37/31 Summary of the biennial Human Rights Council panel discussion on unilateral coercive measures and human rights - Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

GE.17-21424(E)

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Human Rights Council Thirty-seventh session

Agenda items 2 and 3

Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the

High Commissioner and the Secretary-General

Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil

political, economic, social and cultural rights,

including the right to development

Summary of the biennial Human Rights Council panel discussion on unilateral coercive measures and human rights

Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 34/13, the Human Rights Council requested the United Nations

High Commissioner for Human Rights to organize for the thirty-sixth session of the

Council the biennial panel discussion on the issue of unilateral coercive measures and

human rights, and requested the Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) to prepare a

report on the panel discussion for submission and presentation to the Council at its thirty-

seventh session. The Office submits the present report to the Council pursuant to that

request.

2. The objective of the biennial panel discussion, held on 14 September 2017, pursuant

to Council resolution 34/13, was to increase awareness among all stakeholders, including

United Nations human rights mechanisms, of the negative impact that unilateral coercive

measures have on the enjoyment of human rights in targeted and non-targeted countries.

The discussion also offered a platform for the continuous exchange of views and

experiences among Member States, academic and civil society organizations, human rights

mechanisms and other stakeholders on the impact of unilateral coercive measures on human

rights.

3. The panel discussion focused on the resources and compensation necessary to

promote accountability and reparations. Its objective was to build consensus on the

development of basic principles and guidelines and the identification of mechanisms to

assess and mitigate the adverse impact of unilateral coercive measures and to ensure

accountability; and to follow up on and update the recommendations of the previous panel

discussions and workshops mandated by the Human Rights Council, held in 2015, 2014

and 2013, and the report of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee

(A/HRC/28/74).

4. The panel discussion was chaired by the Vice-President of the Human Rights

Council, Amr Ramadan, and moderated by the Ambassador and Permanent Representative

of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations Office at Geneva, Jorge

Valero. The panellists were the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral

coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, Idriss Jazairy; the Vice-Rector and

Head of the International Law Department at the International University MITSO (Minsk),

Alena Douhan; a member of the Advisory Committee, Jean Ziegler ; and the Independent

Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, Alfred de Zayas.

II. Opening of the panel discussion

5. The chair opened the session and gave the floor to the Director of the Thematic

Engagement, Special Procedures and Right to Development Division, Peggy Hicks, who

delivered an opening statement on behalf of OHCHR. The moderator then introduced the

topic and defined the scope of the discussion. The panellists made their initial statements,

which were followed by an interactive discussion with the participation of States and non-

governmental organizations. Panellists reacted to comments from the floor in two rounds.

The discussion concluded with the final remarks by the moderator.

6. Ms. Hicks recalled the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, which urged

States to refrain from any unilateral measure not in accordance with international law; the

Charter of the United Nations; and the call made by the Committee on Economic Social and

Cultural Rights to inject a human rights dimension into deliberations on this issue.

7. Ms. Hicks also referred to a thematic study by OHCHR (A/HRC/19/33), which

recommended that all Member States avoid the application of any coercive measures that

had negative effects on human rights, particularly on the most vulnerable. In particular, she

stressed that the positive impact that sanctions imposed with the objective of protecting

human rights could be reasonably expected to have must outweigh the negative impact, and

that the measures must be subject to appropriate human rights safeguards. Unilateral

coercive measures nonetheless continued to be imposed without full consideration of their

human rights impact, and without proper assessment, monitoring and remedy. Sanctions

often failed to provide for clear exemptions for the purchase and payment of food or

medical supplies, which led to violations of the rights to food, to water, to health – and

ultimately, to the right to life.

8. Ms. Hicks then encouraged the members of the panel to address the following

questions:

 How could sanctions be designed so that they did not render already vulnerable

parts of the population more vulnerable?

 What safeguards could be put in place when such measures were imposed?

 What review and monitoring were possible to assess the impact of measures on

human rights, and how could immediate remedial measures be taken when

sanctions had negative consequences?

 How could accountability and reparation be framed in this context?

