39/43 Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014 - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights containing the findings of the Group of Independent Eminent International and Regional Experts and a summary of technical assistance provided by the Office of the High Commissioner to the National Commission of Inquiry

GE.18-13655(E)



Human Rights Council Thirty-ninth session

10–28 September 2018 Agenda items 2 and 10

Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the

High Commissioner and the Secretary-General

Technical assistance and capacity-building

Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

containing the findings of the Group of Eminent International and

Regional Experts and a summary of technical assistance provided by

the Office of the High Commissioner to the National Commission of

Inquiry**

Summary

The present report is being submitted to the Human Rights Council in accordance

with Council resolution 36/31. Part I of the report contains the findings, conclusions and

recommendations of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on

Yemen. Part II provides an account of the technical assistance provided by the Office of

the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the National Commission

of Inquiry into abuses and violations of human rights in Yemen.

* Reissued for technical reasons on 27 September 2018. ** The annexes to the present report are circulated as received, in the language of submission only.

United Nations A/HRC/39/43*

Contents

Page

I. Findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen ....................... 3

A. Introduction and mandate ..................................................................................................... 3

B. Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 3

C. Legal framework ................................................................................................................... 4

D. Context.................................................................................................................................. 4

E. Violations of international law ............................................................................................. 5

1. Attacks affecting civilians ............................................................................................ 5

2. Access restrictions ........................................................................................................ 8

3. Arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment ...................... 10

4. Violations of freedom of expression ............................................................................ 11

5. Sexual violence ............................................................................................................ 12

6. Child recruitment and use ............................................................................................. 13

F. Accountability....................................................................................................................... 14

G. Conclusions and recommendations ....................................................................................... 14

II. Technical assistance provided by the Office of the High Commissioner

to the National Commission of Inquiry ......................................................................................... 16

Annexes

I. Mapping of actors ......................................................................................................................... 17

II. Access restrictions by the Government of Yemen/coalition ......................................................... 29

III. The Joint Incidents Assessment Team .......................................................................................... 34

IV. Attacks affecting civilians ............................................................................................................. 38

I. Findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen

A. Introduction and mandate

1. In its resolution 36/31, the Human Rights Council requested the United Nations

High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish a group of eminent international and

regional experts on Yemen to monitor and report on the situation of human rights. The

group was mandated to carry out a comprehensive examination of all alleged violations and

abuses of international human rights and other appropriate and applicable fields of

international law committed by all parties to the conflict since September 2014, including

the possible gender dimensions of such violations, and to establish the facts and

circumstances surrounding the alleged violations and abuses and, where possible, to

identify those responsible.

2. On 4 December 2017, the High Commissioner established the Group of Eminent

International and Regional Experts, appointing Charles Garraway (United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Kamel Jendoubi (Tunisia) and Melissa Parke

(Australia) as the experts, and Mr. Jendoubi as Chair.

3. The Group of Experts examined alleged violations and abuses of international

human rights and other appropriate and applicable fields of international law committed by

parties to the conflict. In addition to international human rights law, the Group applied

international humanitarian law, international refugee law and international criminal law.

4. Given the limited access, resources and time available to fulfil its wide mandate, the

Group of Experts examined incidents based on the gravity of the allegations of violations;

their significance in demonstrating patterns of alleged violations; access to victims,

witnesses and supporting documentation; and the geographic locations of the incidents. It

also considered the gender dimensions of violations and the impact on vulnerable groups.

In the light of the emphasis on accountability in the Group’s mandate, the experts focused

on establishing the facts and circumstances of the violations and, where possible,

identifying those responsible for them.

5. In the findings, the term “pro-government forces” refers to actors fighting against

the Houthi-Saleh forces and “de facto authorities” refers to those controlling Sana’a and the

surrounding areas, where the majority of the Yemeni population lives.

6. The present report, which covers the period 1 September 2014 to 30 June 2018, does

not purport to be exhaustive in documenting the extraordinary number of relevant incidents

that occurred in the reporting period. Nevertheless, the Group of Experts considers that the

report is illustrative of the main types and patterns of violations.

B. Methodology

7. The Group of Experts and members of the secretariat carried out visits to Aden,

Sana’a, Sa’dah and Hudaydah, but faced significant security, logistical and administrative

constraints in arranging some of the planned visits to Yemen, and were unable to visit all

the affected governorates, notably Ta’izz. Visits were also undertaken to Djibouti, Jordan,

Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and the United States of America. In addition, the Group

considered submissions and other documentation and reviewed photographs, videos and

satellite images.

8. The Group of Experts issued an online call for submissions in February 2018 with a

deadline of 1 June 2018. It addressed written requests for specific information to the

Government of Yemen on 17 April 2018, to all the member States of the coalition,

described in paragraph 18 below, on 23 April 2018 and to the de facto authorities in Sana’a

on 11 July 2018. As of 24 July 2018 no responses had been received.

9. As a priority, the Group of Experts applied best practices to ensure the safety,

security and well-being of witnesses and victims. The present report includes information

only where sources granted their informed consent and where disclosure of the information

would not lead to any harm. Primary responsibility for protecting victims, witnesses and

other persons cooperating with the Group rests with their States of residence and nationality.

10. Consistent with established practice, the Group of Experts applied a “reasonable

grounds to believe” standard of proof.

11. Where the Group found information linking alleged perpetrators to specific

violations or patterns of violations, such information has been transmitted to the High

Commissioner on a strictly confidential basis. In instances where there was insufficient

information to identify particular individuals responsible for violations, the party or group

responsible has been identified, where possible.

12. The Group of Experts expresses its gratitude to the victims and witnesses who

shared their experience. It is also grateful for the assistance provided by government and

non-governmental entities and for the support received from United Nations agencies and

partners.

C. Legal framework

13. Yemen is a State party to 9 of the 13 core international human rights treaties, which

remain applicable in periods of armed conflict. The Government retains positive obligations

in areas where it has lost effective control.

14. The de facto authorities control large swathes of territory, including Sana’a, and

exercise a government-like function in that territory such that they are responsible under

international human rights law.

15. Yemen is in a state of non-international armed conflict. In this context, international

humanitarian law obligations arise under both treaty and customary law. All parties to the

conflict, their armed forces and persons or groups acting on their instructions or under their

direction or control are bound by customary international law. Yemen, the coalition forces

and non-State actors are parties to the conflict and must abide by the fundamental principles

of distinction, proportionality and precaution when conducting hostilities. Moreover, they

must ensure that constant care is taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian

objects.

16. Yemen is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, nor

are many of the other States involved in the conflict in Yemen. However, many of the

Rome Statute’s provisions reflect customary international law.

D. Context

17. In 2011, a popular revolution arose against the 33-year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh,

President of Yemen. A deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council granted Saleh

immunity and transferred power to Vice-President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Yemenites

conducted a National Dialogue Conference, accompanied by a constitution-making process.

In 2014, the conflict escalated between the government forces led by President Hadi, the

Houthis and other armed groups over power-sharing arrangements and the draft constitution.

In September, the Houthis and the armed forces aligned to former President Saleh seized

and consolidated control over the capital, Sana’a and other parts of the country.

18. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition with Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan,

Kuwait, Morocco, Senegal, the Sudan and the United Arab Emirates to initiate military

action at the request of President Hadi.1 The United States and the United Kingdom, among

other States, advise and support the coalition. The coalition forces launched an air

1 Qatar was a member of the coalition until June 2017.

campaign causing significant civilian casualties. On 8 October 2016, in one of the deadliest

incidents, the coalition targeted Al-Kubra Hall in Sana’a during a funeral, killing at least

137 male civilians and injuring 695, including 24 boys. In addition to air strikes, coalition

naval forces imposed severe restrictions and, in late 2017, enforced a de facto blockade on

Yemeni seaports, hindering imports of essential supplies to the country. In August 2016,

the coalition effectively closed Sana’a International Airport. The airport remains closed to

commercial aviation to date.

19. Intense hostilities continue in certain parts of Yemen despite the grave humanitarian

impact on the population. The violence is exacerbated by food insecurity, limited access to

health care and restrictions on imports of vital commodities. The non-payment of public

sector salaries since August 2016, following the Government’s move of the central bank

from Sana’a to Aden, has also had a devastating impact on civilians.

20. The well-established front lines remain largely unmoved after three years of fighting,

although control of territory continues to change hands at the local level. The United Arab

Emirates has established control across southern Yemen, both by its direct action and

through its proxy forces, namely the Security Belt Forces, the Hadrami Elite Forces and the

Shabwani Elite Forces, despite resistance from President Hadi, who has disavowed those

forces (see S/2018/242).

21. In 2015 and 2016, suicide and other attacks, claimed by Al-Qaida and groups

affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, ravaged Sana’a, Aden and

elsewhere, resulting in high civilian casualties.

22. On 4 November 2017, the Houthis fired a missile into Saudi Arabia. Two days later,

the coalition announced a complete blockade of all the country’s borders — air, sea and

land; over the following weeks, it was gradually lifted. In 2018, the Houthis continued to

launch missiles into Saudi Arabia.

23. The simplistic view of a binary conflict between the Government and the Houthi-

Saleh alliance, while never accurate, had become increasingly muddled as loyalties shifted,

armed groups proliferated and factions fragmented.

24. Following continued tensions between the Houthis and Saleh allies, their forces

clashed in Sana’a in December 2017. Former President Saleh was killed by the Houthis. In

January 2018, the Southern Transitional Council, established in May 2017, declared a state

of emergency in Aden and its supporters clashed heavily with government forces. A

cautious calm resumed following intervention by the coalition. The Southern Transitional

Council forces, backed heavily by the United Arab Emirates, continue to control major

cities in southern Yemen.

25. In June 2018, the coalition and affiliated forces launched an offensive on Hudaydah.

After a few weeks, it was halted, ostensibly to allow space for United Nations mediation

efforts. As over 120,000 displaced people have fled the governorate, humanitarian agencies

have warned of grave risks to civilians if fighting affects the critical port city.

26. Since March 2017, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has

designated Yemen as the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. In April 2018, out of a

population of 29.3 million, 22.2 million persons were in need of humanitarian assistance,

including 11.3 million in acute need. Needs extend across all sectors, including health, food,

sanitation and water, housing and protection.

E. Violations of international law

1. Attacks affecting civilians

27. From March 2015 to June 2018, there were at least 16,706 civilian casualties, with

6,475 killed and 10,231 injured in the conflict; however, the real figure is likely to be

significantly higher.

28. Coalition air strikes have caused most of the documented civilian casualties. In the

past three years, such air strikes have hit residential areas, markets, funerals, weddings,

detention facilities, civilian boats and even medical facilities. The Group of Experts has

investigated 13 such incidents by interviewing victims, witnesses and other credible sources;

analysing satellite imagery, photographs and videos; and visiting sites in the Hudaydah,

Sa’dah and Sana’a governorates.

29. Residential areas have repeatedly been hit by air strikes, often resulting in significant

destruction and civilian casualties. In 60 cases, the Group of Experts reviewed air strikes

that hit residential areas, killing more than 500 civilians, including 84 women and 233

children. The Group investigated the 25 August 2017 air strikes that hit a residential

building in the Faj ‘Attan area of the city of Sana’a, killing at least 15 civilians and injuring

another 25, including 7 women and 11 children. It also investigated the 20 December 2017

incident in the Bab Najran area of the Sa’dah Governorate in which three coalition air

strikes hit a family home, killing at least 12 civilians, including at least 3 women and 3

children.

30. In 29 incidents, the Group of Experts reviewed air strikes hitting public spaces,

including attacks on targets in densely populated areas that killed more than 300 civilians.

The Group investigated two incidents where air strikes hit hotels. The 23 August 2017 air

strike in the Bayt Athri area of the Arhab district, Sana’a Governorate, and the 1 November

2017 air strikes that hit a hotel in Al Layl market in Sa’dah Governorate combined killed

more than 50 male civilians and injured another 50. In each case, at least 12 boys were

among the casualties.

31. The Group of Experts has also reviewed 11 incidents where air strikes hit

marketplaces. In a particularly egregious case, on 15 March 2016, coalition air strikes on

Khamees market in the Mastaba district of the Hajjah Governorate killed more than 100

civilians, including 25 children. Since the establishment of the Group’s mandate, at least

five markets have been struck. The Group investigated the 26 December 2017 air strikes on

the Mahsees Market in Ta’izz Governorate, which killed at least 36 male civilians and

injured another 46.

