Original HRC document

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Document Type: Final Report

Date: 2017 Apr

Session: 35th Regular Session (2017 Jun)

Agenda Item: Item3: Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development

GE.17-05801(E)



Human Rights Council Thirty-fifth session

6-23 June 2017

Agenda item 3

Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,

political, economic, social and cultural rights,

including the right to development

Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on his mission to Honduras

Note by the Secretariat

The Secretariat has the honour to transmit to the Human Rights Council the report of

the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on his official

visit to Honduras from 23 to 27 May 2016. In the report, the Special Rapporteur presents

his main findings, including comments on the situation of violence in the country, the most

frequently targeted groups, the policy and legal framework for the protection of the right to

life and the lack of systematic accountability for violations of that right.

The Special Rapporteur makes recommendations to all parties involved, the

Government, the international community and civil society for the prevention of unlawful

killings and better protection of the right to life.

United Nations A/HRC/35/23/Add.1

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Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on his mission to Honduras*

Contents

Page

I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 3

II. Background ................................................................................................................................... 3

III. Legal and institutional framework for the protection of human rights .......................................... 4

IV. Violence in society ........................................................................................................................ 5

V. Violations of the right to life of affected groups ........................................................................... 8

VI. Impunity for violations of the right to life ..................................................................................... 15

VII. State response to violence ............................................................................................................. 16

VIII. Prisons ........................................................................................................................................... 18

IX. Engagement with the regional and international human rights protection system ........................ 19

X. Conclusions and recommendations ............................................................................................... 19

* Circulated in the language of submission and Spanish only.

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I. Introduction

1. At the invitation of the Government of Honduras, the Special Rapporteur conducted

an official visit to the country from 23 to 27 May 2016. He thanks the Government for

extending the invitation and for the extensive cooperation provided during the preparation

and conduct of the visit. He appreciates the openness and willingness to engage that he

encountered in his meetings. He would also like to thank the country office of the Office of

the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) for the valuable

support received in the preparation and conduct of the visit.

2. The aim of the visit was to examine the level of protection of the right to life in

Honduras, particularly the legal framework and measures in place to prevent attacks on the

life, security and physical integrity of individuals, and to ensure justice and accountability

for such violations. The Special Rapporteur viewed the visit as particularly important in

view of the fact that Honduras had one of the highest homicide rates in the world.

3. During his visit, the Special Rapporteur visited Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula and

met with numerous officials of the federal and state Governments. At the federal level, he

met with authorities from the Office of the Presidency; Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Ministry of Human Rights, Justice, Government and Decentralization; Ministry of Security;

Ministry of Defence; Supreme Court of Justice; Public Prosecutor’s Office; National

Congress, including the committees on justice and human rights and on citizen security;

national police; armed forces; National Human Rights Commission and the national

preventive mechanism. He also visited the National Penitentiary and the detention centre of

the Second Tactical Infantry Battalion, both in Tegucigalpa. In San Pedro Sula, he held

meetings with the Governor of the Department of Cortes and the Vice-Mayor of San Pedro

Sula and visited the Returnee Migrant Care Centre. He also met with members of the

United Nations country team, academia and civil society organizations.

4. The present report focuses on the situation as it was during the visit, although some

specific references are made to subsequent developments. The report was sent to the

Government for comments on 14 February 2017 and was completed on 28 March 2017.

II. Background

5. In 1963, a military coup in Honduras led to a succession of military Governments

that held power almost uninterruptedly until 1981. Democratic Governments ruled until

June 2009, when an attempt to hold a ballot to reform the Honduran political process led to

the ousting of the democratically elected President, Manuel Zelaya. The international

community unanimously condemned the coup, but the Honduran Supreme Court ruled the

proceedings to be legal. Reports of human rights abuses against supporters of the deposed

President rocketed after the coup, when the de facto Government suspended civil liberties

and security forces responded to anti-coup demonstrations with excessive force, causing

several deaths and injuries and leading to thousands of arbitrary detentions. Elected

President Porfirio Lobo established a truth and reconciliation commission in 2010 to

examine the events that had occurred before and after the coup. The commission

documented 20 cases of excessive use of force and killings by security forces and set out 84

recommendations. However, little progress has been made in prosecuting those abuses.1

6. A series of corruption scandals involving the Government and political parties gave

rise in 2015 to a massive anti-corruption movement known as “los indignados” (the

outraged), whose supporters demanded the establishment of an international commission

with investigatory and prosecutorial powers to address crimes and corruption by

government officials. In response, the Government announced an initiative in conjunction

with the Organization of American States to reform the justice system and strengthen the

independence of the judicial branch, which began in April 2016. The announcement of the

1 See A/HRC/32/35 Add. 4.

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creation of the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras

did not meet the expectations of the “indignados” movement.2

III. Legal and institutional framework for the protection of human rights

A. Legal framework

7. The Honduran Constitution guarantees as inviolable the rights to life, dignity,

physical, moral and mental integrity, and the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel

inhuman or degrading treatment. It also guarantees freedom of expression, movement,

speech, thought, religion, assembly and association, and recognizes the writ of habeas

corpus and the remedy of amparo. The Constitution provides for the creation of the

National Human Rights Commission to guarantee the rights and freedoms recognized

therein. Under the Constitution, international treaties ratified by the State form part of

domestic law as soon as they enter into force, and shall prevail in case of conflict with

domestic law.3

8. The Honduran Criminal Code was amended in 2011 to define the offences of

torture, femicide, hate crimes against women and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender

persons, incitement to hatred and discrimination through the media. A further amendment

in 2012 defined enforced disappearance as a specific offence.

9. In April 2015, the Congress enacted a law to protect human rights defenders,

journalists and legal practitioners that led to the creation of a national system of protection,

as described in section VII.D below.

B. Role of the National Human Rights Commission

10. The National Human Rights Commission is mandated to receive complaints for

human rights violations and provide recommendations to relevant authorities. Its presence

is well established throughout the country’s 18 departments. Critics have noted the scarce

budget of the Commission and the need to improve its independence and internal selection

process. In 2011, the Commission was downgraded to B status by the Global Alliance of

National Human Rights Institutions.

11. In view of its mandate, the National Human Rights Commission is ideally placed to

lead policies in Honduras to better protect the right to life. Analysing developments in the

country through the perspective of ensuring better protection for that right in a proactive

way should be its main priority. During the visit, it was difficult to see concrete evidence of

a close and systematic engagement in this field by the Commission. This is an underutilized

resource in the struggle for the better protection of the right to life in Honduras.

C. Human rights action plan and monitoring mechanisms

12. Honduras led a process of consultation to design and adopt its Public Policy and

National Action Plan on Human Rights 2013-2022, which transforms into strategic action

recommendations from civil society, the human rights treaty bodies and the truth and

reconciliation commission. The action plan aims to mainstream a human rights perspective

into all State actions.

13. Authorities informed the Special Rapporteur about the creation of the Observatory

on Human Rights to monitor the implementation of the action plan and to assess progress

2 See www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/honduras/report-honduras/.

3 See www.conaprev.gob.hn/index.php/biblioteca-virtual-pdf/send/19-leyes-de-interes/992-

constitucion-de-la-republica-de-honduras-actualizada-2014.

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on human rights issues. They also informed him about the establishment of a system to

monitor implementation of recommendations from international and regional human rights

protection mechanisms. This is a positive and welcomed initiative.

D. University Observatory on Violence

14. The Special Rapporteur was impressed with the quality and standing of the work of

the Observatory on Violence of the Universidad Autónoma de Honduras. Its statistics are

used widely and provide an accurate account of the situation of violence in the country,

which is unavailable from other public institutions. The observatory is a national asset and

should be treated as such. Its independence should be closely guarded.

