36/33 Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014 - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

GE.17-15963(E)



Human Rights Council Thirty-sixth session

11-29 September 2017

Agenda items 2 and 10

Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the

High Commissioner and the Secretary-General

Technical assistance and capacity-building

Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for

Human Rights*, **

Summary

In the present report, submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 33/16,

the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights provides an overview of the

human rights situation in Yemen from 1 September 2014 to 30 June 2017 and describes

new allegations of violations of international human rights law and international

humanitarian law that reportedly occurred between 1 July 2016 and 30 June 2017,

emphasizing the ongoing nature of many of those violations. The High Commissioner also

provides an update on cooperation between the Yemen National Commission to Investigate

Alleged Violations to Human Rights and the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights. He calls upon all stakeholders to implement the

recommendations already made in previous reports.

* The report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect the most recent developments.

** The annexes to the present report are circulated as received.

United Nations A/HRC/36/33

Contents

Page

I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 3

II. Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 3

III. Legal framework ........................................................................................................................... 3

IV. Context .......................................................................................................................................... 4

V. National Commission .................................................................................................................... 4

VI. Human rights situation .................................................................................................................. 5

A. Conduct of hostilities ............................................................................................................ 6

B. Arbitrary or illegal detention and violations of due process ................................................. 13

C. Violations of freedom of expression ..................................................................................... 14

D. Violations of freedom of religion ......................................................................................... 14

E. Sexual and gender-based violence ........................................................................................ 15

F. Violations of economic and social rights .............................................................................. 15

VII. Accountability ............................................................................................................................... 15

VIII. Conclusions and recommendations ............................................................................................... 16

Annexes

I. Additional information on the situation in Yemen ........................................................................ 18

II. Photographs ................................................................................................................................... 22

III. Infographics................................................................................................................................... 24

I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 33/16,

covers the period from 1 September 2014 to 30 June 2017.

2. In its resolution 33/16, the Council requested the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights to provide technical assistance and advice to the Yemen

National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations to Human Rights to enable it to

fulfil its mandate in line with international standards and finalize its comprehensive report

on its investigations; and to allocate additional international human rights experts to the

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Yemen

to complement the investigatory work of the National Commission.

3. In the same resolution, the Council requested the High Commissioner to present to

it, at its thirty-sixth session, a written report on the situation of human rights, including

violations and abuses since September 2014, and on the implementation of technical

assistance.

4. The present report examines the human rights situation in Yemen and provides an

overview of recurring violations and abuses documented since September 2014. It describes

new allegations of violations of international human rights law and international

humanitarian law that reportedly occurred in the past year, between 1 July 2016 and 30

June 2017, and provides an update on cooperation between the National Commission and

OHCHR, including in relation to technical assistance provided by the Office. It should be

read in conjunction with the High Commissioner’s previous reports on the situation of

human rights in Yemen.1

II. Methodology

5. The information contained in the report is based primarily on human rights

monitoring conducted by OHCHR in Yemen, including interviews with survivors,

witnesses, family members of victims and other relevant sources, site visits and meetings

with authorities. The report also reflects credible information gathered from other United

Nations entities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and indicates whether

OHCHR was able to corroborate such information.

6. OHCHR employs a “reasonable grounds” standard in its assessment of incidents

investigated and considers the credibility and reliability of the sources, taking into account

their nature and objectivity. It draws conclusions in its assessment of incidents investigated

only when this standard is met.

7. In the past year, the ability of OHCHR to monitor and report on violations was

limited by numerous constraints, namely security restrictions, delays in the issuance of

visas and inhibitive operational costs.

III. Legal framework

8. International human rights law and international humanitarian law are applicable in

Yemen. The High Commissioner’s 2016 report on the situation of human rights in Yemen

contains an outline of the applicable legal framework and the obligations of the various

duty bearers,2 namely the Government of Yemen, the States members of the coalition3

forces and the de facto authorities in Sana’a.

1 A/HRC/33/38 and A/HRC/30/31.

2 See A/HRC/33/38, paras. 8-10.

3 The Saudi Arabia-led coalition consists of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Senegal, the

Sudan, the United Arab Emirates and, until June 2017, Qatar.

IV. Context

9. The present report covers the period from September 2014 to June 2017, and focuses

primarily on the conflict between the forces supporting President Abd Rabbo Mansour

Hadi, including the coalition forces (together, “pro-Government forces”), and the Popular

Committees affiliated with the Houthis and the army units loyal to the former President, Ali

Abdullah Saleh (“Houthi/Saleh forces”).

10. From July 2016 through June 2017, almost 8,700 conflict-related incidents,

including airstrikes, armed clashes, shelling and detonation of explosives, were reported

throughout Yemen.4 From January 2017, hostilities escalated with the launch of a campaign

by the coalition forces that targeted the west coast. The average number of airstrikes per

month in the Al-Hudaydah and Taizz governorates during the first three months of 2017

was almost double the average for the previous six months. 5 In that context, the pro-

Government forces commenced operations against the southwestern port town of Al-

Mukha, which they took in February, and thereafter pushed northwards along the coast.

Since then, the coalition forces have signalled that they may commence operations on Al-

Hudaydah. The High Commissioner has warned of the likely devastating consequences of

such operations on both the city’s civilian population and the country’s largest port.6 The

city of Taizz remains a heavily contested area, as it has for the past two years.

11. Other armed actors continued to take advantage of the prevailing insecurity in

Yemen. In the past year, extremist groups sustained and adapted their presences. For

example, after being driven out of Al-Mukalla in Hadramaut Governorate in April 2016,

Al-Qaida is now operational in Taizz city.

12. None of the attempts at humanitarian pauses and ceasefires over the years have held.

Peace talks held in June and December 2015, in Switzerland, and from April to July 2016,

in Kuwait, were unsuccessful. Although talks have not resumed, the Special Envoy of the

Secretary-General for Yemen continues to pursue potential avenues for peace.

13. The humanitarian situation in Yemen continued to deteriorate. According to the

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as of June 2017, out of

a population of 27.4 million, 18.8 million were in need of humanitarian assistance,

including 10.3 million in acute need. There have been more than 500,000 suspected cases

of cholera since April 2017 and 7.3 million people were on the brink of famine. More than

3 million people have been forced to flee their homes since the conflict began. 7 This

catastrophe is entirely man-made.

V. National Commission

14. The mandate of the National Commission was extended for another year in

presidential decree No. 97 of 24 August 2016. Pursuant to Human Rights Council

resolution 33/16, OHCHR deployed five additional staff members to Sana’a, Yemen,

Amman, Jordan, and Geneva, Switzerland, from April 2017 to provide the National

Commission with technical assistance and advice, and to complement its investigatory

work. Owing to security constraints, no OHCHR staff could be based in Aden, where the

Commission sits.

15. In consultation with OHCHR, the National Commission identified a number of

priority areas for technical assistance. OHCHR conducted a variety of activities, including a

workshop with members of the Commission on 21 and 22 February 2017 in Doha, Qatar, at

which it presented regional best practices for commissions of inquiry; a working visit to the

National Commission headquarters in Aden from 23 to 25 May 2017 to provide technical

expertise on the development of databases, including on information management,

4 Information from United Nations sources.

5 Ibid.

6 See www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-un-idUSKBN17X1F1.

7 See annex I.

protection protocols and archiving; training for staff of the Commission on 7 and 8 July

2017 in Amman, Jordan, on international humanitarian law, interviewing techniques,

gender and databases. Future activities envisaged include more specialized targeted training

workshops. However, those activities are limited by security and logistical constraints. For

example, owing to operational constraints — airport closures, abrupt cancellation of flights

and restrictions on United Nations travel owing to the deteriorating security situation — the

location and dates of the training provided had to be adjusted repeatedly.

