37/72 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic
Document Type: Final Report
Date: 2018 Feb
Session: 37th Regular Session (2018 Feb)
Agenda Item: Item4: Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention
GE.18-01542(E)
Human Rights Council Thirty-seventh session
26 February–23 March 2018
Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention
Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*
Summary
For more than six years, the Commission has been independently and impartially
documenting serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
committed by the parties to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic that has claimed the
lives of hundreds of thousands. Such violations have driven more than half of the
population of the country to leave their homes. From its inception, the conflict was
characterized by the utter disregard for the civilians that the parties to the conflict purport to
represent and for international law.
The present report demonstrates once again that civilians have not only been the
unintentional victims of violence, but have often been deliberately targeted through
unlawful means and methods of warfare. Arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances,
torture, and sexual and gender-based violence have all been used against thousands of
persons in detention. Vital civilian infrastructure has been decimated by repeated attacks on
medical facilities, schools and markets. Humanitarian aid has been instrumentalized as a
weapon of war with siege warfare and denial of life-saving assistance used to compel
civilian communities and parties to the conflict, alike, to surrender or starve.
Despite this range of violations, Syrian victims have been denied any modicum of
justice. In the report, the Commission signals its intention to help victims obtain justice and
to pursue this task vigorously in the light of the evolving situation on the ground in the
Syrian Arab Republic and the various ongoing efforts to bring the parties to the conflict to
the negotiating table. Those developments provide new challenges — but also opportunities
— to pursue justice for the victims. They will require, however, affirmation by all
concerned that victims’ demands for justice and accountability are a central component of
any negotiated settlement and any durable solution to achieve peace. There can be no trade-
off between that goal and a viable political solution.
* The annexes to the present report are being circulated as received, in the language of submission only.
United Nations A/HRC/37/72
Contents
Page
I. Mandate and methodology ............................................................................................................ 3
II. Introductory remarks ..................................................................................................................... 3
III. Political and military developments .............................................................................................. 6
IV. Fall of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant .................................................................................. 9
A. Raqqah .................................................................................................................................. 9
B. Dayr al-Zawr ......................................................................................................................... 12
V. Internally displaced persons .......................................................................................................... 13
VI. Returnees and barriers to return .................................................................................................... 13
VII. Detained and missing persons ...................................................................................................... 14
VIII. Life under siege ............................................................................................................................. 15
IX. Erosion of civilian infrastructure ................................................................................................... 16
A. Hospitals .............................................................................................................................. 16
B. Schools.................................................................................................................................. 17
C. Markets ................................................................................................................................. 17
X. Recommendations ......................................................................................................................... 17
Annexes
I. Map of the Syrian Arab Republic .................................................................................................. 19
II. Siege of eastern Ghutah (Rif Damascus) ....................................................................................... 20
III. Internally displaced persons .......................................................................................................... 27
IV. Erosion of civilian infrastructure ................................................................................................... 32
I. Mandate and methodology
1. In the present report, submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 34/26,
the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic sets out
the findings of investigations conducted from 8 July 2017 to 15 January 2018 in the
country.1
2. The methodology employed by the Commission was based on best practices of
commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions. First-hand information was collected
through interviews with victims and witnesses of events in the Syrian Arab Republic.
3. In total, 513 interviews were conducted in person and remotely. The Commission
faced numerous challenges with regard to the security of interviewees, particularly those in
areas controlled by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In Raqqah and Dayr al-
Zawr, many persons interviewed by the Commission had limited access to mobile phones
and Internet connection. In all cases, the Commission was guided by the “do no harm”
principle.
4. The Commission collected, reviewed and analysed satellite imagery, photographs,
videos and medical records. Communications from Member States and reports from the
United Nations and non-government organizations were also consulted.
5. The standard of proof was considered met when the Commission obtained a reliable
body of information to conclude that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the
incidents occurred as described and that violations were committed by the party identified.
6. The Commission’s investigations remain curtailed by the denial of access to the
Syrian Arab Republic.
II. Introductory remarks
7. For more than six years, the Commission has been independently and impartially
documenting serious violations of human rights committed by the parties to the conflict in
the Syrian Arab Republic that has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands, with many
more maimed or permanently incapacitated for life. More than half the population have
been forced to leave their homes, and over 13.5 million people are in need of humanitarian
assistance.
8. What began as peaceful demonstrations calling for reforms in March 2011 was met
with a heavy-handed response by the Syrian State security and military forces, and
tragically descended into a non-international armed conflict characterized by an utter
disregard by the parties to the conflict for civilian life and international law. Civilians have
not only been the unintentional victims of the mindless violence, but have often been
deliberately targeted through unlawful means and methods of warfare employed by an ever-
growing number of regional and international actors.
9. The Commission has diligently and meticulously documented, analysed, verified
and presented to the Human Rights Council, the Secretary-General, the Security Council,
the General Assembly, regional bodies and the international community information about
this tragedy that could have been halted. Instead, the involvement of a variety of regional
and international actors and sponsors has enabled the prolongation and escalation of the
conflict rather than brought it to an end.
10. Over time, the Commission has reported on systematic violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law, including arbitrary arrests, torture in detention,
enforced disappearances, sexual and gender-based violence, attacks on medical facilities,
schools and markets, indiscriminate attacks and intentional attacks against civilians. No
party has abided by its obligations, either under international humanitarian or human rights
1 The commissioners are Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro (Chair), Karen Koning AbuZayd and Hanny Megally.
law, to protect civilians, the infrastructure that facilitates civilian life and livelihoods or
specially protected sites that form the backbone of their communities. Humanitarian aid has
been instrumentalized as a weapon of war with siege warfare and denial of life-giving
assistance used to compel civilian communities and parties to the conflict alike to surrender
or starve.
11. As a Commission of inquiry, the primary tasks of the commissioners have been to
document all serious human rights violations and war crimes, expose those responsible,
seek to bring perpetrators to account for their crimes and help the victims to achieve justice.
Efforts to promote criminal accountability through the International Criminal Court have
not been successful so far, despite the best efforts of the Human Rights Council, the
Commission, a large number of Member States committed to the promotion of international
justice and countless civil society groups. Attempts to refer the situation in the Syrian Arab
Republic to the International Criminal Court have never made it past the floor of the
Security Council. More success may be achieved through recourse to universal jurisdiction
and we welcome the fact that the number of such cases before a variety of national
jurisdictions is on the rise.
12. Additionally, Member States in the General Assembly adopted resolution 71/248 in
December 2016 aimed at promoting criminal accountability in a novel manner by
establishing the International Impartial and Independent International Mechanism to
collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes
committed during the armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. This is to be done with a
view to compiling case files to facilitate proceedings in both international and national
jurisdictions willing to prosecute perpetrators of the atrocious crimes that have been
committed during the war in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Commission welcomes this
initiative as a step forward in promoting accountability and will work closely to assist the
mechanism in achieving this goal.
13. On the question of helping victims obtain justice, the Commission intends to pursue
this task vigorously in the coming year in the light of the evolving situation on the ground
in the Syrian Arab Republic and the various ongoing efforts to bring the parties to the
conflict to the negotiating table. Those developments provide new challenges, but also
opportunities to pursue justice for victims. They will require, however, an affirmation by all
concerned that victims’ demands for justice and accountability are a central component of
any negotiated settlement and in any durable peace solution, and that there can be no trade-
off between this goal and a political solution.
14. The Commission is obliged to prioritize the justice-based needs and demands of the
Syrian people, civilians who have been trapped or held hostage in this mindless conflict and
who have suffered appalling deprivation and injustice. As such, the Commission will seek
to utilize the accumulated knowledge, expertise and verification processes gained over the
past six years to help victims achieve the justice that has eluded them so far.
15. In the present report, the Commission stresses the need to find practical remedies to
the violations that it continues to document that go beyond a call for criminal justice and to
seek solutions that could be implemented in the immediate future to build confidence
among the parties negotiating a political solution or used as factors in initiatives by the
international community to reinforce efforts to build a tangible process for sustainable
peace. In both cases, placing the needs of victims at the front and centre of initiatives and
negotiations is imperative.
16. The Commission wishes to remind the parties to the conflict and their sponsors, the
facilitators of the peace talks and the international community that the serious violations
committed since the beginning of the conflict need to be addressed as part of any process
aimed at ending the conflict and achieving sustainable peace.
17. Accordingly, the Commission wishes to propose to the Human Rights Council the
following principles and initiatives to be adhered to in all efforts aimed at bringing an end
to the conflict. They may also be used as benchmarks or reminders over the coming year of
what can be implemented immediately as part of confidence-building measures, what needs
to be done immediately upon any cessation of hostilities, and what mechanisms need to be
put in place to ensure timely progress on pressing rights issues whose resolution will help
to ensure sustainable peace:
(a) Immediately bring to an end all intentional and indiscriminate attacks on the
civilian population, including, but not limited to, hostage taking, disappearances, torture,
summary executions, sexual and gender-based violence and all acts of collective
punishment, in particular sieges.
(b) Allow immediate and unconditional access to all places of detention by
independent monitors and, at a minimum, humanitarian organizations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross. In doing so, end the practice of holding
detainees incommunicado or in secret places of detention and provide full lists of the names
of all those held in detention. This will allow the authorities to begin the process of
compiling the names of those missing or disappeared.
(c) Establish a mechanism, as part of any negotiated agreement, to enable the
speedy release of all political prisoners and those held arbitrarily and begin that process
immediately upon the signing of the agreement. In the meantime, special attention should
be given to immediately releasing the most vulnerable detainees, including children,
women, the elderly and the disabled, while talks continue. These can be considered as
confidence-building measures and applied to all parties to the conflict.
(d) Ensure that there are no pardons or amnesties for those responsible for
ordering or carrying out gross human rights violations and committing international crimes,
such as war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.
(e) Ensure in any agreement that there is immediate and timely access and
provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the conflict, in close
collaboration with United Nations agencies present in the Syrian Arab Republic.
(f) As soon as there is a cessation of hostilities, facilitate the process for
displaced Syrians and those who sought refuge outside the country to return in safety and
dignity, working closely with relevant United Nations agencies.
(g) Enable the registration of births and give access to all concerned to gain or
regain their legal identity through simplified registration mechanisms at the local and
community levels, bearing in mind that an officially recognized identity, substantiated by a
birth certificate or other identity documents, is crucial for the realization of the most
fundamental rights.
(h) Ensure access and freedom of movement throughout the country for Syrian
and international human rights monitors so that they can assess conditions, report on
compliance with commitments and assist in ensuring that rights safeguards and the rule of
law are upheld.
18. The above principles are not merely aspirational. They are doable. The Commission
has regularly reported to the Human Rights Council about the network of checkpoints
established throughout government-controlled areas where Syrians have gone missing.
Arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, false charges in military tribunals, field courts
or antiterrorism courts have all been used as a means to keep tens of thousands of persons
in detention, often incommunicado and in conditions that defy description. Deaths resulting
from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and summary executions in both
known and secret places of detention have been documented throughout the conflict.
Relatives of detainees rarely, if ever, receive information on their whereabouts, the reasons
for their incarceration or even their deaths. As a result, thousands of Syrian families have
no knowledge of whether their relatives are missing due to conflict, displacement,
detention, death or execution.
19. Armed groups and terrorist organizations have also detained people, often with no
reason or rationale, save that they want to use them for bargaining purposes. Civilians,
including individuals with relatives serving in the armed forces of the Syrian Arab
Republic, have been taken hostage to be used in negotiations for the release of their
comrades in arms or their own relatives from situations of detention. Often, the captives
belong to religious minorities and are treated abominably, held in inhumane conditions or
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Arbitrary judicial processes
have been used to justify summary executions of some detainees without any semblance of
due process or fair trial standards being met.
20. It is long overdue for the parties to the conflict to prioritize the release of arbitrarily
detained persons. This has been a key principle underlying the political process since the
Geneva Communique of 2012.2 A clear and immediate starting point that would show
willingness to end the conflict would be the universal release of women, children, elderly
men and persons with disabilities from all places of detention. This should be done now,
not only in the context of the prisoner swaps that have been taking place, but as a
commitment by all sides and as a confidence-building measure.
21. Integral to any negotiated settlement is the commitment to open up all places of
detention to humanitarian and human rights organizations, in particular the International
Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations. This should include the transparent
gesture of releasing the names of and locations where all civilians are being detained
throughout the country.
22. Given the size and scope of the caseload of missing persons, the creation of an
independent and impartial mechanism with an international mandate to coordinate and
consolidate claims, including relating to persons subjected to enforced disappearance, will
likely be essential to devising an adequate response for the families of missing persons.
Such a mechanism could be tasked with defining the key elements required to efficiently
and effectively track and identify missing persons, to help consolidate claims filed with a
wide variety of non-governmental and humanitarian organizations and to coordinate
overtures to the parties to the conflict to locate the missing or their remains. A critical
component of these efforts would be communication with and the involvement of the
families of missing persons to ensure that they are apprised of information and updates as
such data becomes available.
23. Mechanisms designed to alleviate elements of the acute humanitarian crisis
afflicting the country and to facilitate sustainable returns should also be prioritized.
Addressing the displacement of civilian populations on a scale unseen since the Second
World War will require a concerted international effort. In particular, a mechanism will be
needed to ensure that housing, land and property rights of refugees and internally displaced
persons are respected. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic must make sure that
changes to the existing legal framework also respect the property rights of all Syrians and
that any laws that are discriminatory in intent or application or that otherwise violate
fundamental human rights are repealed promptly. It will be essential to guarantee that
persons wishing to return and who have a home to return to can do so. While this is a long-
term and technical process, it requires careful consideration of the existing property laws in
the Syrian Arab Republic and any revisions or reforms to those laws should guarantee the
rights to ownership, possession and security of tenure of the civilians who left their homes
under threat or out of need.
