec41d90f70:

1284691.

46 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Bethlehem Governorate: fragmentation and

humanitarian concerns”, factsheet (January 2015).

47 Ir Amim and Peace Now, Broken Trust: State Involvement in Private Settlement in Batan Al-Hawa,

Silwan (May 2016), p. 5.

security budget allocated by the Ministry of Construction and Housing, totalling

approximately US$ 25 million in 2015.48

31. Intensified efforts by Israeli settler groups to take control of East Jerusalem

properties, often located deep within Palestinian neighbourhoods, have generated an

increased risk of evictions of Palestinian families (see also para. 56 below).

Retroactive legalization of outposts in Area C

32. Successive reports to the General Assembly have detailed Israeli support to

settlement outposts (erected by settlers without official approval from the Government of

Israel) through the provision of funds, infrastructure and security, and through the lack of

any action to remove them.

33. While no outpost has been legalized since May 2014, efforts to retroactively approve

such settlements took a new form during the period under review, as a draft bill was

introduced to avert the impending court-mandated 25 December 2016 deadline for the

evacuation and demolition of the outpost of Amona, erected on the private lands of

residents of Silwad, Ein Yabroud and Taibeh. The “regularization bill” envisaged the

retroactive “regularization” of settlement houses built on private Palestinian property,

which would remove key legal obstacles to the retroactive legalization of dozens of

unauthorized outposts.49

C. Production of and trade in settlement goods

34. The production of and trade in settlement goods raises concerns about the human

rights impact on Palestinians caused and exacerbated by business enterprises and States.

The human rights obligations of Israel within the Occupied Palestinian Territory stem from

the jurisdiction and effective control it exercises as the occupying power. That includes the

obligation to protect individuals and communities from adverse human rights impacts by

third parties, such as business enterprises, operating in territory under its effective control.

Under article 1 common to the Geneva Conventions, States parties have to respect and

ensure respect for the Conventions. Accordingly, third States are under the obligation not to

recognize the unlawful situation resulting from Israeli settlements, nor to aid or assist in the

violations committed by Israel.50

35. The European Union is the main trading partner of Israel, with trade worth over 32

billion euros in 2015. The Government of Israel has reportedly estimated that the annual

value of industrial goods produced in settlements and exported to Europe is US$ 300

million. Agricultural production provides the main source of income for settlements in the

Jordan Valley, with 66 per cent of their produce being exported.

36. Products that are wholly or partially produced in settlements are frequently labelled

as coming from Israel, obscuring their actual origin. That allows the exports to be covered

under preferential trade agreements with the European Union that exclude settlements.

Some measures have been taken to address that issue. During the reporting period, the

European Union issued new labelling guidelines for products coming from the West Bank,

including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Under those guidelines, any product

originating from a settlement must not be labelled as “Made in Israel” but must clearly be

labelled as having been produced in a settlement.

37. While States have a primary duty to protect human rights, there is an independent

corporate responsibility to respect human rights applicable to all business enterprises,

irrespective of where they operate. That has been recognized in the Guiding Principles on

48 Ibid, p. 12.

49 See A/HRC/31/43 and A/71/355. See also www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/

DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21003&LangID=E.

50 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, paras.

157-159, and International Committee of the Red Cross, 2016 commentary on article 1 common to

the Geneva Conventions, para. 163.

Business and Human Rights, which are based on existing responsibilities under

international law and have been unanimously endorsed by all the States members of the

Human Rights Council (see, in particular, A/HRC/17/31, annex, principle 11).

38. The role of Israeli and foreign businesses in supporting and maintaining the

existence of the settlements has already been highlighted (see A/67/379 and A/68/376). In

its 2013 report, the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the

implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural

rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including

East Jerusalem, concluded that business enterprises had directly and indirectly enabled,

facilitated and profited from the construction and growth of the settlements and that

businesses contributed to the maintenance, development and consolidation of the

settlements with full knowledge of the liability risks (see A/HRC/22/63, paras. 96-97).

39. Since the fact-finding mission’s report, increasing attention has been paid to the

activities of business enterprises in relation to settlements. In 2014, the Working Group on

the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises

emphasized that businesses connected to Israeli settlements needed to be able to

demonstrate that they neither supported the continuation of an international illegality nor

were they complicit in human rights abuses; that they could effectively prevent or mitigate

human rights risks; and that they were able to account for their efforts in that regard. The

Working Group added that where companies could not prevent or mitigate the risks of

being involved in human rights violations through their operations and business

relationships, they might need to consider terminating their operations.51

IV. Coercive environment resulting from settlement policies and consequent risk of forcible transfer

40. The impact of settlement policies on the living conditions of Palestinians, including

their increased risks of individual and mass forcible transfer, continues to be a concern.