16. Additional factors, including political constraints, detrimentally affected the work of

the National Commission. The de facto authorities are unwilling to cooperate with and

provide access to the Commission, which comprises members appointed by the other party

to the conflict, namely the Government of Yemen. The perceived partiality of the

Commission and its limited access prevented it from executing its mandate

comprehensively. Despite those challenges, the Commission did noteworthy work over the

past year and issued a preliminary report covering events from August 2015 to 30 July 2016

and two interim reports covering 31 July 2016 to 31 January 2017 and September 2016 to

June 2017. The Commission produced five monthly reports in 2016, which are available on

its Arabic website. Of the more than 17,000 human rights violations reportedly

documented, the Commission noted the completion of investigations into more than 10,000.

In addition to its perceived partiality, the Commission appears to be lacking an instrument

or a mandate that would enable it to channel its findings into a credible accountability

mechanism. The complete absence of such a process will serve to further consolidate the

climate of impunity in Yemen.

VI. Human rights situation

17. The population of Yemen continued to suffer the impact of armed conflict and

violence along with other serious human rights violations and abuses. Airstrikes and

shelling repeatedly struck areas populated by civilians. People faced continuing hardships

owing to limited or no access to food and other basic goods, health care and education —

circumstances caused by the parties to the conflict who had besieged cities, blockaded

seaports and closed airports. Forced displacement and restrictions on movement,

exacerbated by the presence of snipers or landmines, directly affected civilians, causing

deaths, injuries, destruction of property, loss of livelihoods and prevention of access to

essential services. Civilians who spoke out or otherwise opposed the parties to the conflict

were subjected to harassment, intimidation, detention and, on occasion, torture and killing.

Women, children, religious and social minorities, refugees, and internally displaced persons

were disproportionately affected.

18. In the past year, conflict along the west coast of Yemen raised serious human rights

concerns. During intense clashes in Al-Mukha over two weeks in late January and early

February 2017, civilians were caught between the conflicting instructions of warring

parties. Houthi/Saleh forces instructed civilians not to leave their homes while pro-

Government forces demanded that they evacuate. OHCHR verified incidents of

Houthi/Saleh snipers shooting at civilians trying to flee, which may indicate an attempt to

use civilians as human shields, in violation of international humanitarian law.8 OHCHR

verified that at least 32 civilians were killed or injured over the two weeks of fighting, and

more than 200 homes were damaged or destroyed.

19. Since February 2017, tension has risen in anticipation of similar armed operations

against Al-Hudaydah. According to information gathered by OHCHR, airstrikes and attacks

on boats at sea off the shores of Al-Hudaydah caused at least 98 civilian casualties (52

killed and 46 injured) over three weeks in March and April 2017. There are fears that a full-

scale operation on Al-Hudaydah may lead to significant civilian casualties and increased

displacement, while likely rendering the port inoperative, further limiting access to food,

medicines, fuel and other supplies. The impact would be felt far beyond Al-Hudaydah, as

most of the country is supplied by goods shipped through the port.

8 See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), rule 97.

A. Conduct of hostilities

20. Since OHCHR began civilian casualty monitoring in March 2015, the Office has

verified at least 13,520 civilian casualties, with 4,980 killed and 8,540 injured, in more than

1,000 incidents through June 2017. 9 Data collected by OHCHR showed that the most

conflict-affected governorates were Aden, Al-Hudaydah, Sana’a and Taizz. Given the strict

verification methodology applied by OHCHR and access constraints, the actual total of

casualties is likely to be higher.

21. Some of the incidents involving the various parties to the conflict may amount to

violations of international humanitarian law. In many cases, information obtained by

OHCHR suggested that civilians might have been directly targeted, or that operations had

been conducted heedless of their impact on civilians and without regard to the principles of

distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. In some cases, information suggested

that no actions had been taken to mitigate the impact of operations on civilians. According

to the Office’s findings, at no time were civilians given effective advance warning of the

commencement of operations so as to have the opportunity to leave areas of operations

safely, and their access to life-saving or life-sustaining humanitarian assistance was

severely limited or, in some instances, prevented.

Shelling

22. Houthi/Saleh forces primarily relied on shelling in the conduct of their operations.

Given their wide-area effects, the use of such weapons is frequently indiscriminate.

OHCHR documented the recurrent use of shelling in densely populated civilian areas, such

as residential neighbourhoods and markets, which had caused hundreds of civilian

casualties and vast destruction to civilian objects.10 Since July 2016, OHCHR documented

that shelling by Houthi/Saleh forces had killed at least 178 civilians and injured 420. The

city of Taizz has been particularly affected.

Shelling of Taizz

23. Throughout the conflict, the city of Taizz witnessed consistent shelling carried out

by both sides of the conflict, intensifying at times, such as in January and May 2017. Due to

denial of access to areas controlled by Houthi/Saleh forces in Taizz, OHCHR has rarely

been able to verify incidents of shelling attributed to pro-government forces. The following

are examples of shelling incidents verified by OHCHR that caused high numbers of civilian

casualties.11

24. On 3 October 2016, in Beer Basha area, Al-Mudhaffar district, Taizz Governorate, a

mortar shell struck a house, killing 10 civilians, including 6 children, and injuring 17

civilians, including 6 children and 3 women. The attack occurred in the vicinity of a public

market at the busiest time of day. According to witnesses, the mortar shell was launched

from an area under the control of Houthi/Saleh forces, while the market area was controlled

by pro-Government forces.

25. On 18 January 2017, in Al-Noor area, Al-Mudhaffar district, Taizz Governorate,

mortar shells fell among houses. About 15 minutes later, as residents gathered to assess the

damage, another mortar shell struck the same area, killing nine civilians, including three

children, and injuring nine civilians, including four children. Witnesses told OHCHR that

the shells had been launched from an area controlled by Houthi/Saleh forces.

26. From 21 May to 6 June 2017, continuous shelling between forces in Taizz city

impacted civilian residential areas, resulting in the killing of at least 26 civilians, including

4 children and 3 women, and injuring at least 61 civilians, including 29 children and 9

women. Based on witness testimonies and the locations of the impact, OHCHR attributed

9 See annex III.

10 See A/HRC/30/31 and A/HRC/33/38, annex III.

11 See annex I.

19 killed and 59 injured to Houthi/Saleh forces and the remaining casualties to pro-

Government forces. The shelling also damaged at least nine homes.

27. The shelling of Taizz has been unrelenting, even after the impact of those attacks on

civilians and civilian objects had become apparent to the parties involved. The use of such

tactics appeared to be in violation of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and of the

obligation to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects.

Airstrikes

28. Coalition airstrikes continued to be the leading cause of civilian casualties in the

conflict, killing at least 933 civilians and injuring 1,423, since July 2016.12 As in past years,

OHCHR continued to document airstrikes against targets that appeared to be of a civilian

nature.13 In addition to markets, residential areas and public and private infrastructure, the

past year witnessed notable airstrikes against funeral gatherings and small civilian boats.