24. In keeping with past practice, the present report draws from more than 500
interviews and encapsulates the trends over the past six months in the Syrian Arab
Republic, with particular focus on the impact of the offensive against ISIL and the use of
siege warfare on the civilian population. The Commission proposes a set of forward-
looking principles and initiatives and makes recommendations on how these can be
implemented to improve the situation of civilians in the country and help them to achieve a
semblance of justice.
III. Political and military developments
25. The Syrian conflict is entering its seventh year. New military and political dynamics
are taking shape. Numerous international mediation efforts have been carried out in an
attempt to promote dialogue between the conflicting parties and reach a political settlement.
2 See A/66/865-S/2012/522, annex.
Recent military victories by pro-Government forces have weakened the opposition and
impacted the peace talks. Reaching international consensus is complicated as the
underlying interests of the parties diverge. These trends have recently been characterized by
military victories, including by the Syrian Army and the Syrian Democratic Forces against
ISIL in Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr.
26. Despite evolving conflict dynamics in the eastern part of the country and rising
levels of violence in Idlib and eastern Ghutah (Rif Damascus), the use of ceasefires, in
some instances, has reduced violence. Most recently, a ceasefire brokered by the United
States of America, the Russian Federation and Jordan in July 2017 led to a decrease in the
levels of violence in the south-west of the country, particularly in Dar’a, Qunaytirah and
Suwaydah. More generally, July and August 2017 were characterized by Russian efforts to
operationalize local ceasefire accords with armed groups, including in northern Homs and
eastern Ghutah (Rif Damascus).
27. On the military front, the Syrian Army made significant gains against ISIL in the
oil-rich desert to retake control of Dayr al-Zawr. In that context, the United States and the
Russian Federation agreed on a “deconfliction line” along the Euphrates River whereby
areas south of the Euphrates fall under the control of the Government, the Russian
Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and areas north of the river would be
controlled by the United States and the Syrian Democratic Forces. Tensions between the
Syrian Army and the Syrian Democratic Forces over the control of strategic oil fields in
Dayr al-Zawr may escalate after the Government indicated in October 2017 that it planned
to retake the country’s natural resources.
28. At the northern front, Turkey initiated preparations for an offensive against the
Syrian Democratic Forces in Afrin (Aleppo) and intensified shelling of Kurdish-held towns
in northern Syria to diminish the influence of the Democratic Union Party. In Idlib,
Turkish-backed armed groups continued to cede territory in the face of government
advances, which has left them in isolated pockets, divided and politically marginalized. The
weakening of those armed groups enabled Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham3 to emerge as the main
actor in Idlib after it had inflicted heavy military losses on Ahrar al-Sham. Throughout the
reporting period, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham endeavoured to consolidate its foothold in north-
western Syria by incorporating smaller, locally entrenched groups in Hamah and Idlib
governorates and forcibly exerting control over the civilian administration in Idlib.
Nonetheless, widespread civilian protests hindered Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham from retaining
control of key urban centres.
29. Tensions also rose between the Government and the Democratic Union Party in late
August 2017, after the Kurdish-led authorities unilaterally announced their intention to hold
communal and local elections to consolidate administrative control over Kurdish-controlled
areas. Outbreak of the unrest in 2011 and the subsequent withdrawal in 2012 of Syrian
authorities from Kurdish territories enabled the Democratic Union Party to consolidate
power and legitimize its project to establish a de facto autonomous region. Militarily,
Kurdish forces continued to secure control over major gas and oil fields after launching a
military campaign in September 2017, with the support of the United States, to liberate
Dayr al-Zawr.
30. Following the May 2017 agreement between the Russian Federation, Turkey and
the Islamic Republic of Iran to establish de-escalation zones to reduce levels of violence in
certain Syrian governorates, the guarantor States met in Astana on 14 and 15 September for
a new round of talks to decide on the implementation of the agreement over a six-month
period in northern Homs, eastern Ghutah (Rif Damascus) and Idlib. Despite the agreement,
the situation in eastern Ghutah — under siege since 2013 — continued to deteriorate after
airstrikes and military ground operations by the Syrian Army intensified, further tightening
the siege and consequently worsening the humanitarian situation for over 390,000 confined
civilians. Infighting among armed groups moreover affected the population, despite the
3 Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is an umbrella coalition of extremist factions led by the terrorist group Jabhat
Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra).
ceasefire negotiated between Faylaq al-Rahman, Jaysh al-Islam and the Russian Federation
in July and August.
31. Russian and Syrian forces escalated aerial operations in early October 2017 on Idlib
and Hamah after Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham opened an offensive against Government positions
in northern Hamah. The campaign focused on the remaining opposition pockets in Idlib and
north-eastern Hamah as well as on retaking strategic infrastructure such as the Abu Duhur
airbase (see para. 76). Turkish troops concurrently moved into Idlib as part of an operation
to enforce a de-escalation zone, while simultaneously shelling Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
positions in support of a Free Syrian Army advance. In the central part of the country, after
a four-month long military campaign, Syrian Democratic Forces declared Raqqah liberated
from ISIL on 20 October 2017, and established a civil council to administer the city.
32. Military campaigns accelerated throughout November 2017, with the Syrian Army
scoring major victories in the south, and declaring on 3 November that it had taken full
control over the city of Dayr al-Zawr. In the north-west, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham continued
to lose its military sway after the defection of two large components — Nour al-Din al-
Zenki and Jaysh al-Ahrar. The defections created hostilities between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
and Nour al-Din al-Zenki and triggered violent clashes in western Aleppo. In an attempt to
end the clashes, both groups signed an agreement in mid-November, which resulted in an
immediate cessation of hostilities.
33. On the diplomatic front, the presidents of the United States and the Russian
Federation signed a statement on 11 November 2017 at the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation summit in Vietnam, highlighting the need for a constitutional reform process
and the scheduling of United Nations-supervised elections in the Syrian Arab Republic. On
21 November, a day before the beginning of the Turkish-Iranian-Russian tripartite summit
on the Syrian Arab Republic, President Putin and President al-Assad agreed that the
military operation in the Syrian Arab Republic was coming to an end and they emphasized
the need to launch a political process that would encompass a Syrian national dialogue
congress to be held in Sochi, Russian Federation. With diverging Russian and American
opinions over the future role of United States troops in northern Syria, Kurdish aspirations
for self-determination as well as efforts to reach a political settlement in Sochi will remain
contentious issues and no doubt impact efforts to build international consensus on the
political settlement to the crisis. Saudi Arabia also endeavoured to shape the peace process
by hosting a meeting in Riyadh, from 22 to 24 November, aimed at forming a joint
delegation that would represent different factions of the Syrian opposition at the next round
of Geneva peace talks. At the end of the meeting, the Syrian opposition issued the Riyadh II
declaration, in which it announced the creation of a 50-member body to participate in the
Geneva talks and engage in direct negotiations with the Government, without
preconditions.
34. On 28 November, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Staffan de
Mistura, opened the eighth round of intra-Syrian peace talks in Geneva, which focused on
the constitutional process and the scheduling of United Nations-supervised elections in the
context of implementing Security Council resolution 2254 (2015). The delegation of the
Government of the Syrian Arab Republic postponed its departure for the talks following the
publication of the Riyadh II statement, which, according to the Government, contains a
precondition for President al-Assad to leave the country. Although the Special Envoy
extended the talks until 15 December, the goal of holding direct talks between the
Government and the opposition was not achieved.
35. On 11 December 2017, President Putin visited Humaymim airbase (Ladhiqiyah) to
announce the withdrawal of a significant part of the contingent of Russian troops following
the declaration by the Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces that the country has been
completely liberated from ISIL. On 21 and 22 December, the Government of Kazakhstan
hosted the eighth round of the Astana talks, which focused on the situation in the de-
escalation zones and the issue of releasing detainees. At the end of the meeting, the
guarantor States issued a joint statement announcing the beginning of preparations for the
Syrian National Dialogue Congress to be held in Sochi on 29 and 30 January 2018. In
response, more than 40 opposition groups called for a boycott of the Sochi congress,
claiming that the Russian Federation was seeking to bypass the United Nations-facilitated
intra-Syrian talks in Geneva.
IV. Fall of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
A. Raqqah
36. As early as February 2012, the Commission expressed concern that the conflict
carried the risk of radicalization4 and, since then, it has consistently documented violations
by terrorist and extremist groups. Through the use of indiscriminate attacks or attacks
against civilians, often with sectarian undertones, these groups had been responsible for
countless deaths of men, women and children. On 2 October 2017, ISIL carried out a
suicide bombing in the Maydan neighbourhood of Damascus city, killing 17 persons,
including several police officers, and injuring 20 others. Similar attacks had been carried
out by the terrorist group against internally displaced persons who had fled battles in
Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr, killing and wounding dozens, including women and children
(see annex III, para. 14).
37. Since 2013, ISIL had prioritized the building of a “state” or “caliphate”. By targeting
local leaders and activists and exploiting social fragmentation and economically desperate
communities, it quickly gained control over a considerable swathe of territory in the
country, with Raqqah city serving as its de facto capital. Designated a terrorist group by the
Security Council, ISIL became synonymous with brutality.5 The Commission has reported
on its findings of genocide,6 crimes against humanity and war crimes7 committed by ISIL.
38. In November 2016, the Syrian Democratic Forces announced that it would be
launching “Operation Wrath on the Euphrates” aimed at capturing Raqqah governorate.
After quickly advancing across the governorate, in June 2017, the Forces launched the last
stage of the operation to take control of Raqqah city. Their ground offensive was carried
out together with extensive air support from the international coalition.8 Although by mid-
October, the Forces and the international coalition had successfully ousted ISIL, the battle
for Raqqah city was marked by violations committed by all sides and came at an extremely
high cost to civilians. At the height of the operation, the international coalition conducted
about 150 airstrikes daily that resulted in the destruction of much of Raqqah city9 and large
numbers of civilian casualties. In an attempt to escape the violence, some 200,000 people
left their homes, with no choice but to move to camps for internally displaced persons
managed by the Syrian Democratic Forces, where they were held in internment (see annex
III, paras. 12–18). Some of the few who stayed in the city were used by ISIL as human
shields to prevent advances by enemy forces.
1. International coalition airstrikes
39. On the night of 20 to 21 March 2017, at approximately 11 p.m., United States-led
coalition forces carried out an airstrike against Al-Badiya school in Mansurah (Raqqah), an
area that was under ISIL control at the time. The Commission initially reported on that
incident in July 201710 and its findings are detailed in annex IV below (paras. 7–11). The
Commission conducted 20 interviews with survivors, relatives of victims, rescuers, village
4 See A/HRC/19/69, para. 124.
5 See A/HRC/27/CRP.3.
6 See A/HRC/32/CRP.2.
7 See A/HRC/27/CRP.3.
8 Since 2014, an international coalition of more than 60 countries joined together to combat ISIL
through a variety of means, including airstrikes.
9 United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Operational Satellite Applications
Programme (UNOSAT), “Syria: Ar Raqqa/Ar Raqqa governorate”, Imagery analysis taken 21 October 2017, published 1 December 2017, available at http://unosat-maps.web.cern.ch/unosat-
maps/SY/CE20130604SYR/UNOSAT_A3_Raqqa_Damage_Points_20171021.pdf.
10 See A/HRC/36/55, para. 79.
residents and individuals on site after the airstrike and concluded that the school had been
housing internally displaced families since 2012. Of more than 200 residents in the school,
150 were killed. The Commission identified 12 survivors, several of whom had sustained
serious injuries, including severe burns and loss of limbs. Among the survivors there were
four women and six children, the youngest of who was a 10-month-old baby.
40. During a briefing of journalists on 28 March 2017, the Combined Joint Task Force
established by the international coalition took responsibility for the strike, claiming that it
had targeted 30 ISIL fighters whom it claimed were using the school. The Task Force stated
that it could not corroborate that the school was used by internally displaced persons.
41. Information gathered by the Commission does not support the claim that 30 ISIL
fighters were in the school at the time of the strike, nor that the school was otherwise being
used by ISIL. Rather, the status of casualties and the nature of the Al-Badiya building is
widely divergent from the international coalition’s assessment. Information that residents of
the school were internally displaced families, including a large number of women and
children, and that the school had been used to shelter internally displaced persons since
2012 should have been readily available to the coalition’s targeting team. The Commission
therefore concludes that the international coalition should have known the nature of the
target and failed to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects, in violation of international
humanitarian law. The subsequent investigation conducted by the international coalition
should have been able to identify the high number of civilian casualties resulting from this
incident.
2. Ground operations of the Syrian Democratic Forces
42. As part of forced conscription campaigns in areas under its control, the Syrian
Democratic Forces continued to conscript men and children for military service throughout
the reporting period. Conscripts, including children as young as 13, receive basic training
before being deployed to active frontlines. In July 2017, two boys, aged 15 and 16, enlisted
with the Syrian Democratic Forces in Tabaqah (Raqqah). The youngest subsequently
sustained an arm injury in battle. In another instance, one Raqqah resident who had fled the
city in mid-July 2017 was stopped with his family upon arrival in the territory held by the
Syrian Democratic Forces and interrogated by a Kurdish teenage boy in uniform. Although
less frequent, girls have also been recruited; a teenage girl was recruited by the Syrian
Democratic Forces in Raqqah in October 2017. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, which the Syrian
Arab Republic adopted in 2003, sets — without reservation — 18 years as the minimum
age for direct participation in hostilities, recruitment into armed groups and compulsory
recruitment into armed forces by governments.
43. The Commission received reports that the Syrian Democratic Forces asked returnees
to Tall Abyad (Raqqah) to volunteer one man from each family for military service, which,
in effect, prevented some families from going back to their homes. In other instances,
families have opted to move away from areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces to
avoid reprisals, including arrest, for refusing conscription. Forced conscription of men has
also been reported in internally displaced persons camps, and some men have been arrested
for refusing to join the Forces.