IV. Violence in society

15. Violence and insecurity are serious problems that face Honduran society, with major

implications for the enjoyment and effective exercise of human rights. Violence grew

exponentially since the early 2000s, when the country took on a bigger role in the drug

routes from South to North America, which coincided with the infiltration of organized

criminal groups and the expansion of gang activity. Following the 2009 coup, societal

violence took on bigger proportions and the homicide rate in Honduras became among the

highest in the region and the world. According to the Global Study on Homicide,4 in 2012,

Honduras had the highest crime rate in the world, with an annual homicide rate of 90.4 per

100,000 inhabitants. According to the Observatory on Violence, homicide rates remained

the highest in the world from 2011 to 2013, before starting to fall, from 79 per 100,000

inhabitants in 2013 to 71.4 in November 2015 and to 60.0 by early 2016.5

16. From the discussions the Special Rapporteur had during the visit, violence appears

to be the result of several factors, many of them systemic and linked regionally beyond the

borders of the country such as gang activity; organized crime; drug trafficking; the arms

trade; corruption and extortion; ineffective law enforcement; lack of accountability for

crimes against life; and deep and systemic poverty, unemployment, inequality and lack of

opportunities for the population. The atmosphere of insecurity is compounded by the

increasing militarization of public security and concomitant episodes of excessive use of

force by members of the police force, military police and armed forces, sometimes in

collusion with organized crime.

17. Although it is difficult to obtain figures, the Special Rapporteur was told that

disappearances were also a common occurrence.

18. By all accounts, incidences of violence have gone down to some extent since 2013

but remain at an alarming level. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact causes for the

decline, it was mentioned during the Special Rapporteur’s visit that it could be due to the

fact that leaders of gangs had been captured or extradited; the increased teamwork within

law enforcement; the role of the military in law enforcement; steps taken against corruption

in the police; greater investigative capacity in the police and the prosecution services;

greater technological abilities on the part of law enforcement; and some successes in the

fight against corruption. This may not tell the full picture, and there is ample room for

further study of the causes of the apparent decline.

A. Situation in San Pedro Sula

19. The city of San Pedro Sula, located in the north-west corner of Honduras, grew

exponentially in the late nineteenth century when foreign companies received land and tax

exemptions to settle in the region, leading to the arrival of thousands of Honduran workers.

4 Available from www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf.

5 See Observatory on Violence, National Bulletin No. 40 (February 2016), available from

www.iudpas.org/pdf/Boletines/Nacional/NEd40EneDic2015.pdf.

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The city soon become the country’s manufacturing and commercial hub and currently

generates two-thirds of its gross domestic product.

20. In recent years, San Pedro Sula has become a major operational and strategic

distribution point in the illegal drug trade. Infiltration of organized crime is compounded by

the increased presence of brutal street gangs. As a result, the city has seen a surge in

violence and homicides, becoming the city with the highest homicide rate in the world

between 2011 and 2014. 6 Violence has led to substantial internal displacement and

migration abroad.

B. Police abuse and corruption

21. There is widespread acceptance that the police has over many years not fulfilled its

function as it should have. In many cases, it has not addressed the problem of crime,

including violent crime, and has in fact become part of the problem.

22. Police corruption further affects the atmosphere of insecurity, with reports of police

elements being involved in soliciting bribes, extortion, murder and acting in collusion with

gangs and organized criminal groups. In at least five cases, police officers have been

implicated in death squad-style killings of gang members. During the visit, the Special

Rapporteur encountered numerous reports of killings by police, military police and military

officers. According to the Observatory on Violence, police killed 285 people between 2012

and 2015. Not all of those cases were unjustified, but they are often not properly

investigated. Impunity is the rule. Investigations and effective prosecution for the crimes

seems to be limited to only a few high-profile cases or cases in which the families of the

victims had to push the investigations or assist in obtaining evidence.

C. Gangs and organized criminal groups

23. Presence of street gangs known as maras is rampant in Honduras, especially in big

cities such as Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. They are mostly descendants of gangs

formed in Los Angeles and deported in the 1990s, including groups such as Mara

Salvatrucha and Barrio 18. Maras are involved in many criminal activities, such as drug

trafficking and extortion, and operate with brutal violence, controlling the lives of residents

in gang-controlled neighbourhoods. Local populations are forced to pay “taxes” to gangs in

exchange for security in what is referred as “tax war”. During his visit, the Special

Rapporteur received reports of children and young people being forced to collect those

“taxes” or sell drugs. Those who refuse are often killed, leaving children with only two

options: join gang activity or migrate, which in turn exposes them to a new series of risks.

People involved in transportation and business owners are subject to similar treatment.

Young women are forced to carry drugs and guns and are often raped, tortured or killed in

gang disputes.

24. Owing to lack of control in certain areas, corruption or lack of political will, State

security forces offer limited or no protection to these communities. Authorities are not

exempt from the challenges and risks posed by organized crime. For example, the Chief of

the Attorney General’s Directorate for Combating Drug Trafficking was shot dead in 2009

by suspected cartel hitmen.

25. It should be emphasized that the State remains responsible for the protection of all

citizens from threats to their lives and security and, if it does not take reasonable measures

in that regard, the State is in violation of the right to life.

6 See the 2014 annual ranking of the 50 most violent cities, available in Spanish from

www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/biblioteca/download/6-prensa/198-las-50-ciudades-mas-

violentas-del-mundo-2014.

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D. Personal use of firearms

26. Violence is also heightened by the extensive personal use of firearms, facilitated by

highly permissive legislation on arm possession and the rampant proliferation of private

security companies. In response to high violence rates in the country, people have resorted

to buying guns and hiring the services of private security companies.

27. The Law on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Similar

Items allows anyone to request one or more licenses to possess and carry firearms. The

right to register up to five firearms was recently reduced to three. Estimates put the number

of firearms in circulation in Honduras at 800,000 to 1,000,000, of which only 282,000 are

registered.7 It is evident that this permissive regulation has contributed to the spiralling

violence in the country and facilitated access to weaponry by gangs, organized criminal

groups and private security companies. A new draft law on gun control is currently being

considered by the National Congress, with a view to tightening regulations and access to

guns.

E. Private security companies

28. In a report, the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating

human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

indicated that there were 706 private security companies registered in Honduras, as well as

60,000 private guards, many of whom were illegal and unregistered. Given that there were

14,000 police officers in Honduras, the ratio of private security personnel to police was

almost 5 to 1.8

29. The provision of private security services is subject to the Organic Law of the

National Police and the Regulations for the Control of Private Security Services. The law

entrusts the Ministry of Security to authorize, regulate and supervise private security

companies and creates a control unit for private security services to control and monitor

these companies. However, the authorities do not implement that mandate effectively.

There are insufficient vetting processes for the licensing of such companies and their

agents, inadequate supervision of their operations and a lack of control of the weapons used

and the training provided to private security agents. Many companies are reportedly owned

by or constituted of agents who are former military or police officers, including officers

suspected of past human rights violations. In addition, while the existing framework

regulates the types of weapons that companies may use, it does not set the conditions for

the use of arms and force. Moreover, violations of the Law and the Regulations do not seem

to result in the revocation of licences or sanctions.

30. It is clear that in many cases private security providers play a positive role, for

which the police is currently not equipped. At the same time, they can and in some cases do

form part of the problem of excessive violence in society. The legal framework within

which they operate appears to be insufficient. The sector needs to be better regulated and

controlled. According to information from the Government received subsequent to the visit,

the Congress is considering a draft law on private security services aiming at reinforcing

regulations and forbidding certain public officials to hold ownership of private security

companies. Other sources indicated that the law had been pending approval for two years

and didn’t preclude anyone with a criminal or disciplinary record from being a member of

such companies.