Such incidents were widespread and continued to take place, once again, even after the

impact of the attacks on civilians had become apparent. Directly targeting civilians and

civilian objects or conducting disproportionate or indiscriminate attacks and the failure to

take all necessary precautions to avoid and, in any event, minimize, the impact on civilians

during air operations targeting military objectives, constitute serious violations of

international humanitarian law.

Al-Kubra Hall

29. The most deadly incident of the conflict thus far occurred on 8 October 2016, when

coalition airstrikes targeted the Al-Kubra Hall in Sana’a during the funeral of the father of a

senior official, killing at least 132 civilians and injuring 695, including 24 boys. At the time

of the attack, the hall — the largest such facility in Sana’a, with the capacity of holding

more than 1,000 people — was full of mourners attending the funeral. Those present

included military leaders affiliated with the Houthis and former President Saleh, but the

majority were civilians.

30. OHCHR visited the site the same day and was told by survivors that they had heard

aircraft hovering above the hall around 3.30 p.m. immediately prior to the two missiles that

struck the hall only minutes apart. Many individuals fleeing the first strike had not yet

exited the building when the second strike hit. The short interval between the strikes meant

that those assisting victims of the first strike were hit by the second.

31. The points of impact of the two strikes were 15 to 20 metres apart.14 Based on

information available to OHCHR, the remnants of the munitions used revealed that they

had been fitted with precision guidance units, indicating that the targeting of the hall had

been deliberate. Based on the circumstances, including the prior announcement and public

nature of the funeral, as well as the timing of the strike, coalition forces should have been

aware of the high risk of civilian casualties inherent in carrying out such a strike. Despite

initial denials of responsibility by the coalition forces, a subsequent investigation of the

incident by the coalition’s Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT)15 found that coalition

aircraft had conducted the strike and that it had resulted in “several” casualties.16 According

to JIAT, the targeting was based on faulty intelligence provided by a party affiliated with

the Government of Yemen, and the airstrike was conducted without proper approval or in

non-compliance with coalition procedures.

32. OHCHR verified two other airstrike incidents against funeral gatherings in the past

year.17

12 See annex III.

13 See annex I.

14 See annex II, figure I.

15 See sect. VII below for additional information on the Joint Incident Assessment Team.

16 See www.justsecurity.org/33615/full-text-saudi-led-coalitions-statement-explanation-funeral-

hall-bombing-yemen/.

17 See annex I.

Attack on a boat carrying Somali migrants and refugees

33. As a result of military operations along the west coast of Yemen, the waters off Al-

Hudaydah had become dangerous, with many boats coming under fire. OHCHR verified six

incidents of attacks on fishermen in early 2017, three of which occurred on 15 and 16

March 2017.18

34. The most devastating attack was against a boat carrying 146 Somali migrants and

refugees, along with 4 Yemeni crew members. Survivors told OHCHR that, on 15 March

2017, they saw ships and a helicopter near their boat. The following night, a ship fired on

their boat and minutes later, a helicopter circled over the boat and opened fire. The

survivors reported that they screamed, waved and shone flashlights in an effort to signal

they were civilians, however, the shooting continued. Once the attack had ended and the

helicopter had departed, the crew turned off the lights and the boat drifted to shore.19 Forty-

two civilians were killed, including 11 women, and 34 were injured, including 8 children.

35. Emirati State media reported that an official of the United Arab Emirates, a member

of the coalition, had acknowledged that its forces had spotted the boat and, as it had been

identified as a civilian vessel, had refrained from firing on it.20 In an unprecedented move,

the official welcomed an independent international investigation into the incident and

denied that Emirati forces had been involved in the attack.21 The Coalition also reportedly

denied responsibility for the incident. 22 As of 31 July 2017, there had been no

acknowledgement of responsibility for the attack, nor any explanation as to why the vessel,

along with other civilian boats, had been attacked.

Restricted weapons

36. Owing to the ongoing armed conflict, a variety of explosives litter the landscape of

Yemen, including anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines, improvised explosive devices,

unexploded ordnance and cluster munitions. All of those explosives pose a danger to

civilians, causing casualties and hindering the safe return of displaced populations. The

legality of those weapons varies23 but the use of anti-personnel landmines, victim-activated

improvised explosive devices and cluster munitions may violate international humanitarian

law, particularly in the absence of precautionary measures owing to their inherently

indiscriminate nature.24

37. No comprehensive statistics are available on civilian casualties caused by those

weapons, but credible reports from demining experts, medical professionals and local

residents indicate that the danger is widespread and continuing. According to the United

Nations Development Programme, deminers had cleared nearly 450,000 explosive

remnants of war between February 2016 and June 2017, including thousands of anti-

personnel mines and cluster munitions.25 The vast majority of mines and explosive devices

were reported in areas currently or previously controlled by Houthi/Saleh forces. Residents

regularly told OHCHR that their areas had not been mined prior to the arrival of those

forces. OHCHR had no evidence of any precautionary measures being taken, such as

warnings or symbols, to indicate the presence of mines or explosive devices. Owing to

access and capacity constraints, OHCHR was only able to verify a few cases of civilian

casualties from such explosives, which had been sustained mostly by people going about

their daily activities.26

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 See http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302603973.

21 Ibid.

22 See http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-yemen-security-refugees-idUKKBN16O0WF.

23 Yemen ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of

Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; however, neither Yemen nor any coalition members,

except Senegal, are parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

24 See ICRC, rules 71 and 81.

25 Demining activities were limited prior to February 2016.

26 See annex I.

38. As reported to the Human Rights Council in 2016, OHCHR found credible

allegations of the use of cluster munitions by coalition forces dating back to December

2015. On 19 December 2016, the coalition acknowledged the use of cluster munitions and

avowed that it would cease the use of British-manufactured BL-755 cluster munitions.27

OHCHR documented two new apparent cases of the use of cluster munitions in Sa’ada

Governorate, in December 2016 and May 2017.

Siege and blockade

39. Most movement of goods and people in and out of Yemen is by sea or air. Moving

within the country by land requires crossing active conflict lines. The sieges and blockades

imposed by the warring parties have had a devastating impact on civilians, preventing them

from leaving areas affected by conflict to reach safety and, when they remain, preventing

them from accessing goods necessary for survival, including life-sustaining or life-saving

humanitarian assistance.

40. In August 2015, when pro-Government forces gained control of parts of the city of

Taizz, Houthi/Saleh forces besieged the city, controlling the two main entrances and

effectively blockading it until March 2016. OHCHR documented several incidents of

Houthi guards at checkpoints preventing civilians from bringing essential items, such as

food and medicine, into the city. Houthi/Saleh forces also denied passage to civilians trying

to exit or enter the city for urgent health care. OHCHR documented the brutal tactics of the

Houthi/Saleh forces in enforcing the siege of Taizz, including more than 20 incidents of

beating and shooting of civilians at checkpoints.

41. In March 2016, pro-Government forces established control of a third entry point into

the city. Accessible only via circuitous, arduous secondary roads, that entrance permitted

civilians to move and to bring goods in and out of the city. As a result of international

pressure and other factors, Houthi/Saleh forces intermittently allowed the passage of

civilians and small quantities of civilian goods, including humanitarian aid, through the

main entrances to the city. Nevertheless, access to Taizz city remains extremely limited and

residents continue to suffer.