44. Journalists and activists have been intimidated and arrested for reporting on alleged
violations committed by the Syrian Democratic Forces and the international coalition in
Raqqah city, Tall Abyad and Tabaqah. In several instances, the Forces arrested and
detained relatives of the wanted activists for periods of up to six weeks in order to obtain
information about their whereabouts and pressure the activists to come forward. The Syrian
Democratic Forces also arrested relatives of members of the Free Syrian Army and ISIL for
interrogation. Several of those detained were women and children, including a 16-year-old
girl and a 10-year-old boy. Family members reported being denied information on the
detainees, including the location of the detention facility and the reason for their detention.
Some male detainees were reportedly beaten and burnt with cigarettes and did not receive
medication for chronic illnesses such as diabetes.
3. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
45. In June 2017, the Syrian Democratic Forces and affiliated groups, including the Free
Syrian Army and tribal elements from Raqqah governorate, 11 primarily, encircled and
gained control over parts of Raqqah city with air support from the international coalition.
By then, an estimated 200,000 residents had left the city, but some 50,000 remained trapped
inside. While most of those who could do so left the city, others such as the elderly and the
infirm had no choice but to remain. Some interviewees said that they had decided to remain
because they feared that ISIL would confiscate their homes if they left. Initial reports that
ISIL was preventing civilians from leaving emerged in late June 2017 and continued until
the end of the offensive to repel ISIL from Raqqah city in October.
46. As the Syrian Democratic Forces gained territory, it became more difficult for
civilians to escape. Before June 2017, ISIL allowed some civilians, including the sick, to
move to Raqqah countryside under their control. However, once the Syrian Democratic
Forces encircled the city, ISIL stopped the practice and ordered residents living in the
outskirts of the city to move to the centre. In early August, ISIL ordered a family in Albu
Saraya neighbourhood to move to another building, which was hit by an airstrike two hours
later. An estimated 30 civilians were killed in that strike. After the encirclement, it also
became increasingly difficult for civilians to escape to the south using the old bridge over
the Euphrates River, as the area became a frontline and ISIL planted landmines in areas
where it lost control, forcing many civilians to pay smugglers to guide them through those
areas.
47. ISIL used a variety of means to prevent civilians from leaving Raqqah city,
including ordering civilians to move from neighbourhoods whose control it had lost to the
Syrian Democratic Forces, as well as using snipers and landmines. An extended family
consisting of more than 20 people were reportedly leaving the city in mid-July after the
Syrian Democratic Forces approached their neighbourhood, but ISIL ordered them to move
to a western area which was still under its control. When the family sought to escape at
night using the old bridge, they were shot at by ISIL snipers. Fortunately, no one was
injured. Another group using the same route in early August was shot at by ISIL snipers;
and four people, including two women and a disabled 11-year-old girl, were killed when a
landmine exploded.
48. By ordering civilians to move to areas that it controlled and actively preventing them
from leaving by sniping and laying landmines, ISIL attempted to render Raqqah city
immune from further attack by using civilians as human shields. By deliberately placing
civilians in areas where they were exposed to combat operations, for the purpose of
rendering those areas immune from attack, ISIL militants committed the war crime of using
human shields in Raqqah governorate.12 Further, interviewees recalled that, from a doctrinal
viewpoint, ISIL considered those attempting to leave Raqqah city as apostates who were
leaving dar al-Islam (the territory of Islam) towards dar al-harb (the territory of war) and
as such they were targetable.
49. Despite the fact that civilians were being used as human shields, international
coalition airstrikes continued apace on a daily basis, resulting in the destruction of much of
Raqqah city and the death of countless civilians, many of whom were buried in improvised
cemeteries, including parks. Some of those interviewed said that they had attempted to
recover bodies from under the rubble, but were often unable to owing to the lack of heavy
machinery. As the number of fatalities mounted, international agencies expressed concern
about the risk that the bodies posed to public health, including the spread of diseases.
11 Those elements were mainly from Al-Sanadid Forces militia and Jabhat Thuwar al-Raqqah front.
12 See, for example, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Radovan
Karadžić, case No. IT-95-5/18-T, judgment of 24 March 2016 (four volumes), p. 199, para. 525.
B. Dayr al-Zawr
50. As in Raqqah, successful military operations to recapture Dayr al-Zawr from ISIL
militants were marked by concerted aerial attacks, carried out primarily by pro-Government
forces, which in effect served to compound the suffering of thousands of civilians who had
been living under ISIL for over three years. ISIL militants encircled Government-held
neighbourhoods in Dayr al-Zawr city in June 2014 and denied all commercial and
humanitarian access to the besieged population. On 22 August, pro-Government forces
officially launched an offensive to recapture Dayr al-Zawr and broke the three-year ISIL-
laid siege on parts of Dayr al-Zawr city on 5 September.13
51. After two months of clashes, the Syrian Ministry of Defence announced that
Government forces had gained full control of the city. On 6 December 2017, Syrian State
television proclaimed that Dayr al-Zawr governorate had been liberated from ISIL. That
was echoed by the Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces on the same day, who also
announced that the Russian forces had taken over Dayr al-Zawr city on 3 November.
Despite those pronouncements, pro-Government aerial operations against remaining ISIL
targets appeared ongoing, particularly in certain swathes of desert terrain.
52. Civilians who were able to flee Dayr al-Zawr recalled the level of destruction they
had witnessed; the majority consistently described how some 80 per cent of the city had
been severely damaged due to airstrikes. 14 Numerous witnesses reported that pro-
Government forces made no distinction about military objectives and that hundreds of
civilians in residential areas had perished in airstrikes.
53. Prior to September 2017, ISIL militants actively prevented civilians from leaving
Dayr al-Zawr by employing street patrols, who operated mostly in the evening. Any civilian
attempting to leave Dayr al-Zawr was apprehended and taken to the nearest hisbah (ISIL
police) station, where he or she was either made to pay a fine for disobedience or corporally
punished by whipping. After September, when aerial attacks markedly intensified and ISIL
began losing control over the population, the ensuing chaos rendered hisbah street patrols
unfeasible and ISIL resorted to the use of checkpoints. As in Raqqah, ISIL deliberately
placed civilians in harm’s way in order to render areas immune from attack, which amounts
to the war crime of using human shields.
54. Unable to cope with the scale of the offensive against them, in September 2017,
ISIL began a campaign to forcibly conscript new recruits, by issuing a decree ordering the
conscription of all men between the ages of 20 and 30. To implement the decree,
checkpoints were established in both the city and countryside. Buses and taxis were stopped
and searched, and male passengers were made to attend religious repentance (istitabah)
lessons, followed by military training. After a few months, the men were sent directly to the
frontlines.
55. By September, as ISIL lost control of the population, tens of thousands of civilians
headed north towards Kurdish-held areas (see annex III). Hundreds of others, however,
attempted to cross the Euphrates River on ferries previously used to transport cargo,
vehicles and cattle. On 11 and 12 September, pro-Government forces attacked ferries
crossing the Euphrates at Kharita. On 11 September, at approximately 10.30 a.m., between
40 and 50 individuals were on board the Kharita ferry when pro-Government forces
launched an aerial strike against it. 30 civilians were killed, many having drowned.
Witnesses maintained that there were no ISIL militants aboard the ferry.
56. Similarly, on 9 and 10 September, at Al-Bouleel crossing point, pro-Government
forces launched aerial attacks against ferries set to depart on the Euphrates. On 9
September, at approximately 11 a.m., an aerial attack hit the Shamia al-Jazeera crossing
point where civilians attempting to flee were waiting. At least 32 civilians were killed in the
13 See, for example, A/HRC/31/68, paras. 127–129 for siege of Dayr al-Zawr by ISIL. 14 UNITAR, UNOSAT, “Syria: Deir Ez Zor, Deir Ez Zor governorate, Imagery analysis done 9
November 2017, published 21 November 2017, available at http://unosat-maps.web.cern.ch/unosat-
maps/SY/CE20130604SYR/UNOSAT_A3_Deir_Ez_Zor_Damage_Points_20171109_Optimized.pdf.
attack, including women and children. Photos of remnants provided by interviewees
indicated that RBK-250 and RBK-500 cluster bombs were used. The use of cluster
munitions in civilian populated areas is inherently indiscriminate (given their typically wide
dispersal pattern and high dud rate, which continue to endanger civilians years after the
cessation of hostilities). They are therefore prohibited by customary international
humanitarian law. Their use by pro-Government forces in Dayr al-Zawr city constitutes the
war crime of indiscriminate attacks in a civilian populated area.
V. Internally displaced persons
57. At least 6.5 million Syrians have been displaced within the Syrian Arab Republic as
a result of hostilities, including almost 3 million children. Well over one million Syrian
civilians were displaced in 2017. Displacement comes in many forms. In some instances,
pro-Government forces have repeatedly attacked civilian infrastructure in besieged areas,
leading to the displacement of civilians who were able to flee, and thousands of civilians
have been forcibly displaced in the framework of reconciliation, which often entails local
truces and evacuation agreements.15
58. Many civilians who were forcibly displaced from opposition-held areas found
themselves accommodated in schools in Idlib, which were ill-prepared to receive them.
Others had no choice but to reside in overcrowded camps or unfamiliar towns, where they
lacked basic resources. In Idlib and the neighbouring Aleppo countryside, internally
displaced persons live under near-constant bombardment (see paras. 77–79) and do not
receive sufficient humanitarian aid. Pursuant to evacuation agreements, pro-Government
forces have transferred populations sympathetic to it to areas under Government control in
Homs, Tartous and Ladhiqiyah governorates, where conditions are starkly better.
59. In other situations, civilians have been displaced as a result of hostilities or have fled
in advance of clashes. Operations against ISIL in Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr triggered one
of the single largest waves of internally displaced persons since 2011. By June 2017, tens of
thousands of Syrians from Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr had begun perilous journeys to
escape, crossing frontlines and risking landmines, to relocate to desert camps administered
by the Syrian Democratic Forces in northern Raqqah and Hasakah governorates. The total
number of persons who fled Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr stands at 320,000. In northern
Raqqah and Hasakah, the Syrian Democratic Forces have interned 80,000 internally
displaced persons in order to vet them for possible connections to ISIL. Irrespective of the
legitimacy of a security threat, the blanket internment of all internally displaced persons
from Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr by the Syrian Democratic Forces cannot be justified.
Among the civilians currently interned are women, children, the elderly and infirm,
disabled persons and others who do not represent any imperative security threat and whose
continued detention is manifestly unnecessary on any grounds. In many instances, the
ongoing internment of those individuals amounts to arbitrary deprivation of liberty and the
unlawful detention of thousands of individuals.
VI. Returnees and barriers to return
60. In addition to the precarious situation of those who have been internally displaced
within the country, up to 600,000 Syrians have returned from abroad and are also internally
displaced persons since they could not return to their homes. Throughout Raqqah city,
booby traps and landmines planted by ISIL and explosive remnants from airstrikes prevent
the feasibility of civilian return. No civilians who had been forcibly displaced to Idlib under
local truces and evacuation agreements have returned to their homes.
15 The Commission has previously documented the forcible displacement of civilians by Government
forces from eastern Aleppo city (see A/HRC/34/64, para. 93), Madaya (Rif Damascus), Barza,
Tishreen and Qabun (eastern Damascus) (see A/HRC/36/55, para. 35) to Idlib governorate.
61. Many internally displaced persons were displaced multiple times as a result of
conflict or difficulties concerning security of tenure and rising food and housing prices in
their places of displacement. In addition to the thousands who have been internally
displaced as a result of hostilities in Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr, large numbers of previously
displaced persons in Idlib were again displaced in November and December 2017. The
waves of displacement impose constraints on host communities as demand pushes up rental
and commodity prices, while employment opportunities remain limited. Displaced persons,
in particular female-headed households, suffer disproportionately to access basic rights,
including the right to adequate housing.
62. The risks associated with the conflict, including the likelihood of violence,
discrimination or detention constitute barriers preventing certain communities from
returning to their places of origin immediately. Furthermore, the massive scale of
destruction and contamination from explosive remnants of war throughout the country
serve as long-term barriers which will require significant resources and political will to
clear and make safe contaminated areas, reconstruct homes and infrastructure, and restore
the fragmented social fabric of Syrian communities.
63. In this context, the Commission continues to receive reports concerning actual and
proposed changes to the legislative framework on housing, land and property rights that
have the potential to seriously limit the ability of internally displaced persons and refugees
from returning to their homes. For instance, Law No. 33 of 2017 regulating the
reconstitution of lost or partially damaged title deeds, which was approved by Presidential
Decree on 26 October 2017, sets out detailed criteria for the identification and
administrative and legal reconstitution of lost or damaged title deeds in respect of
immovable property.16 Although the provisions of the law, in particular its notification
procedures, appear to comply with the right to a fair hearing, the law does not appear to
address the situation of internally displaced persons or make provisions for their
notification should they have a stake in decisions to reconstruct their titles either
administratively or judicially.
64. Other laws that may impact the ability of internally displaced persons to access their
properties are under consideration. For example, there have been reports that a recent draft
law in the Syrian Parliament, which requires payment of US$ 8,000 to be exempted from
military service and imposes financial penalties on those who fail to report or pay, also
provides for the possibility of seizure by the Government of movable and immovable
property. 17 Although the draft law had not been officially promulgated at the time of
drafting the present report, interviewees believed that it was unofficially in force and they
highlighted the difficulties that internally displaced persons faced to access reliable legal
information concerning issues impacting property rights, which represents another barrier
to their right to return to their places of origin.