31. Private security staff have been linked to numerous attacks and killings, for

example, in areas of high social conflict. However, in a study, it was found that during

investigations police and prosecutors in Bajo Aguán routinely failed to take adequate steps

to ascertain the possible involvement of private security agents in serious crimes, including

7 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in Honduras

(December 2015), p. 27. Available from www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Honduras-en-2015.pdf.

8 See A/HRC/24/45/Add.1, para. 14.

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by requisitioning work records of staff on duty at a given time or by making weapons

inventories of private security companies.9

32. The State has the primary responsibility to protect individuals from the depravation

of life by non-State actors and to bring perpetrators to justice. While private security agents

are not public officials, they are still bound by domestic regulations and are obliged to

respect the rights of citizens.

V. Violations of the right to life of affected groups

33. The persons targeted with violence and intimidation by State and criminal actors in

retaliation for their work include human rights defenders; indigenous, peasant and

Afrodescendent leaders involved in land disputes; lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender

activists; justice operators; and journalists.

34. From 2006 to 2015, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights granted 49

precautionary measures for persons at imminent risk in Honduras. Beneficiaries between

2009 and 2015 included 34 per cent of peasants, 17 per cent of journalists, 14 per cent of

indigenous persons, 7 per cent of environmental rights defenders and 6 per cent of lesbian,

gay, bisexual and transgender persons. According to a study conducted in 2016 by civil

society organizations, 99 per cent of beneficiaries considered that those measures had not

granted them security because the protection mechanisms offered by the government had

been inadequate or ineffectively implemented.

35. The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned at the failure of the authorities to

effectively implement the precautionary measures of the Inter-American Commission on

Human Rights and to provide protection to members of these targeted groups.

A. Human rights defenders

36. Human rights defenders are attacked by sectors opposed to their work and by those

they have exposed for human rights violations. From 2010 to 2015, there were 22 murders,

2 disappearances and 15 kidnappings of human rights defenders. In total, 14 human rights

defenders benefiting from the precautionary measures of the Inter-American Commission

on Human Rights were killed.10

37. During his visit, the Special Rapporteur received many reports about the lack of

investigation into killings, threats and violence against human rights defenders. Civil

society organizations have also reported the ineffectiveness of the Public Prosecutor’s

Office and the Honduran judiciary in responding to these attacks.11 More than 90 per cent

of cases remain unpunished.12

38. Violence against human rights defenders is also underreported. Reports have

included estimates that, of the more than 109 cases of human and environmental rights

defenders killed between 2010 and 2015, only 8 were reported publicly.13

39. A case brought to the attention of the Special Rapporteur was the killing two months

before his visit of world-renowned indigenous and land rights defender, and beneficiary of

precautionary measures, Berta Cáceres. An investigation by the Public Prosecutor’s Office

led to the detention of eight persons, including an active mayor of the armed forces, a

9 See www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/12/there-are-no-investigations-here/impunity-killings-and-other-

abuses-bajo-aguan.

10 See Situation of Human Rights in Honduras, pp. 28-29.

11 See www.omct.org/files/2016/05/23748/honduras_030516_eng.pdf; and Amnesty International report

No. AMR37/2193/2015, available in Spanish from

www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr37/2193/2015/es/.

12 See Global Witness, “¿Cuántos más?” (2015), available from

www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/cuantos-mas, p. 16.

13 See www.devp.org/en/blog/honduras-impunity-murders-human-and-land-rights-defenders.

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former lieutenant and former private security guard at the hydroelectric company — against

which Ms. Caceres had led a legal battle — and a high-ranking employee at the

hydroelectric company. The Government informed the Special Rapporteur that

investigations regarding the masterminds of the crime were ongoing. Many feared,

however, that the prosecutions would not lead to effective convictions and that the

masterminds of the crime would remain unpunished. The Special Rapporteur was informed

that the family and colleagues of Ms. Cáceres had demanded the establishment of an

independent international mechanism to assist in the investigation of her death. Concerns

grew further when Ms. Cáceres’ case file was stolen in late September 2016 from a car

driven by a Supreme Court magistrate, which prompted the Mission to Support the Fight

against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras to demand an urgent investigation into the

robbery and condemned the serious irresponsible action of the judge concerned.14 The case

file had reportedly included evidence against several suspects.15 The file was rebuilt on the

basis of copies kept in court. Sensitive information about Ms. Caceres legal case was also

stolen from the offices of the Broad Movement for Justice and Dignity. The Special

Rapporteur continues to follow the case.

B. Journalists and media workers

40. The general context of violence against journalists and media workers in Honduras

worsened after the 2009 coup d’état and persists to date. Journalists are victims of physical

assaults, attacks, death threats and homicide. In total, 36 journalists were killed in Honduras

between 2010 and 2014.16 Although estimates vary regarding the exact number, all show a

dramatic increase in homicides in 2010 compared with previous years. 17 The National

Human Rights Commission reported that 43 journalists had been murdered between 2010

and 2014. While numbers have been declining since 2011, they have not fallen back to pre-

coup levels.18

41. Authorities fail to investigate effectively and prosecute most crimes against

journalists. In February 2015, the National Human Rights Commission reported that the

lack of effective investigations affected 96 per cent of the cases and that authorities had

handed down convictions in only 4 per cent of the 50 cases in which media workers had

been killed between 2003 and 2014.19

42. The lack of accountability for crimes against journalists impedes the establishment

of whether the crimes are connected with their work and thus promotes the notion that

journalists are simply victims of generalized violence.

43. Since 2013, the Section on Violent Deaths of Persons from Vulnerable Groups of

the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes against Life deals with cases of violence

against journalists and other affected groups, a responsibility previously assigned to the

Special Prosecutor for Human Rights Defenders. The transfer reportedly led to a reduced

focus on the particularities of violence against journalists.20

14 See www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-102/16.

15 See www.amnesty.ca/our-work/individuals-risk/berta-caceres-and-human-rights-defenders-honduras.

16 Data from the Section on Violent Deaths of Persons from Vulnerable Groups, provided by the

Government.

17 See PEN International, Journalism in the Shadow of Impunity (Toronto and London, 2014), p. 19.

Available from www.pen-international.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Honduras-Journalism-in-the-

Shadow-of-Impunity1.pdf.

18 See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2016 (New York, 2015), p. 293. Available from

www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2016_web.pdf.

19 See Situation of Human Rights in Honduras, p. 83, and article by Teleprensa, available in Spanish

from www.teleprensa.com/honduras/11-personas-vinculadas-a-los-medios-de-comunicacion-

murieron-en-circunstancias-violentas-en-honduras.html.

20 See Journalism in the Shadow of Impunity, p. 29.

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C. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons

44. The Special Rapporteur received reports of a high number of attacks and killings

against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons. In total, 123 homicides were

registered between 2010 and 2014.21

45. Of the 216 cases registered by civil society organizations between 2004 and 2015,

103 victims were gay, 78 transgender and 13 lesbian.22

46. The Section on Violent Deaths of Persons from Vulnerable Groups investigates such

deaths. The Public Prosecutor’s Office informed the Special Rapporteur that, of the 232

killings registered from 2008 to March 2017, investigations had led to 48 prosecutions, 19

convictions and 9 acquittals.

47. While the Special Rapporteur welcomes the amendments to the Criminal Code

criminalizing hatred on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, he is concerned to

learn that investigations into deaths of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons

continue to be influenced by discriminatory stereotypes,23 and that a fraction (20.6 per cent)

of murder cases appear to lead to prosecutions.