32. Funerals and weddings have also been affected. The Group of Experts reviewed five

air strikes involving such gatherings. The 8 October 2016 attack on Al-Kubra Hall in the

city of Sana’a during the funeral of the father of a senior official killed at least 137 civilians

and injured 695, including 24 boys. The Group investigated the coalition air strike on 22

April 2018 that hit a wedding celebration in Al-Raqah village, in the Bani Qa’is district of

the Hajjah Governorate. At least 23 male civilians were killed, including 8 boys.

33. The Group of Experts reviewed four air strikes that hit detention facilities since the

beginning of the conflict, including the 29 October 2016 air strikes on the Security

Directorate Prison in the Al Zaidia district of the Hudaydah Governorate, which killed at

least 63 male civilians, mainly detainees. The Group investigated the 13 December 2017

coalition air strikes on a detention facility at a military police camp in the city of Sana’a

that killed at least 42 male civilians, some detainees, including 8 boys.

34. In 11 air strikes hitting civilian boats off the shores of Hudaydah from November

2015 until May 2018, of which 9 were reviewed and 2 investigated by the Group of Experts,

approximately 40 fishermen were killed or disappeared. In another incident examined by

the Group in which coalition aircraft targeted a boat carrying refugees on 17 March 2017, a

total of 32 Somali refugees, including 11 Somali women, and 1 Yemeni civilian were killed,

and another 10 persons were reported missing.

35. Despite the special protection afforded to medical facilities and educational, cultural

and religious sites under international humanitarian law, many such facilities and sites have

been damaged or destroyed by coalition air strikes throughout the conflict. The Group of

Experts reviewed information concerning at least 32 such incidents. It received credible

information that the no-strike list of protected objects was not being adequately shared

within the coalition command chain.

36. Several air strikes have damaged facilities operated by Médecins sans frontières,

including a clinic in the Houban district of the Ta’izz Governorate, hit on 2 December 2015;

an ambulance in the Sa’dah Governorate, struck on 21 January 2016; and a hospital in the

Abs district of the Hajjah Governorate, hit on 15 August 2016. All the locations of the

Médecins sans frontières facilities had been shared with the coalition and the ambulance

was clearly marked. On 11 June 2018, Médecins sans frontières reported that an air strike

had hit a new cholera treatment centre in the Abs district of Hajjah Governorate. It

indicated that the coordinates of the facility had been shared with the coalition on 12

separate occasions.

37. The specific cases investigated by the Group of Experts raise serious concerns about

the targeting process applied by the coalition. The Group submitted a request to the

coalition for specific information on this process; regrettably, it has not received any

response to date. The brief public reports by the coalition’s Joint Incidents Assessment

Team do not provide any detail on the targeting process. Therefore, the Group has been

limited to examining the results of air strikes.

38. Based on the incidents examined, and information received in relation to the

targeting process, the Group of Experts have reasonable grounds to believe the following:

(a) In the absence of any apparent military objective in the vicinity, the objects

struck raise serious concerns about the respect of the principle of distinction and how

military targets were defined and selected. The use of precision-guided munitions would

normally indicate that the object struck was the target;

(b) The number of civilian casualties raises serious concerns as to the nature and

effectiveness of any proportionality assessments conducted;

(c) The timing of some attacks and the choice of weapons raise serious concerns

as to the nature and effectiveness of any precautionary measures adopted;

(d) The failure to ensure that all relevant commanders have access to the no-

strike list raises serious concerns about the ability of the coalition to comply with the

special protections accorded to such objects;

(e) The use in some cases of “double strikes” close in time, which affect first

responders, raises serious concerns as to whether updated proportionality assessments and

precautionary measures were carried out for the second strikes.

39. If there are errors in the targeting process that effectively remove the protections

provided by international humanitarian law, these would amount to violations. These may,

depending on the circumstances, amount to war crimes by individuals at all levels in the

member States of the coalition and the Government, including civilian officials.

40. Shelling and sniper attacks by parties to the conflict have resulted in large numbers

of civilian casualties in the Hajjah, Lahij, Ma’rib and Ta’izz governates. The Group of

Experts focused on such attacks in the city of Ta’izz, an urban environment with some of

the most intense and sustained fighting in the country. The Group could not access Ta’izz

for security reasons, but obtained information from numerous reliable sources.

41. The situation in Ta’izz is complicated due to the large number of armed groups

operating in the city, including Houthi-Saleh forces, pro-Hadi forces, Salafist militias, Islah

militias and jihadist groups. Many parties fighting in Ta’izz have been responsible for

civilian casualties. While the constant clashes have resulted in shifting front lines within the

city, the Houthi-Saleh forces have maintained control of the highlands surrounding the city

since the start of the conflict. The Group of Experts gathered reports of shelling by Houthi-

Saleh forces from the highlands and areas of the city under their control resulting in the

majority of civilian casualties. However, the breakdown of responsibility for civilian

casualties in Ta’izz requires further investigation.

42. The information available indicates that civilians, including women and children,

were hit by shelling and snipers from the Houthi-Saleh forces and other parties to the

conflict while in their homes, just outside their homes, fetching water at local wells, on

their way to purchase food, travelling to seek medical attention and delivering critical

supplies. Some witnesses alleged that they were subjected to almost daily attacks in their

residential neighbourhoods.

43. A large number of witnesses consistently reported that incoming fire from mortar,

artillery and small arms originated from Tabat Softel Hill, Al-Salal Hill, Air Defence Hill,

Central Security Hill, and the Al-Khalwah, Al-Hareer, Al-Houd, Al-Salheen and Al-

Qohous mountains, all under the control of the Houthi-Saleh forces when the attacks took

place.

44. A small number of victims were caught in crossfire, but many said they were not

near active hostilities or near military forces or objects when they were hit, and witnesses

were often able to corroborate this information.

45. The Group of Experts is concerned by the alleged use by the Houthi-Saleh forces of

weapons with wide area effect in a situation of urban warfare, as the use of such weapons in

an urban setting is indiscriminate. Such acts would be violations of international

humanitarian law.

2. Access restrictions

46. Restrictions on humanitarian access remained a critical constraint in Yemen.

International humanitarian law requires all parties to the conflict to allow and facilitate

rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief, including medicine, food and other

survival items.

47. The coalition has imposed severe naval and air restrictions in Yemen, to varying

degrees, since March 2015, citing the arms embargo provisions of Security Council

resolution 2216 (2015). Prior to the conflict, Yemen imported nearly 90 per cent of its food,

medical supplies and fuel. These de facto blockades have had widespread and devastating

effects on the civilian population, in particular in the areas controlled by the de facto

authorities.

48. Following the imposition of severe restrictions, the United Nations Verification and

Inspection Mechanism was established to facilitate commercial shipping to Red Sea ports

not under the control of the Government. The coalition nonetheless maintained an

additional inspection process, and has denied entry to vessels on a seemingly arbitrary basis.

The coalition has not produced a written list of prohibited items, and items are sometimes

blocked without warning. While clearance by the United Nations Verification and

Inspection Mechanism has taken an average of 28 hours, the additional coalition clearance

process can take several weeks.

49. On 6 November 2017, in response to missiles fired at Saudi Arabia by Houthi forces,

the coalition imposed a total blockade on all the borders of Yemen, preventing all

humanitarian aid and commercial trade, including food and fuel, from entering the country.

After the coalition announced that it would allow urgent humanitarian and relief materials

to enter, the first shipments of food reached Hudaydah on 26 November. The first vessel

containing fuel entered on 22 December. In April 2018, the coalition announced that all

ports were reopened; however, as of June 2018, restrictions remain.

50. The arbitrary nature of restrictions, compounded by the November blockade, has had

a clear chilling effect on commercial shipping.

51. The impact of these developments on the civilian population has been immense. The

accessibility of food and fuel has significantly declined, due to increased costs of bringing

goods to markets. These costs have been passed on to consumers, rendering the limited

goods available unaffordable for the majority of the population. The problem has been

exacerbated by the Government’s non-payment of public sector salaries, affecting one

quarter of the population, since August 2016. The effects of the price increases coupled

with the erosion of their purchasing power have been disastrous for the population.

52. The harm to the civilian population caused by severely restricting naval imports was

foreseeable, given the country’s pre-conflict reliance on imports. By November 2017, the

international community had repeatedly underscored the effects of the existing restrictions

and had warned of the catastrophic effects of the announced closure of all ports. The

duration of the restrictions raises additional concerns that systemic damage to the economy

is occurring.

53. As of April 2018, nearly 17.8 million people were food insecure and 8.4 million

were on the brink of famine. Health-care facilities were not functioning, clean water was

less accessible and Yemen was still suffering from the largest outbreak of cholera in recent

history.

54. Despite their significant impact on civilians, these restrictions are unlikely to be

effective in achieving their stated military objectives due to the absence of a clear and

published list of prohibited items. Moreover, in the three years that the naval restrictions

have been in place, no searches by either the United Nations Verification and Inspection

Mechanism or coalition forces have discovered weapons.

55. The coalition and the Government have had sufficient notice of the harm caused and

their responsibility for it, and sufficient opportunity to correct the situation. No possible

military advantage could justify such sustained and extreme suffering of millions of people.

The coalition has failed to cancel or suspend the restrictions, as required under international

law.

56. On 9 August 2016, the coalition effectively closed Sana’a International Airport to

commercial traffic. This has prevented thousands of Yemenites from seeking medical care

abroad. In the meantime, the health-care system in Yemen has disintegrated. Those who are

chronically ill and need to leave the country must attempt alternative routes that require

long journeys across active front lines at high risk and at high costs. For example, on 31

August 2017, the founder of the Yemen Red Crescent Society died because he could not

obtain the life-saving treatment he needed in Yemen and could not travel abroad for such

treatment. Since August 2016, only United Nations and humanitarian flights have been

permitted at Sana’a International Airport, and during the November 2017 blockade even

those were halted for more than three weeks.

57. Prior to August 2016, commercial flights to Yemen were required to stop in Saudi

Arabia for inspection en route. The coalition has not explained the military necessity of

closing the airport completely, including to those genuinely seeking immediate medical

treatment abroad.

58. There are reasonable grounds to believe that these naval and air restrictions are

imposed in violation of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

The Government is required to achieve progressively the full realization of the economic

and social rights of the people in Yemen and to at least ensure satisfaction of minimum

standards of these rights. The Government and the member States of the coalition must also

allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief. Given the severe

humanitarian impact that the de facto blockades have had on the civilian population and in

the absence of any verifiable military impact, they constitute a violation of the

proportionality rule of international humanitarian law. The effective closure of Sana’a

airport is a violation of international humanitarian law protections for the sick and wounded.

59. Such acts, together with the requisite intent, may amount to international crimes. As

these restrictions are planned and implemented as the result of State policies, individual

criminal responsibility would lie at all responsible levels, including the highest levels, of

government of the member States of the coalition and Yemen.

60. Ta’izz, a strategically important city located between Sana’a and the port cities of

Aden and Hudaydah, is facing ongoing hostilities and significant access restrictions. Parties

to the conflict have impeded the delivery of humanitarian and other goods indispensable to

the survival of the civilian population in Ta’izz. The restrictions imposed by the Houthi-

Saleh forces have been particularly harmful.

61. From approximately March 2015 until March 2016, the Houthi-Saleh forces

controlled the two main entry points into Ta’izz, one on the west side of the city and one on

the east. From March to July 2015, there were continuous armed clashes between these

forces and local armed groups within the city. Checkpoint commanders only permitted

civilians to leave the city without their personal belongings. Civilians could only enter the

city on foot and much of their food and medicine was confiscated or looted at checkpoints.

Trucks carrying humanitarian supplies were subject to substantial delays and other

interference. Consequently, suppliers of humanitarian and commercial goods began using

an unpaved mountainous route south of the city to deliver essential supplies. Trips from Ibb

or Aden took many hours longer using the southern route.

62. In August 2015, as pro-government forces moved north after retaking Aden, the

restrictions imposed by the Houthi-Saleh forces became acute. Snipers were used to enforce

the restrictions.