VII. Detained and missing persons
65. Throughout the Syrian Arab Republic, civilians continued to be arbitrarily arrested,
tortured and held in inhuman conditions of detention. All parties to the conflict routinely
denied detainees due process and fair trial rights. Detainees released in 2017 from
Government-held facilities, including the Aleppo and Damascus Political Security
branches, described being beaten during interrogation to provide information or to force
confessions.18 Overcrowded cells, lack of adequate sanitation and lice infestations caused a
variety of ailments, including the spread of skin infections. In many cases, detainees were
released after their families paid bribes to the officials.
16 See www.sana.sy/?p=649244, “A law regulating the reconstitution of a lost or damaged real estate document”, 26 October 2017.
17 See www.sana.sy/?p=656572, “The People’s Assembly approves a draft law concerning those who have passed the mandatory age for compulsory service and another on linking the public register of
workers in the State with the Ministry of Administrative Development”, 8 November 2017.
18 See also A/HRC/31/CRP.1.
66. Across Raqqah, Dayr al-Zawr, and Hamah governorates, ISIL detained civilians
accused of violating its rules or suspected of cooperating with enemy forces, members of
minority religious groups, journalists and activists accused of reporting on alleged
violations committed by the group. In late July 2017, ISIL arrested and beat a young man in
southern Dayr al-Zawr governorate for possessing Internet cables, accusing him of assisting
Government forces. In another incident, in mid-October, the group arrested some 40
members of the Druze community in Hamah countryside thereby continuing its practice of
arbitrarily detaining religious minorities.
67. Some anti-Government armed groups used makeshift detention sites in areas under
their control to hold civilians. For example, on 1 November 2017, Nour al-Din al-Zenki
detained three civilians, including a member of the Free Education Directorate, in Darat
Izza (Aleppo). The arrests took place during clashes with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Aleppo
governorate. During a month of detention, at least two of the detainees were beaten, kept in
solitary confinement and forced to fingerprint a confession. Two of the detainees were
released after being brought before a “military” judge of the armed group.
68. During the course of operations in Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr, Syrian Democratic
Forces claimed that they had detained 1,397 “terrorist” fighters, the majority of whom are
or were ISIL members, including hundreds of foreign fighters from as many as 30
countries.19 Women and children associated with ISIL were also being held. While Syrian
Democratic Forces had indicated that it was seeking to return foreign fighters, spouses and
children to their countries of origin, they reported that States had thus far declined to
repatriate their nationals, which left them in legal and administrative limbo. Syrian
nationals held as ISIL fighters will reportedly be “judged” by “courts” affiliated with Syrian
Democratic Forces.
69. International human rights law and humanitarian law impose clear obligations on
States and all parties to non-international conflicts regarding the treatment and protection of
persons in their custody. Regardless of the lawfulness of their detention, detainees are
entitled to conditions of detention that respect their inherent dignity under article 3 that is
common to the four Geneva Conventions as well as customary international humanitarian
law.
VIII. Life under siege
70. Over the past five years, the use of siege warfare has affected civilians more than
any other tactic employed by the warring parties, and is consistently characterized by denial
of the rights to freedom of movement, food, water, education, health care and the right to
life. The most devastating of the sieges was that of eastern Aleppo that was laid by pro-
Government forces between July and December 2016.20 Close to 420,000 Syrian civilians
remain confined in besieged locations and 90 per cent of them now subsist in dire
circumstances in eastern Ghutah (Rif Damascus). An additional 2.9 million Syrians live in
areas that are hard to reach by humanitarian actors. Pro-Government forces, armed groups
and terrorist organizations have routinely denied the delivery of vital foodstuffs, health
items, and other essential supplies to besieged civilian populations in an effort to compel
the surrender of armed groups governing them. As noted by the Commission21 in January
2016, Government forces used starvation as a method of warfare in the siege of Madaya
(Rif Damascus), which constitutes a war crime. 22 Starvation has led to severe acute
malnutrition and has had a disparate impact on expectant mothers and children.
Malnutrition is exacerbated by the routine denial of medical evacuations.
19 See People’s Defense Units, “2017 Balance sheet of war — Syrian Democratic Forces”, press release, 3 January 2018, available at www.ypgrojava.org/2017-Balance-Sheet-of-War-%E2%80%93-Syrian-
Democratic-Forces.
20 See A/HRC/34/64.
21 See A/HRC/31/68, para. 120.
22 See International Committee of the Red Cross, rule 156.
71. The protracted siege of eastern Ghutah (see annex II for details), is now entering its
fifth year. Like that of eastern Aleppo city, the siege of eastern Ghutah by pro-Government
forces has been characterized by the lack of access to sufficient food, limited deliveries of
humanitarian aid and the denial of medical evacuations. The Commission has documented
the use of prohibited chemical weapons and cluster munitions in densely populated areas
and attacks against civilian and protected objects, including schools and hospitals. Although
they are protected objects, hospitals in besieged areas struggle to operate in damaged
facilities that have been the object of repeated attacks,23 and often without the most basic
equipment and medication for which delivery has been denied. Fearing bombardments
against hospitals, expectant mothers have often opted to give birth at home without medical
assistance. The Security Council, through its resolutions 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and
2258 (2015), authorized the unconditional delivery of humanitarian assistance, including
medical assistance, to besieged and hard-to-reach communities countrywide. Nonetheless,
the brutal siege of eastern Ghutah and surrounding areas in Damascus endures.
IX. Erosion of civilian infrastructure
72. Since the inception of the Syrian conflict, attacks against civilian and protected
objects by all parties have been a grotesque feature, in violation of international
humanitarian law. Hospitals, places of worship, civil defence centres, densely-populated
residential areas, homes, bakeries, markets and, to a lesser extent, schools have been razed
by indiscriminate attacks or, more commonly, have deliberately been targeted for attack.
Children throughout Syria remain disproportionally vulnerable to violence and abuse, and
continue to be denied the protection to which they are entitled under the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, to which Syria is a party.
A. Hospitals
73. Nowhere have attacks against civilian and protected objects been more apparent than
against hospitals and medical facilities in opposition-held areas, including those besieged
by pro-Government forces. Those attacks markedly increased in frequency as of October
2015. Over the past two years, numerous hospitals and medical facilities have been
operating from reinforced basements or caves dug into the mountains, with the aim of
reinforcing them from exposure to attack. Out of fear of attack, health-care administrators
have ceased using a distinctive emblem as is generally required by international
humanitarian law.
74. Hospitals, medical units and medical personnel are afforded special protection under
international humanitarian law because of their specific humanitarian function. Parties to a
conflict must take additional, specific measures prior to targeting such objectives. In no
instances recorded, however, have pro-Government forces or armed groups ever given
warning prior to attacking hospitals, medical units or civil defence centres. The lack of
warnings and the absence of military objectives within and near hospitals demonstrate that
pro-Government forces deliberately target medical infrastructure as part of their war
strategy, which constitutes the war crime of intentionally targeting protected objects.
Furthermore, deliberate attacks against medical staff and ambulances constitute the war
crimes of intentionally attacking medical personnel and medical transport.
75. During the period under review, the Commission documented the ongoing pattern of
deliberate attacks by pro-Government forces on hospitals in Idlib (see annex IV, paras. 2–
6), Hamah (see annex III, para. 21) and eastern Ghutah (see annex II, paras. 25–28).
23 See A/HRC/34/64, paras. 30–40.
B. Schools
76. Between September and December 2017, as Government ground forces in Aleppo
and Hamah advanced towards Idlib from the north, east and south, pro-Government forces
concurrently launched a series of airstrikes against at least seven schools in the Aleppo
countryside bordering Idlib. All but one attack were carried out at times when children were
not present, evincing a pattern intended to decimate the structures and minimize civilian
casualties. Affected schools were located in a militarily strategic area leading up to Abu al-
Duhur airbase and the railway connecting Aleppo and Damascus. After laying two years of
siege, Jabhat al-Nusra militants and affiliates captured the Abu al-Duhur airbase from
Government forces in September 2015.24 Details on the attacks against schools in Aleppo
can be found in annex IV, paras. 7–18. The Commission has also documented attacks
against schools in the context of the siege of eastern Ghutah by pro-Government forces (see
annex II, paras. 20–23).
C. Markets
77. The pattern of attacks affecting crowded market places continued during the
reporting period.25 For example, on 13 November 2017, minutes after 2 p.m., a series of
airstrikes hit the main market as well as surrounding houses and the Free Syrian police
station in Atarib (Aleppo). The airstrikes killed at least 84 people, including 6 women and 5
children, and injured another 150 or so. The impacted site was located in a densely civilian-
populated area. In addition to shops, restaurants, commercial offices and family homes, two
schools operated nearby (see annex IV, paras. 19–31 for details).
78. Information available indicates that the strikes were conducted by a Russian fixed-
wing aircraft using unguided weapons, including blast weapons. The use of such weapons
in a densely civilian-populated area was certain to impact civilians. Some interviewees
claimed that there had been ongoing infighting between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Nour
al-Din al-Zenki in western Aleppo governorate. The Commission also received conflicting
information about a possible target.
79. All parties in a conflict must distinguish between legitimate military targets, on the
one hand, and civilians and civilian objects, on the other, and use methods or means of
combat that are directed at a specific military objective. There is no evidence to indicate
that the above-mentioned attack deliberately targeted civilians or the Atarib market.
However, the use of unguided bombs, including blast weapons, in a densely civilian
populated area may amount to the war crime of launching indiscriminate attacks resulting
in death and injury to civilians.
X. Recommendations
80. In addition to the recommendations made below, the Commission reiterates the
recommendations made in its previous reports.
81. The Commission recommends that parties to the conflict in both their conduct
in military operations and their role as negotiating parties:
(a) End violations against the civilian population, including summary
executions, hostage-taking, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture, and
sexual and gender-based violence;
(b) Disclose the locations of all places of detention, whether they are official,
secret and/or makeshift, as well as provide complete lists identifying all detainees;
24 See A/HRC/31/68, para. 107.
25 See A/HRC/28/69, annex II, paras. 2–8; A/HRC/30/48, paras. 34–35; and A/HRC/31/68, para. 77.
(c) Allow unconditional access to all places of detention by independent
monitors, and, at a minimum, humanitarian organizations such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross;
(d) Release children, women, the elderly and the disabled from all detention
centres as advocated by the Special Envoy for Syria;
(e) Establish a mechanism, as part of any negotiated agreement, to enable
the swift release of all political prisoners and others held arbitrarily;
(f) Ensure that perpetrators of crimes are held to account and that any final
settlement does not include amnesties for gross violations of human rights, genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity;
(g) End siege tactics to ensure that there is immediate and timely access and
provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the conflict;
(h) Ensure that the right to return is fully respected and facilitated by
guaranteeing that all return movements are voluntary and subject to informed
consent to places of origin and protect all property or tenancy rights.
82. The Commission recommends that the international community:
(a) Support an independent mechanism with an international mandate to
coordinate and consolidate claims regarding missing persons, including persons
subjected to enforced disappearance;
(b) Ensure that United Nations agencies and major donors among Member
States and regional organizations make the provision and facilitation of
reconstruction funding and assistance contingent upon the fulfilment of benchmarks
on accountability and human rights protection.
83. The Commission recommends that the international coalition:
(a) Take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to the civilian
population, including by reviewing all tactical guidelines related to targeting in the
conduct of aerial operations;
(b) Conducts further investigation into allegations of airstrikes resulting in
civilian casualties, including by interviewing witnesses, and make their findings
public.
84. The Commission recommends that pro-Government forces:
(a) Cease using unguided weapons and weapons with wide-area effects,
including cluster munitions and blast weapons, in densely civilian populated areas.
Annexes
Annex I
[English only]
Map of the Syrian Arab Republic
Annex II
Siege of eastern Ghutah (Rif Damascus)
I. Evolution of the siege
1. Situated just northeast of Damascus, the rural enclave of eastern Ghutah is
administratively part of the Rif Damascus governorate. It had originally been heavily
forested, though with the expansion of Damascus, many neighbouring areas, particularly
those in the north, were steadily cleared for development. Over the past 50 or so years, due
to rising housing costs in Damascus, many people began relocating to villages on the
outskirts of Damascus city. As a result, eastern Ghutah eventually became an extension of a
greater Damascus. Of the cities in eastern Ghutah, Douma was the largest prior to the 2011
uprising, with a population of 600,000, and, at the time, the seventh largest city in the
country. The total population of eastern Ghutah prior to the uprising was 1.5 million
individuals. According to the most recent census conducted by the civilian local council in
eastern Ghutah, around 390,000 individuals currently subsist in the enclave, comprising
less than 70,000 families, with just shy of 100,000 of them internally displaced persons.
Over 90 per cent of all besieged Syrian men, women, and children currently reside in
eastern Ghutah.
2. Government forces initially laid siege to the opposition-held enclave in April 2013,
where after soldiers at checkpoints began imposing stringent restrictions on the entry of
humanitarian aid, including by impeding the delivery of food and vital medicine. On some
occasions, soldiers demanded bribes to grant entry of even the most basic commodities. For
the vast majority of the duration of siege, checkpoints served as opportunities for extortion,
with pro-Government forces and armed groups both profiting off the desperation of the
confined population.
3. Since 2013, inhabitants of eastern Ghutah have been incinerating plastic to generate
electricity, when all fuel products coming from Government-held areas ceased. The process
was completed by burning the plastic down, distilling and filtering it, and producing
kerosene, benzene, and diesel. Civilians further produced natural gas by digging holes,
filing them with animal waste, and covering them with plastic. By early 2015, Government
forces had cut access to water in Douma. Besieged civilians began digging underground
wells. Some 600 wells were dug and manual pumps installed to supply neighbourhoods
with water. Children created seesaws on some pumps and played on them, in order to also
pump water.