D. Justice operators

48. Justice operators, comprising lawyers and members of the judiciary, are frequently

threatened, attacked or killed as a result of their profession. The Observatory on Violence

registered 115 homicides between January 2009 and December 2015. Killings are mainly

concentrated in the Central District and San Pedro Sula (66 per cent). In 67.8 per cent of

cases, killings are attributable to organized crime or hitmen.24

49. Five prosecutors were killed between 2009 and 2015:25 the Chief of the Directorate

for Combating Drug Trafficking; the Chief Prosecutor of the Anti-Money Laundering

Unit;26 a leading criminal investigator on car thefts;27 the Coordinator of the Office of the

Special Prosecutor for Crimes against Life; and the Special Prosecutor for environmental

protection.28 The Government reported that one of the murders had been prosecuted, while

investigations continued regarding the masterminds of the crimes. Twelve judges were

killed in the same period.29

50. Attacks and impunity for these crimes have a chilling effect on members of the

judiciary, who will be less likely to investigate and adjudicate politically sensitive cases

owing to fear of retaliation, thus reproducing existing impunity patterns, sanctioning future

crimes and reducing further public trust in the judicial system.

51. In total, 96 lawyers were killed between 2009 and 2015.30 The Government noted

that several criminal cases had been opened, while other reports indicated that, of the 53

homicides registered between 2010 and 2012, more than 95 per cent had gone

unpunished. 31 As lawyers play an important role in defending human rights and

21 Data from the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes against Life provided by the Government.

22 See Asociación para una Vida Mejor de Personas Infectas y Afectadas por el VIH-SIDA en

Honduras, Informe sobre muertes violentas por crímenes de odio motivados por orientación sexual e

identidad de género en Honduras (Tegucigalpa, December 2015), p. 25. Available in Spanish from

www.ci-romero.de/fileadmin/media/informieren-

laender/honduras/INFORME_2015_CRIMENES_DE_ODIO_APUVIMEH.pdf.

23 See www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2014/146a.asp.

24 Observatory on Violence, Special Bulletin No. 45 (January 2016), pp. 1-2. Available from

www.iudpas.org/pdf/Boletines/Especiales/BEP_Ed45.pdf.

25 Ibid, p. 3.

26 See www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/honduras-top-anti-money-laundering-prosecutor-murdered.

27 See www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/15/san-pedro-sula-honduras-most-violent.

28 See www.cejil.org/es/cejil-condena-nuevos-asesinatos-fiscales-honduras.

29 See Observatory on Violence, Special Bulletin No. 45, p. 3.

30 Ibid.

31 See Journalism in the Shadow of Impunity, p. 29.

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strengthening the rule of law, impunity thrives when they are persecuted as a result of their

profession.

E. Indigenous and land rights defenders: situation in Bajo Aguán

52. Indigenous leaders, land right defenders and peasants are also affected

disproportionally by attacks, murder, intimidation and threats, particularly those who

defend their territories and natural resources in the context of development projects. Serious

human rights violations have been attributed to private security guards hired by landholding

companies, the police and the military.

53. Reportedly, a total of 111 environmental activists, particularly in indigenous

communities, were murdered between 2002 and 2014, making Honduras the most

dangerous country in the world for land and environmental defenders in that period.32

54. The Tolupán indigenous community is among the most affected by violence, with

about 100 murders over the past decade, most of which remain unpunished.33 Members of

the independent indigenous Lenca movement for peace, which opposes the construction of

hydroelectric projects on the territory of the Lenca people, have endured a series of

assaults, threats and killings since 2013. 34 The Honduras civil council of popular and

indigenous organizations, an indigenous Lenca organization supporting environmental and

indigenous rights, has experienced persisting violence. Attacks intensified since the murder

of their co-founder, Berta Caceres, after which the Inter-American Commission on Human

Rights granted them precautionary measures. The national authorities have failed to

implement the measures. Another member of the council was killed in March 201635 and

two suffered attempted murders in May 2016.36

55. Violence and threats against indigenous communities take place in the context of

land incursions by drug traffickers, for example, in the Garífuna and Tolupan

communities.37 Law enforcement officials also exert violence in this context. In May 2012,

four members of the Miskito community of Ahuas died and others were wounded in an

anti-drug operation conducted by officials from Honduras and the United States of

America. In December 2015, two young Garífuna men were killed by military personnel

who had suspected them of being drug traffickers.38

56. The Government has established the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Ethnic

Groups and Cultural Heritage. However, complaints filed by community members are not

effectively investigated or prosecuted.39

Bajo Aguán

57. The Special Rapporteur received many reports about the numerous attacks against

peasants and land right defenders in Bajo Aguán by private security agents and security

forces. In May 2014, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights granted

precautionary measures to 123 defenders in the region, but their lives remained at risk.40

The National Human Rights Commission reported that 92 people had been killed between

2009 and 2012, most of whom had been active members of peasant organizations.41 In

32 See “¿Cuántos más?”, p. 16.

33 See A/HRC/33/42/Add. 2, para. 22.

34 See A/HRC/32/53, case HDN 1/2016; and Situation of Human Rights in Honduras, pp. 39-40 and 42.

35 See A/HRC/33/32, case HDN 3/2016.

36 See www.fidh.org/es/temas/defensores-de-derechos-humanos/honduras-situacion-de-los-defensores-

de-derechos-humanos.

37 See Situation of Human Rights in Honduras, pp. 44-45.

38 A/HRC/33/42/Add. 2, para. 26

39 See Situation of Human Rights in Honduras, p. 46.

40 See https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId

=22828 (available in Spanish only).

41 See www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/12/there-are-no-investigations-here/impunity-killings-and-other-

abuses-bajo-aguan.

A/HRC/35/23/Add.1

12

2015, the Government reported that 127 persons had died since the land conflict started in

2009, including farmers, security guards and others.42 In 2016 alone, 11 human rights

defenders had been killed and 9 left the country owing to attacks and intimidation.43 The

Secretary of Security reported three such killings in 2016.

58. In most cases, the perpetrators have not been identified or prosecuted. In a 2014

report on impunity in the Bajo Aguán, it was noted that prosecutors and police had failed to

perform the most basic investigative steps necessary to identify and prosecute suspects and

had not followed criminal forensic procedures to preserve the crime scene, collect evidence,

conduct autopsies and search for the missing.44

59. While the Public Prosecutor’s Office established in 2014 the Special Unit for the

investigation of violent deaths in Bajo Aguán to address a backlog of 147 pending cases,

impunity levels remain alarmingly high and transparency concerns persist.45

F. Refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons

60. The impact of gang violence and organized crime in certain regions of the country is

leading to the forced migration of thousands of persons who try to avoid extortion, forced

integration to gangs, sexual violence and killings.

61. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, at the end of 2014, there

were an estimated 29,400 internally displaced persons in Honduras.46 The Office of the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that, between 2004

and 2014, 174,000 persons had been affected by internal displacement owing to violence.47

In a 2015 study, it was reported that persecution and insecurity had been the determining

factors of displacement for 67.9 per cent of internally displaced households, particularly

threat, murder, injury, extortion, insecurity and sexual violence.48

62. The impact of violence is also evident in the growing number of Honduran asylum

seekers and refugees in neighbouring countries, Mexico and the United States. UNHCR

reported a 1,153 per cent increase in the number of asylum applications from — 810 to

10,146 — between 2012 and 2014, and a 59 per cent increase in the number of refugees,

from 2,613 to 4,159, in the same period.49

63. Migrants on route to northern countries face numerous risks and many end up as

victims of trafficking networks that subject them to kidnapping, torture, mutilation or

murder. In recent years, around 400 Honduran migrants were reported missing on their way

to the United States.50 Three mass graves were found in Mexico between 2010 and 2012,

which contained the remains of dozens of migrants who had been in transit including from

Honduras. The relatives of the victims reported delays in the repatriation of the remains and

difficulties in gaining access to justice.