63. Following his visit to Ta’izz in January 2016, the United Nations Humanitarian

Coordinator noted challenges to humanitarian access to three districts within the city that

had lasted several months.

64. Based on the information available, during the period July 2015 to January 2016,

when they were at their most severe, the restrictions imposed by the Houthi-Saleh forces

appear to have been in violation of international law. However, further investigation on

restrictions and impediments imposed by all parties in Ta’izz is required.

3. Arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment

65. Investigations by the Group of Experts confirm widespread arbitrary detention

throughout the country, and ill-treatment and torture in some facilities. In most cases,

detainees were not informed of the reasons for their arrest, were not charged, were denied

access to lawyers or a judge and were held incommunicado for prolonged or indefinite

periods. Some remain missing. Parties to the conflict are using undeclared detention

facilities in an apparent, and if confirmed unlawful, attempt to put detainees outside the

reach of the law. A few individuals detained in areas under the control of the de facto

authorities reported that they had been brought before tribunals where proceedings flouted

basic due process standards, including the right to legal representation. In Aden and

Mukalla, detainees have carried out hunger strikes protesting the absence of due process.

Death sentences have been passed and implemented in Sana’a and Aden, in the absence of

due process standards.

66. In detention, during interrogation and while blindfolded and/or handcuffed,

detainees were beaten, electrocuted, suspended upside down, drowned, threatened with

violence against their families and held in solitary confinement for prolonged periods in

violation of the absolute prohibition on torture, cruel or inhuman treatment. Reports

indicate poor material conditions and grossly inadequate medical care for detainees. The

Group has also received allegations of deaths in custody.

67. The Group of Experts conducted interviews related to detention by forces affiliated

with the Government, as well as by coalition forces, and visited Al Mansoura Prison and Al

Mansoura Block B (known as Bir Ahmed Prison II) in Aden.

68. The criminal justice system had become largely defunct in the areas where pro-

government forces reclaimed control. Coalition-backed forces were empowered to fill the

void, resulting in widespread arbitrary detention. Hundreds of individuals have been

detained for perceived opposition to the Government or to the United Arab Emirates.

69. By early 2017, consistent reports began to surface of violations committed in

detention facilities or undeclared centres under the control of the United Arab Emirates.

President Hadi requested the coalition to hand over all places of detention and secret

prisons that had been created outside the framework of the State institutions and to deliver

case files to the judicial authorities (see S/2018/242). Dozens of detainees have since been

released but, as of June 2018, the Government officials still claimed very little authority

over detention facilities in the south.

70. Detainees have been subjected to torture and other cruel treatment in facilities such

as the Al Rayyan and Bureiqa facilities (controlled by the United Arab Emirates); the 7

October facility in Abyan, Lahij Central Prison and Al Mansoura Prison (controlled by

Security Belt Forces); and Ma’rib Political Security (controlled by the Government).

71. The Group of Experts also investigated sexual violence, including rape of adult male

detainees, committed by United Arab Emirates personnel. At the Bureiqa coalition facility,

detainees described being interrogated while naked, bound and blindfolded, sexually

assaulted and raped. At Bir Ahmed Prison, forces of the United Arab Emirates raided the

facility and perpetrated sexual violence. In March 2018, nearly 200 detainees were stripped

naked in a group while personnel of the United Arab Emirates forcibly examined their

anuses. During this search, multiple detainees were raped digitally and with tools and sticks.

72. In the context of naval operations around Hudaydah Governorate, Saudi Arabian

forces routinely arrested Yemeni fishermen. The Group of Experts investigated cases that

occurred between October 2016 and April 2018 in which 148 fishermen were arrested by

coalition forces. Victims were taken to detention facilities in Saudi Arabia and remained

incommunicado. Many were beaten and interrogated and some were kept in solitary

confinement for prolonged periods. Most have been released, but 18 fishermen, all held for

more than one year, remain missing.

73. The Group has reasonable grounds to believe that the Governments of Yemen, the

United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are responsible for human rights violations,

including enforced disappearance. As most of these violations appear to be conflict related,

they may amount to the following war crimes: rape, degrading and cruel treatment, torture

and outrages upon personal dignity.

74. The Group conducted interviews, including with former detainees, related to

detention by the de facto authorities, and visited Sana’a Central Prison. Access to the

National Security Bureau and the Political Security Organization in Sana’a was conditioned

by the de facto authorities on guarantees that the facilities visited would not be targeted by

air strikes. The visits therefore did not take place as the Group of Experts was not in a

position to offer such guarantees.

75. From September 2014, the de facto authorities consolidated control of detention

facilities previously run by the Government as they seized territory, including in Sana’a,

Sa’dah, Ibb, Hudaydah and parts of Ta’izz. They appointed “supervisors” in detention

facilities, relieving existing authorities of their duties or rendering them redundant.

Furthermore, they turned mosques, schools and homes confiscated from political opponents

into undeclared detention centres.

76. Detainees include individuals perceived to be opposed to the de facto authorities,

including students, human rights defenders, journalists and supporters of political parties.

77. Baha’is have also been targeted. The Group of Experts is aware of several Baha’is

detained in Sana’a on the basis of their faith, some for more than two years. In 2018,

another Baha’i, detained since 2013, was sentenced to death in Sana’a after a hearing

neither he nor his family were allowed to attend. The same ruling also disbanded all Baha’i

assemblies. The de facto authorities denied the Group’s request to visit the victim in

detention. In a televised speech on 23 March 2018, the leader of the Houthis described the

Baha’i faith as “satanic” and “engaged in a war against Islam”.

78. The Group of Experts received information concerning ill-treatment and torture of

detainees at the national security bureau, the Political Security Organization, the Criminal

Investigation Department and in the Habrah and Al-Thawra prisons in Sana’a, among other

facilities under the control of the de facto authorities.

79. A significant number of former detainees believed they had been released as part of

detainee exchange agreements between parties to the conflict.

80. The Group of Experts has reasonable grounds to believe that the de facto authorities

are responsible for international human rights violations. Where these violations by the de

facto authorities are associated with the armed conflict, they may amount to the following

war crimes: degrading and cruel treatment, torture and outrages upon personal dignity.

4. Violations of freedom of expression

81. The Group of Experts has reasonable grounds to believe that, since September 2014,

parties to the conflict in Yemen have severely restricted the right to freedom of expression.

In addition, human rights defenders have faced relentless harassment, threats and smear

campaigns from the Government, coalition forces, including those of Saudi Arabia and the

United Arab Emirates, and the de facto authorities.

82. In this climate, women human rights defenders, journalists and activists have faced

specific repression on the basis of gender. The Group has documented at least 20 such cases

committed by parties to the conflict. Many women faced threats from all sides, suggesting

that discrimination against women is endemic.

83. The coalition continued to impede the work of international media and human rights

organizations by preventing their personnel from using United Nations flights since at least

early 2017. Consequently, such independent observers can only take commercial flights to

government-controlled areas and then must travel by land across dangerous front lines to

other areas. Given the inherent insecurity, this measure by the coalition impedes

independent and credible coverage of the situation in Yemen, and contributes to global

neglect of the conflict.

84. Since 2016, in areas under their control, pro-government forces have harassed media

and monitors by censoring television channels and raiding civil society organizations. The

situation appears to have deteriorated since August 2017, with Security Belt Forces in Aden

and the elite forces in the Hadramawt and Shabwah governorates intimidating those

perceived to be critical of the United Arab Emirates and the forces backed by that country.

In this context, journalists and demonstrators alike have been detained for peaceful protests

complaining about detention practices and for publicly criticizing military operations.

Furthermore, following the consolidation of actors allied to the Southern Transitional

Council, backed by the United Arab Emirates, media perceived to be associated with the

pro-Hadi elements of the Government have been targeted, such as a newspaper in Aden

whose offices were stormed and burned in March 2018.

85. Since 2015, in areas under their control, the de facto authorities have carried out

intimidation, arbitrary detention, ill-treatment and torture of vocal critics, in addition to

raids on media outlets in Sana’a. Furthermore, they have blocked news websites, censored

television channels and banned newspapers from publication. They have also raided or

closed the premises of a large number of civil society organizations. Victims were targeted

for their affiliation or perceived affiliation to political opponents or for having expressed

their views in relation to the ongoing conflict. The de facto authorities have also frozen the

assets, including bank accounts, of at least two non-governmental organizations; in one

case, the account remains blocked. The Group of Experts is aware of at least 23 journalists

who are still being detained by the de facto authorities. Most of them are allegedly held at

the Political Security Organization and at the national security bureau in Sana’a, while

others are believed to be in unofficial detention centres in Dhamar and Ibb. The

whereabouts of several of these journalists are unknown.

5. Sexual violence

86. New levels of sexual violence have proliferated in Yemen since September 2014.

The already limited capacity to address sexual and gender-based violence in the criminal

justice system has collapsed. Survivors are re-victimized. New vulnerabilities have

emerged from displacement, poverty and indiscriminate violence. Women, children and

men are at serious risk of all forms of sexual violence and there is limited space to pursue

protection and justice.

87. The Group of Experts investigated cases of sexual violence in the Bureiqa migrant

detention centre in Aden. The facility housed several hundred Eritrean, Ethiopian and

Somali migrants, asylum seekers and refugees who had been rounded up and detained by

the Security Belt Forces. Conditions in the detention facility were dire. Rapes and sexual

assault reportedly occurred in various parts of the facility, often in full view of other

detainees, including family members, and guards. Survivors and witnesses described to the

experts how each night guards selected women and boys for abuse. One former detainee

described a guardroom with three beds where several guards assaulted several women

simultaneously. Women were told to submit to rape or commit suicide. Others reported that

individuals trying to resist or intervene were beaten, shot or killed. At least once guards

ordered hundreds of Ethiopian male detainees to stand naked for hours in front of dozens of

Ethiopian female detainees as punishment. Reportedly, verbal threats of rape accompanied

the punishment.

88. In early April 2018, the Minister of the Interior publicly claimed to have dismissed

the commander of the Bureiqa migrant detention centre from his position. All migrants

were released by May 2018, but a new facility was being opened in Lahij Governorate.

89. The Group has also investigated allegations of sexual violence committed by

Security Belt Forces in the Al Basateen area of the Dar Saad district of Aden. Since 2017,

Security Belt Forces have controlled the area from a base in Al Basateen Police Station.

The area hosts a population of at least 40,000 refugees, internally displaced persons and

marginalized Yemenites. A majority of the population are Somali refugees who have been

in Yemen for many years.

90. Victims and witnesses described to the Group of Experts persistent and pervasive

aggressive behaviour, including sexual violence, perpetrated by the Security Belt Forces

against the population. Examples include rape, arrest or abduction, disappearances and

extortion.

91. One common practice involved security forces abducting and raping women, or

threatening to, as a way to extort money from their families and communities. Security

forces reportedly entered homes at night and took women to rape. Community leaders

estimated receiving steady reports of sexual violence every few nights. The authorities did

not conduct investigations or make arrests in relation to these violations. Violations

continued as of May 2018.

92. There are reasonable grounds to believe that government personnel and Security

Belt Forces have committed rape and other forms of serious sexual violence targeting

vulnerable groups, including foreign migrants, internally displaced persons and other

vulnerable groups, including women and children. The Government is responsible for

violations of international human rights law and, as these appear to be conflict-related,

international humanitarian law. Other States may also have responsibility.

93. Furthermore, individuals may be responsible for the war crimes of committing

outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, as well

as rape and other forms of sexual violence.

94. In addition to the foregoing, the Group of Experts has received allegations of sexual

violence committed by several parties to the conflict in Yemen, dating from 2015 to 2018.

The violations verified in the present report are indicators that there may be more sexual

violence by parties to the conflict requiring further investigation.

6. Child recruitment and use

95. The Secretary-General reported 842 verified cases of recruitment and use of boys as

young as 11 years old in Yemen in 2017 (see A/72/865-S/2018/465). Nearly two thirds of

these cases were attributed to the Houthi-Saleh Forces, with a substantial increase in the

number attributed to the Security Belt Forces and the Yemen Armed Forces as compared

with 2016. The United Nations also documented the deprivation of liberty of boys by armed

forces and groups for their alleged association with opposing parties. The Group’s

investigations into the recruitment and use of children revealed similar concerns.