4. Between July 2014 and February 2017, residents of eastern Ghutah primarily relied
on an elaborate network of manmade tunnels to smuggle in food and medicine, which
helped to alleviate their suffering. Owing to bribery, food and commodities were also
occasionally smuggled inside the besieged area through formal routes and sold in local
markets at elevated prices. Many of those tunnels were de facto closed by pro-Government
forces in February 2017 upon their recapturing of large swathes of municipalities in the
eastern Damascus area (e.g., Barza, Tishreen, and Qabun), and further closed as part of a
local truce implemented between pro-Government forces and opposition groups in Qabun
that May (see A/HRC/36/55, annex III, para. 6).
5. Since May 2017, the official closing of tunnels in eastern Ghutah has compounded
the effects of the siege to unparalleled levels. International organisations including the
United Nations have to seek and obtain Government permission prior to aid deliveries,
efforts which are routinely denied. Aid deliveries on 30 October and 12 November were
wholly insufficient. Supplies on 30 October, for example, were only granted for 40,000
individuals in the towns of Kafr Batna and Saqba. In December, pro-Government forces did
not allow any humanitarian aid into eastern Ghutah. Over the preceding months, aid
reached only ten or maximum 20 per cent of people in besieged areas countrywide. Though
intended to be de-escalation zone, aid deliveries into eastern Ghutah have been denied by
pro-Government forces more often over the reporting period than in 2016.
6. Eastern Ghutah is currently under the primary control of two armed groups, namely
Jaysh al-Islam (the Islam Army) and Faylaq ar-Rahman (the Rahman Legion). Both
factions have consistently been attacking Government-held Damascus city with unguided
mortars that have killed dozens of civilians, amounting in each instance to the war crime of
launching indiscriminate attacks.1 Other groups present in eastern Ghutah include Ahrar al-
Sham, which controls the area of Harasta, and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which maintains
control over certain pockets.
7. Infighting between the terrorist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Faylaq ar-Rahman
on one side, and Jaysh al-Islam on the other was rampant in April and May 2016, in April
2017, as well as over July and August 2017. The impact of armed group and terrorist
organisation infighting posed grave risks to civilians living under their control. Specifically,
civilians were denied freedom of movement within the enclave, which impacted upon their
ability to access farmlands. The inability to cultivate land and produce food locally led to
an increased reliance on the use of tunnels. Prior to their closing, however, infighting
between rebel factions also affected the regularity of tunnel access.
8. In September 2017, Government forces closed the Wafidin crossing point close to
Douma, which served as an entry point for goods and which was manned by pro-
Government forces on one side and by Jaysh al-Islam on the other. By November, prices
for basic commodities surged drastically. One kilogram of sugar now costs between 10,000
and 16,000 Syrian lira. One kilogram of tea costs 100,000, of salt 20,000, of vegetable oil
12,000, and one box of powdered milk between 20,000 and 25,000 lira. Many families in
eastern Ghutah currently subsist on $10 to $15 USD a day, though the cost of living would
require a salary of $50 to $100 USD per family per day. While seasonal vegetables remain
available, very little red meat or poultry can be found.
9. Just as pro-Government forces markedly heightened aerial and ground operations on
eastern Ghutah in September 2017, cases of acute malnutrition become more prominent,
with several children having since died of preventable illness such as organ failure
exacerbated by malnutrition. The Commission has documented numerous instances in
which children suffered immeasurably as a result of malnutrition in eastern Ghutah. Around
the same time, women began increasingly experiencing difficulties producing breastmilk
due both to malnutrition and stress, further leading to malnutrition of their babies. Many
individuals throughout eastern Ghutah are currently subsisting on one meal a day.
10. Siege conditions have further pushed armed actors in eastern Ghutah to loot food
and medical supplies from civil society organisations and aid warehouses. Reportedly, on
19 October, at approximately 11 p.m., a group of around 40 armed men wearing balaclavas
attacked a Provincial (governorate) Council aid warehouse in Hammourieh. They had
spread across the centre of Hammourieh and erected a checkpoint 25 metres away from the
warehouse. The armed men broke down the door, stormed the warehouse, and carried
stored foodstuffs out and into trucks parked at the entrance. Due to their masks, civilians
near the scene were unable to identify any of the armed men. Around one hour after the
attack, beleaguered civilians rushed to the warehouse and began taking foodstuffs as well,
rendering the warehouse empty of its stocks. On the same evening, another Provincial
Council aid warehouse had been attacked by armed men, as well as a third the next
1 Both factions have consistently been attacking Government-held Damascus city with unguided
mortars that have killed dozens of civilians. After the tightening of the siege in February, armed
groups began increasingly relying on rockets capable of reaching mid- and long-range areas. For
example, on 17 November, a woman was left severely disabled after armed groups launched rockets
into Damascus. On 19 November, shortly after 3:00 pm, armed groups located in Jobar or Harasta
launched an improvised, 20-metre range rocket from the besieged enclave which struck a crowded
city street (Mazza 86) on which two schools are located. One witness recalled hearing the typical
“whistle” of the rocket, followed by a large explosion. Three civilians were killed in the attack, and their car destroyed. Minutes later, a similar rocket landed in an open area some dozens of meters
away. Similarly, dozens more civilians died on 20 November when armed groups launched attacks
against Damascus city. The Abdullah bin Rawaha mosque was reportedly damaged on the same day.
morning. Several similar incidents occurred throughout late October, including in other
areas such as Beit Sawa.
11. The United Nations Security Council has issued numerous resolutions calling “on all
parties to lift all sieges on populated areas, including in … Eastern Ghouta” (Res. 2139);
expressing deep disturbance “by the continued, arbitrary and unjustified withholding of
consent to relief operations and the persistence of conditions that impede the delivery of
humanitarian supplies to destinations within Syria, in particular to besieged and hard-to-
reach areas” (Res. 2165); and expressing grave concern at the “the use of starvation of
civilians as a method of combat, including by the besiegement of populated areas” (Res.
2258). Despite these resolutions, the brutal siege of eastern Ghutah endures.
12. The UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, has further commented that
“besiegement belongs in the Middle Ages”. 2 The siege of eastern Ghutah has been
characterised by pervasive war crimes including the use of prohibited weapons, attacks
against civilian and protected objects, starvation as a method of warfare leading to severe
acute malnutrition, and the routine denial of medical evacuations. Indeed, Government
forces routinely deny humanitarian evacuations for wounded and sick civilians and fighters
until surrender (truces) and subsequent evacuation, granting it only in rare instances when
successful exchanges can be carried out (see A/HRC/36/55, para. 27).
II. Use of prohibited weapons
A. Chemical weapons
13. During the period under review, Government forces continued to use chemical
weapons against armed group fighters in eastern Ghutah. After using chlorine against
Faylaq ar-Rahman fighters in Ayn Tarma, Zamalka, and Jowbar (Damascus) in early July
(see A/HRC/36/55, para. 71), the Commission documented the use of chemical weapons
against Ahrar al-Sham fighters in Harasta. In the early morning hours of 18 November, a
number of weapons fell on the Harasta frontline. Minutes later, 25 fighters suffered from a
combination of symptoms including blurred vision, unconsciousness, contracted pupils,
shortness of breath, nasal secretions, vomiting, and headaches. Two other fighters who
went to the rescue reported experiencing similar symptoms. Victims were taken to a
medical point where their clothes were removed, they were washed with water, and given
oxygen, atropine, and pralidoxime. There were no fatalities. Most of the fighters were
released from the medical point within 24 hours, though some reported suffering from
symptoms up to three days later.
14. The symptoms reported and treatments described are consistent with a small-scale
chemical attack involving an organo-phosphorous pesticide. The small number of
casualties, the absence of fatalities, and the relatively mild symptomology with quick
recovery all suggest that a small dose of chemical agent was released on the Harasta
frontline. Some interviewees also reported that it rained shortly after the attack, which
would have limited effects farther away.
15. The information available is insufficient to establish the weapons delivery system.
Some victims said they did not see the weapon that caused the explosion, which released
white smoke, and others said it was caused by an artillery shell. Second-hand information
suggesting the agent originated from a hand-grenade, which would be an extremely
unlikely delivery system, was denied by victims. While the Commission is unable to
establish the delivery system, it notes that the attack follows a pattern of Government forces
using chemical weapons against fighters in eastern Ghutah, including in three instances in
July, and that there are no documented incidents of armed groups using organo-
phosphorous pesticides. Interviewees consistently said they believed the weapon originated
2 UN NEWS CENTRE, ‘Medieval’ sieges, barrel bombs are ‘disgusting reality’ in Syria — senior UN officials, 23 June 2016, available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54308#.Wlu0BK6
nHIU.
from Government forces positions. It is therefore concluded that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that Government forces used chemical weapons in Harasta on 18
November.
16. The use of chemical weapons is prohibited under customary international
humanitarian law regardless of the presence of a valid military target, including when used
against enemy fighters, as the effects of such weapons are designed to cause superfluous
injury and unnecessary suffering.
B. Cluster munitions
17. Pro-Government forces further used cluster munitions in densely populated civilian
areas on at least three occasions in eastern Ghutah during the period under review,
continuing a pattern previously documented in Douma (Rif Damascus),3 Aleppo,4 Dayr al-
Zawr,5 and Idlib.6 All three documented incidents took place over the span of four days.
Given their typically wide dispersal pattern and high dud rate, which continues to endanger
civilians years after a cessation of hostilities, cluster munitions are inherently indiscriminate
weapons when used in densely populated civilian areas. In such cases, including the two
incidents described below, their use constitutes the war crime of launching indiscriminate
attacks in a civilian populated area.
18. At around 7 a.m. on 15 November, residents in Saqba awoke to the sound of
explosions, which injured seven persons, including one girl. Approximately half an hour
later, another explosion was heard. Eyewitnesses recalled that a few seconds later, a
number of smaller bombs exploded. In total, ten persons were injured including two women
and four children under the age of 15. Subsequently, on 18 November, at around 3.30 p.m.,
three weapons struck a residential area in Hammourieh. When rescuers were arriving to the
hospital with those injured by the first weapon, a second weapon released numerous
bomblets hitting the vicinity of the hospital, which was located in a residential area. One
man was killed and at least 25 persons were injured in the second incident, including three
children, one of whom received surgery. Images of weapons remnants taken at the scenes
of the 15 and 18 November incidents show multiple 3-O-8 rocket assisted mortar cargo
canisters and their O-10 submunitions. These are cluster bombs fired from either the M-240
towed mortar or 2S4 Tyulpan self-propelled mortar gun, both of which are systems that
Syrian and Russian forces are known to possess.
19. Throughout the afternoon of the following day, on 19 November, Douma was struck
by a series of weapons resulting in the killing of six persons, including one child. The
weapons impacted residential areas and al-Quwatly street, one of the city’s main shopping
streets. Of the 143 injured in Douma throughout that day, 25 were women and 26 were
children. The victims sustained varying degrees of injuries with 50 requiring
hospitalisation. Photos provided by interviewees display typical fragmentation pattern from
cluster submunitions on concrete and a parachute for a O-10 cluster submunitions deployed
from rocket-assisted 240 mm cluster bombs.
III. Attacks against protected objects
A. Schools
20. Over the span of three weeks, between mid-October and early November, an
alarming number of schools and kindergartens were impacted by bombardments in eastern
Ghutah. Incidents that occurred in October were caused by ground shelling; in November,
schools were hit with air dropped munitions. Fearing further attacks, the majority of schools
3 A/HRC/34/CRP.3, paras. 57 and 59.
4 A/HRC/34/CRP.3, para. 54; A/HRC/34/64, paras. 33–35. 5 A/HRC/34/CRP.3, para. 58.
6 A/HRC/34/CRP.3, para. 56; A/HRC/36/55, para. 65 and annex II, para. 18.
were closed down, leaving thousands of children deprived of education. While schools may
be made the object of attack when used for military purposes, such attacks require prior
warning when the school is located in a densely populated civilian area, as would be the
case for the incidents documented. In none of the following incidents, however, were
warnings issued.
21. At around 10.40 a.m. on 16 October, a shell fell in a lane next to the Ghosn Zeitoun
school in Kafr Batna. More than 150 children were gearing up to leave the school after
attending classes, when an explosion was heard, later identified by interviewees as a shell
likely fired from pro-Government forces’ positions. A female teacher and her 8-year-old
daughter who were leaving school were killed by shrapnel, and the teacher’s 5-year-old son
sustained injuries to one leg and his hands. Following the incident, the school reduced the
number of shifts, operating only from 6 to 9 a.m.
22. On the morning of 31 October, at 10.30 a.m., a shell hit the playground of the
Mohammad Nasser Ash’Osh primary school for boys in Jisreen. The school, attended by
more than 400 pupils, is located in the centre of Jisreen, surrounded by residential
buildings. There is a kindergarten across from the school. As with the incident on 16
October on the Ghosn Zeitoun school, students had just finished classes. The shell killed
five boys aged eight to 11 years, and an elderly man who was selling candy close by. At
least 26 other boys were injured, as well as one girl in the vicinity. Several of the injuries
required immediate surgery, with one boy’s feet having been amputated. The school’s gate
and one wall were destroyed. Following the incident, the school adopted an “emergency”
schedule, holding only two classes a day.
23. In one single day, on 8 November, three schools were impacted by airstrikes in
eastern Ghutah. The same school complex hosting the Ghosn Zeitoun school, previously hit
on 16 October, was struck again though this time by an airstrike. At 1 p.m., an airstrike hit
the pavement in front of Basma Amal school, also in Kafr Batna, causing severe damage to
the classrooms. Shortly afterwards, at 2.30 p.m., an airstrike hit the Tamayoz kindergarten
in Hammourieh. About 240 children attend the kindergarten, which is adjacent to a
hospital. There were no casualties among pupils in any of the 8 November incidents, as the
Education Directorate instructed all schools to close for security reasons just two days
prior.