42 See Situation of Human Rights in Honduras, p. 69.

43 See www.fidh.org/es/temas/defensores-de-derechos-humanos/honduras-asesinato-de-fernando-

aleman-banegas-hijo-de-la-defensora; and Amnesty International, report No. AMR37/5015/2016,

available from www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr37/5015/2016/en/.

44 See www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/12/there-are-no-investigations-here/impunity-killings-and-other-

abuses-bajo-aguan, pp. 3, 21 and 57.

45 See www.omct.org/es/human-rights-defenders/urgent-interventions/honduras/2016/04/d23697/.

46 See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Overview 2015 (Geneva, May 2015), pp. 16-

19. Available from www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Media/201505-Global-Overview-

2015/20150506-global-overview-2015-en.pdf.

47 See UNHCR, Protection and Solutions Strategy for the Northern Triangle of Central America 2016-

2018 (Geneva), p. 6. Available from

http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Protection%20and%20Solutions%20Strategy%20for%20t

he%20Northern%20Triangle%20of%20Central%20America%202016-2018.pdf.

48 See A/HRC/32/25/Add.4, p. 7.

49 See Situation of Human Rights in Honduras, pp. 64-65.

50 Ibid., para. 146.

A/HRC/35/23/Add.1

13

64. Many migrants are deported to Honduras while in transit or on arrival at their

country of destination, even those who face serious risks back home. UNHCR reported that

249,618 Hondurans had been deported between 2011 and 2014.51 In the United Sates alone,

20,309 Hondurans were deported in 201552 and 10,468 unaccompanied migrant children

were apprehended in 2016.53 On their return to Honduras, many of the deportees face the

same perils they had attempted to elude. As at 2014, 35 returnees had been killed soon after

arriving in Honduras.54 The Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced

persons received confirmation from United States officials that criminal activity in their

home countries was not considered grounds for individuals to claim asylum.55

65. The Special Rapporteur was informed about the precarious conditions of detention

of Hondurans deportees held in United States migration detention centres and was

particularly alarmed at reports of deportees detained in cold cells referred as “iceboxes”. He

was also informed that Hondurans were prevented from gaining access to the relevant

authorities to process their asylum requests or were deported before they could get a chance

to submit them. In total, 80 per cent of Hondurans were placed in expedited removal

procedures in which asylum claims were not properly considered. 56 Civil society

organizations have also noted the precarious conditions and abusive treatment received by

Honduran deportees in Mexican detention centres and the lack of information about asylum

procedures offered to migrants victims of violence. 57 Mexican authorities also return

migrants in immediate danger.

66. The Special Rapporteur visited the Returnee Migrant Care Centre in San Pedro Sula

and was impressed by the commitment of its staff and the quality of the support provided to

Hondurans returnees before being transferred to their hometowns. While he encourages the

Government to maintain and support this much needed initiative, he warns about the need

to establish medium- and long-term measures to support the returnees’ reinsertion in their

communities and to guarantee their safety and integrity, especially to those at risk of

violence.

67. To respond to this critical situation, in 2013 the Government established the Inter-

institutional Commission for the Forced Displacement of Persons, and is currently working

on a draft law on migration to regulate the situation of refugees, asylum seekers and

stateless persons, and a draft law to protect and assist displaced persons and prevent forced

displacement.

G. Women

68. Women in Honduras suffer high levels of violence, including murder, domestic

violence and rape. As noted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its

causes and consequences, violence against women is widespread and systematic and

compounded by a climate of fear in the public and private spheres. 58 A total of 4,013

women were killed between 2005 and 2014, and 478 femicides were registered in 2015.59

Reports indicate a 263.4 per cent increase in femicides between 2005 (175 cases) and 2013

51 UNHCR, p. 5.

52 See www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/fy2015removalStats.pdf.

53 See www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016.

54 See A/HRC/32/35/Add. 4.

55 Ibid.

56 See www.hrw.org/report/2014/10/16/you-dont-have-rights-here/us-border-screening-and-returns-

central-americans-risk.

57 See Casa Alianza, “Monthly report: September 2016”, p. 20. Available in Spanish from www.casa-

alianza.org.hn/images/documentos/CAH.2016/01.Infor.Mensuales/09.%20informe%20mensual%20se

ptiembre%202016_cah.pdf.

58 See A/HRC/29/27/Add.1, para. 9.

59 See Observatory on Violence, Bulletin on Women’s Violent Deaths and Femicide No. 10, (January-

December 2014), p. 1, available from

www.iudpas.org/pdf/Boletines/Genero/MMEd10EneDic2014.pdf; and National Bulletin No. 40, p. 3.

A/HRC/35/23/Add.1

14

(636 cases),60 and a 281 per cent increase in disappearances of women between 2008 (91

cases) and 2013 (347 cases).61

69. The situation is compounded by gang activity. Women are often killed to settle gang

disputes, or subjected to rape, torture and mutilation.

70. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women noted a culture of impunity and

lack of accountability for these crimes. Despite the establishment in 2013 of femicide as a

specific offence, very few cases have been tried under this offence.62

71. In 2013, the Unit for the Investigation of Crimes against Women’s Lives of the

Office of the Special Prosecutor for Women, which handled femicides and violent deaths of

women, was transferred to the Section on Investigation of Violent Deaths of Women of the

Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes against Life to ensure a gender dimension to

investigations. The Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes against Life adopted a

manual for such investigations and trained justice operators nationally. Critics voiced

concern that this transfer would result in a loss of a gender perspective for criminal

investigations.63

H. Children and young people

72. The context of violence and insecurity in Honduras puts children and adolescents in

a particularly vulnerable position. In total 21,710 children suffered violent deaths between

January 2010 and March 2016.64 A civil society organization reported 79.26 deaths per

month between January 2014 and December 2015.65 While in most cases the perpetrators

remained unidentified and unpunished, reports indicated that security forces had been

involved in the killing of at least seven children and adolescents between June and

December 2015.66

73. Children living in areas under the influence of maras are placed in particular distress

as they are both harassed, threatened and attacked by gang members, and stigmatized,

discriminated against and mistreated by law enforcement forces, who often regard them as

potential criminals or gang members.67

74. Young students are also frequently targets of violence. At least 1,183 students were

killed in Honduras between 2010 and 2016, of whom 52 per cent had been secondary

school students and 13.5 per cent had been university students. 68 Young people are

particularly targeted for their participation in protests and other forms of public

demonstrations. In March 2015, Honduran society was shocked to learn about the killing of

four young people who had participated in student protests. One of the victims, a 13-year-

old girl, had been seen expressing her demands on television days before her body was

found in a bag with signs of torture.

75. Civil society organizations reported a worrying increase in cases where bodies were

found with signs of torture, strangled to death, in plastic bags, tied with ropes or wrapped in

60 See Situation of Human Rights in Honduras, p. 52.

61 See A/HRC/29/27/Add.1, para. 19.

62 Ibid, paras. 9 and 76.

63 See United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the

Empowerment of Women and USAID, Violencia y seguridad ciudadana: una mirada desde la

perspectiva de género (Tegucigalpa, 2015), available in Spanish from

hn.undp.org/content/dam/honduras/docs/publicaciones/diagnosticogeneroyviolencia.pdf.

64 See Observatory on Violence, Special Bulletin No. 42 (June 2016), p. 1. Available from

www.iudpas.org/pdf/Boletines/Especiales/BEP_Ed42.pdf.