III. Summary of the proceedings

9. During his initial remarks as moderator, the Ambassador and Permanent

Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations Office at

Geneva, Jorge Valero, recalled the summit of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held on Margarita Island, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in September 2016, where

Heads of State and Government condemned the approval and imposition of unilateral

coercive measures in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law,

particularly the principles of non-intervention, self-determination and the independence of

States subjected to such practices. Mr. Valero echoed the call for the removal of such

measures undermining human rights and which prevent people from achieving full

economic and social development.

A. Contributions of panellists

10. The Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on

the enjoyment of human rights, Idriss Jazairy, affirmed that the basic principle when

addressing unilateral coercive measures was to focus on prevention. Where such measures

were adopted and entailed a negative impact on human rights, the right to a remedy should

be effectively available and be protected at the national, regional and international levels.

The lack of such mechanisms would contravene some of the basic obligations enshrined in

most human rights treaties.

11. The Special Rapporteur described a range of differential legal mechanisms that

offered potential avenues for victims of unilateral coercive measures to claim remedies and

redress. In practice, however, such measures rarely granted the requisite degree of remedies

or redress to affected parties. Some mechanisms were only available to States, such as the

International Court of Justice, which had already considered the legality of economic

sanctions under international law. In the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and

against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), the Court’s ruling suggested

that the freedom to impose measures restricting trade with a targeted State was limited to

situations where such measures would not involve a violation of existing treaty obligations.

The Special Rapporteur suggested that the Court could be requested to provide an advisory

opinion on the legality or otherwise of unilateral coercive measures that could be in conflict

with the International Bill of Human Rights. Another inter-State mechanism was the act of

resorting to the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization in the case of

sanctions between States Members of the Organization. In such cases, the State imposing

sanctions was likely to invoke the security exceptions (art. XXI) of the General Agreement

on Tariffs and Trade. The admissibility of the defence would have to be assessed on a case-

by-case basis.

12. With regard to mechanisms directly available to affected individuals and entities, the

Special Rapporteur gave the examples of national, regional and international mechanisms.

National courts had rarely addressed cases concerning unilateral coercive measures in a

satisfactory manner. For regional mechanisms, the Special Rapporteur referred to the

example of European courts. Sanctions by the European Union were subject to full judicial

review before the European Court of Justice. He emphasized how the courts had developed,

over time, a rich jurisprudence of cases brought by individuals or entities subject to

restrictive measures. In some cases, applicants had obtained delisting from sanctions. The

European Court of Human Rights was also competent to adjudicate cases brought by

individuals or legal entities for violations of the Council of Europe Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Court had already considered

cases on sanctions, albeit in a more limited manner. Its jurisdiction was limited to the

territory of Member States or over which the latter exercised control.

13. For international mechanisms, the Special Rapporteur discussed the treaty-based

human rights bodies of the United Nations. Some of these mechanisms were, prima facie,

relevant to the situation of persons whose human rights had been infringed by sanctions.

Such mechanisms were, however, not available when the States imposing the sanctions

were not party to the relevant instrument. He argued for targeting State accountability and

liability for damages. States had not only obligations when they adopted measures

applicable to their own territory, but also extraterritorial obligations insofar as the actions of

the State could have an influence on situations abroad. A State imposing sanctions should

therefore be liable for any resulting human rights violations.

14. Although a treaty body could render a decision with regard to remedial action to be

taken by a State, such as compensation to victims, their decisions were not legally binding

on targeting States. Complaints of violations of human rights caused by the application of

unilateral coercive measures may also be submitted to the special procedures of the Human

Rights Council, or to its complaint procedure mechanism.

15. The Special Rapporteur concluded by suggesting that a compensation commission

could be set up under the Security Council or, alternatively, be established by means of a

multilateral convention. States that had imposed unilateral coercive measures on other

States could be called upon to contribute financially to such a commission.

16. The Vice-Rector and Head of the International Law Department at the International

University MITSO, Alena Douhan, argued that the impact of unilateral coercive measures

was similar to that of other threats to international peace and security, leading to negative

effects and even the destabilization of progress in the peaceful social and economic

development of peoples around the world. The debate on remedies, however, first required

a clear definition of what unlawful unilateral coercive measures actually were, taking into

account not only the mechanisms used but also their consequences and purposes, as well as

immediate and long-term responses.

17. Ms. Douhan proposed the reactivation of the fact-finding mechanisms of the

Security Council and the General Assembly as a response to unilateral coercive measures.