B. Hospitals
24. Attacks on medical facilities are one of the longest running patterns of violations of
the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. In besieged areas, hospitals often operate from
damaged facilities that have been made the object of repeated attacks over years (see
A/HRC/34/64, paras. 30–40), and without the most basic equipment and medication.
Hospitals, clinics, and medical points are regularly attacked for attending to the wounded,
as part of a strategy to erode the viability of civilian life in opposition-held areas. Attempts
to protect the facilities by changing their names or moving underground have often proved
unsuccessful (see A/HRC/36/55, paras. 62–66). Hundreds of medical workers have been
killed and injured, and countless others have sought refuge abroad. Together, these factors
have resulted in a severe weakening of the medical system countrywide, with devastating
impact on besieged civilians, particularly vulnerable groups such as children, expectant
mothers, the elderly, and those with chronic illnesses. During periods of intense
bombardment, such as the one in eastern Ghutah on 8 November, the hundreds of casualties
in need of care far exceed the capacity of hospitals to provide it, resulting in inadequate
treatment and preventable deaths.
25. On 13 September, at 1.30 p.m., two artillery shells hit Al-Hekma hospital in Kafr
Batna, with two more shells landing in its immediate vicinity. Al-Hekma hospital is the
main trauma facility of the area. As the hospital had been hit several times in previous
years, medical staff stopped using the building’s upper floors, which were more frequently
impacted in the other attacks. The 13 September attack resulted in four people being
injured, among them two patients, including a woman, and one hospital worker. The
emergency and recovery rooms were also both damaged, as was hospital furniture including
beds, tables, and a solar panel. Medical staff said they believed that the attack was carried
out as reprisal against them for having treated a large number of civilians who were injured
in pro-Government forces’ bombardments in the days preceding the shelling.
26. Between 14 and 17 November, 84 people were reportedly killed and another 659
injured. On the afternoon of 20 November, when hospitals were overwhelmed with
casualties, shells believed to have been launched from pro-Government forces’ artillery
positions in Al-Maliha impacted the Kafh hospital and its surroundings in Kafr Batna. One
shell hit the roof of the hospital damaging water tanks and electrical installations. A second
shell hit the front of the hospital’s main entrance injuring a hospital worker in the head.
Another two shells landed near the hospital, killing a woman and her four children,
including two girls, aged between 2 and 11-years-old.
27. In both incidents, interviewees denied the presence of fighters or other military
objectives in the hospitals. No warnings were issued prior to the attacks. Hospitals, medical
units, and medical personnel are afforded “special protection” under international
humanitarian law as a result of their specific humanitarian function, and parties to a conflict
must take additional, specific measures prior to targeting such objectives. Throughout the
entire Syrian conflict, in no instances has the Commission documented that pro-
Government forces ever gave warning prior to attacking hospitals or medical units. Such
attacks constitute the war crime of intentionally targeting protected objects.
IV. Medical evacuations
28. Until the initial closures of tunnels in February, only about 80 patients out of 700
estimated to be in need were able to leave eastern Ghutah to obtain treatment in Damascus
city. Those who left fell into two categories: one group were patients, such as those in need
of open-heart surgeries, who could only obtain treatment in Damascus as it was the only
city with the required specialists. The second group were patients, including those requiring
dialysis, who could be treated in eastern Ghutah were it not for the fact that siege conditions
prevented the required medication and equipment from reaching those in need. In both
groups, specific difficulties were faced by men and women. Men under the age of 42 risked
being conscripted by Government forces once they reached Damascus city. Further, if a
husband left for treatment, life for his wife and children became increasingly difficult.
Women and girls in need of medical care faced additional challenges as armed groups in
eastern Ghutah only allowed them to travel if accompanied by mahram (male guardian). In
practice, this meant that a seat for evacuation that could have been taken by another patient
was instead used for the mahram who did not medically need it.
29. After the complete closure of tunnels in May, all movement of patients was halted,
leading to a desperate situation for those sick and wounded. Healthcare practitioners
reported that the closure of tunnels led to shortages of medical equipment and medication,
which — compounded by malnutrition — exacerbated existing medical conditions for
countless civilians.
30. By early October, an estimated 368 patients, including 101 women and 48 children,
required urgent medical evacuation. Among them were two girls under the age of three, one
requiring heart surgery and the other chemotherapy. Requests for evacuations were
submitted to the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and followed a heavily bureaucratic
process including having to go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of
Health, and obtaining authorisation by all parties controlling checkpoints along the route
patients needed to take. In October, a woman and 14-year-old girl were taken to Damascus
for treatment but reportedly only because they were exchanged for a member of Faylaq al-
Rahman. Another four patients were reportedly evacuated in October.
31. By December, the number of patients requiring evacuation had risen to 529. In an
attempt to assist the gravest cases, 29 patients with severe injuries and chronic diseases
were selected for immediate evacuation. While waiting for evacuation, at least two children
died, and nine men refused to leave eastern Ghutah because they feared being arrested by
Government forces. Their names were replaced with those of other patients. Requests to
pro-Government forces for guarantees that patients would not face reprisals went
unanswered. Between 26 and 28 December, 29 patients were evacuated to Damascus in
exchange for a number of civilians held by armed groups in Douma (see A/HRC/36/55,
paras. 46–48).
V. Conclusion
32. Entering its fifth year, the siege of eastern Ghutah has been marked by increasingly
cynical means and methods of warfare, which have led to the worst documented cases of
malnutrition over the course of the Syrian conflict. Characterised by pervasive war crimes,
including the use of prohibited weapons, attacks against civilian and protected objects,
starvation leading to severe acute malnutrition, and the routine denial of medical
evacuations, the siege of eastern Ghutah continues to primarily affect the hundreds of
thousands of civilians subsisting in the besieged enclave. The Commission has thoroughly
documented how all parties to the conflict use siege warfare in order to erode the viability
of life under the control of opposing sides, in an attempt to compel surrender (see
A/HRC/36/55, para. 18). On the part of armed groups operating in eastern Ghutah,
concerted, indiscriminate attacks using unguided mortars continue to kill and injure dozens
of civilians in Government-held Damascus city.
Annex III
Internally displaced persons
1. Beyond civilian casualties and destruction of civilian property wrought by
campaigns to combat and ultimately defeat ISIL in Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr,1 aerial and
ground operations during the period under review triggered one of the single largest waves
of internally displaced persons since the inception of the conflict. By June, tens of
thousands of Syrian men, women, and children from Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr began
perilous journeys to escape both locales by crossing active frontlines and risking landmines,
only to relocate to desert camps administered by the SDF in northern Raqqah and Hasakah
governorates. The total number of displaced persons who fled Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr
since July stands at over 319,000 individuals — comprising at least 90,000 from Raqqah,
and at least 229,000 from Dayr al-Zawr.
2. Beginning in May, the SDF, Asayish (Kurdish civilian police), and Kurdish military
intelligence employed a systematic vetting procedure to assess the threat of all individuals
fleeing Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr for possible connections to ISIL. Tens of thousands of
individuals who fled clashes were required to cross checkpoints and register in SDF-
controlled camps for vetting, where SDF confiscated every encamped individual’s
identification documents (national card, family booklet, and/or passport). SDF initially
established three emergency transit points where displaced persons transferred through
prior to being sent on to larger camps: two are located in southern Hasakah (al-Karama and
al-Shadadi camps), and one northwest of Raqqah city (al-Twehnah camp).
3. As hostilities increased so too did the rate of internally displaced persons,
whereupon four larger, informal camps/managed sites administered by SDF began
receiving hundreds of daily new arrivals. These camps currently host approximately 20,000
internally displaced persons in each, totalling at least 80,000 individuals. They are scattered
throughout desolate areas in Kurdish-held northern Syria, and located in al-Sad near Arisha,
and Mabrouka village (Hasakah), and Ain Issa Cotton Factory and Slouk village (Raqqah).
4. Through the use of road closures, checkpoints, and the requirement of transit
permits, SDF created a coercive environment whereby Syrians displaced from Raqqah and
Dayr al-Zawr who fled north were left with no choice but to transit through camps,
amounting to de facto detention from the moment of capture. Many were driven to the
camps in pickup trucks by armed SDF, while those able to find and pay smugglers evaded
the vetting process. During the reporting period, conditions throughout all camps failed to
meet satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety, and/or nutrition. 2 SDF
soldiers further regularly extorted money from internally displaced persons in exchange for
food, water, and for returning their identification documents to leave the camps. Though
located primarily in the Syrian desert, the advent of winter has rendered encamped
internally displaced persons more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.
A. Conditions in camps of internally displaced persons
5. Displaced persons in al-Sad, Mabrouka, and Ain Issa Cotton Factory camps
frequently reported a lack of even the most basic resources in each, though to varying
degree. In al-Sad (Hasakah), some internally displaced persons recalled sleeping on the
desert soil upon arrival because no tents were provided to them. Those in need of medical
treatment often were not granted medical evacuations to a city hospital in Hasakah unless
they could pay SDF camp authorities. One encamped civilian described only witnessing a
1 See A/HRC/37/72, paras. 36–41 and 50–56. 2 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, United Nations Economic and Social Council,
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998 [hereinafter “UN Guiding Principles”], at Introduction 3(c), and Principles 18–19.
physician onsite when children required care. At times, access to food was limited to one
loaf of bread per day. Access to water was also limited, with one 20-litre tank distributed
per day per family, which had to be rationed for cooking, drinking, and sanitation.
6. On 22 October, civilians in al-Sad camp organised a protest against SDF, hoping
their demonstration would allow them to leave. The protest was ultimately quelled after
SDF soldiers fired their guns into the air. Ultimately, once vetted, some internally displaced
persons were still forced to pay $100 to exit al-Sad camp. One family was forced to pay
$100 per vehicle to leave, even though the SDF administration lost their identification
documents. The same family was unable to depart towards Kurdish-held areas, and was
instead diverted by SDF towards northern Idlib. There, displaced for the second time, they
were met again by tents in the winter.
7. Equally inadequate living conditions were echoed by civilians in Mabrouka camp,
located in Ras al-Ayn countryside (Hasakah). There, internally displaced persons recalled a
lack of access to sufficient food, water, and medical care, though tents, mattresses, and
blankets were distributed to new arrivals. Additional water had to be purchased, with 20
litres costing over $9 USD. Some civilians spoke of the water being unpotable and causing
diarrhoea in children. One family recalled being given only four cans of sardines upon
arrival. In order to cook, they were forced to burn their clothes to maintain fires, while other
families lacked the means to purchase prohibitively expensive food sold by SDF soldiers.
8. Mabrouka camp further lacked sanitary latrines, which prompted open defecation
and exposure to infectious disease. In numerous instances, no doctors were onsite, and
internally displaced persons recalled being placed under the care of paramedics whose
medical assistance was limited to dispersing paracetamol. Expectant mothers in Mabrouka
were left particularly vulnerable, as the camp lacked specialised maternity care. Only those
women who could afford to pay SDF authorities were taken to a nearby hospital to deliver,
while those who could not delivered babies on unhygienic campgrounds with the support of
other displaced women. As in al-Sad, civilians in Mabrouka camp also organised a protest
against deplorable living conditions on 15 December.
9. Some internally displaced persons in Mabrouka explained how SDF targeted certain
families for forced conscription, while those who did not have sons were reportedly made
to pay $300 USD to SDF soldiers. Numerous interviewees described Mabrouka camp as
being akin to a “prison”, with complete restrictions on movement and no possibility to
receive visitors. One encamped civilian, unable to wait out his vetting, paid $68 USD to an
SDF member in order to obtain a “departure permit”, while others paid up to $100 USD
each.
10. Equally inadequate living conditions were reported by civilians who transited
through Ain Issa Cotton Factory camp (Raqqah). There, civilians recalled how one loaf of
bread was sold to them by SDF members for $3 USD. Owing to living conditions inside the
camp, specific pathologies emerged including diarrhoea and skin disease. On 24 August,
the SDF officially admitted to “a very large shortage of medical staff, medicines, and
teachers” at Ain Issa. 3 On 27 August, the SDF further conceded unsatisfactory living
conditions when it announced a fumigation campaign to deal with “the problem of snakes,
scorpions, and poisonous desert animals” at the camp, which it noted posed a particularly
harmful threat to children.4 Women and girls were also particularly affected due to a lack of
adequate latrines, with many recalling having waited until dark to relieve themselves in
open areas due to fears of assault, humiliation, as well as the cultural sensitivity of using a
latrine which was also being used by males.
11. Civilians further lamented the camp’s desolate location by recalling limited mobile
network signals, which inhibited their ability to communicate with family. On the rare
occasion journalists were admitted to Ain Issa, they were required to interview encamped
residents in the presence of an SDF escort.
3 FORCES SYRIA DEMOCRACY, Ain Issa Camp Under Microscope, available at www.sdf-
press.com/en/2017/08/ain-issa-camp-under-microscope.
4 FORCES SYRIA DEMOCRACY, Insecticide Spraying Campaign Inside Ain Issa Camp, available at
www.sdf-press.com/en/2017/08/insecticide-spraying-campaign-inside-ain-issa-camp.
B. Internment by Syrian Democratic Forces
12. All individuals who fled from Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr were forced to reside
within fenced, camp-like sites in al-Sad, Mabrouka, and Ain Issa while their identification
documents were assessed for individual vetting. Families with identifying documents issued
by ISIL were disproportionally affected however, as SDF authorities did not recognise
these documents as legitimate which led to more prolonged vetting periods. The transit time
for vetting procedures averaged between a few days to eight weeks, though internally
displaced persons were not made aware any details of the underlying process. Once cleared,
only those individuals or families who were able to locate a kafīl or “guarantor” in Kurdish-
held areas were authorised to leave the camps towards those areas. Similar requirements of
“guarantors” were imposed for onward movement towards FSA-held Jarablus (northern
Aleppo). The desolate locations of camps and confiscation of mobile phones by SDF
soldiers in some camps complicated opportunities to secure a “guarantor” for many
internally displaced persons. Many others had no choice but to head west towards Idlib,
while SDF have forced some families to return to Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr after landmine
clearances.