96. The Group of Experts received substantial information indicating that the

Government, the coalition-backed forces and the Houthi-Saleh forces have all conscripted

or enlisted children into armed forces or groups and used them to participate actively in

hostilities. In most cases, the children were between 11 and 17 years old, but there have

been consistent reports of the recruitment or use of children as young as 8 years old. The

Group found reliable information on the use of children in many conflict-affected

governorates.

97. According to witnesses and sources, in some areas Houthi-Saleh forces forcibly

recruited children in schools, hospitals and door to door. In other areas, Houthi-Saleh forces

relied on appeals to patriotism and financial incentives to attract child recruits. Moreover,

Houthi-Saleh forces have used children in combat, at checkpoints and to plant explosive

devices.

98. Sources alleged that pro-government forces recruited particularly vulnerable

children in the internally displaced camps in Ma’rib, and offered significant payments for

child recruits. Pro-government forces frequently used children in support roles, although

they have also been used in combat on the front lines, such as in Shabwah and Hudaydah.

There have also been credible allegations that government and coalition forces detained

children fighting with Houthi-Saleh forces and used them in prisoner exchanges.

99. While parties in Yemen expressed opinions to the contrary, the instruments that

Yemen has ratified remain binding, and these acts would constitute violations of

international human rights law and, in some cases, violations of international humanitarian

law and war crimes.

F. Accountability

100. Information documented by the Group of Experts strongly suggests that violations

and crimes under international law have been perpetrated and continue to be perpetrated in

Yemen.

101. The primary legal responsibility for addressing these violations and crimes lies with

the Government, which bears the duty to protect persons under its jurisdiction. All States

that are parties to the conflict, including Yemen and the member States of the coalition,

have responsibilities to investigate and prosecute violations that amount to crimes by their

nationals and armed forces.

102. Given the gravity of the human rights situation in Yemen, a comprehensive

approach to accountability is required for the realization of the rights to truth and adequate,

effective and prompt reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence. Such processes

contribute to the fight against impunity, the reinstatement of the rule of law and, ultimately,

reconciliation.

103. The fourth report of the National Commission of Inquiry suggests an increased

willingness to address violations committed by all parties to the conflict. Nevertheless, the

report asserts that the Commission has had no cooperation from the de facto authorities in

Sana’a and that significant access issues continue to impede its work. In addition,

cooperation by the Government and the coalition appears to remain superficial. Finally, the

Commission is not an independent body.

104. In 2016, the coalition established the Joint Incidents Assessment Team to investigate

allegations of unlawful coalition attacks. It would appear, however, that the Team lacks

independence, its public findings contain insufficient details and that there is no mechanism

to ensure implementation of its recommendations.

105. The path towards long-term peace and stability in Yemen must be through a genuine,

joint and comprehensive accountability exercise involving all responsible State and non-

State actors. This requires a deeper reflection on viable accountability options. A review of

national and international accountability mechanisms is an imperative step towards defining

a viable and sustainable criminal accountability framework in line with national obligations

and international standards.

G. Conclusions and recommendations

106. The Group of Experts has reasonable grounds to believe that the Governments

of Yemen, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are responsible for human

rights violations, including unlawful deprivation of the right to life, arbitrary

detention, rape, torture, ill-treatment, enforced disappearance and child recruitment,

and serious violations of freedom of expression and economic, social and cultural

rights, in particular the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to health.

107. The Group of Experts has reasonable grounds to believe that the de facto

authorities are responsible, in the areas over which they exercise effective control, for

human rights violations, including arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment and child

recruitment, and serious restrictions on freedom of expression and of belief.

108. The Group has reasonable grounds to believe that the parties to the armed

conflict in Yemen have committed a substantial number of violations of international

humanitarian law. Subject to a determination by an independent and competent court:

(a) Individuals in the Government and the coalition, including Saudi Arabia

and the United Arab Emirates, may have conducted attacks in violation of the

principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution that may amount to war

crimes;

(b) Individuals in the Government and the coalition, including Saudi Arabia

and the United Arab Emirates, have committed acts that may amount to war crimes,

including cruel treatment and torture, outrages upon personal dignity, rape and

conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 or using them to participate

actively in hostilities;

(c) Individuals in the de facto authorities have committed acts that may

amount to war crimes, including cruel treatment and torture, outrages upon personal

dignity and conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 or using them to

participate actively in hostilities.

109. The Group of Experts has identified, where possible, individuals who may be

responsible for international crimes, and the list of individuals has been submitted to

the High Commissioner. More information is needed on some incidents documented

by the Group to establish responsibilities.

110. In order to ensure justice for all victims of violations of international human

rights and humanitarian law, and in the light of the ongoing armed conflict, the

Group of Experts presents the following recommendations.

111. The Group of Experts recommends that parties to the conflict:

(a) Immediately cease acts of violence committed against civilians in

violation of applicable international human rights and international humanitarian law,

take all feasible precautions to protect civilians from the effects of hostilities and meet

the basic needs of the civilian population, in particular women and children;

(b) Respect international humanitarian law, including in relation to the

prohibition on attacks against civilians and civilian objects, and the core principles of

distinction, proportionality and precaution;

(c) Take the necessary measures to remove disproportionate restrictions on

the safe and expeditious entry into Yemen of humanitarian supplies and other goods

indispensable to the civilian population, and the movement of persons including

through Sana’a International Airport;

(d) Fulfil obligations to facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of

humanitarian relief and unhindered access to medical facilities both in Yemen and

abroad;

(e) Ensure that all persons deprived of their liberty have their detention

reviewed by a judge in compliance with national and international law;

(f) Ensure that arrests of individuals in connection with the ongoing conflict

are carried out on legal grounds only and supported by credible and sufficient

evidence;

(g) Document all unofficial detention centres and transfer detainees to

official detention facilities in line with national and international law;

(h) Create a national register for missing persons and inform families of the

whereabouts of all detainees;

(i) Immediately cease all attacks against freedoms of expression and of

belief, including detention, enforced disappearance and intimidation, and release all

journalists and others detained for exercising their freedom of expression or belief;

(j) Cease acts of sexual and gender-based violence in all forms, including

sexual violence against women and children, sexual violence in detention and the

persecution of women activists;

(k) Conduct transparent, independent, impartial and effective gender-

sensitive investigations of all violations and crimes in accordance with international

standards, to ensure accountability for the perpetrators and justice for the victims;

(l) Cease and prevent the recruitment and use of children in the armed

conflict;

(m) Establish an independent and competent mechanism to ensure the

identification, release, recovery and reintegration of all children, including girls, who

have been recruited or used in hostilities by all parties to the conflict.

112. The Group of Experts recommends that the international community,

including the League of Arab States:

(a) Promote efforts led by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for

Yemen to cease hostilities, reach a sustainable and inclusive peace and ensure

accountability for serious violations and crimes;

(b) Refrain from providing arms that could be used in the conflict in Yemen.

113. Furthermore, the Group of Experts recommends that the Human Rights

Council:

(a) Ensure that the situation of human rights in Yemen remains on its

agenda by renewing the mandate of the Group of Experts;

(b) Urge the Security Council to emphasize the human rights dimensions of

the conflict in Yemen and the need to ensure that there will be no impunity for the

most serious crimes.

II. Technical assistance provided by the Office of the High Commissioner to the National Commission of Inquiry

114. During the reporting period, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights (OHCHR) continued to provide technical assistance to the National

Commission of Inquiry pursuant to Council resolution 36/31. OHCHR organized seven

training sessions and workshops for the commissioners and staff of the Commission on

applicable international law, human rights monitoring and documentation, investigation

methodologies, report writing, administration, finance and information management.

115. OHCHR conducted two training sessions in Kuala Lumpur in November and

December 2017. The first session, for field monitors of the Commission, focused on human

rights investigation and monitoring methodologies. The second session, for the

investigators of the Commission, focused on applicable international law, human rights

monitoring, gender integration and documentation in the context of limited access.

116. OHCHR conducted a workshop in January 2018 in Addis Ababa on documenting

human rights violations and report writing for the commissioners of the Commission of

Inquiry. This included the sharing of best practices by the Ethiopian Human Rights

Commission. OHCHR held another workshop for the commissioners on protecting human

rights in the context of countering terrorism in March 2018 in Amman.

117. OHCHR organized a training session on investigation methodologies for human

rights violations in March 2018 in Beirut for investigators of the Commission. In April

2018, it delivered a training session for administration and finance staff of the Commission

on best practices in archiving, information protection, finance and budgetary matters. It also

organized a seminar on international humanitarian law for the commissioners in July 2018

in Amman. OHCHR was unable to proceed with two additional planned workshops that

were to be held in Geneva.

Annex I

Mapping of actors

1. The Royal Saudi Arabian Armed Forces

Serial Name Position Date assumed role/Remarks

1 Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman

Minister of Defence 23 January 2015 Commander of the coalition in “Decisive Storm” Operation1

2 General Fayyadh al- Ruwaili2

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

27 February 2018

3 Prince Lieutenant General Fahad bin Turki bin Abdalazeez

Joint Forces Commander 27 February 2018 Commander of the coalition

4 Lieutenant General Fahd bin Abdallah al-Mtair3

Land Forces Commander 27 February 2018

5 Prince Lieutenant General Turki bin Bandar bin Abdalazeez al-Saud4

Air Force Commander 27 February 2018

6 Admiral Fahd bin Abdulla al-Ghufaili5

Naval Commander 4 November 2017

7 Lieutenant General Mazyad Sulaiman al- Amro6

Air Defence Commander 27 February 2018

8 Lieutenant General Jarallah bin Mohammed bin Jarallah Al-Elwait

Strategic Missile Force Commander

27 February 2018

9 Major General Pilot Abdullah al-Ghamdi

Air Operations Director Deputy Commander of the coalition

1 www.mod.gov.sa/en/Leaders/Minister/Pages/CV.aspx.

2 Replaced General Abdulrahman bin Saleh al-Bunyan who held the post since

2014.www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1729621.

3 Replaced Prince Lieutenant General Fahad bin Turki bin Abdalazeez.

www.janes.com/article/78278/top-saudi-commanders-replaced.

4 Replaced Major General Mohammed Saleh al-Otibi.

www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1729618.

5 Replaced Admiral Abduallah bin Sultan bin Mohammad al-Sultan.

6 Replaced Lieutenant General Mohammed bin Awadh bin Mansour Suhaim.

2. United Arab Emirates Armed Forces

Serial Name Position Location

Date assumed

role/Remarks

1 Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan

Supreme Commander

3 November 2004

2 Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan

Deputy Supreme Commander

3 Mohammed bin Rashid al- Maktoum7

Minister of Defence

4 Lieutenant General Hamad Mohammed Thani al-Romaithi8

Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces

3 January 2005

5 Major General Eisa Saif al- Mazrouei

Deputy Chief of Staff

6 Major General Saleh Mohammad Saleh al-Ameri

Commander of Ground Forces

7 Major General Ibrahim Nasser Mohammed al- Alawi

Commander of Air Force and Air Defence

8 Rear Admiral Sheikh Saeed Bin Hamdan Bin Mohammad al- Nahyan9

Commander of Navy

11 October 2017

9 Brigadier General Ali Ahmed el- Tanjee

Coalition Commander

Aden May 2015–January 2016

10 Brigadier General Ali el-Nuaimee

Coalition Commander

Aden January 2016–July 2016

11 Brigadier General Sultan el-Habsee

Coalition Commander

Aden July 2016–January 2017

12 Brigadier General Naser el-Otaibee

Coalition Commander

Aden January 2017–July 2017

13 Brigadier General Ahmed el-Blushee

Coalition Commander

Aden July 2017–January 2018

14 Brigadier General Muhammad el- Hasani

Coalition Commander

Aden January 2018– Present

7 https://uaecabinet.ae/en/biography.

8 https://uaecabinet.ae/en/details/news/ chief-of-staff-of-armed-forces-promoted-to-the-rank-of-

minister.