She also suggested making active use of the special procedures and other mechanisms of

the Human Rights Council, such as the treaty bodies and the complaint procedure.

18. With regard to immediate responses to unilateral coercive measures applied to

natural and legal persons, an individual or a legal entity should have the right to appeal to a

national court, which could assess the legality of the measures and decide, if applicable, on

the most appropriate criminal or administrative penalty. If the targeted individual or legal

entity is acquitted of the charges that triggered unilateral coercive measures, the State of

habitual residence of that individual or legal entity would be empowered to request the

cessation of the measures, which would have to be lifted immediately. In all cases, the

natural or legal entity targeted by the measures would have the right to stand trial, with the

observance of other due process guarantees.

19. Long-term responses to unilateral coercive measures should inevitably include the

drafting of a clear definition of such measures, and of criteria upon which activities could

be judged as illegal. The lack of a definition opened the way for misuse by both sanctioning

and sanctioned States. Therefore, if the means of pressure applied by a State were legal

under international law, they would not constitute unilateral coercive measures and could

not constitute grounds for accountability or reparations.

20. According to Ms. Douhan, steps should be taken at the highest level, such as by

means of a General Assembly resolution, to prevent the adoption and application of

unilateral coercive measures. When a State sought to change the behaviour of another State

leading to a dispute between them, it should seek a settlement through any peaceful means

available, for example, the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization,

which addresses the application of economic sanctions.

21. The whole system involving the application of targeted sanctions should be amended

to ensure that it offers guarantees of due process. Criminal or administrative proceedings

should be started immediately by the targeting State with simultaneous submission of

information about the party concerned to the Security Council (or the European Council in

the case of restrictive measures applied by the European Union). Targeted sanctions should

be lifted if the party concerned was acquitted.

22. Ms. Douhan concluded by pointing out that natural or legal entities should be able to

have recourse to relevant bodies that are able to decide whether a given act falls within the

scope of unilateral coercive measures, and order, if applicable, a response or compensation

from the State responsible.

23. Jean Ziegler, a member of the Advisory Committee, pointed out that unilateral

coercive measures generally violated economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the

right to autonomous development, an opinion expressed by the Advisory Committee in a

study issued some years earlier. He underlined how unilateral coercive measures constantly

violated the human rights of people living in States subjected to sanctions. The Advisory

Committee had concerned itself mainly with the way unilateral coercive measures

functioned and the way they were technically implemented. The sanctions operated on three

levels, on an ongoing basis, regardless of the State on which they were imposed. Firstly,

there was an assault on the foreign relations of the State targeted. Secondly, the State

deploying the sanctions interfered in the national economic, social and political policies in

the State on which the sanctions had been applied. Thirdly, a press campaign also

accompanied and tried to justify the sanctions.

24. Mr. Ziegler referred to the case of unilateral coercive measures applied by the

United States of America on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The measures adopted

by the President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, on 24 August 2017

affected the State’s access to financial markets. The measures had been accompanied by

interference in national politics and the economy, and by a press campaign to legitimize the

unilateral coercive measures. Mr. Ziegler also drew a parallel between the circumstances

surrounding the overthrowing of the democratically elected Government of Chile in 1973 at

the three levels with contemporary unilateral coercive measures.

25. Mr. Ziegler welcomed the work of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of

unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights and his proposal to establish

a commission to regulate and put an end to unilateral coercive measures once and for all.

26. In his statement, the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and

equitable international order, Alfred de Zayas, affirmed that the imposition of unilateral

coercive measures threatened the realization of a democratic and equitable international

order. These measures had been shown to cause immense harm to the world’s most

vulnerable populations, while granting disproportionate leverage to the powerful. In an

interconnected and unsteady world, the unilateral actions of a single State could have a

negative impact on the realization of rights across the globe. The ability of States to fulfil

their economic, social and cultural rights obligations was hampered when unilateral actions

disturbed the provision of public services or the maintenance of vital infrastructure. Human

rights and humanitarian actors had raised concern about the particular harm that unilateral

measures had inflicted on historically marginalized groups. That was why such measures

had been condemned by a majority of States on a regular basis and in a number of different

international forums.