13. Internment, or administrative detention, for the purposes of vetting civilians believed
to pose a security threat may only be justified when absolutely necessary to address
“imperative reasons of security”,5 and a case-by-case evaluation must take place in relation
to every individual prior to detaining him or her. The internment of civilians may not be
used solely for interrogation or intelligence gathering. All internees must have been
informed promptly, in a language he or she understood, of the reasons for internment, and
all had the right to challenge, with the least possible delay, the lawfulness of his or her
detention in these camps. The review of lawfulness of internment must be carried out by an
independent and impartial body.6
14. The threat of ISIL attacks against Kurdish-held areas was exemplified on 3 May,
when ISIL militants attacked Rajm as-Salibi camp (Hasakah) just before dawn, killing at
least 30 civilians including women and children. Similarly, on 12 October, ISIL militants
detonated two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices at Al-Malha checkpoint in Abu
Fas village, bordering Hasakah and Dayr el-Zawr, where approximately 7,000 internally
displaced persons were gathered for initial SDF screening. The suicide attack killed 40
internally displaced persons, including women and children, and injured dozens of others.
Several suspected ISIL terrorists have since been identified as a result of SDF-run vetting.
The SDF is currently detaining nearly 1,400 “terrorist” fighters, primarily ISIL militants
identified as such, including hundreds of foreign fighters from up to 30 countries.7
15. Irrespective of this threat, the blanket internment of all civilians from Raqqah and
Dayr al-Zawr cannot be justified by SDF. Among those civilians currently interned are
women, children, elderly, infirm, disabled persons, and others who did not represent an
imperative security threat and whose continued detention is manifestly unnecessary on any
grounds. In many instances, the on-going internment of these individuals amounts to
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and therefore the unlawful confinement of tens of thousands
of individuals.8
5 The Commission concurs with the International Committee of the Red Cross that “both customary
and treaty international humanitarian law contain an inherent power to intern”, and considers
“imperative reasons of security” the permissible grounds standard applicable to situations of non-
international armed conflict. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, Commentary
of 2016, Article 3: Conflicts Not of an International Character, at para. 728, available at www.ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=59F6CDFA4
90736C1C1257F7D004BA0EC. 6 Ibid. at. para. 723.
7 PEOPLE’S DEFENSE UNITS, 2017 Balance Sheet of War — Syrian Democratic Forces, 3 January 2018,
available at www.ypgrojava.org/2017-Balance-Sheet-of-War-%E2%80%93-Syrian-Democratic-
Forces, Press Release.
8 As Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions is silent on the procedural safeguards for persons
interned in non-international armed conflict, the Commission applies core human rights obligations to
16. The de facto Kurdish self-administration and SDF moreover sought to rely on
humanitarian aid from non-governmental organisations as well as the United Nations to
sustain their internment camps. The aid received however continues to be vastly insufficient
to support the soaring numbers of internally displaced persons received from Raqqah and
Dayr al-Zawr. Notwithstanding the lawfulness of their detention, at all times internees were
entitled to conditions of detention which respected their inherent dignity. All internees
further had the rights to an adequate standard of living, which includes the rights to food
and water, as well as the right to health.9 At the very least, the minimum core of these
obligations applied irrespective of the economic situation or budgetary considerations of the
detaining power, and therefore the SDF could not wholly transfer these obligations onto
humanitarian organisations. 10 By failing to provide adequate food, water, and living
conditions to any internees, SDF continue to violate these rights in Mabrouka, al-Sad, and
Ain Issa camps.
17. The Commission is aware of infirm civilians from al-Sad, Mabrouka, and Ain Issa
Cotton Factory camps having been granted medical evacuations only when they paid for
them, while SDF actively denied urgent requests for such evacuations in certain instances.
In other cases, strict bureaucratic procedures imposed by SDF prevented civilians from
being able to medically evacuate when most needed. The failure to provide appropriate
medical care or assistance to internees constitutes a violation of the prohibition of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment, 11 as well as the right to health. Once vetted and cleared,
the additional burden of requiring all individuals and families to locate a “guarantor” prior
to leaving the camps towards Kurdish and FSA-held areas constitutes a denial of freedom
of movement. Finally, SDF soldiers extorting money from individuals prior to allowing
them to leave al-Sad and Mabrouka similarly amounts to a denial of freedom of movement.
18. Though the responsibility to provide food, water, and adequate living conditions to
persons displaced from Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr governorates rests with the SDF
authorities interning them, humanitarian organisations have played an auxiliary role to
ameliorate the sizeable crisis. The presence of local and international humanitarian
organisations and the impartial assistance they provide has reduced the harm interned
internally displaced persons in the foregoing sites have been exposed to, though such
assistance has thus far been insufficient to meet the mounting humanitarian and protection
needs of tens of thousands of interned, internally displaced persons at risk.
C. Persons internally displaced from Hamah
19. During the period under review, pro-Government forces renewed offensives in
Hamah, steadily attacking remaining opposition-held pockets of the governorate currently
under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and various armed groups including Faylaq al-
Sham and Jaysh al-Izza. Aerial and ground offensives have thus far led to the displacement
of tens of thousands of civilians from those areas: since October, hostilities in the north and
north-east of Hamah led to the displacement of over 90,000 individuals, particularly those
from areas under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham control. Over 30,000 have been displaced since
early November from al-Saan, Hamra, and Oqeirbat sub-districts. Civilians from Oqeirbat
the SDF, an armed group exercising de facto control over territory in Syria and who must therefore
respect the fundamental rights of persons interned in that territory. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-
General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 31 March 2011, at para. 188, available at www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171 [hereinafter “ICCPR”], at art. 9; see also UN Guiding Principles, supra note 34, at Principle 12(1) and (2).
9 See United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 13 May 1977, at Rules
24–26. 10 See, e.g., Mukong v. Cameroon, Views, Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 458/1991, 21
July 1994, para. 9.3; Leroy Lamey et al v. Jamaica, Decision, IACHR, Case nos. 11.826, 11.843,
11.847, 4 April 2001, para. 203.
11 Keenan v. the United Kingdom, Judgment, App. no. 27229/95 (ECtHR, 3 April 2001) para. 111; Tibi
v. Ecuador, Judgment, IACtHR, 7 September 2004, para. 157; Huri-Laws v. Nigeria, Decision,
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication no. 225/1998, para. 41.
— an area comprising 73 villages and located 70 kilometres east of Hamah city — were
primarily displaced towards northern Hamah, southern Idlib, and Atarib (Aleppo).
20. By mid-July, and with air support, Government ground forces and affiliated militias
began advancing from the west towards Oqeirbat. Owing to the heightened intensity and
frequency of attacks, many fleeing civilians gathered in Wadi al-Azib (Hamah), a desert
terrain near the Salamiyah-Raqqah highway, hoping that evacuations would be facilitated.
Instead, those internally displaced ended up trapped with very little food or water as
Government forces blocked all roads and laid landmines surrounding both sides of the
highway. Up to 10 children perished under severe living conditions in the area, including
due to heatstroke, in addition to three elderly persons. By August, civilians unable to subsist
in Wadi al-Azib began to risk fleeing at night. Pro-Government snipers targeted fleeing
civilians, killing and injuring dozens. On 25 August alone, pro-Government snipers killed
at least 70 internally displaced persons. Others were killed in landmine detonations, while
up to 25 civilians were arrested by pro-Government forces and have not been heard from
since.
21. Oqeirbat is now under Government control, and no civilians remain in the sub-
district. Those displaced described how schools, pharmacies, shops, and residential areas
were all but destroyed by aerial and ground attacks. Some came to know that pro-
Government militias looted their homes, or set fire to them in acts of reprisal. Fearing
revenge attacks, civilians displaced from Oqeirbat maintained they would not return to the
area even if given the opportunity. On 19 September, armed groups led by Hay’at Tahrir al-
Sham launched a large-scale offensive on Government-held areas north of Hamah city, with
pro-Government forces’ counteroffensives having since killed and injured dozens. On 26
September, in al-Sheikh al-Hilal village, a pro-Government forces ground attack reportedly
killed over 60 internally displaced persons, and injured many more. On the night of 12
November, the Syrian Expatriate Medical Centre in al-Jezdaniya, eastern Hamah
countryside, was destroyed in an airstrike. While no civilians were affected, an ambulance
centre endured severe material damage, and vital medical supplies were damaged. Pro-
Government forces continue to deliberately target medical infrastructure as part of a
warring strategy, constituting the war crime of intentionally targeting protected objects.
Deliberate attacks against ambulances further amount to the war crimes of intentionally
attacking medical transport. At the time of writing, fighting in Hamah rages on.
Annex IV
Erosion of civilian infrastructure
1. Since the inception of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, attacks against
civilian and protected objects have been a near constant feature, in violation of international
humanitarian law. Places of worship, civil defence centres, homes, bakeries, markets, and
to a lesser extent, schools, have regularly been made the object of attack by all warring
parties.
A. Hospitals
2. On 19 September, pro-Government forces launched an aerial attack against al-
Rahma hospital in Khan Sheikhoun (Idlib), where around 80 patients were being treated.
Al-Rahma is a “cave hospital” on the outskirts of Khan Sheikhoun, which was previously
attacked on 4 April while treating victims of a sarin attack carried out by Government
forces (A/HRC/36/55, annex II, paras. 17). Between approximately 10:00 and 10:15 a.m.,
two airstrikes were launched; though the first did not cause extensive damage, the second
struck the hospital’s entrance, completely destroying an ambulance reception area, as well
as three ambulances. The strike also hit the warehouse of the hospital, causing a fire, and
damaging vital trauma unit equipment. As jets continued to circulate, rescue efforts were
put on hold for a further ten minutes until clear skies could be confirmed. Witnesses
recalled noticing an unusual number of flights over Khan Sheikhoun that morning, and
therefore evacuated the hospital in anticipation of a possible attack. As such, no casualties
were endured. At 3:00 p.m., a primary care clinic in Khan Sheikhoun was also attacked.
3. The walls of al-Rahma cave further cracked due to the force of the blasts. Images
and video footage of the aftermath of the attack show widespread bomb damage from blast
weapons of varying sizes, including the tail section of an unguided OFAB 100-120 blast
bomb, consistent with bombs used by both the Syrian and Russian air forces.
4. On the same day, just before noon, pro-Government forces launched an aerial attack
against al-Rahman Charity Hospital, an obstetrics hospital in Tah village (Idlib).
Approximately 30 individuals were present at the hospital at the time, including 12 in-
patient children receiving treatment and whom their mothers were accompanying. Six
babies were in incubators, while an additional 40 patients remained outside receiving
clinical services.
5. The first bomb damaged the south-eastern corner of the hospital, which served as a
children’s ward, and further destroyed a section for incubators. The second-floor extension
to the hospital collapsed, while a pharmacy including medicine stocks were severely
damaged. Generators and electricity supplies also sustained severe damage. Outside, one
ambulance and two private vehicles were damaged. Photos of remnants indicate that the
airstrikes were carried out using multiple blast weapons, and the damage sustained is
consistent with unguided OFAB aerial bombs used by both Syrian and Russian forces.
6. Approximately ten minutes before the airstrikes took place, staff at the hospital
received warnings of a possible attack from a civilian observatory, and were able to
evacuate the vast majority of staff and patients. One female hospital cleaner was
immediately killed as a result of the attack, however, and the hospital’s male administrative
manager suffered an arm injury.
B. Schools
7. On the night of 20 to 21 March, at approximately 11 p.m., an airstrike hit the Al-
Badiya school in Al-Mansoura (Raqqah) killing at least 150 persons. Al-Badiya school,
located approximately 1.5 kilometres from the village, was a large, isolated, three-storey
building, save for a few houses and tents in the vicinity. The area was controlled by ISIL at
the time. During a briefing of journalists on 28 March, the Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF) of the international coalition took responsibility for the strike noting that it had
targeted 30 ISIL fighters using the school, and that it could not corroborate the allegation
that internally displaced persons used the school.1 On 7 July, the Task Force announced
that, upon further review of available information, it assessed there was insufficient
information to find that civilians the strike harmed civilians.2
8. The Commission initially reported on this incident in July 2017 (see A/HRC/36/55,
para. 79). As part of its investigation, it conducted 20 interviews with survivors, relatives of
victims, rescuers, village residents, and individuals onsite after the airstrikes. Interviewees
all explained that, since 2012, Al-Badiya school housed internally displaced families from
Palmyra (Homs), al-Sukhna (Homs), al-Qaryatayn (Homs), al-Khafsa (Aleppo), Maskanah
(Aleppo), al-Bab (Aleppo), and Hamah countryside. Some of the residents were recent
arrivals while other internally displaced persons had been living in the school for years.
More than 200 people were estimated to be living in the school at the time of the airstrike,
of which only a few survived. One-hundred and fifty bodies were retrieved from the site
though others remained under the rubble as, three days after the airstrike, on 24 March,
ISIL prevented rescuers from continuing searches.
9. Of the more than 200 residents at the school, only 12 survivors were identified by
the Commission, and several of them sustained serious injuries such as severe burns and the
loss of limbs. Survivors reported being blasted through windows during the explosions and
landing outside of the school, which saved them from being crushed under the rubble. The
vast majority of survivors were women and children, namely four women and six children,
the youngest a 10-month-old baby. Interviewees identified the fatalities they knew
personally, the majority of them relatives. These included eight women, one of whom was
in the final stages of pregnancy, and 21 children, all but one under the age of 11.