9 Replaced Rear Admiral Ibrahim al-Musharrakh.

Serial Name Position Location

Date assumed

role/Remarks

15 Brigadier General Abd el-Salam al- Shahi

Coalition Commander

Western Coast

3. Government of Yemen

(a) Yemen Armed Forces10

Serial Name Position Location

Date assumed

role/Remarks

1 President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi

Supreme Commander11

February 2012

2 Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar

Adviser to the President for security and military affairs

December 2012

3 Major General Mohammad Ahmed Salem al- Subaihi

Minister of Defence12

kidnapped on 25 March 2015

4 Major General Mohammad Ali al- Maqdashi

Adviser to the Supreme Commander13 Acting Minister of Defence, March 2018

Chief of the General Staff during May 2015 – September 2017

5 Major General Tahir Ali al- Aqaili14

Chief of the General Staff

4 September 2017

6 Major General Saleh Mohammad Timis15

1st Military District

Say’un 22 November 2016

Major General Saleh Mohammad Timis

37th Armored Brigade

Al-Khash’a Al-Khash’a Axis Commander

Brigadier General Ahmad Ali Hadi

315th Armored Brigade

Thamud

Brigadier General Sameer Sharaf al- Hakemie16

23rd Mechanized Brigade

Al-Abr

10 The new structure established five military branches under the Ministry of Defence: Army, Air Force

and Air Defence, Navy and Coastal Defence Forces, Border Guard, and Strategic Reserve Forces.

11 According to the new structure, Missile Brigades and Presidential Production Brigades fall under the

umbrella of the Supreme Commander.

12 Position vacant from March 2015 to March 2018.

13 Presidential Decree 124 (2017).

14 Replaced Major General Mohammad Ali al-Maqdashi, Presidential Decree 125 (2017).

15 Replaced Major General Abdul Rahman al Halili, Presidential Decree 154 (2016).

16 Replaced Brigadier General Hamoud Naji.

Serial Name Position Location

Date assumed

role/Remarks

Major General Fahmi Haj Mahros17

11th Border Guard Brigade

Al-Rumah

Brigadier General Abdu Rabbu Abdel Allah

135th Infantry Brigade

Say’un Thamud Axis Commander

7 Major General Faraj Salamin al- Bahasani18

2nd Military District

Al-Mukalla Since 2015

Brigadier General A’oad Salem al- Joa’i19

27th Mechanized Brigade

Al-Rayyan Air Base

Brigadier General Ahmed Hassan al- Hamdee

190th Air defence Al-Rayyan Air Base

Brigadier General Abdullah Mansour al-Waleedi

123rd Infantry Brigade

Al-Hat Camp, Al- Mahrah

Commander of Al- Ghaidah Axis

Brigadier General Mohammad Yahya al-Qadi

137th Infantry Brigade

Al-Ghaidah

Brigadier General Mohammad Ali al- Sofee

1st Naval Infantry Brigade

Socotra Resigned on 12 April 2018

8 Major General Ahmed Hassan Gibran20

3rd Military District21

Ma’rib 21 January 2017

Major General Ahmed Hassan Jibran22

13th Infantry Brigade

Sahn Al-Jin Camp 21 January 2017

Brigadier General Mohsen al-Da’ari

14th Armored Brigade

Sahn Al-Jin Camp

Brigadier General Jahdal Hanash Karam

21st Mech. Infantry Brigade

Ateq Ataq Axis

Brigadier General Ali Saleh al- Kulaibi23

19th Infantry Brigade

Ateq October 2017

Ataq Axis

17 Replaced Major General Saleh Mohammad Timis, Presidential Decree 157 (2016).

18 On 29 June 2017, President Hadi additionally named Major General Faraj al-Bahasani Governor of Hadramaut to replace Major General Ahmed bin Brik.

19 Replaced Brigadier General Abdulaziz al-Shamiri.

20 Replaced Major General Abdel Rab al Shadadi.

21 Presidential Decree 36 (2018), forming a new axis that incorporated the 26th Mech. Brigade from the 7th Military District, and appointing Major General Farah Bahib, commander of that brigade, leader

of the axis.

22 Replaced Major General Abdel Rab al-Shadadi.

23 Replaced Brigadier General Masfer al Harthi.

Serial Name Position Location

Date assumed

role/Remarks

Brigadier General Khaled Nasser Yaslim

107th Infantry Brigade

Safir

Brigadier General Abdu Rabbu al- Shadadi

312th Armored Brigade

Sirwah

Brigadier General Naji Hanash24

3rd Mountain Brigade

Ma’rib

9 Major General Fadhl Hasan25

4th Military District

Aden 21 November 2016

Brigadier General Abdallah al-Subehi

39th Armored Brigade

Khor Maksar

Brigadier General Abdallah Saleh Mohammad al- Nakhebi26

120th Air Defence Brigade

Aden

Brigadier General Abu Baker Hussien

15th Infantry Brigade

Zinjibar Abyan Axis

Brigadier General Mohammad Ahmed Mulhem

111th Infantry Brigade

Ahwar Abyan Axis

Brigadier General Naser Abed Rabbu al-Tamje

115th Infantry Brigade

Shaqra Abyan Axis

Brigadier General Hamzah Ali Salim

119th Infantry Brigade

Jaar Abyan Axis

Brigadier General Sadeq Serhan

22nd Armored brigade

Ta’izz Ta’izz Axis

Brigadier General Abdel Rhman al- Shamsani

17th Infantry Brigade

Central Prison, Ta’izz

Ta’izz Axis

Brigadier General Adnan al-Hamadi

35th Armored Brigade

Al-Mukha and Ta’izz airport

Ta’izz Axis

Brigadier General Abdel Aziz al- Majedi

170th Air Defence Brigade

Bab Al-Mandab Ta’izz Axis

Brigadier General Thabit Muthana Naji al-Jwas27

131st Infantry Brigade

Anad Airbase Anad Axis

24 Replaced Brigadier General Mansour Ali A’id.

25 Yemen’s Southern Powder Keg, Chatham House, Peter Salisbury, 2018. Presidential Decree 155

(2016).

26 Replaced Brigadier General Muhsen Mohammad al-Khabi.

27 Yemen’s Southern Powder Keg, Chatham House, Peter Salisbury, 2018.

Serial Name Position Location

Date assumed

role/Remarks

Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Abedalhaq

201st Mech Brigade

Lahij Anad Axis

Brigadier General Abu Baker Faraj al-ataiqi

31st Armored Brigade

Aden Anad Axis

Brigadier General Abdullah al- Subayhi28

39th Aviation Brigade

Khor Maksar Anad Axis

Major General Muqbil Saleh

33rd Armored Brigade

Al-Dhale’e Governor of Al- Dhale’e

10 Major General Yahya Hussien Salah29

5th Military District30

Midi 27 February 2018

11 Major General Hashem Abdallah al-Ahmar31

6th Military District32

Al-Jawf 27 February 2018

12 Major General Naser al-Dhebani33

7th Military District

Nahim August 2017

13 Brigadier General Naser Abd Rubbo Hadi Mansour

Presidential Protection Brigades

Aden

Brigadier General Sanad Abdallah al-Rahwa

1st Presidential Brigade

Kraiter Al-Masheq Palace

Brigadier General Abd al-Raqib Dabwan

2nd Presidential Brigade

Ta’izz

Brigadier General Ibrahim Haydan al-Sayari

3rd Presidential Brigade

Khor Makser

Brigadier General Muhran al-Qubati

4th Presidential Brigade

Dar Said Now in Al- Hudayadh

Brigadier General Adnan Rzaiq

5th Presidential Brigade

Ta’izz

28 Ibid.

29 Presidential Decree 20 (2018).

30 Area of responsibility is under control of the de facto authorities.

31 Presidential Decree 20 (2018) Replaced Major General Wae’l al-Dulaymi who was commander since

2015. 32 Area of responsibility (Amran, Sa’dah and Al-Jawf) is under control of the de facto authorities.

33 Replaced Major General Esmaa’il Zahzoh.

(b) Provincial Security, Security Belt Forces34 and Elite Forces

Serial Name Position Location Remarks

1 Major General Shall al-Shaye

Security Director Aden

2 Brigadier General Wadah Omer Abdul Aziz

Security Belt Forces35

Commander and 2nd support Brigade

Aden

3 Brigadier General Mounir Muhamoud Ali (Abu Yamamah)

1st Support Brigade

Aden

4 Brigadier General Nabil al- Mashoushi

3rd Support Brigade

Aden Removed in 2017

5 Brigadier General Saleh al-Sayed

Security Director Lahij

6 Captain Faisel al- Salemee

Security Belt Commander

Lahij

7 Colonel Hader al- Shukhaty

4th Support Brigade

Lahij

8 Colonel Mukhtar Ali al-Nubi

5th Support Brigade

Rdafan, Al- Dhale’e

9 Colonel Khader al- Nub

Security Director Abyan

10 Brigadier General Abd al-Latif al- Sayed

Security Belt Commander

Abyan

11 Major General Faraj Salemin al- Bahsani

Hadramaut Elite Forces Commander

Hadramaut Governor of Hadramaut

12 Lieutenant colonel Mohammed Salem al-bohar al- Qamishi

Shabwani Elite Forces Commander

Shabwah

13 Major Mahdi Mohammed Barahma

Rapid Intervention Forces

Shabwah

34 Established in March 2016 by Presidential Decree under the General Security Directorate of each

governorate, who fall under the umbrella of the Ministry of Interior.

35 Presidential Decree No. 60 (2016).

(c) Armed Groups

Serial Name Position Location

Area of

control/Remarks

1 Hamoud Saeed al- Makhlafi

(no military rank)

Chief of Military Council for Resistance36

Ta’izz • Al-Rawdah and Zayed al-Mushki

• Kalabah, parts of Al-Tahrir, Hawd

Al-Ashraaf and

Jabal Al-Ikhwah

• The outskirts of Al-Kamb

• Tho`baat

2 Colonel Adel Abdo Farea al- Dhubhani, (Abu al-Abbas)

Homat al- Aqeedah37

Ta’izz • Old City

• Cairo Fort and the buildings of

Political Security

• Entire Mudaffar and Al-Qahira

• Jumhuri

• Al-Jahmaliya area

• Thawra

3 Adnan Ruzayq al- Shabwani (no military rank)

Hasm Battalions Ta’izz • HQ at Ta’izz University

• Al-Manakh

• Parts of the old airport area

• Hawdh Al-Ashraf

4 Sheikh Sadek Mahyoob Hasan (Abu al-Sadouk) (no military rank)

Kata`ib al- Tawheed

Ta’izz • Osaiferah

• Al-’Ashrafiyah

• Bab Musa and the Old Town

• Haudh Al-Ashraf between

Jahmailya and

Thawra Hospital

5 al-Hussein bin Ali, currently Azaam al-Farhan (no military rank)

The Tramps Brigade38

Active in the western parts of the city and in Al- Dabab mountain region

36 Military commander is Brigadier General Sadeq Serhan. The Military Council for Resistance is itself

an umbrella body, coordinating the military operations of fighters affiliated with Islah and military

units loyal to Ali Mohsen.

37 A Ta’izz Salafist group with roots in Dammaj.

38 A mixture of local youth with different ideological backgrounds, not initially affiliated with any

political party.

Serial Name Position Location

Area of

control/Remarks

6 Abu Zerah al- Mahrami (no military rank)

Yemeni Commander of Hudaydah Front39

Hudaydah

7 Brigadier General Tareq Saleh40

National Resistance Forces

Hudaydah Began operations on the western coast of Yemen front in April 2018

8 Abd Ruhman al- hajree (no military rank)

Tohama Resistance/ Tohama Brigades

Hudaydah Since early 2017, these forces have been steadily advancing north along the Red Sea Coast toward Hudaydah41

9 Abu Zerah al- Mahrami (no military rank)

Giants Brigades Hudaydah Operations in Hays, Al-Tuhayat , Al-Garrahi , Al- Khawkhah , Zabid and Jabal Ras districts

Ra’ed al-Habhi (no military rank)

1st Brigade Hudaydah

Sheikh Hamdi Shukri (no military rank)

2nd Brigade Hudaydah

Sheikh Abd Ruhman al-lahji (no military rank)

3rd Brigade Hudaydah

Sheikh Nizar al- Wajeh (no military rank)

4th Brigade Hudaydah

39 Supported by Coalition commander for the western front, Brigadier General (UAE) Abdul Salam al-

Shehi.