42. The prices of basic commodities in Taizz have skyrocketed, leaving civilians unable

to afford basic essential items even if they are accessible or available. To access basic

services, such as health care, residents have to traverse routes mined with explosives and

are exposed to the constant risk of shelling, airstrikes and snipers. Residents reported that, if

they managed to reach a location where health care might be available, they often found

that the facilities had been destroyed or damaged in the fighting, or that they lacked even

the most basic supplies. No public health-care facilities in the city and few private facilities

are fully functional.28

43. Given the geography of Yemen, the powers exercised by the coalition forces along

the land borders and coasts and in the airspace, enable the coalition to determine, to a great

extent, the conditions of life in Yemen. Reportedly to enforce the United Nations-

sanctioned arms embargo,29 the coalition imposed de facto naval and aerial blockades. All

ships entering ports under the control of Houthi/Saleh forces required prior authorization

from the coalition. Few ships received such authorization; many were delayed, denied or

rerouted. In one case, the non-governmental organization, Save the Children, issued a

public statement alleging that the coalition’s prevention of three of its supply shipments

from reaching Al-Hudaydah — by rerouting them to Aden and thereby delaying them for

up to three months — killed children.30

44. Through a variety of mostly arbitrary regulatory restrictions, the coalition has

strangled the entry of imports into the country. Prior to the conflict, Yemen imported 80 to

90 per cent of its food, medical supplies and fuel. Yet for most of the last two years, for

27 See http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1571875.

28 See www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/healthcare_under_siege_in_taiz.pdf.

29 See Security Council resolution 2216 (2015).

30 See www.savethechildren.org.uk/2017-03/saudi-delays-yemen-aid-killing-children.

example, only 20 to 30 per cent of the country’s estimated monthly fuel needs had been

met.31 As a result of such restrictions, as well as the danger of sailing in an active conflict

zone, many commercial shipping companies were no longer willing to attempt shipments to

Al-Hudaydah. Coupled with coalition airstrikes that significantly damaged Al-Hudaydah

port, the effects of the naval blockade have been paralysing for the importation of essential

supplies into the country.

45. Since March 2015, coalition restrictions on air access have also crippled the country,

particularly in the north where the population is under Houthi/Saleh control. Sana’a

international airport has remained closed to commercial aviation since 9 August 2016,

when the Government of Yemen and the coalition forces closed the surrounding airspace.32

The closure has prevented thousands of Yemenis from seeking medical care abroad, while

the health-care system in Yemen has disintegrated. The aerial blockade has also further

limited cargo importation into the country and severely restricted the ability of civilians to

enter and leave those areas.

46. All parties to the conflict must do their utmost to ensure the respect and protection of

the civilian population at all times and in all circumstances. In particular, the parties must

allow and facilitate “rapid and unimpeded” passage of humanitarian relief, including food

and other items essential to the survival of the civilian population.33 They must do all they

can to facilitate or ensure that civilians had access to essential humanitarian supplies and

were able to leave areas affected by conflict in safety, dignity and in full compliance with

humanitarian standards. In addition, the parties must also facilitate or ensure that

humanitarian organizations, including the United Nations and the International Committee

of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, had access to civilians.34

Forced displacement

47. Forced displacement of civilians was exploited as a tactic in the conflict in violation

of international humanitarian law. In the past year, OHCHR verified two cases of entire

villages that had been forcibly displaced by Houthi/Saleh forces.

48. On 1 November 2016, following weeks of harassment, movement restrictions and

arrests, 175 families were forced to leave Al-Dabah Al-Rabe’ei village, in Taizz

Governorate, after the Houthis threatened by loudspeaker that, if the villagers did not leave

within 24 hours, all the men would be detained. On 18 February 2017, again following

weeks of harassment and movement restrictions, two villagers were killed by sniper-fire

while trying to leave Tabaysha’a village, in Taizz Governorate. The following day, armed

Houthi/Saleh forces entered the village, destroyed homes and seized vehicles, while fighters

positioned on the mountains overlooking the village opened fire on the residential areas. As

a result of the violence, all the villagers — at least 250 families — fled the village waving

white banners.

Specially protected persons and objects

49. Despite special protection afforded under international humanitarian law,35 medical

and education facilities and personnel, as well as cultural and religious sites, continued to

be damaged or destroyed by coalition airstrikes and shelling by Houthi/Saleh forces. 36

Parties to the conflict had endangered the protected status of such objects by positioning

military objectives within or around them. Extremist groups had carried out direct attacks

against cultural and religious sites.

31 See www.logcluster.org/countries/YEM.

32 United Nations and international non-governmental organization flights have since resumed.

33 See ICRC, rule 55.

34 See ICRC, rule 56. 35 See ICRC, rules 25, 28, 38 and 39.

36 See annex III. Such attacks may also violate international human rights law, including the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 12, 13 and 15.

Medical facilities and personnel

50. The conflict has ravaged the health system. According to the World Health

Organization, as of October 2016, at least 274 health facilities had been damaged or

destroyed by fighting, and 13 health workers had been killed and 31 had been injured while

performing their duties. Some of those incidents were reportedly the result of direct,

targeted attacks, while others resulted from indiscriminate attacks or were incidental. As of

June 2017, less than 45 per cent of health facilities in the country were fully functional.

Furthermore, many health personnel had been forced to relocate owing to insecurity and the

risks associated with carrying out their duties.

Abs Hospital

51. OHCHR investigated a coalition airstrike that took place on 15 August 2016 against

Abs Hospital, in Hajjah Governorate.37 Within minutes of a vehicle — whose occupants

were reportedly unarmed and wearing civilian clothing — entering the hospital compound,

an airstrike hit the grounds of the hospital complex, near the emergency ward, where the

vehicle had stopped and where a large number of patients and caregivers were awaiting

treatment.38 OHCHR verified that 19 civilians, including 1 woman and 3 children were

killed and 28 were injured, including 4 women and 4 children.

52. Reportedly, in a communication immediately following the airstrike, a General of

the coalition forces stated that the airstrike had been intended to target the vehicle that had

entered the hospital compound. JIAT found that coalition forces had targeted a gathering of

Houthi armed leaders in the north of the city, and that a vehicle leaving the targeted site

was pursued and struck39 when it was near an unmarked building. Allegedly, the building

was only later determined to be Abs Hospital. JIAT concluded that the incident was an

“unintentional error”.

53. Following the attack, the hospital was out of service for 11 days. Once it reopened,

many patients chose not to return to seek care for fear of future airstrikes. One survivor,

who lost her husband in the attack, told OHCHR that she would not go to any hospital no

matter how much pain she felt. As a consequence of that airstrike, inter alia, Médecins sans

frontières evacuated its teams from six hospitals in Sa’ada and Hajjah governorates.40

Education facilities and cultural sites

54. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), more than half of the

schools in Yemen have been damaged in the conflict, with 28 attacks on schools

documented in the past year by the country task force on monitoring and reporting.41 In

addition, parties to the conflict occupied and used schools as fighting positions, detention

centres and arms depots. The following two incidents were verified by OHCHR in the past

year.