10. The school was hit by three airstrikes, each using multiple bombs that destroyed
most of the building rendering it uninhabitable. Photos provided by interviewees show
evidence of a massive airstrike, and multiple impacts from aerial bombs show delayed
fuzing aimed at bringing down the entire building. Photographs of remnants also show
fragments of Hellfire missiles, which the Commission has previously documented being
used by the international coalition to target survivors of airstrikes (see A/HRC/36/55, para.
57). While many interviewees said that they did not see ISIL members in the school, one
survivor who arrived at the school days before the strike said that his family was registered
by an ISIL member shortly after moving in, but that the fighter did not reside in the school.
Initial information that two families of ISIL fighters had lived in the school but left one
month before the strike has not been corroborated (see A/HRC/36/55, para. 79).
11. Information gathered by the Commission does not support the claim that 30 ISIL
fighters were in the school at the time of the strike, nor that the school was otherwise being
used by ISIL. Rather, the status of casualties and nature of Al-Badiya building is widely
divergent from the international coalition’s assessment. Information that residents of the
school were internally displaced families, including a large number of women and children,
and that the school had been used to shelter internally displaced persons since 2012 should
have been readily available to the coalition’s targeting team. The Commission therefore
concludes that the international coalition should have known the nature of the target and
failed to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects, in violation of international humanitarian
law. The subsequent investigation conducted by the international coalition should have
been able to identify the high number of civilian casualties resulting from this incident.
1 News Transcript, Department of Defense Briefing by Gen. Townsend via Telephone from Baghdad,
Iraq, 18 March 2017, available at www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-
View/Article/1133033/department-of-defense-briefing-by-gen-townsend-via-telephone-from-bagdad-
iraq.
2 Combined Joint Task Force — Operation Inherent Resolve Monthly Civilian Casualty Report Release No: 17-258 July 7, 2017, available at www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-
Release-View/Article/1239870/combined-joint-task-force-operation-inherent-resolve-monthly-
civilian-casualty.
12. In the latter half of 2017, pro-Government forces began a concerted campaign to
decimate schools throughout Aleppo countryside, which were located in a militarily
strategic area leading up to Abu al-Duhur airbase (Idlib) and the railway connecting Aleppo
and Damascus. On 26 September, at approximately 12:30 p.m., about 15 minutes after all
children had been dismissed from classes, pro-Government forces launched a series of
airstrikes against Tanatya school in Knater village, Atarib, where nearly 4,000 civilians
reside. Up to 11 aerial attacks were carried out over the span of one hour, striking Tanatya
school and the surrounding residential area. Tanatya school teaches children in grades 1 to
9 in two buildings, though one was completely damaged as a result of the attack. Students,
many of them severely traumatised, have since been relocated to the remaining building.
13. The next day, on 27 September at 2:00 a.m., pro-Government forces carried out an
aerial attack against the Baraem al-Thawra school in Batbo village (Aleppo). As an all-girl
school, Baraem al-Thawra teaches hundreds of female students in grades 1 to 9. No civilian
casualties occurred as the attack took place after midnight. The school included six
classrooms, four of which were completely damaged. One individual who went to assess
the damage described how a “missile” had entered through the roof and caused a crater two
metres in depth. The attack led to the near-complete destruction of the school, rendering it
completely out of service. Windows of nearby homes were also shattered by the blasts. A
non-governmental organisation and a Free Syrian police station engaging solely in civilian
matters are located near the site of Baraem al-Thawra school.
14. On the night of 6 November, at approximately 9 p.m., pro-Government forces
attacked the Tel Aldaman secondary school in Monbetah village (Aleppo). Prior to the
attack, approximately 200 students, aged six to 16 years, attended the school, which was
located on a compound that further comprised a training centre for teachers. Witnesses
described how the attack rendered the school and training centre completely out of service,
and how this and similar attacks have crippled both students and their families with fear; of
the village’s 200,000 original inhabitants, only approximately 10,000 remain. The premises
of the school were reportedly attacked again in an airstrike carried out ten days later.
15. Pro-Government forces further carried out at least five separate aerial attacks against
three schools in Aleppo in December. On 4 December, in Sumeiryya village, 45 kilometres
south of Aleppo city, pro-Government forces attacked the eastern and western schools in
Has compound shortly after 9:00 a.m. Images of the aftermath show remnants of an RBK-
250 cluster bomb containing sub-munitions. No students were present during the attack,
though approximately 30 teachers had gathered to collect their salaries. It is unclear
whether pro-Government forces were aware of the presence of civilians at that time, as the
announcement for salary collections was transmitted to teachers digitally the day prior. One
female teacher and two male teachers sustained minor injuries. The use of cluster munitions
in civilian populated areas is inherently indiscriminate (given their typically wide dispersal
pattern and high dud rate, which continues to endanger civilians years after a cessation of
hostilities), and therefore prohibited by customary international humanitarian law. For this
reason, their use by pro-Government forces in Sumeiryya village constitutes the war crime
of indiscriminate attacks in a civilian populated area.
16. On 6 and 7 December, pro-Government forces launched an aerial attack on Bayaiya
primary school in Tel Aldaman. Airstrikes were carried out at 11:00 p.m., and again shortly
after midnight the following day. More than 150 children in grades 1 through 6 attend
Bayaiya primary school. The school further hosted an internally displaced husband and
wife couple, though neither was injured. The building sustained physical damage, though
continues to operate.
17. Similarly, on 9 December, at 9:20 a.m., airstrikes carried out by pro-Government
forces hit a private school in al-Hanouteh village (Aleppo). Unlike the foregoing attacks,
children were present on the morning of the attack, and a few children were mildly injured
as a result. The school was partially damaged, and reportedly attacked again in an airstrike
at 3:00 a.m. the following morning.
18. Repeated bombardments, lack of warnings, and the absence of military objectives in
and around all schools strongly suggest pro-Government forces intentionally targeted them
as part of a strategy to force dissenting communities to leave by rendering their
neighbourhoods uninhabitable, amounting in each instance above to the war crime of
intentionally attacking civilian objects.
C. Markets
19. A pattern of attacks affecting crowded market places continued during the reporting
period (see A/HRC/28/69, annex II, paras. 2–8, A/HRC/30/48, paras. 34–35, A/HRC/31/68,
para. 77). For example, on 13 November, minutes after 2 p.m., a series of airstrikes hit the
main market, surroundings houses, and the Free Syrian police station of Atarib (Aleppo).
The impacted sites covered an area 250 meters long, with the police station being adjacent
to the market. One commercial street was all but flattened by the attack. Based on satellite
imagery, an area of approximately 5,000 square meters was damaged or destroyed. The
airstrikes killed at least 84 individuals including 6 women and 5 children, and injured
around another 150.
20. The population of Atarib, estimated at 30,000 inhabitants in 2011, has grown
substantially in recent years as many internally displaced persons from previously besieged
areas were forced to leave their homes and settled there. Atarib market, previously hit by
airstrikes in April 2014 and July 2016, is itself located in a densely populated area. In
addition to shops, restaurants, commercial offices and family homes, two schools operate
from a building located 100 meters from the market, where an estimated 450 children were
attending classes when the airstrikes were carried out.
21. Being located in western Aleppo governorate, Atarib was part of zone 1 of the de-
escalation zones memorandum agreed in May and implemented in September by the three
guarantors of the Astana talks, Russia, Iran and Turkey. The main Russian news outlets did
not report on the events as they normally do. Yet, on the same day of the strikes, the
spokesperson of the Humaymim airbase denied on social media that Russian aircraft
committed a massacre in Atarib. 3 Humaymim airbase is located in Ladhiqiyah,
approximately 160 kilometres from Atarib, and used exclusively by Russian forces. A few
hours after the airstrikes, media reports claimed that a meeting between Hay’at Tahrir al-
Sham and Nour al-Din al-Zinki took place in Atarib on 13 November.
22. Interviewees, video footage, and photos indicate that it was a clear day.
Eyewitnesses saw one aircraft flying at high altitude. In less than ten minutes, the aircraft
conducted three waves of airstrikes dropping two weapons in each. Interviewees
consistently said that the aircraft remained at high altitude while conducting the strikes and
that they received no warning that airstrikes were imminent. On the contrary, interviewees
recalled that there had been no airstrikes in Atarib since the de-escalation zones agreement
and that they had no reason to believe the town would be targeted.
23. The weapons destroyed the police station and killed at least 13 police officers and
six detainees. One survivor who was pulled from the rubble described how the first
explosion penetrated the roof of the police station all the way to the ground floor. Some
four minutes later another weapon hit the area destroying a three-storey building. A third
weapon hit the vicinity of the police station but did not explode. Interviewees denied that
the police station was associated with armed factions and maintained it dealt with civilian
related matters including acting as traffic police. None of the information gathered suggests
that the station was used for military purposes or that any of its officers actively
participated in hostilities although some officers carried light weapons. Therefore, the
station and the officers remained civilian and were not lawful military objectives.
24. According to local residents and shop owners, the third wave of strikes directly hit a
market street killing and maiming civilians and destroying vegetable and clothing shops as
well as nearby residential buildings. These accounts are corroborated by video footage and
satellite imagery. Shop owners explained that, at the time of the attack, the market was
crowded with people who had left work, most of whom were men since many women had
stopped going to the market after the earlier attacks. Similarly, as is customary in the
3 At the time of writing, this remained the only statement by a Russian official.
country, shopkeepers were mostly male. Due to the high number of casualties, serious cases
were transferred from Atarib hospital to Bab al-Hawa hospital (Idlib). Among the
approximately 150 injured were first-responders, including an ambulance driver, who was
seriously injured by an airstrike while responding to the first wave of strikes on the police
station. The driver died in hospital some days later, his ambulance having been destroyed in
the attack. Rescue efforts continued over subsequent days. In some instances, rescuers were
unable to identify the deceased because they were internally displaced persons who had
moved to Atarib in recent months, including former residents of eastern Aleppo city. In
other cases, identification was not possible because only body parts were retrieved.
25. While some interviewees said they only saw one aircraft — with fixed-wings at the
back — others recalled seeing a second aircraft they believed to be a reconnaissance
aircraft because it circled above the location while the other conducted the strikes. All
information available indicates that a Russian fixed-wing aircraft that took off from
Humaymim airbase conducted the strikes. Early warning observers monitored the take-off
of a fixed-wing aircraft, whose pilots communicated in Russian, from Humaymim airbase
at 1:37 p.m. and tracked the aircraft going south and then to the northeast all the way to
Atarib where it arrived at 2:07 p.m. No Syrian aircraft were observed in the area in the two
hours preceding the airstrikes.
26. As to potential military objectives, many interviewees, including shop owners and
local residents, said that due to efforts by the local council, there were no armed groups
present in Atarib. Others, however, claimed that — from 9 November onwards — there was
on-going infighting between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Nour al-Din al-Zinki in western
Aleppo governorate countryside, including in Atarib, Abzemo, and Orum al-Kubra. On 11
November, civilians took to the streets of Orum al-Kubra to protest against the
confrontations between the two groups. The protest was violently repressed and three
children were shot dead.
27. Some interviewees claimed that there was on-going infighting between Hay’at
Tahrir al-Sham and Nour al-Din al-Zinki in western Aleppo governorate. The Commission
received conflicting information about a possible target, including unconfirmed reports of a
meeting between armed groups and tribal elders. Analysis of the site and other information
indicate that a specific location was targeted.
28. Multiple airstrikes in Atarib employed at least two types of aerial bombs — blast
weapons and earth penetrators. Images and videos from the site show evidence of at least
six impacts. Widespread damage is consistent with blast weapons such as the unguided
OFAB-500 causing devastating surface damage that destroyed a large part of the market
area. Additionally, at least one bomb carrying multiple smaller earth penetrating munitions
caused several impacts collapsing multiple buildings. One entry hole was found containing
an unexploded bomblet. Evidence at the scene and video evidence is consistent with a
BeTAB-500 unguided “bunker buster” carrying 12 rocket-assisted penetrators. The Russian
Air Force has used the BeTAB throughout Aleppo province. The impact points show that
unguided bombs roughly fell in a line with a 250 m dispersion which suggests that the
aircraft lined up on the target dropping weapons into an area that formed a target box rather
than conducting a precision strike against the point target.
29. The likely use of unguided weapons in a densely populated area such as the one hit
in Atarib raises the issue of how accurate the weapons were. Circular Error Probable (CEP)
is the measure of precision for a guided bomb. It means that 50 per cent of bombs fall
within a circle the size of the CEP and 50 per cent outside of it — so a weapon with a 10 m
CEP will fall within 10 m half the time and farther than 10 m half the time. When precision
weapons miss they usually have close misses. In contrast, unguided bombs do not measure
accuracy with CEP. Their accuracy varies greatly depending on a number of factors
including aircraft, altitude, speed, heading, training of the pilot, and wind.
30. Unguided bomb accuracy is not officially measured in CEP but military studies have
produced estimates of their accuracy using CEP as a rule of thumb. Using visual targeting,
CEP is estimated as 122 m at an altitude of 3000 m. As the altitude increases, the accuracy
of unguided bombs diminishes greatly. Using an advanced targeting computer, Russian
sources estimate that aircraft are able to reliably attain a 25 m CEP with unguided bombs.
Even assuming that the Russian estimate that its unguided bombs have a 25 m CEP is
correct, this means that 50 per cent of the weapons would fall within a 25 m CEP and the
remaining 50 per cent outside of that. Using such weapons in a densely civilian populated
area was certain to impact civilians.
31. All sides in a conflict must distinguish between legitimate military targets on the one
hand and civilians and civilian objects on the other and use methods or means of combat
that are able to be directed at a specific military objective. There is no evidence to indicate
that this attack deliberately targeted civilians or the Atarib market. Through the use of
unguided bombs, including blast weapons in a densely civilian populated area, however,
this attack may amount to the war crime of launching indiscriminate attacks resulting in
death and injury to civilians.