40 The nephew of the former president.

41 The New Front in Yemen, What’s at Stake in Hodeidah, Foreign Affairs, Peter Salisbury, 2018.

(4) De facto authorities

Serial Name Position Location Remarks

1 Abdulmalik Bader Aldain al- Houthi

Leader of the revolution

Political, no military rank

2 Mohammed Ali Abdulkarim al- Houthi

President of Supreme Revolutionary Committee42

Sana’a Military, no rank

3 Mahdi al- Mashat43

President of supreme political council

Political, no military rank

4 Major General Yahya Mohammed al- Shami

Assistant of Supreme Commander

Sana’a

5 Abdulkarim Ammer Aldain al-Houthi

Chairman of Executive committee

Sana’a Military, no rank

6 Major General Mohammed Nasser al-Atifi

Minister of Defence

Sana’a

7 Major General Mohammed Abdulkarim al- Ghumari

Chief of General Staff

Sana’a

8 Major General Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim (Abu Ali al-Hakem)

Chief of military Intelligence

Sana’a

Brigadier General Amer Ali al-Marani

Military Intelligence

9 Major General Mehdi Mqulah44

General Reserve Forces45

Sana’a 11 December 2016

Colonel Mohamed al- Shu’aibi

1st Presidential Protection Brigade

Sana’a

Colonel Mohamed al- Jabri

2nd Presidential Protection Brigade

Sana’a

42 Also commanding popular committees which are functioning in three ways: integrated within military

and security forces, working in parallel with military and security forces, and working separately and

unilaterally.

43 Replaced Saleh Ali al-Sammad who was killed in April 2018.

44 Replaced Major General Ali bin Ali al-Jayefi who was killed in the Al-Kubra Hall attack in October

2016.

45 Combat Strength of General Reserve Force consists of Presidential Protection Brigades, Special

Operations Command and Missile Brigades Group.

Serial Name Position Location Remarks

Brigadier General Fuad al-Imad

3rd Presidential Protection Brigade

Sana’a

Brigadier General Abdullah Abbas

4th Presidential Protection Brigade

Sana’a

Major General Mohammad Nasser al-Atefi

Missile Brigades Group46

Sana’a Defence Minister

Major General Husayn al- Ruhani

Special Operations Command47

Al-Sobaha Camp

10 Brigadier General Ali Mohsen Obayd

83rd Artillery Brigade, Katusha

Al-Sawad camp Defence Reserve

11 Major General Ibrahim Ali al- Shami

Air Force & Air Defence Commander

Dilamy Base

Brigadier General Ali Hussein al- Rooney

140th Air defence Brigade

Dala’ Shemlan

Brigadier General Mohammed Abdullah al-Saar

160th Air Defence Brigade

al-Sama’ Camp

12 Major General Abduqalik Bader Aldain al-Houthi

Commander of Special Forces

13 Major General Mubarak Salih al-Mishin

3rd Military District Commander

Ma’rib

14 Major General Abdulatif Homood Almahdi48

4th Military District Commander

Brigadier General Hamoud al-Tahish

22nd brigade Ta’izz Remained loyal to GPC

Brigadier General Hamoud Ahmed Dahmash

35th armored brigade

Ta’izz Brigade split

Unknown 17th Infantry brigade

Ta’izz Al-Janad, around Ta’izz International Airport

46 Combat Strength consists of 5th Brigade, 6th Brigade, and 8th Brigade.

47 Includes the counter-terrorism and Special Forces Brigade, the latter commanded by Brigadier

General Ahmed Dahhan al-Shay’ani.

48 Replaced Major General Abu Ali al-Hakem.

Serial Name Position Location Remarks

Brigadier General Abdullah al- Haddad

170th air defence brigade

Ta’izz Tariq airbase, near Ta’izz International Airport

15 Major General Yusif al-Madani

5th Military District Commander

Hudaydah

16 Major General Muhammad Yahya al-Hawari

6th Military District Commander

Amran/Sa’dah

17 Major General Hamid al- Kharashi

7th Military District Commander

Dhamar/Sana’a

18 Brigadier General Zakaria al-Mataa

Military Commander

19 Major General Salih Mosfir Alshaer

Assistant of MoD

20 Major General Ali Homood Almoshaki

Deputy Chief of General Staff

21 Major General Abu Ali al- kahlani

Military Logistics

22 Major General Muhammad Fadhl

Navy and Coastal Defence Commander

23 Major General Muhammad al- Miqdad

Chief of Operations

24 Major General Abdulqader Ahmad Qassem al-Shami

President of Political Security

25 Major General Abdurab Saleh Jurfan

President of National Security

Annex II

Access restrictions by the Government of Yemen/coalition

Introduction

1. The coalition has enforced severe naval and air restrictions in Yemen, to varying

degrees, since March 2015, citing the arms embargo provisions of Security Council

resolution 2216 (2015). Prior to the conflict, Yemen imported nearly 90 per cent of its food,

medical supplies and fuel. These de facto blockades1 have had widespread and devastating

effects on the civilian population. Among other international legal obligations, the Experts

find that they violate the proportionality rule of international humanitarian law.

2. The rule of proportionality prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause harm to

the civilian population that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct

military advantage anticipated.2 Proportionality assessments are prospective, and therefore

must be based on reasonable expectations, not a known result. If the harm to civilians

would be excessive, then an attack must be cancelled or suspended.3 Attacks that violate the

rule of proportionality are considered indiscriminate4.

3. The rule of proportionality applies to attacks, which are defined in international

humanitarian law as acts of violence against the adversary.5 “Attack” has traditionally been

understood to mean the use of physical force. However, reflecting the state of armed

conflict today, the Experts find persuasive the argument for a broader interpretation of

“attacks”, where the requisite violence for an attack can be found in the consequences of an

operation. This view has been increasingly accepted in legal literature and military doctrine

manuals, and has been embraced by the International Criminal Court.6

4. If the scope of attacks is interpreted more broadly to include blockades and other

restrictions that cause significant injury and death, such restrictions are prohibited if they

can be expected to disproportionately harm civilians.7 The purpose of the proportionality

rule is to preserve humanity in times of conflict and protect noncombatants. Such a reading

of the proportionality rule would be in keeping with the explicit obligation of parties,

incorporated in the requirement to take precautions, to take constant care to spare the

civilian population, civilians and civilian objects in the conduct of military operations.8

1 In international law, a blockade is defined as a declared, notified, impartial and effective mechanism

that aims to prevent any access, regardless of cargo or direction. The naval restrictions on access to

Yemen could not qualify as a blockade, except during November 2017. The closure of Sana’a airport

could qualify as a blockade. However, blockades are generally understood as applicable in

international armed conflict and this report considers Yemen to be in a state of non-international

armed conflict. Therefore, this report relies on the terminology “de facto blockades” to describe the

whole of the coalition operations restricting access to Yemen.

2 CIHL Rule 14.

3 CIHL Rule 19, AP I Art 57(2)(b).

4 AP I Art.51(5)(b).

5 AP I Art.49.

6 Phillip Drew, The Law of Maritime Blockade: Past, Present and Future (Oxford University Press,

2017), p.97 note 33; Michael Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to

Cyber Warfare (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda (Trial Chamber)

[2014] ICC- 01/04-02/06 (para.46).

7 Alternatively, an argument could be made that the proportionality rule should apply to military

operations more broadly than attacks. This appears to be the approach of the San Remo Manual on

International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1994), which imported the proportionality

language to cover a blockade scenario, without describing a blockade as an attack, or an act of

violence.

8 CIHL Rule 15, AP I Art 57(1).

Naval restrictions

5. Shortly after the coalition engaged in Yemen, the Government of Yemen closed the

country’s territorial waters and empowered the coalition to enforce entrance restrictions.

Ships seeking entry to Yemen required authorization and were subject to coalition

inspection. The restrictions immediately caused delays and prevented commercial and

humanitarian goods from entering Yemen. Delays and uncertainties for shipping companies,

along with increased insurance costs and operational risks in a conflict zone, reduced

shipments to Yemen. By June 2015, only 15 per cent of pre-crisis imports were entering

Yemen.9

6. These restrictions have continued even following the establishment of the United

Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism in Yemen (UNVIM). In November 2017,

the coalition increased the restrictions, enforcing a total blockade on the country. While the

total blockade was gradually lifted, coalition restrictions and inspections remain in place as

of 30 June 2018.

Impact

7. Devastated by years of conflict, Yemen is only more reliant on imports now. The

need cannot be met by humanitarian aid alone. Meanwhile, the capacity of Hudaydah port,

where the majority of imports historically arrived and more than half of food milling and

storage capacity is located, has been deleteriously affected by coalition airstrikes. Even so,

during the conflict the port has remained critically important, with some 70 per cent of all

imports entering the country through Hudaydah.10

8. Total imports of staple foods, though they declined at various periods during the

conflict, have overall been sufficient to meet most of Yemen’s needs, at least prior to the

November 2017 blockade. The problem has been the price of food rather than its

availability.

9. Prices have risen due to the increased costs of getting food to market. While this is

in part due to prevailing insecurity, damaged infrastructure and additional taxation within

Yemen, nearly all involved in business attribute the primary cause of price increases to the

coalition’s restrictions on naval imports. Every day that vessels are delayed, shippers incur

demurrage fees, up to tens of thousands of dollars per day. The high costs of delays, as well

as the unpredictability of delays and clearance, have led to inflated food prices.

10. Meanwhile, most Yemenis have suffered a loss of income due to the conflict,

including the non-payment of salaries by the Central Bank of Yemen. The effects of the

price increases coupled with an erosion of purchasing power have therefore been

catastrophic on the population.

11. While supply became insufficient and the extreme unpredictability of the restrictions

drove prices even higher, fewer people were able to afford food and more people went

hungry. Humanitarian aid could not fill the gap.

12. While food requirements were generally being met prior to the November 2017

blockade, fuel imports have generally been insufficient throughout the conflict. This was

exacerbated in June 2017 when the Government closed Ras Isa port, which primarily

accommodated fuel.

13. The legacy of the November 2017 blockade and the ongoing restrictions imposed on

vessels to the Red Sea ports have resulted in a decrease in requests to enter. From March

through June 2018, requests had fallen 50–66 per cent compared to before the November

2017 blockade.

9 www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/dms/Documents/25%20June%202015%

20USG%20Yemen.pdf.

10 https://logcluster.org/sites/default/files/logistics_cluster_yemen_

hodeidahcontingencyplan_170322_0.pdf.

14. In March 2017, OCHA announced that Yemen had become the world’s largest

humanitarian crisis. As of May 2018, out of a population of 29.3m, nearly 17.8m were food

insecure and 8.4m people were on the brink of famine. The hungry are even more

susceptible to other health complications, including contracting disease. Since April 2017, a

cholera epidemic has swept through Yemen at an unprecedented scale. Scarcity of fuel

further drives the health crisis, limiting both the functioning of medical facilities and water

supply.

Proportionality Assessment

Harm to the Civilian Population

15. The harm to Yemen’s civilian population caused by severe restrictions on naval

imports was foreseeable, given the country’s pre-conflict reliance on imports and the

criticality of Hudaydah port. The reliance of the population on naval imports for basic

survival, and the harm, including injury and death, that would be caused by the economic

impact of a disruption to that pipeline, were knowable facts available to those who planned

and implemented the naval restrictions.

16. Moreover, a proportionality assessment need not be static. The continuing nature of

such naval restrictions requires a continuing assessment. Most explicitly, the November

2017 blockade presented a juncture that required an updated assessment. The coalition had

an obligation to reassess the effects of their methods on the civilian population, and the

proportionality thereof. By then, the international community had repeatedly underscored

the effects of the existing restrictions and had warned of catastrophic effects of the

announced closure of all ports.

17. An additional concern is that the longer the restrictions last, the more difficult it will

be for the civilian population to recover.

Military Advantage

18. According to coalition public statements, the restrictions are intended to enforce the

arms embargo of Resolution 2216 (2015). The coalition has specifically highlighted Houthi

use of ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia.

19. The Experts make no assessment as to whether the restrictions could have been

anticipated to be effective when first announced in 2015. But as the situation evolved, the

contrary became evident, particularly in light of measures such as UNVIM. The restrictions

are also unlikely to be effective in the absence of a clear and published list of prohibited

items.11

20. Additional evidence of the ineffectiveness of the restrictions comes from the reports

of the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts tasked to investigate violations of

the arms embargo. The Panel has found there is no indication that ballistic missiles are

entering Yemen via Red Sea ports, and low likelihood that other weapons are.12 In the years

that the naval restrictions have been in place, no searches by either UNVIM or coalition

forces have discovered weapons.13

21. Any effectiveness of the restrictions has clearly been limited, given that the Houthis

continue to demonstrate the capability to strike Saudi Arabia with missiles.