55. On 13 August 2016, in Juma’a Bin Fadil village, Haydan district, Sa’ada

Governorate, an airstrike hit a religious school, killing at least 7 children and injuring 19

others. The children, aged between 6 and 14 years, were studying at the time. According to

local residents and witnesses, the school was used solely for religious instruction, and no

37 OHCHR findings corroborate the findings of the internal investigation conducted by Médecins sans

frontières, which ran the hospital, see www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/yemen_abs_

investigation.pdf.

38 See annex II, figure IV.

39 See www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1567351.

40 See www.msf.org/en/article/yemen-indiscriminate-bombings-and-unreliable-reassurances-saudi-led-

coalition-force-msf.

41 The task force, established in the context of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on grave

violations against children in situations of armed conflict, comprises 15 United Nations agencies and

international non-governmental organizations.

military training activities were conducted there. JIAT reported that the closest site targeted

by coalition forces that day was a weapons store 10 kilometres away.42

56. On 6 January 2017, in Al-Khameis area, Arhab district, Sana’a Governorate, several

airstrikes damaged civilian objects, killing nine civilians, including five children, and

injuring four other civilians. The first airstrike hit a school and, a few minutes later, a

second airstrike hit a mosque. The facilities, which were 50 metres apart and empty at the

time, were both damaged. Approximately one hour later, a third airstrike hit a vehicle

transporting local civilians to the scene of the first two airstrikes to assess the damage. All

those on board were killed or injured.

57. The cultural heritage of Yemen has been another casualty of this conflict. Since

September 2014, cultural sites, including castles, ruins, shrines, museums and other

historical buildings had sustained damage. Much of the damage was incidental, as all

parties to the conflict failed to respect and take the required measures to protect cultural

property when conducting hostilities. Nonetheless, OHCHR documented several cases of

targeted attacks against cultural and religious sites during the course of the conflict. Most of

those cases were attributed to armed groups affiliated with Al-Qaida or unknown actors.

For example, on the evening of 29 July 2016, in the Old City, Al-Mudhaffar district, Taizz

Governorate, four armed men were seen leaving an ancient mosque and tomb, just before

an improvised explosive device detonated, destroying the site, and killing one civilian and

injuring four others when a nearby home collapsed.

Child casualties and recruitment

58. Since March 2015, when documentation began, OHCHR has verified that 1,120

children have been killed and 1,541 injured in incidents of armed conflict.43 Continuing the

trend of recent years, more than half of the child casualties in the past year were the result

of coalition airstrikes. Ground engagements, shelling, landmines and unexploded ordnance

also resulted in child casualties. The casualty figures reflect the nature of the conflict; areas

where children were present, such as residential areas, markets, schools and hospitals,

continued to be affected by attacks carried out by all parties to the conflict.

59. Children also continued to be recruited and used in hostilities, contrary to

international humanitarian law and human rights law.44 Such violations remain challenging

to document. Since March 2015, the country task force on monitoring and reporting

documented 1,702 cases of child recruitment and use, 67 per cent of which were attributed

to Houthi/Saleh forces and 20 per cent to pro-Government forces. In the past year, nearly

one-quarter of the 488 documented cases were reportedly from Taizz Governorate.

Approximately 100 of those children were reportedly younger than 15 years. OHCHR

monitors frequently observed children as young as 10 years who were armed and uniformed

and manning the checkpoints of Houthi/Saleh forces.

Drone attacks and raids

60. The ongoing conflict between Houthi/Saleh and pro-Government forces exacerbated

security vacuums that had been increasingly exploited by extremist groups, including Al-

Qaida. In its campaign against suspected Al-Qaida affiliates, the United States of America,

in cooperation with the Government of Yemen, continued to conduct targeted drone attacks

and raids. In one such incident, on 29 January 2017, in Yakla’a village, Rada’ district, Al-

Bayda Governorate, a night raid by United States forces on suspected Al-Qaida operatives

resulted in the killing of at least 10 children and 5 women. The operation destroyed more

42 See www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1567371.

43 The country task force on monitoring and reporting documented 1,676 children killed and 2,760

injured. OHCHR is a member of the task force and contributes its casualty figures to these totals.

44 See ICRC, rules 136 and 137. Yemen ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in

armed conflict.

than 12 homes and public buildings, including a school, a mosque and a health facility. The

United States acknowledged that civilians had “likely” been killed in the raid.45

B. Arbitrary or illegal detention and violations of due process

61. Since March 2015, OHCHR has documented 1,019 cases of arbitrary or illegal

detention.46 Of those, 82 per cent were attributed to Houthi/Saleh forces and their affiliates,

and 15 per cent to pro-Government forces, with the remainder of cases being abductions

attributed to extremist groups such as Al-Qaida and the so-called “Islamic State”.

Throughout the conflict, OHCHR documented 51 cases that may amount to enforced

disappearances, with the whereabouts of the victims still unknown.

62. OHCHR has conducted approximately 150 monitoring visits to detention facilities

since March 2015. Conditions of detention had notably deteriorated; overcrowding,

damaged facilities and shortages of food and medicines had all been exacerbated by the

conflict. OHCHR was rarely able to access persons who were arbitrarily or illegally

detained; it relied on interviews with released detainees, family members and lawyers, as

well as information from authorities. In all the cases classified as arbitrary or illegal

detention by OHCHR, the detainees had not been charged, did not have access to legal

assistance and had not been brought before a court. Often, they were held in unofficial or

secret facilities and prevented from contact with their families. In extreme cases, detainees

appeared to have been subjected to torture or ill-treatment.

63. Since September 2014, the de facto authorities in Sana’a, affiliated with

Houthi/Saleh forces, have engaged in widespread detention of individuals. Those perceived

to be opposed to the de facto authorities — including political figures, activists, human

rights defenders, journalists or private individuals — had been particularly targeted. Most

detainees were held for several days, weeks or months before being released. Some remain

detained indefinitely.

64. In addition to targeting individual opponents, the de facto authorities used mass

detentions to instil fear among the wider population. Since July 2016, OHCHR has

documented at least nine cases of mass detentions, in which more than ten individuals,

including men, women and children, were taken in one operation. Most of them were held

for a few days, then released.47

65. OHCHR monitored two trials of opponents in Sana’a by the de facto authorities that

raised serious due process concerns. On 12 April 2017, a journalist was convicted and

sentenced to death on charges of spying. He was not notified in advance of the trial and was

not permitted to offer a defence. The trial lasted 15 minutes. In the second case, 36

individuals were accused in a mass trial, reportedly on terrorism charges. In open court, the

detainees raised challenges about the use of video confessions, claiming that they were

coerced and fabricated. As of June 2017, the procedure was ongoing.

66. Another development of concern was the preventive detention of migrants by the de

facto authorities. According to the International Organization for Migration, in the past

year, authorities in several governorates had begun to systematically detain migrants,

invoking the security implications of high numbers of migrants, and for military

recruitment. OHCHR had also observed this practice during visits to detention centres.

67. In the government-controlled south of the country, the official prisons had been

significantly damaged and the criminal justice system remained largely defunct. Criminal

justice was localized in the hands of militias, security actors and local authorities. In that

context, OHCHR received numerous reports of arbitrary detention, possible enforced

disappearances and torture. In 2017, allegations were mounted against both the Hadrami

Elite Forces, in Hadramaut Governorate, and the Security Belt, in Aden, both Yemeni

45 See www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/1068267/us-central-

command-statement-on-yemen-raid/.

46 See annex III.

47 See annex I.

armed elements that emerged in the past year, supported by members of the coalition.