27. The Independent Expert underlined how the contributory nature of unilateral

coercive measures to ongoing human rights situations, including those related to the supply

of weapons to armed groups, the blockade of Gaza and the targeted killings of non-State

actors, touched the fundamental United Nations pillar of international peace and security.

International stakeholders, academics and civil society had pointed out that the imposition

of unilateral coercive measures ran counter to foundational General Assembly resolutions,

in particular Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) regarding friendly relations between States.

The unifying goal of friendly relations and the obligation to avoid interference in the

internal affairs of other Member States were crucial preconditions for the peaceful co-

existence of States.

28. The Independent Expert stressed that the international law applicable to coercive

measures was remarkably clear. The Charter of the United Nations clarified that the

Security Council was the only body with the authority to impose sanctions, and even then,

only provided it had made a finding, under Article 39 of the Charter, that international

peace and security had been jeopardized. Furthermore, he endorsed the report of the Sub-

Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33)

that coercive measures must be limited in time, should not affect the innocent population,

should not aggravate imbalances in income distribution, nor generate illegal or unethical

business practices. Rather, sanctions regimes should be proved to be proportionate. They

must be periodically monitored, and terminated when it becomes apparent that they are

ineffective or result in grave human rights violations.

29. The Independent Expert argued that multilateral sanctions had been implemented

successfully in the fight against colonialism, racism and apartheid in southern Africa.

Similarly, a multilaterally agreed weapons embargo could be both legal and effective when

appropriately aimed at promoting peace and diplomatic solutions to violence. He

recommended that the harm to human rights caused by unilateral regimes should be further

exposed through the communications dialogue of the special procedures, raised in the

individual and inter-State complaints mechanisms of the treaty bodies, and debated in the

context of the universal periodic review.

30. To conclude, the Independent Expert underscored how the accountability framework

for the harm caused by unilateral coercive measures was underdeveloped. Where sanctions

had resulted in famine, conflict or mass migration, the obligation to account for and repair

the violation naturally followed. However, the political will to create and enforce this

necessary framework remained absent. He called upon the States Members of the Human

Rights Council to cooperate towards the development of mechanisms that would guarantee

recourse and reparations for communities suffering as a result of coercive actions taken by

individual States, and also defended multilateralism as the way forward.

B. Interactive discussion

31. During the plenary discussion, representatives of the following States took the floor:

Algeria, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Cuba (on behalf of a like-minded group of

developing countries), Ecuador, Egypt (on behalf of the Group of Arab States and in their

national capacity), Fiji, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Nicaragua, Pakistan (statement on

behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and in their national capacity), Qatar, the

Russian Federation, the Sudan, Tunisia (on behalf of the Group of African States), the

United Arab Emirates (speaking on behalf of Bahrain, Egypt and Saudi Arabia), Venezuela

(Bolivarian Republic of) (statement on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries

and in their national capacity) and Zimbabwe.

32. Representatives of the following national human rights institutions and non-

governmental organizations spoke: the International Council Supporting Fair Trial and

Human Rights, the Iraqi Development Organization, the Maarij Foundation for Peace and

Development, the National Human Rights Committee of Qatar, United Nations Watch and

Verein Südwind Entwicklungspolitik.

33. Most participants characterized the imposition of unilateral coercive measures as a

violation of human rights, especially when taken against developing and least developed

countries. Delegates also referenced unilateral coercive measures as having an adverse

effect on the right to development and economic, social and cultural rights, including the

right to education, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to health, the right to

food and the right to water. Some participants referred to instances where unilateral

coercive measures had had an impact on civil and political rights, in particular, the right to

freedom of movement, the right to privacy, the right to fair trial and the right to life.

34. Some speakers described unilateral coercive measures as a violation of the Charter

and the principles enshrined in the Declaration on Principles of International Law

concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the

Charter of the United Nations. They also regarded these measures as obstacles to the

achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals included in the 2030 Agenda for

Sustainable Development. Some delegations also cited General Assembly resolution 71/193

as an instrument condemning the adoption of such measures.

35. Some delegates drew a distinction between unilateral coercive measures and

sanctions applied pursuant to decisions by the Security Council. While the latter were

considered effective tools that the international community used to resolve conflicts,

unilateral coercive measures were perceived by the same delegations as a means of

collective punishment.