22. All of these factors combined lead to the conclusion that the coalition naval

restrictions cannot be reasonably expected to achieve the concrete and direct military

advantage of preventing Houthi arms smuggling. Even if such a conclusion was not

knowable in March 2015, it became increasingly obvious as the months and years passed.

11 The law of contraband requires published, reasonably specific contraband lists. San Remo Manual

(1994) para.149.

12 S/2018/68 Annex 33.

13 S/2018/68 para.78.

Assessing the Proportionality

23. The effects on the civilian population of the naval restrictions imposed by coalition

forces are clear. The harm to civilians can be and has been accurately estimated,

particularly as the naval restrictions have continued and evolved over more than three years.

The coalition and the Government of Yemen have had sufficient notice of the harm caused

and their responsibility for it, and sufficient opportunity to correct the situation.

24. No possible military advantage could justify such sustained and extreme suffering

by millions of people. When the coalition was able to assess that the naval restrictions were

causing harm to the civilian population that was excessive in relation to the anticipated

concrete and direct military advantage of those restrictions, the coalition was required by

law to cancel or suspend those restrictions. It has failed to do so.

Closure of Sana’a Airport

25. Sana’a International Airport is the most crucial airport linking Yemen to the world.

Since 2015, the coalition has implemented measures to restrict access to the airport,

including, at times, requiring flights to first land in Saudi Arabia for inspection.

26. On 9 August 2016, the coalition effectively closed the airport by closing the

surrounding airspace, thereby causing the cancellation of all commercial flights. The

coalition has acknowledged responsibility for the airport closure by publicly indicating that

it has the power to reopen the airport to commercial traffic.14 Post hoc explanations for the

closure of the airport relied on enforcement of resolution 2216 (2015) and purportedly

ensuring the safety of passengers.15

27. The November 2017 blockade further closed Sana’a airport to all United Nations

and humanitarian flights for three weeks.

Impact

28. Before the conflict, thousands traveled abroad each year for medical treatment

unavailable in Yemen. Due to the conflict, the healthcare available in Yemen has

deteriorated, resulting in even more patients in need of traveling abroad. ‘Yemenia’

Airways, the main commercial airline in Yemen, estimates that prior to the airport closure,

at least one-third of passengers were travelling abroad to seek medical care.16 In a letter to

the United Nations Secretary-General dated 22 August 2017, the Ministry of Health in

Sana’a reported that more than 13,000 people had died from health conditions that could

have been treated abroad but for the airport closure.17 By June 2018, those casualties are

surely higher.

29. The airport closure has created significant issues for those in need of immediate

medical care, including the chronically ill, who cannot leave the country by alternative

routes. For the majority of the population in areas controlled by the de facto authorities,

access to airports in Hadramaut and Aden requires long journeys across active frontlines at

often prohibitive costs. Travelers must pass through myriad checkpoints operated by the

various parties to the conflict, and are often scrutinized and sometimes harassed and

detained. In the aftermath of the Al Kubra Hall airstrike in October 2016, officials of Saudi

Arabia and the coalition forces acknowledged that adequate health care is not available in

Yemen when they directed the transfer of those wounded in the airstrike “whose cases

necessitate medical treatment outside Yemen”.18

14 www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1655689.

15 www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1527487;

www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1655689.

16 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/YEMEN%

202017%20HNO_Final.pdf.

17 On file.

18 www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1547693.

Proportionality Assessment

30. The coalition has imposed a complete effective closure of Sana’a airport to all

commercial flights since August 2016, including travel for individuals requiring immediate

medical treatment abroad. The only exceptions have been flights arranged by Saudi Arabia.

The coalition has provided no explanation of the military necessity of closing the airport

completely. In the absence of such an explanation, the closure of Sana’a International

Airport appears to violate the proportionality rule of international humanitarian law.

Conclusion

31. Based on the evidence available, there are reasonable grounds to believe access

restrictions and de facto blockades violate the proportionality rule of international

humanitarian law.19 While this finding relies on an evolved understanding of the application

of the principles of international humanitarian law, it is consistent with those principles.

Given the grave consequences of these restrictive measures for the civilian population in

Yemen, the Experts consider this approach warranted.

19 This finding is without prejudice to the application of the other rules of international humanitarian

law, including the principle of precautions in attack.

Annex III

Joint Incidents Assessment Team

1. The Experts reviewed the summaries of 71 incidents investigated by the Joint

Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT), an investigative body established by the coalition in

response to allegations of air strikes hitting or affecting civilians or civilian objects. All but

one referred to cases brought to the attention of JIAT by the Office of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) or civil society organizations.

2. In assessing the findings, consideration was given to the fact that military

commanders are often required to make decisions in the “fog of war”; that a number of

accidents are unavoidable, and that commanders may not have the same information that is

available to those reviewing an incident in hindsight. The Experts accepted that the publicly

available information may only constitute summaries of JIAT findings. They, nonetheless,

expressed serious concerns as the summaries lacked details of legal analyses undertaken,

and rarely addressed reports of civilian casualties.

3. The Experts requested JIAT to provide information about its terms of reference,

appointments process, and reporting structure. It has received no response. However, the

Experts received reliable information suggesting that at times, JIAT findings were

substantially altered by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Experts also sought

information about JIAT rules of procedure and the coalition’s process for determining

whether to implement JIAT recommendations, and has received no response.

Case Selection

4. The Experts requested JIAT to provide information on the case selection process. No

response was received. JIAT has investigated certain prominent cases but appears to have

chosen to investigate a majority of cases where very few civilian casualties or little damage

to protected objects occurred. For example, JIAT investigated damage to a hospital on 7

July 2015, which the United Nations Panel of Experts1 alleged was the result of collateral

damage on a separate target. It does not appear to have investigated allegations in the same

section of the report of direct strikes at the end of August 2015 on Maran Health Center in

Sa’dah and on 3 September 2015 on Rizah Hospital, also in Sa’dah, which destroyed those

facilities entirely.

5. In some instances, JIAT also appears to have opted to review cases where the

organization alleging the unlawful airstrike noted the presence of a possible military

objective at the strike site rather than cases in which no such suspicions were raised. For

example, an international organization report documenting the 29 October 2016 attack on

the al-Zaydiya security administration building north of the city of Hodeida noted the

presence of Houthi/Saleh armed forces at the detention facility. JIAT appears not to have

investigated other alleged incidents in the same report that make no such reference to any

military presence at the sites attacked.

6. The JIAT has not responded to additional Experts’ questions about its methodology

or access to After Mission Damage reports. Nor has it explained procedures for making or

receiving complaints.

The cases

7. JIAT has generally justified strikes on apparent civilians or civilian objects on the

following three grounds: 1) accident or technical fault; 2) the coalition was not responsible

for the attack; and 3) the object was a military objective.

1 The Security Council Committee on sanctions is supported by the Panel of Experts established

pursuant to resolutions 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015).

Accident or technical fault

8. In 10 cases, JIAT concluded that strikes on civilians or civilian objects were

accidental. As noted above, the Experts accepted that accidents happen during armed

conflict. It is nonetheless concerned about those cases in which the JIAT summary failed to

mention civilian casualties. For example, in response to allegations regarding an attack on

Sa’dah’s main street on 2 May or June 2015, JIAT asserted that “a laser-guided munition

missed its target”, but did not mention the 29 casualties alleged by the reporting

organization. In another case, JIAT concluded that an airstrike accidentally hit a house in

the outskirts of Ta’izz on 26 May 2015, but failed to make reference to the 15 civilian

casualties that allegedly resulted. It also did not address the 47 alleged civilian casualties

associated with the mis-identification of a well on 10 September 2016 in the Arhab area

north of Sanaa.

9. The Experts also observed that in one of the cases, in response to allegations of an

attack on a World Food Programme (WFP) convoy, JIAT found that “these trucks were a

convoy of WFP and that the coalition forces were not aware of the timings and locations of

the convoy”. JIAT noted that “officials supervising this programme did not provide the

coalition forces with memorandum showing the dates and timings of the movement of the

convoy, which is a breach of the international conventions”. This interpretation of the de-

confliction system is incorrect. The system was established to help promote the safety and

security of humanitarian activities and personnel, but it was never intended to relieve the

parties of their obligations under international humanitarian law. The burden has always

been on the parties to apply the principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality. In

other words, it is for the coalition to properly identify what they intend to attack; it is not

for humanitarian organizations to identify what may not be attacked. Moreover, the Experts

have received reliable information indicating that during the period at issue, there was a

presumption in the coalition that certain convoys were carrying military materiel. This

presumption may have affected the targeting process.

10. In eight of the 10 cases, JIAT recommended that victims be compensated for loss or

damage. The Experts requested that the coalition provide information about the follow-up

to these recommendations. It has received no response.

The coalition is not responsible

11. In 33 cases, the coalition denies that it carried out the alleged strikes. On these cases,

the Experts make the following general observations. First, the allegations were made by

reliable entities and human rights organizations. Those organizations often visited the sites

and spoke with victims and witnesses immediately after the attacks took place. Some also

performed crater and weapons analysis. Second, when the coalition announced the end of

‘Operation Decisive Storm’ on 21 April 2015, it announced that “… Operation Decisive

Storm focused on very specific objectives, including controlling the Yemeni airspace and

preventing the Houthi militias and their supporters from using the Yemeni air force. The

coalition was able to completely control Yemeni airspace within the first 15 minutes of the

operation.”2 Third, even if the information is not conclusive that in each of the 33 cases the

site was struck from the air, it is unlikely that Houthi/Saleh forces would have attacked sites

in areas under their own effective control. In 25 cases, the attacks were in areas under

effective de-facto authority control at the time the attacks took place. In eight cases, it is

unclear which party had effective control over the sites at the time of the attacks. It is

therefore difficult to understand how the damage could have occurred other than by air

strikes as alleged.

12. In eight of the nine most recent findings released by JIAT, it has concluded that the

coalition did not strike the sites as alleged. Its conclusion in the ninth case is unclear. The

Experts are therefore additionally concerned about what appears to be an increasing

reliance by JIAT on blanket denials of coalition airstrikes.

2 www.saudiembassy.net/press-release/saudi-ministry-defense-daily-briefing-operation-decisive-storm.

Military objectives

13. JIAT finding in 24 cases that it had attacked military objectives also raises concerns.

The Experts received reliable information that during the period covering at least 25 of the

28 cases at issue, dynamic targeting decisions were made by field commanders who

routinely failed to consult with those in the Joint Command holding information about the

‘No Strike Lists’ and de-confliction information before approving attacks. It is not clear

whether this was still the case in 2017 and 2018.

14. The Experts have serious concerns that where field commanders either did not have

access to such information or did not seek such access, they may not have had the requisite

information necessary to make proportionality assessments and may have failed to take all

feasible precautions to avoid or minimise civilian loss of life, injury or damage to civilian

objects.

15. All but one of the 24 strikes were on what appear to be civilian objects. In one case,

an international NGO reported that Houthi/Saleh armed forces had placed an office in the

Nour Center for the Care and Rehabilitation of the Blind, Sanaa. This would appear to be in

violation of Article 58 of Additional Protocol I on precautions against attacks. However,

such violations do not release other parties to the conflict from their own obligations,

particularly to take precautionary measures to protect civilians.

16. The Experts have serious concerns about the paucity of information released by

JIAT about how the coalition determined that apparently civilian objects had become

military objectives as a result of use by Houthi/Saleh forces. Where JIAT relies on

intelligence received, there is no indication as to whether the reliability of that intelligence

has been assessed by the Joint Intelligence Assessment Centre and if so, how. There is no

evidence that JIAT carries out its own independent assessment of the intelligence. In

addition, as noted above there may have been a presumption within the coalition that

certain types of vehicles were carrying weapons. In one case, an ambulance was struck in

Sa’dah on 21 January 2016. The JIAT concluded that it had been carrying weapons, a

conclusion at odds with the information provided by the humanitarian organization

responsible for the ambulance.