Although it had limited access to detention facilities in the south, OHCHR verified 46 cases

of arbitrary detention in the past year in Hadramaut and Aden.

C. Violations of freedom of expression

68. Since the beginning of the conflict, an effective campaign of repression has been

waged by both the de facto authorities in Sana’a and the Government of Yemen against

journalists, activists and other civil society actors through restrictions on freedom of

expression, intimidation, arbitrary and illegal detentions, enforced disappearances and

killings.

69. Since 2015, the de facto authorities in Sana’a had blocked 21 news websites,

censored 7 television channels and banned 18 newspapers from publication. They also

raided or closed the premises of 52 human rights and civil society organizations. Pro-

Government forces censored seven television channels and raided seven organizations.

Consequently, few avenues remain for free expression and a chilling effect has led to self-

censorship. Many activists have left the country for fear of reprisals.

70. In a disturbing development, as of December 2016, the coalition has prevented the

United Nations from providing seats on its flights into the country to journalists; this was

extended to international human rights organizations in May 2017. Combined with the ban

on commercial flights into Sana’a, those restrictions have served to minimize coverage of

the conflict in the international media.48

71. Individual journalists and activists bore the brunt of the repression, with 74

arbitrarily or illegally detained by all parties. As of June 2017, at least 16 journalists

remained detained, all by the de facto authorities. In one notable case, nine journalists taken

by the de facto authorities in a single raid in Sana’a on 9 June 2015 remained in custody.

The journalists had been held incommunicado for months and denied family visits at

various stages of detention as they were transferred to different facilities. OHCHR was

concerned that the journalists and other detainees faced a serious risk of torture or ill-

treatment.

D. Violations of freedom of religion

72. The de facto authorities in Sana’a targeted the Baha’i community in Yemen, in what

appeared to be “a persistent pattern of persecution”, which included raids, arrests and

prolonged arbitrary or illegal detentions.49 In the past year, OHCHR documented the mass

arrest of 22 Baha’i, including women and children, at a public community event in Sana’a,

in August 2016; the arrest of three Baha’i men in Al-Hudaydah and Sana’a, in April 2017;

and threatening phone calls to tens of Baha’i in Sana’a from the Prosecutor of the

Specialized Criminal Court, pressuring them to recant their faith or face arrest, in April

2017.

73. As of June 2017, five Baha’i remained in detention; one of them had been held for

nearly four years, accused of apostasy, which carries the death penalty.

74. Although most Baha’i in Yemen live in areas controlled by the de facto authorities,

the persecution of Baha’i is not limited to those authorities. On 17 January 2017, two

Baha’i men attempting to leave the country were detained by security officials at Aden

international airport; they were removed from the airport and their whereabouts remain

unknown, despite OHCHR inquiries.

48 As of 23 June 2017, there were no signs that the Government of Yemen would allow journalists into

the country.

49 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21643&LangID=E.

E. Sexual and gender-based violence

75. The ongoing conflict exacerbated the entrenched inequalities faced by women and

girls in Yemen, leading to increased vulnerability. The breakdown of formal and informal

protection mechanisms, together with large-scale displacement, gave rise to negative

coping strategies, particularly child marriage. More than two thirds of Yemeni females

marry before the age of 18, compared to half before the conflict.50

76. Sexual and gender-based violence was underreported owing to the stigma and risks

associated with reporting. While no statistics were available, some information received by

OHCHR indicated that migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons and detainees were

all at increased risk of such violence.

F. Violations of economic and social rights

77. The ongoing armed conflict negatively impacted a range of economic and social

rights, including the right to food, housing, education, health, and water and sanitation. The

imposition by the parties to the conflict of sieges, blockades and restrictions on movement

had a severe impact on the availability of goods and services and their accessibility by the

civilian population. Public and private infrastructure collapsed and access to basic services

remained low or non-existent. Factories and farms were damaged and food imports

restricted. The non-payment of public sector salaries for most of the past year and the

economic uncertainty caused by the relocation by the Government of the central bank to

Aden further exacerbated the situation. Teachers, doctors and sanitation workers — and

therefore schools, hospitals and city streets — were all affected. Less than half of the health

facilities were functional. Many people could not purchase medicine or food, even where

they were available. Those circumstances accelerated the spread of cholera and other

diseases and increased the risk of famine. The population in Yemen was increasingly

impoverished, hungry, displaced, sick, injured and/or dying, and people faced a desperate

situation.

VII. Accountability

78. Impunity is both a cause and consequence of the current conflict in Yemen. The

2011 crisis and the eventual failure of the National Dialogue Conference were in part due to

the unwillingness of the parties in Yemen and the international community to pursue

accountability for past crimes and human rights violations and abuses.

79. International human rights law and international humanitarian law include

obligations to investigate violations to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice and

to provide victims with full and effective reparation. Despite the ongoing armed conflict,

there have been some developments in that regard.

80. In August 2016, the coalition forces announced the establishment of JIAT, an

investigative mechanism comprised of 14 individuals with military and legal experience

from the member States.51 As of June 2017, JIAT had released the findings on compliance

by the coalition with international humanitarian law in 21 airstrikes since March 2015. In

all but one of those cases, it found that the coalition was pursuing a legitimate military

objective. Without necessarily acknowledging wrongdoing, JIAT suggested that the

coalition should pay compensation or offer assistance to the victims in five incidents and

take action against those responsible in two incidents. OHCHR requested more clarity and

transparency on JIAT, including during a meeting between the Deputy High Commissioner

for Human Rights and representatives of Saudi Arabia held in Geneva on 3 May 2017.

Based on a review of the limited available findings by JIAT, OHCHR was concerned that

50 See www.unicef.org/videoaudio/PDFs/Yemen_2_Years_-_children_falling_through_the_

cracks_FINAL.pdf.

51 See www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1524799.

the Team appeared to accept assertions that an intended target was a legitimate military

objective as sufficient justification for carrying out attacks that resulted in civilian

casualties and damage or destruction of civilian objects. Critically, to date, it appears that

no concrete actions have been taken in relation to either prosecutions or reparations to the

victims and survivors of such incidents.

81. On 22 June 2017, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 115, the Government of

Yemen opened an investigation into alleged torture and enforced disappearances by United

Arab Emirates and its allied Yemeni forces in the south of the country.52 As of mid-August

2017, the six-member committee conducting the investigation had not yet released its

findings.

82. As far as OHCHR was aware, efforts by Houthi/Saleh forces to pursue

accountability for violations and abuses were limited to a single incident, which took place

on 31 July 2016, in Sha’ab Al-Shaqab valley, Al-Malagim district, Al-Bayda Governorate.

That day a group of armed men affiliated with Houthi/Saleh forces went to the homes of

four influential tribal leaders in the Al-Omer area, Dhi Na’im district and made demands.

When the sheiks failed to acquiesce, they were abducted from their homes and taken to the

valley, 20 kilometres away. Their bodies were found there three days later. Autopsies

reportedly determined that they had been killed by multiple gunshot wounds, many in their

backs. As a result of significant outrage within the community, criminal charges were filed

against three of the individuals involved. As of June 2017, the case was still pending.

83. OHCHR acknowledges the efforts made towards accountability by the parties to the

conflict, but notes that they are wholly insufficient to respond to the gravity of the

violations and abuses that are continuing every day in Yemen.