65 See Casa Alianza, “Monthly report: December 2016”, p. 31. Available in Spanish from www.casa-

alianza.org.hn/images/documentos/Comunicados/CAH.2015/Informes.Mensuales.2015/12.%20infor

me%20mensual%20diciembre%202015_cah.pdf.

66 Ibid, p. 33.

67 See Situation of Human Rights in Honduras, p. 48.

68 See Observatory on Violence, Special Bulletin No. 42, p. 1.

A/HRC/35/23/Add.1

15

sheets.69 During the visit, the Special Rapporteur received numerous and concerning reports

about the existence of extermination squads that targeted children. The actions of these

squads were reportedly motivated by considerations of “social cleansing”.

VI. Impunity for violations of the right to life

76. Impunity is a widespread problem in Honduras that has a particular affect on

violations of the right to life. Lack of resources and technical capacity, intimidation and

killings of justice operators, lack of independence of the judiciary, corruption of public

officials and infiltration by organized crime are substantial barriers to obtaining justice and

have virtually stalled the judicial system.

77. The Special Rapporteur received information about corruption, infiltration and

interference with the judiciary, including in the handling of cases and in the appointment or

dismissal of judges and prosecutors. Interest groups or individuals often bribe, threaten or

attack judges to influence their work. Lack of independence and corruption within the

judiciary hampers the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system to respond

effectively to human rights violations and ensure accountability.

78. In addition, the country’s prosecutorial services have been marred by accusations of

inefficiency and lack of will to investigate criminal cases, particularly high profile ones.

Inadequate forensic protocols and services, overreliance on witness testimonies in judicial

procedures, and police refusal to carry out crucial investigative tasks that prosecutors assign

to them70 further obstructs the administration of justice and hinders accountability.

79. As a result of these shortcomings, impunity affects 97 per cent of murder cases in

Honduras.71 The level of impunity in connection to violations of the right to life is alarming

and one of the determinant factors in the spiralling of violence, as the prospect of

prosecution is not an effective deterrent of crime. It also frustrates expectations and chances

for justice and reparation for victims of human rights violations.

80. The absence of accountability sends a message to society that violence is tolerated

by the State and undermines the public’s trust in the authorities. The lack of public

confidence in the judicial system and its institutional capacity to obtain justice for victims is

also likely to exacerbate the underreporting of crimes. Some reports indicate that only 20

per cent of all crimes are reported in Honduras, which is alarmingly low.72

81. The Government informed the Special Rapporteur that measures had been adopted

to address impunity and corruption, including the establishment of the Mission to Support

the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras and a collaboration agreement with

the organization Transparency International for the promotion of transparency, combating

of corruption and strengthening of integrity systems.

82. The Special Rapporteur was dismayed to observe the lack of reliable statistics on the

number of homicides that led to prosecutions, including of security forces. The lack of

reliable figures hinders transparency and exacerbates people’s mistrust in institutions.

83. The overly broad interpretation of confidentiality requirements in Honduran criminal

procedures — by which police and prosecutors refuse to provide information on the status

of investigations to families of victims — also affects transparency, trust and

accountability.

69 See Casa Alianza, “Annual report: 2014”, p. 18. Available from www.casa-

alianza.org.hn/images/documentos/Comunicados/CAH.2015/Informes.Mensuales.2015/situacin%20d

e%20derechos%20de%20nios%20nias%20y%20jvenes%20en%20honduras.pdf.

70 See www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/12/there-are-no-investigations-here/impunity-killings-and-other-

abuses-bajo-aguan, p. 21

71 See A/HRC/32/35/Add.4, p. 5, and www.amnesty.org/es/countries/americas/honduras/report-

honduras/.

72 See Journalism in the Shadow of Impunity, p. 28.

A/HRC/35/23/Add.1

16

84. States are under the immediate obligation to ensure accountability where there are

arbitrary losses of life, including proper investigations. A failure to do so could amount to a

breach of the right to life.

VII. State response to violence

A. Legislation in response to gang violence

85. In response to rampant gang violence, the Congress adopted in October 2001

Legislative Decree No. 141-2001 on prevention, rehabilitation and social reintegration,

which aimed to address the causes that led individuals to join gangs and to rehabilitate and

reintegrate them into society, and created the National Prevention, Rehabilitation and Social

Reintegration Programme. In 2003, article 332 of the Criminal Code, on unlawful

associations, was amended to criminalize illicit association, as part of an iron-fist (mano

dura) approach, effectively criminalizing gang membership. It has been criticized for

criminalizing also the actions of vulnerable persons coerced into gang membership. In July

2015, the Parliament approved reforms to the penal code, introducing harsher penalties for

members of the maras, increasing the maximum prison terms for gang leaders from 30 to

50 years and for lower-level members from 20 to 30 years.73

B. Police reform

86. There is an important and much needed effort under way to clean up the work and

the image of the police and to develop its technical capabilities.

87. Several attempts at cleaning up the national police have taken place since 2011.

However, efforts to address endemic corruption and abuses within the police force have

made little progress. The most recent purge was initiated in April 2016 with the

establishment of the Special Commission for the Process of Purge and Transformation of

the National Police, in response to the public outcry when information was published that

the higher ranks of the institution had been involved in the killing of the Chief of the

Directorate for Combating Drug Trafficking. The Special Commission was given a one

year mandate to assess the members of the entire force, starting at the top. By the end of

2016, it had evaluated 4,934 officers and had terminated the contracts of 2,183, mostly

(1,949) as part of an internal restructuring effort. However, files relating to 15 officers were

referred to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Criminal Investigation by November 2016. In

September 2016, the Office established a special unit to support the clean-up process.

88. The clean-up process is ambitious and far-reaching, and in principle a positive step.

At the same time, it is important to have a clear legal framework for such an undertaking,

including the criteria used to ensure that the system can resist legal and other challenges. A

good plan that is poorly implemented can close many doors in the future.

89. The work of the Special Commission is undertaken in parallel with a restructuring of

the police, renewed qualification programmes that include training on human rights and the

gradual use of force, and a plan to increase the police corps from 14,000 to 26,000 agents

by 2019. In addition, a proposed reform to the Organic Law of the National Police and a

new Police Career Law were under consideration by the National Congress. A new manual

on the use of force was developed in collaboration with the International Committee of the

Red Cross, but is not before Congress.

C. Militarization

90. One of the main focuses of the response of the Government to violence has been the

militarization of public security through the establishment of a series of new measures and

73 See A/HRC/32/35/Add.4, p. 15.

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17

entities. Decree 168-2013 of August 2013 provided for the creation of the Military Public

Order Police to support the national police in confronting the challenges posed by

organized crime, drug trafficking and gang activity. The measure had originally been

intended as a short-term emergency response while the national police entered a process of

reform and depuration, and murder rates remained high.

91. While the support of the military had been welcomed by certain sectors of society,

including members of the national police, many others had raised concern about the

expected negative repercussions of the militarization of society and the insufficient legal

specification of the functions of the military police and its use of force. The introduction of

the military police, although understandable as an emergency response, requires the

adoption of clearly defined roles and rules of engagement to prevent abuses by an armed

body trained for the conduct of war and not for the provision of citizen security. In his

meetings with relevant authorities, the Special Rapporteur was unable to get a clear picture

of the legal framework applicable to the use of force by the military police, which is a

matter of concern.

92. According to reports from civil society, human rights abuses by the military have

increased with the militarization of citizen security. Between 2012 and 2014, agents of the

military police were accused of involvement in at least nine killings, more than 20 cases of

torture and about 30 illegal arrests. At least 24 soldiers were under investigation in

connection with the killings.74

93. A special unit within the national police known as TIGRES was created by decree in

2013. The unit is mandated to act in special operations undertaken in the context of high-

impact crimes, such as drug trafficking and organized criminal activity. It also supports

extradition processes.