36. Many participants emphasized that unilateral coercive measures had

disproportionate and discriminatory effects on vulnerable groups, which deserved more

attention of States and of the Human Rights Council. Some groups especially affected by

unilateral coercive measures cited were women, children, older persons, persons with

disabilities, indigenous peoples, ethnic and religious minorities, peasants and the poor.

37. According to one delegate, even if these groups were not the primary targets of the

measures, experience showed that they were the first to suffer from their consequences.

Speakers also considered the measures inefficient and counter-productive, as they often

entrenched the leaders they were intended to affect.

38. Some participants recalled that unilateral coercive measures violated human rights

beyond the populations of targeted States. Some measures could even affect the human

rights of nationals of the targeting State.

39. According to a number of participants, unilateral coercive measures were tools in the

hands of the powerful by which more developed countries could apply pressure to

developing and least developed countries with economic and political regimes that did not

enjoy their approval. This violated general international law, as it constituted interference in

the self-determination of peoples and their right to decide on their own economic and

political systems. Such coercive measures were not only unilateral but also unidirectional,

as powerful States directed them against weaker ones. One delegation described them as

“non-military measures to put pressure on countries”, and drew a parallel between the laws

governing armed conflicts to protect civilians and the need to protect the human rights,

including the right to development, of the persons and peoples affected by unilateral

coercive measures.

40. Cases of unilateral coercive measures cited during the interactive discussion

included the recent measures taken against Qatar and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

and the measures applied against Zimbabwe, Yemen, the State of Palestine (Gaza), the

Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq during the 1990s. Non-governmental organizations also

referred to measures against specific groups, such as the Saharawi population by Morocco

and the Rohingya by Myanmar.

41. One civil society organization noted that the panellists had spoken with largely the

same perspective, despite different views on the legality and justifiability of unilateral

coercive measures. One delegate regretted the absence of more voices that considered the

measures potentially legal, since their presence would have enriched the debate. Another

speaker, while recognizing the adverse effects to human rights caused by unilateral coercive

measures, pointed out that corrupt practices of targeted States were primarily responsible

for the lack of resources for the realization of human rights. A group of States proposed that

a distinction be made between boycotts and blockades and unilateral coercive measures,

given that the former measures were justified in cases where targeted States were believed

to support terrorism.

42. A significant majority of participants urged States to refrain from adopting unilateral

coercive measures in any case. Many also called for those in a position to do so to take

measures to prevent third States from adopting unilateral coercive measures in violation of

international human rights law. Such measures were not conducive to the effective

implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and the Sustainable

Development Goals.

43. Some participants presented concrete proposals with regard to resources and the

compensation necessary to promote accountability and reparations. All mechanisms of the

Human Rights Council, including treaty-based mechanisms, Charter-based mechanisms and

the universal periodic review mechanism, should be used to address and redress violations

of human rights caused by unilateral coercive measures.

44. Many called for the creation of a dedicated mechanism of the United Nations human

rights system to ensure accountability and reparations. The aim of the mechanism would be

to prevent the application of new unilateral coercive measures, to mitigate the effects of

those in place, and to provide full reparation through restitution, compensation and

satisfaction. It could be an ad hoc or permanent body, adopted by the Human Rights

Council through a regular resolution, a declaration or a separate treaty. Delegates also

suggested the creation of a central registry to document violations of human rights as a

consequence of unilateral coercive measure. The said mechanism and the central registry

would be instrumental in the promotion of principles and guidelines to prevent further

adverse effects on human rights caused by unilateral coercive measures. They would also

contribute to democratic control of the exercise of political or economic power that affected

people’s lives, assessing whether it was compatible with the purposes of the Charter.

45. The participants in the discussion explored what a possible mechanism or body for

efficient and effective redress for victims affected by unilateral coercive measures and to

promote accountability would look like. Some wondered which specific steps would be

necessary to create such a mechanism to avoid vetoes by powerful States that impose such

measures. Other questions were concerned with the absence, insufficiency or ineffective

nature of existing mechanisms, the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on an

international democratic order and on the sovereignty of States, and the prospects of

reparations for those whose human rights had been affected by such measures.

C. Responses from panellists

46. The Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on

the enjoyment of human rights emphasized the diplomatic ambiguity of the treatment of

unilateral coercive measures in official documents, entailing different interpretations from

developing and developed countries. Some States had the view that unilateral coercive

measures violated international law, while others argued that no such presumption existed.