41. Moreover, Israel, as the occupying power, may be increasing pressure on

Palestinians to move out of their areas of residence through practices and policies that

contribute to the creation of a coercive environment in areas under full Israeli control. In

previous reports, the Secretary-General has outlined the existence of a coercive

environment in parts of Area C and Hebron’s H2 and highlighted factors constituting a

coercive environment with respect to East Jerusalem.52 He has also raised concerns about

cases where forcible transfer appears to have taken place.53

42. The impact of a coercive environment on individuals and communities depends on

their specific circumstances and experience. A coercive factor alone or in combination with

others may be sufficient to determine the existence of a coercive environment in a given

case and its connection with the grave breach of forcible transfer. The list of coercive

factors below is not exhaustive.

A. Factors contributing to a coercive environment in the West Bank

43. The factors below contribute to the creation of a coercive environment in areas of

the West Bank under full Israeli control.

51 See www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/OPTStatement6June2014.pdf.

52 See A/HRC/24/30, para. 27, A/HRC/31, paras. 46 and 68, A/70/421, para. 36, A/69/348, paras. 12-16,

A/HRC/28/80, para. 24, A/HRC/31/43, para. 54, A/69/348, paras. 12-16, A/HRC/25/40, para. 22, and

A/71/355, paras. 24-33.

53 See A/67/372, para. 39, A/HRC/25/40, paras. 18-20, A/69/347, para. 26, and A/71/355, paras. 61-64.

“Relocation” plans and evictions

44. The publicly stated intention of the Government of Israel to relocate or evict

thousands of Palestinians currently residing in Area C is a principal source of pressure and

coercion for the communities and individuals concerned. In previous reports it was

highlighted that the implementation of such plans would entail forcible transfers, except

where the individuals affected expressed genuine consent to move. 54 This relates in

particular to Israeli plans to relocate some 7,500 Palestinian Bedouin and herders to

between three and nine centralized sites55 and to evict some 1,000 Palestinians living in

eight villages in the Massafar Yatta area for the enforcement of a firing zone.56 It also

applies to other eviction and relocation plans affecting 55 Palestinian families in Susya57

and other communities targeted for relocation outside their areas or residence, such as

Dkaika,58 in southern Hebron Governorate.

45. A history of forced evictions and transfers of entire communities by Israeli

authorities places additional pressure on the individuals and communities targeted by these

plans.59

46. The Secretary-General, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories

occupied since 1967 have pointed to the seizure of Palestinian homes and forced evictions

(and the risk of such seizures and evictions taking place) to make way for settlers to move

in, as factors suggesting a coercive environment in East Jerusalem. 60 According to the

54 See A/HRC/25/40, paras. 18-21 and 78, A/67/372, para. 36-37, and A/HRC/24/30, para. 29.

55 See A/HRC/31/43, paras. 56-60. On 14 June 2016, the Deputy Head of the Israeli Civil

Administration, Col. Uri Mendez, referred to nine relocation sites during the “Judea and Samaria”

subcommittee meeting.

56 See A/HRC/24/30, para. 28.

57 See A/HRC/31/43, paras. 50-54.

58 The Bedouin community of Dkaika has a population of approximately 450, most of whom are

Palestine refugees. The Israeli Civil Administration has proposed relocating the community to one of

the nearby villages, in line with the State’s official position expressed on 13 May 2009 and 23 March

2016 in response to a petition submitted to the High Court of Justice by Dkaika residents demanding

planning and zoning rights for the community. On 2 November 2016, the High Court ordered that

Dkaika residents and the State enter into discussions for 90 days to find a solution regarding planning

for the village residents. A temporary protection order against demolitions is in place. While it

remains unclear whether planning in that location will be an option for the State, the High Court

criticized the State’s proposed relocation plan on the grounds that there was no public need or benefit

to transfer residents. See http://rhr.org.il/eng/2016/11/update.