94. The government also established the National Force for Inter-institutional Security.

It agglomerates several State entities — including the armed forces, the national police, the

Public Prosecutor’s Office and the judiciary — to coordinate actions aimed at strengthening

criminal investigations and prosecution of high-impact crimes. The National Force is

currently headed by a military commander. While the Government informed the Rapporteur

that the role of the Commander was merely to coordinate the actions of the agencies

involved in the National Force, many actors voiced concern that it blurred the separation of

powers among the different branches of Government involved in criminal investigations,

and more particularly put at risk the independence of the judiciary and of prosecutors

involved in these cases.

95. In parallel to those measures, the armed forces implemented the “Guardians of the

Nation” programme aimed at providing civic, patriotic and religious education to Honduran

children and adolescents to reduce the risk that they might become involved in organized

crime or gang activity. The armed forces leads the programme and implements it with the

assistance of other actors, such as churches, doctors and psychologists. While it may serve a

positive role and offer alternatives, there is also a risk that such a programme could

militarize society and worsen the cycle of violence.

D. Reforms to improve criminal investigations and judicial proceedings

96. The Government introduced a process of reform of the Public Prosecutor’s Office

aimed at modernizing and professionalizing criminal investigations. The Technical Agency

of Criminal Investigation, which investigates high-impact crimes, was established in 2015

within the Public Prosecutor’s Office to professionalize criminal investigation services,

provide specialized training to staff and modernize the office’s forensic services and

technologies. Although this was a necessary and important reform, it has not been matched

with sufficient budget allocation for the performance of its functions.

74 See World Report 2016, p. 292.

A/HRC/35/23/Add.1

18

97. The Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes against Life was established in 2013

to strengthen murder investigations. It is divided into seven sections that absorbed all pre-

existing special units involved in investigating deaths, including those that involve human

rights, children, women, journalists and common crime. Many critics voiced concern that

the reform would dilute the human rights focus in homicide cases.75

98. Within the police, and in the context of its cleansing, the much-discredited National

Directorate of Criminal Investigation was replaced by the Directorate of Police

Investigations, which is expected to have over 1,000 agents and modern criminal

investigation technologies.

99. In the judicial system, a 2011 decree established the creation of courts of national

jurisdiction for a series of high-impact crimes, including murder, kidnapping and drug

trafficking. The aim of that measure was to prevent local judges — who are more prone to

intimidation and infiltration by criminal groups — from working on such cases, thus

protecting the judges and improving the effectiveness of judicial proceedings.

E. Protection of human rights defenders, journalists, social

communicators and justice operators

100. In April 2015, the National Congress adopted the Law on the Protection of Human

Rights Defenders, Journalists, Media Workers and Justice Operators to respond to the high

levels of violence they endured. The Law established a national protection system aimed at

ensuring multisectoral coordination for its enforcement. It provided for the creation of the

advisory National Council for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and a General

Directorate, which was given an executive role and mandate to process protection requests

from victims, provisional and precautionary measures from the Inter-American System for

the protection of human rights, as well as security measures adopted by national courts. It

also established a technical committee to conduct risk analyses and adjudicate on protection

requests submitted to the General Directorate. In addition, it granted powers to several State

institutions to provide protection measures to rights-defenders at risk. In total, 10 million

lempiras ($440,140) was allocated to the mechanism. 76 The National Council assesses

particular cases of persons at risk. In 2016, it approved a protocol for the transfer of

precautionary and provisional measures of the Inter-American System, comprising a series

of operating manuals and a methodology for analysing risk. A regulation of the Law was

approved in August 2016 by Executive Agreement No. 59-2016.

101. The adoption of the Law and the establishment of the protection mechanism are very

much welcomed but must be accompanied by the necessary resources and political will

needed for their effective implementation.

VIII. Prisons

102. Very poor conditions, including overcrowding, inadequate nutrition and poor

sanitation, are widespread in Honduran prisons, as was witnessed by the Rapporteur during

his visit to the National Penitentiary and the detention centre of the Second Tactical

Infantry Battalion, both in Tegucigalpa. Corruption among prison officials is reported to be

rife. A main concern with respect to the right to life is the effective relinquishment to

inmates of authority and discipline, which has led to abuses, extortion and intra-prison

violence and killings. Under inmate control, prisons are run by “coordinators” who direct

activities essential to the lives of most of the prison population without control or criteria

decided by the prison administration. Inmates are placed in a position of subordination and

vulnerability. Coordinators are known to have beaten, removed from cells and punished

75 See www.pen-international.org/newsitems/in-post-coup-honduras-violence-against-journalists-and-

impunity-escalate-freedom-of-expression-and-cultural-rights-undermined/?print=print, and

www.proceso.hn/component/k2/item/15922.html.

76 See Situation of Human Rights in Honduras, pp. 146-147.

A/HRC/35/23/Add.1

19

prisoners with the acquiescence of prison authorities. Inmates have described situations of

internal shootings among members of opposing gangs and grenade explosions that resulted

in the death of several inmates, which were facilitated by the tolerated stock of all types of

weaponry within prison walls.

103. Faced with this critical situation, the authorities assigned military officers to manage

most of the countries prisons, in breach of articles 39 and 60 of the Law on the National

Penitentiary System. In addition, they established detention centres in three military

battalions where they have transferred reportedly dangerous inmates, such as gang leaders.

The militarization of the country’s penitentiary service has brought up numerous concerns,

as military training is not fit for purpose and could lead to an array of human rights

violations.

104. The national preventive mechanism plays an essential role in this context and needs

to be strengthened.

IX. Engagement with the regional and international human rights protection system

105. Honduras has a chequered relationship with the Inter-American System for the

protection of human rights. The Special Rapporteur is particularly concerned about the lack

of effective implementation of precautionary measures of the Inter-American Commission

on Human Rights and urges the Government to step up its efforts to ensure their immediate

and full application. The work of the Commission is of great importance and has a great

impact in Honduras. Its continued ability to engage in the country is paramount.

106. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the establishment in 2015 of a country office for

Honduras of OHCHR.

X. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Concluding remarks

107. A few years ago, Honduras had the highest murder rate in the world. Since

then, a number of significant steps have been taken to reduce the levels of violence,

which remain alarmingly high but have started to move in the right direction. The

most difficult but important part still lies ahead: to consolidate the gains and bring the

violence down further.

108. The Special Rapporteur met with many officials who were confronting the

problems head-on and were committed to changing the situation. Likewise, many

parts of civil society were vibrant and engaged.

109. The problem of violence in the country has two parallel dimensions: first, the

high number of people who are killed; and the low number of perpetrators who are

held accountable. Regional patterns of drug smuggling and grinding poverty and

inequality make it hard to break out of the cycle of violence, but the gains that have

been made show this is not insurmountable. Impunity is the hallmark and to a large

extent the cause of the ongoing violence. While impunity is the result of engrained

corruption, extortion and weak institutions, much can and should be done to remedy

the situation.

110. Positive steps have been taken. Law enforcement agencies have increased their

capacity and gang leaders have been jailed or extradited from the country. The police

force is undergoing a far-reaching restructuring and strengthening process, which is

much-needed to reverse the current militarization of law enforcement. A law has been

passed to better protect human rights defenders, journalists and others, and

consideration is being given to change the law to ensure better gun control.