VIII. Conclusions and recommendations

84. The perpetuation of the conflict and its consequences on the population in

Yemen continue to be devastating, with the situation in Yemen currently being the

largest humanitarian crisis in the world.53 At least 4,980 civilians have been killed and

more than 8,540 injured since the beginning of the conflict. Millions, particularly the

most vulnerable, face threats of cholera, famine and displacement. The economy

teeters on the brink of collapse.

85. The conflict has given rise to unrelenting allegations of violations and abuses of

international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law. The

degeneration of the situation has created security vacuums that are increasingly

exploited, including by new armed groups in the south and groups affiliated with Al-

Qaida.

86. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recognizes the

attempts of the National Commission to document and report on violations and

abuses. However, the National Commission is not perceived as being impartial and, in

the absence of recognition by all parties to the conflict, it cannot deliver

comprehensive impartial reporting on the human rights situation in Yemen.

87. The High Commissioner reiterates his call to the parties to the conflict and the

international community to cease hostilities; reach a negotiated and durable solution

to the conflict; adhere to the principles of international humanitarian law and

international human rights law; and allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded

passage of humanitarian relief.

52 See www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-abuse-idUSKBN19F08D?il=0.

53 See http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/usgerc-stephen-o-brien-statement-security-council-missions-

yemen-south-sudan-somalia.

88. In that context, the High Commissioner urges all relevant actors to immediately

implement all the recommendations made in his 2016 report to the Human Rights

Council.54

89. In accordance with the findings of the present report and the overwhelming

circumstances that continue to prevail in Yemen, the High Commissioner repeats his

call upon the international community to establish an international, independent

investigative body to carry out comprehensive investigations of violations and abuses

of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law in

Yemen.

54 See A/HRC/33/38, paras. 71-74.

Annex I

Additional information on the situation in Yemen

Humanitarian situation1

1. Since 27 April 2017, a cholera epidemic has swept through Yemen at an

unprecedented scale. As of mid-August 2017, there were more than 500,000 suspected

cases and 1,930 related deaths across the country. More than one third of all suspected

cases affected children. The risk of the epidemic spreading further was significant, as health

and sanitation systems had collapsed or were unable to cope. Nearly half of all health

facilities were non-functional, with 14.8 million people lacking access to basic health care

and 14.5 million people without consistent access to clean water and sanitation. Every 10

minutes, a child under the age of 5 died of a preventable disease such as cholera, measles or

polio.

2. The current level of hunger in Yemen was also unprecedented. As of June 2017,

17.1 million people in the country were food insecure. Of those, 7.3 million — more than

one in four — were severely food insecure, meaning that they relied entirely on external

assistance and were on the brink of famine. In a country that was previously nearly 90 per

cent dependent on imported food, there was no longer enough. Where food was available in

the markets, people could not afford to buy. Malnutrition increased susceptibility to disease.

3. More than three million people had fled their homes to seek safety during the

conflict; one million of them had returned, but often to find their homes and livelihoods

destroyed, as well as lurking threats of unexploded ordnance. Of the two million who

remained displaced, 81 per cent had been displaced for more than one year. Nearly 75 per

cent of the displaced were from Taizz, Hajjah and Sa’ada governorates and Sana’a city,

where the conflict had hit the hardest.

Shelling

4. On 5 July 2016, in Marib city, Marib Governorate, mortar shelling struck a

residential neighbourhood, killing 8 children and injuring 12 other civilians, including 2

women and 7 children. Witnesses told OHCHR that the shelling had come from an area 25

kilometres to the west, where Houthi/Saleh forces were positioned. At the time, pro-

Government forces controlled Marib city. Local residents told OHCHR that a military camp

was located about 3 kilometres to the east of the area impacted. In addition to the civilian

casualties, 5 homes were totally damaged and 30 were partially destroyed as a result of the

attack.

5. On 16 January 2017, in Al-Mawjer village, Maqbanah district, Taizz Governorate,

mortar shelling struck a residential building, killing five civilians, including two women

and two children, and injuring five civilians, including two women and three children. The

building was completely destroyed. Witnesses told OHCHR that the mortar came from the

mountain, which was controlled at the time by Houthi/Saleh forces, while the area hit was

controlled by pro-Government forces.

6. On 1 February 2017, in Majzar district, Marib Governorate, two mortar shells struck

Al Khaniq camp for internally displaced persons, killing two civilians and injuring four

others, including two women and two children. According to witnesses, the shelling, which

struck three tents inside the camp, came from the Sareem area in a neighbouring district

that was controlled by Houthi/Saleh forcest.

7. On 12 February 2017, in Qa’atabah city, Qa’atabah district, Al-Dhale’e governorate,

mortar shelling struck a residential area, injuring four civilians, including three children

who had been playing in front of their home. Two of the injured — one adult and one girl

1 All the information in this section was provided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs.

— succumbed to their injuries the following day. At the time, the Qa’atabah city was

controlled by pro-Government forces and, according to local authorities, the shelling was

launched from an area controlled by Houthi/Saleh forces.

8. On 24 February 2017, in Al-Mujama’a area, Marib city, Marib Governorate, mortar

shelling struck a restaurant, killing three civilians, including 1 child, and injuring 12

civilians, including 1 child. According to witnesses, the shelling came from the Heylan

mountain, which was controlled at the time by Houthi/Saleh forces.

Airstrikes

9. On 7 August 2016, in Al-Madeed village, Nihm district, Sana’a Governorate, two

airstrikes hit residential and commercial buildings, killing 16 civilians, including 7 children,

and injuring 24 civilians, including 13 children and 1 woman. Moreover, four houses were

damaged and a pharmacy was destroyed. At around 7 p.m., the first airstrike hit two large

houses belonging to two brothers; 29 members of the same extended family were among

the casualties, while the remaining casualties were civilians in the vicinity. Two hours later,

the second airstrike hit a shop that sold cooking gas canisters, which caused a massive

explosion that burned down the pharmacy.

10. On 9 August 2016, in Al Sofan area, Ath’thaorah district, Sana’a Governorate, an

airstrike destroyed a food factory, killing 10 factory workers — all civilians — including 3

women, and injuring 13 others. The bodies were so charred that the victims’ families had

difficulty identifying them. Some survivors were stuck under rubble for hours before

rescuers could pull them out. OHCHR had previously verified an airstrike against the same

factory in January 2016. The factory stood adjacent to a military camp. In its response to

allegations of the attack, JIAT reported that coalition forces had hit military objectives 7 to

10 kilometres away from the factory; it denied hitting the factory itself.2

11. On 10 September 2016, on the eve of Eid al-Adha, in Bait Sadan village, Arhab

district, Sana’a Governorate, at least 10 airstrikes targeted the village, killing at least 31

civilians, including 2 children, and injuring 42 civilians, including 4 children. According to

local witnesses, the first strike hit an artesian well-drilling machine around 2 a.m., killing

five workers and injuring six others. Airstrikes then continued for the next 10 hours. Many

of those killed and injured were participating in the rescue efforts from nearby villages. In

addition to the civilian casualties, three buildings used for storing crops, as well as civilian

cars and motorbikes were damaged.

12. On 20 September 2016, in Al-Mensaf area, Al-Matammah district, Al-Jawf

Governorate, an airstrike hit a civilian vehicle, killing 15 civilians — 3 women and 12

children — and injuring 3 other children. The victims’ bodies were charred and torn into

shreds except for the three injured children who had gotten out of the vehicle a few minutes

before the attack. Local residents told OHCHR that the vehicle belonged to a farmer and

the victims were on their way to work at the farm.