59 Between 1997 and 2007, the Israeli authorities transferred in three waves some 150 Bedouin families

in Jerusalem Governorate to the Al Jabal site despite their opposition to the relocation. See United

Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “Al Jabal: a study on the

transfer of Bedouin Palestine refugees” (2013). Experts have assessed that these three waves of

displacement amounted to forcible transfer under international humanitarian law. See Théo Boutruche

and Marco Sassoli, “Expert opinion on the displacements of Bedouin communities from the central

West Bank under international humanitarian law” (September 2014). In 1999, the Israel Defense

Forces moved some 700 Palestinian herders out of 12 villages in the Massafer Yatta area, in Hebron

Governorate, on the grounds that the area had been designated as a military firing zone. Affected

Palestinians were reportedly placed in trucks and removed by force out of the area. See

www.acri.org.il/en/2013/03/07/918-whats-the-deal-2. See also A/HRC/24/30, para. 28, and Office for

the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Life in a firing zone: the Massafer Yatta communities”

(May 2013). In 1986, 25 families were expelled from the residential area at Susya in southern Hebron

Governorate on the grounds that the land had been designated an archaeological site. A second

transfer took place from the new site in 2001. See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs, “Susiya: a community at imminent risk of forced displacement” (June 2015), Rabbis for

Human Rights (http://rhr.org.il/eng) and B’Tselem, “Khirbet Susiya: a village under threat of

demolition” (7 August 2016). 60 See A/70/351, paras. 25-51, and A/HRC/16/71, paras. 20-22. See also the letter dated 30 April 2015

from the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard

of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, the Special Rapporteur on the

independence of judges and lawyers and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in

Israeli non-governmental organizations Ir Amin and Peace Now, at least 55 families were

evicted from their homes in 2015 and 2016, and some 300 Palestinian families are under

threat of eviction or imminent house demolition in the “historic basin” of the Old City of

East Jerusalem. 61 In most cases, the evictions have been initiated by Israeli settler

organizations on the basis of landownership claims, as well as claims that the residents are

no longer “protected tenants”. As a result, 818 Palestinians, including 372 children, are at

risk of displacement.62

Demolitions

47. Demolitions, 63 the threat of demolitions 64 and the lack of long-term protection

against demolitions have been identified as key elements contributing to a coercive

environment in the West Bank. Demolitions have been identified as a key coercive factor,

in particular for Area C communities targeted for relocation, 65 communities in closed

military zones66 and communities located near Israeli settlements.67

48. During the reporting period, the highest number of demolitions of Palestinian homes

and structures was recorded in the West Bank, with 874 structures demolished in Area C in

2016, compared with 456 in 2015, and 190 demolitions taking place in East Jerusalem,

compared with 79 in 2015, the highest demolitions rate on record.68 Between 1988 and

2016, the Israeli Civil Administration issued 14,929 orders to demolish around 16,000

Palestinian-owned structures in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, which had been

built without permits from the Israeli authorities.

49. The pace of demolitions in East Jerusalem also accelerated to an alarming rate,

reaching 190 between 1 January and 31 October 2016, compared with 79 in 2015.69

Pressure from government officials

50. Pressure, including threats and harassment during repeated visits from Israeli Civil

Administration and other government officials, including members of the Israeli security

forces, continued to be documented as an ongoing form of coercion.70 During visits, in

the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 (https://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/30th/public_-

_UA_Israel_30.04.15_(1.2015)_pro.pdf).

61 Ir Amim newsletter available from www.altro.co.il/newsletters/show/9436?key=

d50319441ca2cdde8d7e87ceb1028269&value=c2e4bb0d506603c6a015881780b407ec41d90f70:1284

691.

62 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “East Jerusalem: Palestinians at risk of

evictions”, 3 November 2016.

63 See A/68/513, paras. 30-34, A/HRC/25/38, paras. 11-20, and A/HRC/31/43, para. 44.

64 See A/HRC/28/80, para. 24, and A/69/348, para. 13. 65 See A/HRC/31/43, paras. 46 and 68, A/67/ 372, para. 55, A/HRC/24/30, A/69/348, para. 13,

A/HRC/25/40, paras. 18-20, and A/HRC/28/45, para. 53.

66 Approximately 18 per cent of Area C has been designated by the Israeli authorities as “firing zones”;

38 Palestinian communities are located in such zones. Because the Israeli Civil Administration

prohibits construction in firing zones, wide-scale demolitions frequently take place. During 2016, at

least five communities located in areas designated as firing zones experienced demolitions, including

Halaweh and Jinba, in the Massafer Yatta area of Hebron, and are at risk of being forcibly transferred

to allow implementation of firing zone 918; Ein ar Rashash (Ramallah, firing zone 906); Al Jiftlik-

abu al Ajaj (Jericho Governorate) and Khirbet Tana in the northern Jordan Valley (firing zone 904).

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Wide-scale demolitions in Khirbet Tana”, 4

March 2016.

67 See A/HRC/28/45, para. 45, A/HRC/22/63, paras 32-38, and A/HRC/67/375, paras. 10-11.

68 The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs began collecting data on demolitions in

2009.