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111. In an interview, one family member of a victim said we have lost our culture

of life. Beyond legal reform, it is that culture that must be restored. The Special

Rapporteur has also met with people who are restoring the normality of life through

open-air concerts, sport and opportunities for young people. These are all important

initiatives, and more is needed. The crucial and most difficult part of the road back to

a culture that cherishes life lies ahead. Some additional legal changes are required,

but it is important not simply to wait for them to come about. The challenge, in

addition to taking other steps to restore the culture of life, is the consistent

implementation of the current laws without fear or favour, and as a matter of

urgency.

112. Civil society is an active part of the quest to improve the situation, as seen for

example in the giant demonstrations against corruption that were managed with

restraint. At the same time, one can feel in Honduras a sense of resignation that the

status quo is unlikely to change. The current downward trajectory in the incidence of

violence should help to counter that approach and demonstrate that change is

possible.

B. Recommendations addressed to the Government

113. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government develop a

comprehensive strategy to ensure the effective protection of the right to life. The

process should be driven by cross-sectoral coordination or, if the necessary capacity

and inclination can be found therein, by the National Human Rights Commission.

114. With respect to legislation, the Special Rapporteur recommends that the

Government:

(a) Ensure that the provisions on the use of force by all sectors of law

enforcement, including the police, military police and penitentiary system, are

brought into conformity with international standards;

(b) Also ensure that the reform of the Organic Law of the National Police

complies fully with international standards governing the use of force, including the

Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and

the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials;

(c) Further ensure that the reform of the Law on the Control of Firearms,

Ammunition, Explosives and other Similar Items introduces strict regulations on the

type and number of weapons permissible, and tight registration requirements for the

purchase of guns, in order to protect all individuals from the threat of gun violence.

115. With respect to law enforcement, the Special Rapporteur recommends that the

Government:

(a) Develop clear criteria for the police certification process;

(b) Guarantee clearly defined rules of engagement for the military police

and the cessation of its functions as soon as the emergency situation has passed;

(c) Ensure that the National Force for Inter-institutional Security is headed

by a civilian, and guarantee the independent performance of duties of judges and

prosecutors who are part of that Force.

116. With respect to government officials and institutions, the Special Rapporteur

recommends that the Government:

(a) Strengthen the independence of the National Human Rights Commission

in accordance with the Principles relating to the status of national institutions for the

promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles) and ensure that the

nomination and selection process is fair and transparent;

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(b) Ensure that the National Human Rights Commission develops more

effective and creative approaches to its work on right-to-life issues, for example,

through the provision of protective measures;

(c) Continue and strengthen the role of the national preventive mechanism,

for example, by ensuring it receives adequate support and resources and can function

without interference;

(d) Ensure the effective implementation of the system to monitor the

implementation of recommendations on human rights.

117. With respect to the protection of affected groups, the Special Rapporteur

recommends that the Government:

(a) Ensure as a matter of priority that the policy framework for the

implementation of the Law for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders,

Journalists, Social Communicators and Justice Operators is completed and

implemented; also ensure that the national protection system is adequately staffed and

funded and that clear protocols are put in place to evaluate its performance and

improve its response to situations of risk; and raise awareness about the existence of

the mechanism, especially at the local level;

(b) Instruct the relevant entities, for example, the national protection

system, to respond promptly and effectively to the precautionary measures granted by

the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;

(c) Take appropriate measures to protect the right to life of children,

particularly during protests, arrests and raids, and establish regulations for the

armed forces, police and judiciary on how to ensure the rights of children during the

investigation of homicides;

(d) Train the police and judicial authorities on gender-identity and sexual-

orientation awareness; ensure protective and precautionary measures for lesbian, gay,

bisexual and transgender persons; and encourage societal tolerance;

(e) Create a safe corridor for migrants in transit, including better protection

while in transit, strengthen cooperation between State bodies and community

organizations that provide humanitarian assistance to migrants, provide adequate

redress to victims of violence committed in the country and also provide adequate

consular services abroad;

(f) Strengthen cross-border cooperation with countries in the region, with a

view to reducing the incidence of trafficking in persons;

(g) Coordinate with countries in the region to establish shared databases on

fingerprints, DNA, genetics and missing persons;

(h) Ensure full family and community reintegration of returning migrants

and design strategies that address the structural factors leading to the forced

migration of persons.

118. With respect to accountability for human rights violations, the Special

Rapporteur recommends that the Government:

(a) Ensure the full, prompt, effective, impartial and diligent investigation of

homicides perpetrated against human rights defenders, justice operators, indigenous

people, journalists, land rights defenders, women, migrants, children, inmates and

lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons; and also ensure the effective

prosecution and conviction of the perpetrators and masterminds of those homicides;

(b) Instruct prosecutors to complement individual investigations with

searches for broader patterns or other common factors that could help in

investigating crimes and in identifying the perpetrators and masterminds of the

above-mentioned homicides;

(c) Ensure that sufficient funding to the Public Prosecutors Office, in

particular the Technical Agency of Criminal Investigation, to guarantee the continued

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professionalization of its staff, procedures and laboratories with the aim of improving

the effectiveness of criminal investigations;

(d) Provide training and support to strengthen the capacity of prosecutors

and investigators;

(e) Conduct prompt and comprehensive autopsies in all homicide cases;

(f) Ensure that all criminal investigations are guided by the Minnesota

Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death (2016), and that forensic

experts are adequately trained on the uses of the Manual;

(g) Also ensure that the investigation into and the prosecution and trial of

homicides linked to organized crime, drug trafficking and gang activity fall within

national jurisdiction, in order to allow federal authorities to attract cases where local

authorities are not in a position or are unwilling to do so;

(h) Respect the right of victims and their families to be informed of the

status of criminal investigations;

(i) Improve data collection and analysis of incidents of violent deaths and

ensure the use of common, reliable and transparent recording methods. Such data

should be disaggregated by sex, race, age, ethnicity, occupation or affiliation,

geographic location and other relevant characteristics, in order to understand the

magnitude, trends and patterns of the problem. Furthermore, it should collect reliable

statistics on the number of homicides that lead to prosecution, the number of effective

convictions and the number of cases involving security forces.

119. With respect to prisons, the Special Rapporteur recommends that the

Government:

(a) Improve conditions for all detainees, in compliance with the Standard

Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and ensure the right to life of all

inmates;

(b) Address the situation of overcrowding and poor conditions of the prison

system;

(c) Ensure that prisons are under the control of penitentiary officers and

descale the militarization of prisons with a view to achieving its full return to civil

administration;

(d) Also ensure that prisons are not permeated by gangs, and should impede

the access by inmates to arms, drugs and mobile telephones, which could be used to

commit crimes and endanger the lives of others inside and outside prisons.

120. With respect to private security companies, the Special Rapporteur

recommends that the Government:

(a) Establish a process of stricter control over private security providers,

and that the registration and functioning of private security companies is tightly

vetted, controlled and supervised. It should establish rules of engagement that govern

the use of arms and force by private security agents;

(b) Ensure that private security personnel and firearm lists are kept fully up

to date and are in full compliance with national laws.

C. Recommendations addressed to the international community

121. The international community should ensure that Honduran migrants who

indicate that their lives are at risk in their home country and request asylum abroad

are granted immediate access to legal assistance or to organizations that could assist

them in processing their request. In compliance with the principle of non-refoulement,

receiving countries should refrain from deporting migrants whose lives are at risk

without having properly and thoroughly assessed their cases and asylum applications.

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122. Countries where Honduran migrants have been subjected to physical abuse

should adopt immediate measures to protect the survivors, to guarantee that criminal

investigations and prosecutions are undertaken without delay and to return the

remains of the deceased. The families of the victims must be informed and cooperation

should be established with the Government of Honduras.

123. The international community should provide sustainable financial assistance to

the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to allow it to continue to play its

vital role in the entire region, including Honduras.