13. On 17 May 2017, in Shawba area, Al-Wazi’iyah district, Taizz Governorate, an

airstrike hit a pickup truck serving as a taxi, killing 16 civilians, including 2 women and 4

children, and injuring 10 other civilians. According to witnesses, the vehicle was coming

from the market at the time of the airstrike.

14. On 17 June 2017, at Al-Mashnaq market, Shad’aa district, Sa’ada Governorate, an

airstrike hit a house, killing at least 23 civilians, including 8 children, and injuring another

civilian. Reportedly, the house, which was located a few metres from the Yemen-Saudi

Arabia border, was used by qat smugglers. According to local residents, those who

survived the airstrike tried to flee the house, but came under machine gun fire from

helicopters flying over the area about 10 minutes after the airstrike. Rescuers from

neighbouring villages were unable to reach the market for one hour owing to continuing

insecurity in the area.

2 See www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1567371.

Attacks on funeral gatherings

15. In addition to the attack on Al Kubra hall, OHCHR verified two other incidents

involving airstrikes against funeral gatherings in the past year. On 21 September 2016, in

Al Hunoud area, Al Hook district, Al-Hudaydah Governorate, an airstrike impacted a

residential area in the city centre, killing at least 28 civilians, including 2 women and 8

children, and injuring 62 civilians, including 11 women and 3 children. At the time of the

airstrike, civilians were gathering in a tent for a funeral procession of a local resident,

which accounted for the high number of casualties. The attack also destroyed 6 houses and

damaged 30 others. On 15 February 2017, in Al Shiraa village, Arhab district, Sana’a

Governorate, an airstrike impacted a two-storey house, killing five women and one child,

and injuring another eight women and two children. The house was completely destroyed.

At the time of the attack, the women and children were participating in a funeral ceremony

for the son of a community leader. Reportedly, the family of the deceased had no political

affiliations. The affected area was residential and surrounded by qat farms.

Attacks against fishermen

16. OHCHR verified six incidents of attacks against fishermen off the shores of Al-

Hudaydah in early 2017. On 3 February, a helicopter gunship fired on the tents and boats of

fishermen gathered on an island off the shores of Al-Hudaydah, killing six civilian

fishermen and injuring seven others. On 15 March, two different fishing boats were

attacked in the waters off Al-Hudaydah. The first boat was fired upon by a helicopter: two

fishermen were killed and five injured. Seeing their fellow fishermen attacked, the second

boat of fishermen tried to escape from the area but was hit by a projectile fired from a

nearby ship, which killed five civilians and injured three. Two of the casualties were boys

— one was killed and the other was injured. The next day, another fishing boat went

missing off the shores of Al-Hudaydah. The 10 civilian fishermen on board were still

missing; parts of the boat were later found burned. On 5 April 2017, four fishermen were

killed when their boat was attacked by a helicopter. On the same day, another fishing boat

was damaged as result of an attack by a helicopter in the same area. No civilian casualties

were reported as the fishermen managed to jump out of the boats as soon as the attack

started.

Casualties caused by explosive weapons

17. On 8 July 2016, in Neijad village, Al-Qabbaytah district, Lahj Governorate, four

civilians, including a woman, from one family were injured as a result of explosions along a

secondary road. The victims were traveling on foot along a road that was too narrow for

vehicle traffic. A witness told OHCHR that the first explosion triggered a second explosion

nearby.

18. On 15 July 2016, near Al-Ma’sar village, Damt district, Al-Dhale’e Governorate,

one child was severely injured when he stepped on an explosive while grazing his livestock.

19. On 9 August 2016, in Wadi Hanna village, Al-Wazi’iyah district, Taizz

Governorate, an explosive planted in the road killed 10 civilians, including 6 children, and

injured 9 civilians, including 4 children. All of the victims were travelling in the same

pickup truck-taxi. The driver had safely used the same route earlier in the day to reach the

same destination.

20. On 31 October 2016, in Al-Masar area, Damt district, Al-Dhale’e Governorate, an

explosive planted in the road killed three children and injured another civilian. The children

were riding in a pickup truck; the driver was injured.

21. On 5 November 2016, in Khour village, Jabal Habashy district, Taizz Governorate,

two children were severely injured when one of them stepped on an explosive while

grazing his livestock.

Mass detentions

22. On 10 August 2016, in Sana’a city, forces aligned with the de facto authorities

detained 68 civilians, including 22 women and 2 children, who were attending a peaceful

community event on youth development. Around 20 of those detained were followers of the

Baha’i faith, including Iranian and Iraqi citizens. The civilians were never charged and

most were released within one week. Two men, who had come to seek the release of their

wives, were detained and held for months. One of them, who was born in the Islamic

Republic of Iran and raised in Yemen, remained in detention at the time of drafting this

report.

23. On 22 October 2016, in Haqib village, Damt district, Al-Dhale’e Governorate, 40

civilian men were detained by Houthi/Saleh forces. Witnesses told OHCHR that the forces

conducted house-to-house searches and aggressive raids, and arrested civilians perceived as

sympathizers of the pro-Government forces. The detainees were transferred to various

unofficial or secret detention facilities in Ibb, Dhamar and Sana’a governorates; they were

released after several days without charge. During their detention, their families did not

know their whereabouts and were not able to visit or communicate with them.

24. On 4 December 2016, in Teiab village, Dhi Na’im district, Al-Bayda Governorate,

Houthi/Saleh forces detained 61 civilians, including 19 boys. Sixty armed men,

accompanied by armoured vehicles and a tank, conducted the operation on the main road,

stopping and searching several vehicles passing the checkpoint. The arrested civilians were

transferred to a secret prison. The mass arrest came after an attack by pro-Government

forces on Houthi/Saleh military positions in the area, the day before. Reportedly,

Houthi/Saleh forces accused local tribes in the area of failing to protect their military

positions during the attack. During the detention, the families of the civilians were not able

to visit or communicate with them. They were all released without charge — most of them

on the same day — and 12 were released after several days.

25. On 11 February 2017, in Al-Rameid IDP camp, Al-Udayn district, Ibb Governorate,

82 civilians, including 7 boys, were detained by Houthi/Saleh forces. Armed men raided the

homes in the middle of the night while the families were sleeping, causing severe panic

among the women and children in the camp. The mass arrest followed the ambush and

assassination of a Houthi military leader that morning, 10 kilometres from the camp. The

civilians were transported to an unrecognized place of detention, where they were held —

40 detainees in a single cell. Their families had no access to them during their detention.

They were released the following day without charge.

Annex II

Photographs

Figure I

Points of impact at Al Kubra Hall on 8 October 20161

Figure II

Destruction caused to Al Kubra Hall on 8 October 20162

1 Photograph taken by OHCHR staff on 9 October 2016.

2 Photograph taken by OHCHR staff on 9 October 2016.

Figure III

Boat attacked the night of 16 March 2017 while carrying Somali refugees and

migrants3

Figure IV

Destruction caused to Abs Hospital on 15 August 20164

3 Photograph taken by OHCHR staff on 18 March 2017.

4 Photograph taken by OHCHR staff on 15 August 2016.

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Annex III

Infographics

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