17. As so few details are contained in JIAT summaries, it is impossible to ascertain how,

once a military objective has been identified, proportionality assessments were carried out

and what precautions in attack were implemented. Nor is it possible to ascertain whether

JIAT has carried out its own independent assessments on how those procedures were

carried out in individual cases. The response to the attack on Khamees market 15 March

2016 is emblematic as the JIAT findings contradict earlier coalition claims and appear to

suggest that because the market struck was named “Thursday market”, the coalition could

not have anticipated that civilians would be present on a Tuesday.

18. With respect to the 11 October 2015 attack on a detention facility, the coalition

found that Al-Bayda prison “was not a prison” but rather a weapons storage depot. Neither

the coalition nor JIAT addressed the large number of civilian or hors de combat casualties

alleged. Similarly, in response to allegations that the coalition unlawfully attacked a

teachers’ syndicate on 18 August 2015, JIAT claimed that the building had lost its protected

status because Houthi leaders were in the building but failed to address the 49 civilian

casualties alleged by OHCHR. With respect to another case, JIAT asserted that the targeted

bridge was clear of civilians and vehicles during the time of both attacks but did not address

the OHCHR report of at least 110 civilian casualties.

19. That proportionality assessments and precautionary measures are not mentioned in

the JIAT summaries does not necessarily indicate that they were not performed. However,

reliable information indicates the Saudi military is trained for conventional state on state

conflict, and in particular, to attack military columns in austere environments, and has little

if no training relevant to combatting insurgents in urban environments. 3 The type of

conventional warfare that the Saudi military is trained to fight would require a different

3 The Experts were unable to obtain information about military training with respect to other coalition

member states.

approach to proportionality assessments and precautionary measures from that required

when planning military operations in populated areas.

Conclusion

19. Based on the information available, the Experts have serious concerns about JIAT’s

independence and its ability to carry out impartial investigations. It would therefore appear

that the coalition does not have a mechanism consistent with the Basic Principles and

Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of

International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian

Law.4 The Experts also have serious concerns over whether, and if so how JIAT carries out

its own proportionality and precautions assessments.

4 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross

Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian

Law, General Assembly resolution 60/147(2005).

Annex IV

Attacks affecting civilians

1. On 26 March 2015, 10 countries, led by Saudi Arabia, formed a coalition to initiate

military action against the Houthis in Yemen. The coalition also included Bahrain, Egypt,

Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates and, until June 2017,

Qatar.

2. The first phase of the operation, called ‘Operation Decisive Storm’, lasted less than

one month, and reportedly focused on gaining air supremacy and targeting the Houthis’

ballistic missile capabilities, troop concentrations, leadership locations, military camps and

arms depots.1 On 22 April 2015, the coalition announced the new ‘Operation Restore Hope’,

with a shift in focus from military operations to the political process, though it still entailed

the use of force, including airstrikes.2 Credible information collected by the Yemen Data

Project, shows that the coalition carried out approximately 18,000 raids in Yemen from 1

March 2015 to 30 June 2018,3 which provides an indication of the campaign’s intensity.4

3. Coalition airstrikes have been and continue to be the leading direct cause of civilian

deaths and destruction of civilian infrastructure in the conflict. The intensity of the air

campaign has been unceasing, even after its impact on the civilian population became

apparent. While there is no comprehensive account of civilian casualties in Yemen,

according to OHCHR, coalition airstrikes have killed at least 4,300 civilians.5 Likewise,

there is no comprehensive and independent assessment of the consequences of airstrikes on

Yemen’s infrastructure, but the coalition’s air campaign has certainly contributed to

Yemen’s dire economic and humanitarian situation.

4. As with many other aspects of coalition operations, opacity has been a prominent

and continuous feature of the air campaign in Yemen. To date, despite requests, the

coalition has not shared its rules of engagement, standard operations procedures or methods

to carry out proportionality assessments and its criteria to differentiate between civilians

and combatants/fighters. The coalition’s establishment of the JIAT in 2016, has not resulted

in any meaningful improvement with respect to transparency or clarity (see Annex 3).

5. The first nine months of the air campaign were the most intense; according to

OHCHR, at least 1,750 civilians were killed. Many airstrikes during that period raise

serious concerns about international humanitarian law violations and possibly war crimes.

An illustrative example is the coalition’s bombing of Sa’dah Governorate between 6 April

and 11 May 2015, in response to Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia launched from the

governorate. On 8 May 2015, the coalition’s spokesperson seemed to imply that the entire

city of Sa’dah was a military target.6 Satellite imagery of Sa’dah after May 2015 shows

over 3124 distinct impact locations, causing damage to or destruction of hundreds of

buildings. On a visit to Sa’dah, the Experts confirmed the significant destruction and spoke

to survivors. One airstrike hit a home, killing 27 members of a single family, including 17

children; others hit a market and a crowded petrol station. The Experts also witnessed first-

hand the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

6. In likely the most visible attack on Yemen’s economic infrastructure, whose

reverberating effects on the civilian population are still felt today, in August 2015, the

coalition bombed the Hudaydah seaport. The airstrikes destroyed critical cranes and

1 www.youtube.com/watch?v=3EGe51MjqOk.

2 www.operationrenewalofhope.com/operation-decisive-storm-ends-operation-renewal-of-hope-

begins/#sthash.p0HaZrz6.dpbs.

3 Approximately 5,800 in 2015, 4,800 in 2016, 5,200 in 2017, and 2,000 in 2018 (January to July 2018).

4 In the absence of a response from the coalition to requests for specific information on its operations,

the Experts are reliant on the scant publicly available information.

5 Approximately 1,750 (2015), 1,070 (2016), 970 (2017) and 500 (January-June 2018).

6 www.youtube.com/watch?v=l38aLG9l_ec.

warehouses in the main entry point for commercial and aid supplies to northern Yemen,

where the majority of the population lives. The Experts visited the port, spoke to sources

and observed the impact of these strikes on the port’s operations. The foreseeable harm,

affecting nearly all of Yemen, caused by the airstrikes on the port raises serious concerns

about violations of international humanitarian law.

7. In 2016, ongoing peace negotiations seemed to have had a limited effect, but in

August 2016, when the talks collapsed, the air campaign intensified dramatically. From

August to December 2016, at least 600 civilians were killed in various airstrikes. The

Experts have received information indicating that targeting practices adopted by the

coalition in this period were found to be so flawed that some of the coalition’s international

backers ceased cooperation, and eventually stopped selling weapons to coalition member

states. Two of the most prominent airstrikes of the conflict occurred during this period, Al

Kubra hall, in Sana’a, and Abs hospital, in Hajjah Governorate.

8. The Experts visited the incident site and met with survivors and relatives of victims

of the 8 October 2016 airstrikes that hit Al Kubra Hall in Sana’a city during the funeral of

the father of the de facto Minister of Interior. The strikes killed at least 137 men, and

injured 671 men and 24 boys. At the time of the attack, the hall, the largest public hall in

Sana’a with a capacity to hold approximately 1,000 people, was full of mourners. Those in

attendance included political and military leaders affiliated with the Houthis and former

President Saleh, but the vast majority in attendance were civilians. According to the JIAT,

the targeting was based on faulty intelligence provided by Yemeni authorities, and the

airstrike was conducted without proper approval or in non-compliance with coalition

procedures, including the use of precautionary measures. Based on the circumstances,

including the prior advertisement and public nature of the funeral, as well as the timing of

the strike, coalition actors should have been aware of the high risk of significant civilian

casualties inherent in such a strike. The JIAT explanation would seem to indicate a major

fault in the targeting process but it is unclear from their summary where the fault lies.

9. With respect to the 15 August 2016 airstrike against Abs Hospital, information

reviewed by the Experts indicates that earlier that day airstrikes occurred within 10–15 km

of the hospital and medical staff were preparing to receive casualties from those strikes.

Around 15:30, a vehicle arrived and was admitted within the hospital compound. Within

minutes, an airstrike hit within the hospital compound, near the emergency ward, where the

vehicle had stopped and dozens of patients and caretakers were waiting for treatment. As a

result of the strike, MSF reported that 19 people were killed, including five children, and 24

injured, including four children. The organization had previously provided the coordinates

of the hospital to the coalition. The JIAT stated that coalition forces were “to apologise for

the unintentional error, provide appropriate assistance to those affected, and launch an

investigation with the persons in charge of the incident to look into whether they have

violated the accredited rules of engagement and take appropriate action as regards the

incident”.7 This attack raises serious concerns about proportionality and precautions.

10. Based on the available information, the Experts have not identified significant

changes in the coalition’s modus operandi. Airstrikes continued to hit markets, residential

buildings, civilian vehicles, civilian boats and weddings celebrations in the last year. From

1 July 2017 until 30 June 2018, according to OHCHR, at least 1,114 civilians have been

killed by airstrikes (604 men, 122 women and 388 children). Another 1,002 were injured

(629 men, 91 women and 282 children).

11. As in previous years, significant peaks in the intensity of the air campaign and the

number of civilian casualties seemed correlated to strategic developments, such as the 4

November 2017 Houthi missile fired at Riyadh, the first against the Saudi capital, and the

unravelling of the Houthi/Saleh alliance in early December 2017. In the month between

these developments, Yemen Data Project registered more than 900 air raids and it was also

one of the bloodiest periods of the air campaign, with 465 civilians killed by airstrikes,

according to OHCHR.

7 www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1567351.

12. A second peak in airstrikes and casualties took place following seven Houthi

missiles launched against Saudi Arabia on 25 March 2018, and as significant changes were

implemented in the military leadership of the coalition and the Yemen Armed Forces (see

Annex 1). In April 2018, according to Yemen Data Project, approximately 400 air raids

took place and, according to OHCHR, at least 200 civilians were killed.

13. The Experts prioritized investigation of incidents occurring since August 2017, to

update OHCHR’s last public report. Although the incidents investigated are only a small

sample of the devastation caused by airstrikes, the Experts’ detailed fact-finding in these

cases allowed a more in-depth knowledge of the practices of the coalition.

Incidents Investigated

Date Location Civilian Casualties

23 August 2017 Bayt Al Athri area, Arhab district, Sana’a Governorate

At least 39 civilians killed, including eight children and one woman. 25 injured, including at least six children and one woman.

25 August 2017 Faj Attan neighborhood, Sabeen district, Amanat Al Asimah Governorate

At least 15 civilians killed, including three women and six children. 25 injured, including four women and five children.

1 November 2017 Al Layl Market/Hotel

Olaaf area, Sahar district, Saa’da Governorate

31 male civilians killed, including six boys. 24 male civilians injured, including six boys.

11 November 2017 Fishermen’ boats, Island of Al Bodhi, near Al Hudaydah

11 male civilians killed, one male civilian injured.

13 December 2017 Military Police College (used as a detention facility)

Shaub area, Shaub district, Amanat Al Asimah Governorate

At least 42 male detainees killed, including eight boys.

20 December 2017 Private House, former Al Salam Sports Club. Bab Najran area, Sa’ada district, Sa’ada Governorate

At least 12 civilians killed, including at least three children and three women. Seven injured.

26 December 2017 Mahsees Market

Shahrah, Al Haymah area, Attazziah district, Ta’izz Governorate

At least 36 male civilians killed, including nine boys. 46 men injured.

3 April 2018 Al Saleh City (Residential Complex of IDPs)

Al Hudaydah city, Al Hudaydah Governorate

At least 12 civilians killed, including 10 children and two women. Approximately 15 civilians injured.

22 April 2018 Wedding Celebration, Al- Raqah village, Bani Qa’is district, Hajjah Governorate

At least 23 male civilians killed, including eight boys. More than 60 male civilians injured, including 29 boys.

22 May 2018 Fishing boat, Turfa Island, Al Hudaydah Governorate

Four male civilians killed, including one child.

Date Location Civilian Casualties

26 June 2018 Bus Road between Zabid and Al Jarrahi, Hudaydah Governorate

Nine male civilians killed, including two children. Ten civilians injured, including three children.

Conclusion

14. The 11 incidents investigated by the Experts raise serious concerns about the

targeting process applied by the coalition. If there are errors in the targeting process that

effectively, remove the protections provided by international humanitarian law, these would

amount to violations. These may, depending on the circumstances, amount to war crimes by

individuals at all levels in the member states of the coalition and the Government, including

civilian officials.