He noted that all States, whether developed or developing, should express their views to

permit the gradual achievement of a common understanding. He referred to

extraterritoriality as an issue on which there was a fair amount of consensus, based on

official European Union policy. International human rights law should be able to protect

people in peace time at least as much as international humanitarian law protected people in

war time. He also recalled that recently, by proclaiming the Sustainable Development

Goals, all States had renewed their commitment to the rule of law, nationally and

internationally. Since existing mechanisms were not effective enough to address the

negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on human rights, the best option was to

prevent the adoption of such measures.

47. Alena Douhan regretted the fact that debates on the issue of unilateral coercive

measures focused too much on policy rather than on the rule of law. The rule of law had to

be protected at the international level. To do so, the legal definition of unilateral coercive

measures could clarify much of the political controversies surrounding them. Targeted

sanctions were a violation in themselves, given that they did not provide procedural

guarantees. On the other hand, not all attempts to influence other States were illegal; for

example, counter measures could be adopted under the framework of existing international

law. There were mechanisms to address reparations; they did not, however, function as they

should, and effective mechanisms will not be possible until there was real dialogue on the

matter between all parties concerned.

48. Jean Ziegler noted that Qatar was the object of unilateral sanctions applied by other

States, and this had dramatic consequences for its population, given that many basic items

had to be imported into the country. The sanctions imposed on Qatar were therefore illegal

and should be lifted. In this case, the International Court of Justice would be competent to

decide on compensation to the population of Qatar. The refusal to trade with another State

was not in itself a violation of international law; but when it impeded the realization of the

right to development, it was an unlawful measure. Mr. Ziegler recalled that the Human

Rights Council first called for an end to unilateral coercive measures in 2012, when it

adopted resolution 19/32. Little had since changed in places like Gaza and Cuba, which had

suffered from the consequences of unilateral coercive measures for years. He hoped that

this would not be the case with the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Mr. Ziegler cited

former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who had once stated that, with regard to human

rights, human conscience evolved, “but at the pace of a glacier”. He concluded by calling

upon all stakeholders to strive for a new norm banning unilateral coercive measures that

violated human rights or impose obstacles to the collective right to development.

49. The Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable

international order stated that the international order was undermined when States

unilaterally imposed sanctions or blockades on other States without the approval of the

Security Council. Remedies should be granted first by the cessation of the measures, and

second by reparation to victims in both targeted States and third countries. The sanctions

against Qatar were totally incompatible with General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV),

and the State could bring an inter-State procedure before the Human Rights Committee. He

also proposed that the General Assembly request an advisory opinion on unilateral coercive

measures from the International Court of Justice. The Independent Expert emphasized that

the general principles of law were violated by blockades and other coercive measures. The

general principles were the spirit of the law, and what inspired the law; these included good

faith, estoppel and non-arbitrariness. Unilateral embargoes also constituted a violation of

pacta sunt servanda, and could be seen as a new form of colonialism. It was a usurpation of

sovereign competencies. The Independent Expert referred to the lack of good faith of many

businesses, which took advantage of investment dispute settlement procedures to the

detriment of the basic human rights of populations affected, undermining the capacity of

States to ensure these rights, but acted differently when their trade was affected by

unilateral coercive measures. In cases of the latter, they rarely brought similar disputes

before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes against targeting

States.

IV. Conclusions

50. The moderator presented the following conclusions and recommendations

drawn from the panel discussion:

(a) Unilateral coercive measures should be prevented; violations of human

rights caused by such measures could entail the international responsibility of States,

and consequently, the duty to offer reparations to victims;

(b) A clearer definition of unilateral coercive measures should guide efforts

to identify them, including in relation to possible resources and means of access to

compensation;

(c) The Human Rights Council and Member States should focus on existing

mechanisms when examining reparations for unilateral coercive measures;

(d) All States are encouraged to create domestic reparation mechanisms;

(e) The Human Rights Council should consider the establishment of a

commission of indemnification and reparation for persons who feel that their human

rights have been negatively affected by the adoption of unilateral coercive measures;

(f) The Human Rights Council should also consider creating a repository of

cases of violations of human rights that result from unilateral coercive measures.