69 Ir Amim newsletter available from

www.altro.co.il/newsletters/show/9502?key=86ffe4a161ed2848474b99ff41b71bac&value=c2e4bb0d

506603c6a015881780b407ec41d90f70:1284691.

70 In Khirbet Tell el-Himma (northern Jordan Valley), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs has documented regular harassment by officials of the Israeli security forces and settlers

during visits to the community following the demolition of homes and other structures in September

particular following demolitions, officials have reportedly solicited the relocation or

removal of the affected individuals outside their area of residence and have threatened to

transfer them out forcibly.71

51. Even where individuals may express consent to relocate, including formal

expressions of consent, the transfer would be forcible, and in violation of international law,

unless the affected individuals express genuine consent.72

Impact of military operations and settler violence

52. In Hebron’s H2, the general sense of insecurity caused by the heavy military

presence and security operations, which often involve the use of force by Israeli security

forces, as well as harassment and arbitrary arrests, contribute to the creation of a coercive

environment.73 Meanwhile, Area C communities located inside and around areas defined by

Israel as “firing zones” continued to experience a coercive environment, notably as a result

of military training exercises, including with live fire. The Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs has documented such training exercises causing displacement during

the reporting period.74

53. For communities located in close proximity to settlements and known hotspots of

settler violence, violence and harassment by settlers exacerbate the coercive nature of the

environment. Nonetheless, the frequency of reports of such incidents dropped notably

during the reporting period.75

Restrictions on freedom of movement and access to essential services

54. As noted by the Middle East Quartet, the policy of denial of Palestinian

development has extended to the “complex system of physical and administrative

restrictions on the movement of people and goods, which Israel justifies as necessary for

security”, including closures, checkpoints, limits to access to natural resources and

agricultural land, and impediments to accessing basic services, including medical care and

education.76

55. Those restrictions and their impact have previously been identified as directly

contributing to the coercive environment that exists in areas under full Israeli control.77

Similarly, interference by Israeli authorities in the provision of humanitarian assistance and

2016. See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin

(October 2016). In January 2016, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human

Rights recorded the testimonies of Abu Nwar residents referring to threats received from Israel Civil

Administration officials and a liaison officer following the demolition of five residential and other

structures on 6 January 2016, leaving 26 refugees, including 17 children, of whom 4 were living with

disabilities, displaced and without a home in the middle of winter. In the following days, on 10 and 14

January, humanitarian materials donated by the international community as part of the post-

demolition response were confiscated by the Administration.

71 For further reports on intimidation and threats related to communities in the outskirts of Jerusalem,

see A/70/421, para. 46, and A/HRC/31/43, para. 59. See also www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-

statements/unrwa-condemns-demolition-homes-palestine-refugee-bedouins-families.

72 See A/67/372, para. 37.

73 See A/71/355, paras. 25-50.

74 Al-’Aqaba community in the northern Jordan Valley was exposed to sustained live fire inside the

residential area for two days while an Israeli military training exercise was being conducted in the

vicinity. Residents of the nearby community of Humsa al-Bqai’a were also temporarily displaced as a

result. See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin — Occupied

Palestinian Territory (October 2016).

75 Systematic intimidation by Israeli settlers has created a coercive environment in Susiya. See

A/HRC/31/43, para. 54, and footnote 79 above. Incidents of intimidation and physical violence by

settlers and Israeli security forces against Bedouins in Umm al-Khair have been documented (see

A/68/513, para. 37).

76 Report of the Middle East Quartet of July 2016, p. 6. Available from

www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Report-of-the-Middle-East-Quartet.pdf.

77 See A/71/355 and A/HRC/31/43.

the destruction of such assistance in Area C has heightened the risk that affected

communities will be forcibly transferred.78

Additional factors contributing to a coercive environment

56. Other factors contributing to a coercive environment include the strict residency

regime for East Jerusalem residents and restrictions on family unification between residents

of East Jerusalem and other parts of the West Bank.79

57. Similarly, policies and practices in the context of the five-decade-long Israeli

occupation can contribute to a coercive environment, notably the confiscation by the

Government of Israel of Palestinian land and restrictions on access to and control over

natural resources, including water, which impede the development of the Palestinian

economy; restrictions on the freedom of movement of Palestinians in the West Bank,

including East Jerusalem; the lack of access to effective legal remedies; and the

implementation of collective punishment measures such as punitive demolitions.

V. Settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan

58. Settlement expansion and land appropriation by the Government of Israel in the

occupied Syrian Golan continued in direct violation of international law. In October 2016,

the Government reportedly approved the construction of 1,600 new homes in the illegal

settlement of Katzrin.80 As noted in previous reports, Israeli settlements in the Golan are

encouraged through financial incentives and a disproportionate allocation of water

resources, contributing to a higher agricultural yield for settlers.81 The Government is also

reportedly seeking to appropriate approximately 20,000 acres of occupied land to create

Hermon national park. The land in question is currently used for agriculture and housing by

the inhabitants of the nearby Syrian towns of Majdal Shams and Ein Qynia. 82 The

appropriation of the land would severely restrict the development and expansion of the

town of Majdal Shams.83

59. The Israeli authorities reportedly demolished a home in the Syrian Golan for the first

time on 7 September 2016. The house was in the village of Majdal Shams and it was

demolished on the basis that it had been built without the necessary permit. 84

Discriminatory land, housing and development policies established by the Israeli authorities

have made it difficult for Syrians to obtain building permits, with the result that Syrian

towns and villages are increasingly overcrowded. 85 The human rights organization Al-

Marsad reported that a number of Syrian homeowners had received demolition notices; the

organization expressed concern that the first demolition could mark the beginning of a new

policy of home demolitions.86

60. Of further concern are reiterations by senior Israeli government officials, including

the Prime Minister, during 2016 that Israel would never give up its claim to the Golan

Heights. The Secretary-General has repeatedly reaffirmed the continuing validity of

Security Council resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council decided that the Israeli

78 Approximately 170 European Union humanitarian structures were demolished between 2009 and

mid-2016, of which 91 were demolished in the first six months of 2016. See www.haaretz.com/israel-

news/1.733729 and www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/un-officials-call-immediate-

revocation-plans-transfer-palestinian.

79 See www.btselem.org/jerusalem/revocation_of_residency.

80 See www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israel-okays-1600-new-homes-in-golan-heights.

81 See A/HRC/28/44, para. 54, and A/HRC/31/43, para. 64.

82 See http://golan-marsad.org/al-marsad-calls-on-international-community-to-act.

83 See http://golan-marsad.org/press-release-al-marsad-submits-objection-to-hermon-national-park-plan.

84 See http://golan-marsad.org/press-release-israeli-authorities-demolish-home-in-majdal-shams-in-the-

occupied-syrian-golan/

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan

Heights was null and void and without international legal effect.

VI. Conclusions and recommendations

61. Israeli settlement activity is incompatible with the obligations of Israel under

international law. Settlement activity is a key driver of need for humanitarian

assistance in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and lies at the core of a range

of human rights violations. Israeli settlement activity further constitutes one of the

main obstacles to a viable Palestinian State. The significant role that the production of

and trade in settlement goods plays in helping to support and maintain settlements is

also of concern.

62. Israel must implement all relevant United Nations resolutions, including

Security Council resolution 497 (1981), and withdraw from territory it has occupied

since 1967. To meet its obligations under international law, Israel must stop building

settlements, reverse any settlement development activity and make full reparations to

the individuals and communities concerned.87

63. Within the scope of its obligation to respect and ensure respect for human

rights within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Government of Israel has the

duty to protect the Palestinian population against human rights abuses by third

parties, including business enterprises. It should implement the Guiding Principles on

Business and Human Rights and, in particular, take the legislative, administrative

policy and remedial actions necessary to prevent, investigate, punish and redress

abuses. The Israeli authorities must rescind all policies and practices that, directly or

indirectly, are likely to lead to the forcible transfer of Palestinians, including policies

and practices that contribute to the creation of a coercive environment that forces

people to leave their communities. Specifically, the Israeli authorities must:

(a) Refrain from any initiative to relocate communities from Area C in

contravention of international law;

(b) Cease the implementation of a planning and zoning regime that is

discriminatory and restrictive and that facilitates the construction and expansion of

settlements and the wall, in violation of international law;

(c) Cease the demolition of the homes and private property of Palestinians

and take all measures to prevent violence and other coercive measures perpetrated by

public officials or settlers;

(d) Ensure that any incident of violence by private actors, including settlers,

against Palestinians and their property are investigated, that perpetrators are

prosecuted and, if convicted, punished with appropriate sanctions, and that victims

are provided with effective remedies in accordance with international standards.88

64. Third States should provide guidance on implementing the Guiding Principles

on Business and Human Rights to business enterprises domiciled in their territory or

within their jurisdiction that operate in conflict-affected areas, including in the

context of military occupation, such as in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

65. Business enterprises should undertake human rights due diligence in order to

identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address any adverse human

rights impact on Palestinians they may cause or contribute to, or which may be

directly linked to their operations, products or services.

87 Draft articles 30 and 31 of the draft articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful

acts, see Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, vol. II (Part Two), p. 28.

88 See CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 16.